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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Over recent years amidst intensified and unrelenting global economic competitive pressures 
that have shaped the business environment within which organisations operate, many 
employers in both the private and public sectors in different countries around the world have 
responded by seeking to reduce labour costs through the specific mechanism of non-standard 
forms of employment (Forde and Slater, 2010; Teicher et al. 2006; Sanchez, and Schmitz, 
200; Kalleberg 2000).   
 
This process has taken a particularly sharp form within the highly strategically important 
Nigerian oil industry, giving rise to a contemporary labour market characterised by 
widespread flexibility of work. It has resulted in a significant decline in so-called ‘standard 
forms of employment’ involving regular, permanent work alongside an alarming growth in 
‘non-standard forms of employment’ involving vulnerable, precarious work (Adenugba and 
Jawadu, 2014; Kalleberg, 2009; Evans et al. 2007; Connelly and Gallagher, 2006). With the 
growing trend towards the agency workers through the use of employment agencies, there has 
been the emergence and consolidation of two-tier work arrangements involving differential 
employment relations contracts (Burgess et al. 2013:4084).  
 
Adopting a Marxist analytical framework, this thesis examined the ways in which the shift 
from direct-standard employment to a triangular employment relation in a crucial Nigerian 
arena of employment has become an increasing source of collective conflict within the 
employment relationships, between workers and their unions on the one hand, and the 
employers on the other. In the process, it considers the challenges and dilemmas for trade 
unions attempting to defend the terms and conditions of employment of different groups of 
workers, as well as the limits and potential of solidaristic forms of union within a highly 
fragmented context. 
The research study has been framed on a critical realism paradigm, with a focus on a mixed 
methods approach involving questionnaires and semi-structured interviews. These involved 
the management, trade unions, ministry of labour and employment, employment agencies, and 
workers on different employment contracts within three of the main Nigerian multinational oil 
companies, namely Shell, ExxonMobil and Chevron. The multi-dimensional evidence 
explains the basic factors that have given rise to the growing trend of agency workers, the 
xv 
 
impacts of this trend on employment relationships, and the dynamics of trade union 
organisation and resistance. 
Findings suggest that the growth of agency workers in the Nigerian oil industry has led to an 
entrenching of dual and fractionalised internal labour markets and an increase in managerial 
control, with an accompanying undermining of the coverage and effectiveness of collective 
bargaining and trade union representation and organisation. Evidence is provided that 
documents the way the oil industry trade unions, while not able to successfully oppose the 
growing trend of agency labour, have nonetheless attempted to mitigate and challenge the 
encroachment of work arrangements amongst workers on standard forms of employment, but 
have been confronted with enormous challenges in attempting to collectively organise and 
represent agency workers in the industry.  The findings of this thesis could help in 
understanding the implications of change in employment relations, and contribute to 
overcoming the current limits of thinking with regard to the use of agency workers, and 
furthers the current discussion on the ‘high-road decent work principles and equality’ of the 
International Labour Organisation (ILO). 
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Chapter 1:   Introduction 
 
1.1. Background of the Study 
Global economic competitive pressure is changing the business environment today, most 
especially in terms of employment relations. As trade boundaries decrease and business costs 
reduce, industrialists are devising ways to remain competitive, and key among these 
intensified competitive pressures is the use of agency labour (Williams 2017; Smith 2016; 
Labour Research, 2014; Acas, 2012 Sanchez, and Schmitz, 2003:9). According to Okafor 
(2012: 7615), the use of agency labour is a global phenomenon. Studies carried out in the 
United Kingdom (Forde and Slater, 2014); the United States (Kalleberg, 2009; Houseman, et 
al.  2003); Australia (Teicher, Gramberg, & Holland, 2006); South Africa (Barchiesi, 2010); 
Canada (Baumann and Blythe, 2003), and elsewhere indicates that agency labour is a global 
phenomenon that has spread over various professions and industries. 
 
This phenomenon has taken a particularly sharp form within the highly strategically important 
Nigerian oil industry, giving rise to a contemporary labour market characterised by 
widespread flexibility of work, which in turn has resulted in a significant decline in so-called 
‘standard forms of employment’ - characterised by regular, permanent work - alongside an 
alarming growth in non-standard forms of employment’ - characterised by vulnerable, 
precarious work (Danesi, 2012; Okafor, 2012). With a growing trend towards agency labour 
using employment agencies, there has been the emergence and consolidation of two-tier work 
arrangements involving differential employment relations contracts, which consequently 
influences trade unions reactions (Burgess, Connell, & Winterton, 2013).  
 
The utilization of agency labour is reportedly on the increase in most countries, as revealed by 
Smith (2016: 50) and Forde, MacKenzie, & Robinson, (2008: 679). Likewise, Ciett (2016) 
reported, in 2014 about 71.9 million gained access to labour market globally and 67.2 million 
were agency workers. More recently, issues around non-standard contracts of agency workers 
have been of interest in the academic field of industrial relations and have received increased 
academic attention. For example, research has been conducted into the working conditions of 
agency workers, particularly those in industrial sectors where agency labour is prevalent 
including construction, apparel, hospitality and tourism, transportation, and information 
technology industries (Williams, 2017; Labour Research, 2014: 23; Burgess et al. 2013: 4084; 
Kalleberg, 2009, Forde, et al. 2008). 
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Other studies have discussed in-depth on the issues reflecting the growth of agency workers, 
such as the drive to reduce labour costs, easy dispensable state of the workers, (Williams, 
2017), and the impact of state policy and legislative changes (Ciett, 2015; Forde and Slater, 
2014; Nijssen and Paauwe, 2012; MacKenzie, Forde, Cook, Eriksson, Larsson, & Bergman, 
2010; Mitlacher, 2007). For instance, Forde and Slater (2014) highlighted how the “myriad of 
state regulations has created space for individual interpretation of the regulations and the 
proactive measures of employers in adapting their strategies and moving into new forms of 
contracting and relationships which may or may not be within the scope of the regulations” 
(2014, p. 9). Likewise, Dickens (2004, p. 601) observed that “where stringent regulation 
provides strict protection for standard workers, employers’ desire for certain forms of 
flexibility (including disposability) may encourage the creation of jobs outside the regulated 
area”. Rather than a desire for flexibility being the only driver towards greater use of agency 
labour, Dickens (2004) suggests that most organisations use agency labour because there are 
cost and other advantages that they accrue from these workers being excluded from some 
legal and social protection. 
 
More recently, there have been growing interests in the functions carried out by agency 
workers. Traditionally, when temporary employment contracts occurred, the numbers of 
agency workers involved were usually few and their job functions are limited to the peripheral 
activities for temporary cover and to meet changes in demand, which are less likely to affect 
employment relationships (Forde, et al. 2008: 682; Kalleberg and Marsden, 2005). However, 
it has been found that the functions carried out by agency workers are no longer merely as 
cyclical or temporary replacement for permanent employees, but now involved in long-term 
employment contracts (Williams, 2017; Stanworth and Druker, 2006; Purcell, Purcell, & 
Tailby, 2004; Forde, 2001, p. 631).  
In some industries there have been radical shift to planned use of long-term agency workers in 
roles previously carried out by permanent employees. Considerable numbers of agency 
workers are being deployed alongside the permanent employees to perform similar job 
functions (Nesheim, Olsen, & Kalleberg, 2007; Broschak, & Davis-Blake, 2006; Stanworth 
and Druker, 2006; Davis-Blake, Broschak, & George, 2003). Such integration has altered the 
traditional usage of agency labour (Jones and Ward, 2009).  
This growing body of literature is contributing to our knowledge of flexible work 
arrangements and the problems agency workers face, but little attention has been paid to the 
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changing nature of the use of agency workers beyond the peripheral to the core production 
areas of organisations, and the impact of this change on trade union membership in the 
Nigerian oil industry. 
Accordingly, this study considers not only the increasing usage of agency workers, but that a 
great change has also taken place in the way and manner these workers are utilised in the very 
core activities of the production process. Such a move implies that the functions of temporary 
agency workers now differ from that found in traditional employment practices. It appears 
that the shift of agency workers to core production areas leads to changes in the organisation 
of work processes, as well as the reconfiguration of previously established roles and 
relationships between workplace actors. These changes have been argued to be influenced by 
neoliberal ideologies (Omoyibo, 2012; Jawado, 2009). 
 
Neo-liberal ideology which dominates the contemporary world, seeks the withdrawal of state 
control, regulations and protection of any economic sector in society. Neo-liberalism believes 
that the free market has the capacity to regulate the labour market and wages. Backed by this 
ideological assumption, structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) have been implemented in 
many developing countries and for this purpose the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) have been instrumental (Kurian, and Schiphorst, 1997, p. 46). 
 
Several developing nations adopted and implemented neoliberal policies in order to attract 
Foreign Direct Investments (FDI), hoping that this would solve the burning issues of 
unemployment and poverty. Accordingly, nation states whose political leadership entrusted 
their nation’s wellbeing in the hands of foreign investors were under constant pressure to 
maintain conditions (such as, softening of labour law) which would keep foreign investors in 
their countries, which Nigeria is, not an exemption. The coming of neo-liberalism as the 
framework for macro-economic development since the early 1980s has had a negative impact 
on employees and trade unions respectively, in terms of retrenchment and downsizing, as well 
as, union membership strength and ability to gain concessions for members (Adewunmi, 
2009). Against this background, the neoliberal economic-political agenda acts as the starting 
point of analysis of this thesis in terms of a causal role, and as the dominant framing context 
of the study. 
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1.2.   Conceptual Framework: Analysis of Agency Labour in the Nigerian oil Industry 
The conceptual issues surrounding the research themes of this thesis are explored by 
conducting a literature review in the areas of flexible work arrangements, agency labour, and 
trade union challenges in the Nigerian oil industry.  
The growth of agency labour in the Nigerian oil industry is structured around dynamic 
interactions (Figure 1) between and within workplace actors (the state-neoliberalism), oil 
multinational companies (MNCs), trade union, employment agency, service firm, and 
employees), such that the cooperation and conflicts effected between them are intertwined. 
This study thus develops a framework for explaining the growth of agency labour in the 
Nigerian oil industry based on the conceptual understanding (see Figure 1 below) of the 
structures by which agency labour is birthed. 
 
Figure 1: Conceptual Framework of Analysis  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Itegboje, 2017 
 
The contemporary trend in employment relations in Nigeria could be said to have begun with 
the introduction of a neoliberal agenda through the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) 
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in 1986 by the then Military Head of State: General Ibrahim Babangida (Omoyibo, 2012, p. 
28; Fapohunda, 2012). The adoption of neo-liberal policies was channeled towards less state 
involvement in the economy and more private sector participation. The revitalization of the 
private sector was aimed at captivating the much-needed Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in 
the country. Therefore, efforts were channelled towards removing forces that hindered the 
effective integration of the Nigerian economy into the global market, hence, the prohibition of 
trade unions who were placed under a military administrator in 1994 (Omoyibo, 2012: 28; 
Fajana, 2005).  
 
In an attempt for the Nigerian state to boost its competitive position in relation to other 
nations in the global market, the state embarked on internal restructuring and new institutional 
arrangements, such as the privatization of public enterprises. This development placed 
business in the hands of a few capitalists (such as the oil MNCs) whose ultimate aim is to 
maximize profit. In order to achieve this objective, neo-liberalism requires an abundant and 
cheap labour force. With flexibility in the labour force, employers increase their profit, 
exploitation of workers and pose obstacles to militant trade unionism.  
This evolution produced adverse consequences for industrial relations, including massive lay-
off of workers, early retirement, increased unemployment, currency devaluation, and the 
erosion of state welfare services (Akinwale, 2014). The continued ideological power of neo-
liberalism greatly weakened the capacity of governments to enforce labour-union rights, and 
state power to enforce labour laws effectively declined (Edwards, 2002; Volscho, 2012).  This 
consequently led to the undermining of trade unionism and the steady increase of non-
unionized labour force, through the contracting of labour (Akinwale, 2014; Fajana, & 
Shadare; 2012; Nwoko, 2009). 
 
The neoliberal agenda promoted many formulas for a perfect relationship between 
government and market, particularly, the supremacy of property rights, minimal state 
involvement, fiscal austerity, and free trade (Weiss, 2007, p. 13). As such, the right to mediate 
between labour and management of the Nigerian oil MNCs who engage in anti-labour 
practices such as the increasing usage of agency labour, and the denial to right of associations, 
are minimised and overlooked, while much power is ascribed to private actors with material 
resources. This dominance is reflected through policies and laws that are made by the state 
which represent the interests of capital, and against labour.  The state is assumed to be used by 
the management of the oil MNCs in Nigeria as an instrument to oppress the subordinate 
6 
 
working masses (Bourchier, 2015, p. 28). Daily permanent employees are retrenched, 
downsized and replaced with agency workers by employers who are all looking for cheap 
labour in order to maximize profits (Jawado, 2009).   
 
Agency workers fall within the ambit of (non-standard employment), a diverse and 
heterogeneous category of workers. They are hired by employment agencies and placed in 
and supervised by the user companies (Kalleberg 2000; Kalleberg and Marsden 2005). This 
form of employment relationship is first and foremost characterised by a triangular working 
relationship, triangular between a worker, the employment agency and a client company, a 
process whereby the employment agency hires the worker and places him or her at the 
disposition of the client company (Davidov 2004). This form of employment relationship is 
widespread throughout the Nigerian oil industry, particularly the big oil MNCs.  
 
Temporary workers were first reportedly engaged in the Nigerian oil industry in the late 
1980s when the country underwent the initial stages of neoliberal agenda reforms, and these 
were direct hires by the oil multinational companies (Okafor, 2012; Adewumi and Adenugba, 
2010). The use of temporary workers increased thereafter, when the nation experienced rapid 
industrialization, which followed the transition to democracy in 1990s. Although there was 
little recourse to labour intermediaries for workers’ procurement before the 1990s, the 
adoption and implementation of neoliberal policies served as the landmark for a rapid growth 
in non-standard employment and greater shift to agency labour amongst the Nigerian oil 
MNCs (Omoyibo, 2012; Fajana and Shadare, 2012; Adewumi and Adebimpe, 2010). See 
(Table 1) below for graphical statistics of permanent employees and agency workers of the 
three largest oil companies, Shell, ExxonMobil and Chevron. 
 
Table 1: 2015 Graphical Statistics of Standard and Agency Workers  
s/no Name of Company No. of Perm. 
Employees 2015 
% No of Agency 
workers 2015 
% Total 
1 Shell 6,000 14.6 35,000 85.5 41,000 
2 ExxonMobil 4,000 33.3 8,000 66.6 12,000 
3 Chevron 3,100 47.6 3,500 53.0 6,600 
Source: Shell Sustainability Report 2016, Management Interview 2015 
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Thus, agency labour has flourished over the past two decades, and the scope within which 
employment agencies operate has broadened to include the core production activities of the 
oil MNCs and often engaged in work similar to that performed by permanent employees in 
the core production areas of the oil industry. 
This new development heralds a fundamental shift in the organization of work, with highly-
skilled ‘experts’ increasingly choosing to sell their labour services to series of clients through 
labour market intermediaries such as employment agencies (Forde and Slater, 2005: 251). 
Such highly skilled workers are known in the Nigerian oil industry as the service staff they 
are a mixture of expatriates and indigenous workers who mainly occupy the grey positions 
(see Figure 2, page, 8). These categories of agency workers are professionals and highly 
skilled in their respective fields. Their job functions are mainly upstream, supervisory and 
line-managers’ positions. These emerging categories of workers are few, data on agency 
workers by occupational class: reveals Highly-skilled and skilled workers as approximately 
1.3%, They are highly remunerated but lack basic benefits, such as holiday pay, sick leave, 
pension, and right to unionization. 
 
While skilled workers and professional agency workers have increased the hierarchies of 
flexible workforce, the importance accorded to high-skilled agency workers in the recent 
literature does not do justice to the continued presence of enduring forms of low-skilled or 
non-professional marginalised and vulnerable group of agency workers, which is also the 
focus of this study. Vulnerable work is precarious work that places workers at risk of 
continuing poverty and injustice resulting from an imbalance of power in the employer-
worker relationship (Williams, 2017). This definition of vulnerable work means that agency 
work in this study would be described as vulnerable. This is the image of agency work that is 
often discussed by trade unions. 
 
Nigerian oil industry agency workers are excluded from benefiting from basic rights enjoyed 
by permanent employees; due to their triangular employment relationships (see Figure 2, page 
8). These workers are supplied by the employment agencies for periods of between 3months 
short-term temporary works (depending on the project at hand) to the oil MNCs, thereafter 
their contract is terminated. However, a favoured few among the agency workers have seen 
their contracts renewed intermittently, either for the same project or a new project, and have 
worked with the oil MNCs between 5-15 years (see Appendix, pg. 331) or more, and work 
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alongside the permanent employees of the oil companies. Thus, indicating a growing trend of 
long-term staffing by employment agencies.  
 
Figure 2: Triangular and Fragmented Employment Relationships 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Itegboje, 2017 
 
Given the various forms of employment status of agency workers, the conditions under which 
such workers are engaged in their work are diverse. For instance, the grey position and some 
of the fixed-term workers reflects workers hired by servicing companies who have been on 
long-term employment contracts by virtue of their intermittent contract renewal. Their 
functions extend into the core productions areas of Shell, ExxonMobil and Chevron; this 
practice confirms Huws, (2012) and Sanchez, et al. (2007) arguments of what began as a 
measures of improving profitability and equity market by reducing labour and organizational 
costs has now escalated to professional’s positions (Forde and Slater, 2005). This fragmented 
workforce threatens the existence of the permanent employees, and trade unions in general. 
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In terms of hiring, the management of the oil MNCs and the employment agency are both 
involved in the hiring decisions. The agency places the adverts, based on the criteria from the 
oil MNCs, shortlist qualified candidates are directed to the management of the oil MNCs 
companies, for interviews, and thereafter the profiles of successful candidates are forwarded 
back to the agency who then issue letters of appointment. Their contracts are open-ended, and 
could be ended by either of them depends on the project and circumstances.  
 
The employment agency is not involved in the allocation of job functions and work 
supervision. The work arrangements in the oil industry take many forms. The diversity of 
operations is found in terms of organisational characteristics, which includes the main type of 
work, geographical location and the kind of projects they handle. For example, Shell Nigeria 
tends to be involved in many downstream projects, and appears to engage more in auxiliary 
services. By contrast ExxonMobil and Chevron are mainly upstream production - hence a 
considerable number of workers are also hired through oil servicing companies and 
employment agencies to work offshore which is the core production units. This evolution has 
led to a steady decline in trade union membership. See (Table 2) below for Trends of union 
membership. 
 
Table 2: Trends in Trade Unions Memberships  
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
PENGASSAN            
MALE 33,283 31,281 31,008 29,097 28,328 28,143 28,359 27,234 27,904 24,256 19,207 
FEMALE   3,324   3,100   3,012   2,279   1,908   1,900  1,881   1,907   1,580   1,033      793 
TOTAL 36,607 34,381 34,020 31,376 30,236 30,554 30,240 30,141 29,484 25,289 20,000 
            
NUPENG            
MALE 32,760 32,450 31,875 30,219 29,671 29,352 29,008 28,877 26,798 23,981 18,240 
FEMALE   4,247  4,132   4,143   3,769 3,498   3,199   3,109   3,102   2,363   1,210      917 
TOTAL 37,007 36,580 36,018 33,988 33,169 32,551 32,117 31,979 29,161 25,191 19,157 
Source:  PENGASSAN and NUPENG 2015 
As mentioned previously, the growth of this labour force has been attributed to lack of 
regulatory framework. The Nigerian Labour Act (Labour Act, 1974- Section 7) did not 
explicitly provide a legal framework for the regulations of these categories of workers. Even 
though several triangular employment relationships exist in contemporary workplaces the 
legal context continues to see long-term employment between a single employer and 
employee as the focus of regulation, thus placing these groups of workers outside the purview 
of the law. There are no labour protection measures in place to limit the scope of their usage, 
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nor are there any measures in place to monitor the business activities of the employment 
agencies, and the employment conditions of the workers. As a result, these workers suffer 
untold hardship in the hands of their employers who exploit them in terms of wages and 
benefits to maximize profits.   
 
Wage-setting is determined by both the management and employment agency, without trade 
union involvement. With regards to wages, union representatives identified two factors that 
undermined the equality principle. First, agency employment contracts are set at the lowest 
salary scale with little chance of incremental progression due to the interruption of 
assignments. Secondly, the high demand for employment with agencies has facilitated this 
process of driving down the wage rate. High unemployment, coupled with changing 
employment practices in the industry, has left the agency worker with little bargaining power 
over the question of wages. Wage inequality is exacerbated by the exclusion of agency 
workers from collective bargaining and additional boosts to income, such as the end-of-year 
bonus accrued to permanent employees. 
 
 The employment agencies receive payments from the management of the oil MNCs on a 
monthly basis, retain their commission, and then pay the workers. Thus, by using agencies for 
‘payroll’ purposes, the oil MNCs companies avoid equitable basic benefits accrued to 
permanent employees without facing legal implications. Further to abdicating employers’ 
obligations in terms of lawful employment benefits to the agency, the oil MNCs companies 
effectively exclude agency workers from bargaining systems within their workforce, thereby 
creating a non-unionised labour force within a unionised system (Gray, 2002; Heery, 2004).    
 
Several Nigerian scholars have argued that one of the major areas that companies have 
continued to violate the ethics of work is in the area of casualization of labour and the strong 
hostility towards workers’ unionization (Danesi, 2012; Adewumi and Adenugba, 2010; 
Otobo, 2000; Okougbo, 2004; Adenugba, 2004; Okafor, 2005; Onyeonoru, 2005). The 
concerns arise due to the fact that workers who work under triangular work arrangements 
have limited, if any, social protection in the form of wage protection, employment security, 
health or pension benefits and rights to unionization, which increases their vulnerability and 
in some cases makes their situation very precarious, with obvious links to poverty (ILO, 
1998). 
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The oil industry trade unions fault the Nigerian government of indirectly encouraging agency 
work through labour law reform. Young Nigerian graduates are consciously entering into 
triangular employment relationships, and view agency work as a bridge to permanent 
employment, for Forde and Slater (2005, p. 263), agency work can be viewed as either bridge 
to secure employment or a trap in which workers are caught. 
 
In their review on the debate over the nature of temporary agency work in the UK, using 
Labour Force Survey data on short-term transitions and prospects, Forde and Slater (2005: 
263) found “48% of the sample had moved to permanent work, while 38% remained in 
temporary employment, 7% became unemployed and 7% left the labour force. Less than half 
of all agency workers in the study made the transition from agency work to permanent work”. 
Moreover, many do not succeed in making the transition within the space of one year or more. 
All this is similar to the case of agency workers in the Nigerian oil industry.  
 
Unlike the UK, agency workers within the scope of the oil MNCs of this study felt that they 
were trapped in agency work, particularly those anticipating to be transited to permanent 
positions within a specific period of time. There is no transition from agency work to 
permanent employment in the Nigerian oil industry. The evidence indicates that the number 
of working years as an agency staff within the oil MNCs does not transit to permanent 
positions, rather for any vacant permanent position advertised, which rarely happens, agency 
staff have to go through the normal processes of application and interview just like any other 
person. If they are successful, they are hired as permanent, but if not, there is no compromise 
on this, the worker remains as agency staff. Thus, agency work in the Nigerian oil industry 
can be described as a ‘trap’ for at least as many workers as it is a ‘bridge’ to permanent 
employment (Forde and Slater, 2010: 38).  
 
The trade unions perceive this as a deliberate attempt to keep workers as agency staffs as long 
as possible and further influences the drive for involuntary choice for agency workers. Unions 
term this process as a discrete act of the government and the management of the oil MNCs in 
steadily narrowing the internal labour market of the oil industry. Against this background, 
trade unions have intensified their campaign to ensure that these workers are unionized 
despite a de-unionization policy by the employers, although this has not yielded much 
success, because of the “yellow dog” contracts most employers compel their workers to sign, 
which deny them the right to unionization. The government on its part has been criticised by 
the unions for encouraging agency work without effective laws to protect the interest of 
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workers from these agents of capitalism. Even the existing labour law is observed in the 
breach. Many employers violate relevant provisions. Workers’ vulnerable in the course of 
employment and government agencies charged with ensuring compliance and enforcement 
are helpless to make any difference. 
 
With respect to several aspects of these arrangements, trade unions have taken their 
grievances to the management of the oil MNCs who have denied their responsibility of being 
the employers of agency workers, and when the unions have gone to the government for non-
recognition by management and employers, employers deny in a subtle way their hostility 
towards trade unionism. The ambiguities surrounding these complex triangular employment 
relationships are further discussed in the next section. Despite these complexities, the unions 
are not letting down their guard, as they have vowed to continue fighting precarious work 
arrangements in the Nigerian oil industry. Before going further to the analytical debate, it is 
necessary to clarify some terms used in the study. 
 
1.2.1. Clarification of Terms 
For the purpose of clarification in this thesis, the term “employee” represents permanent 
employment contracts, while “workers” will be used to denote agency staff. 
 
1.3.    Analytical Debates on Agency Worker 
As we have seen underlying the changing nature of work and employment is the flexibility of 
the organisation, facilitated by employers’ use of agency labour through employment 
agencies. This creates a particular employment relationship termed “triangular” a process 
whereby an employment agency intervenes in employment relationship, this distinguishes 
agency labour from the bilateral form of employment relationships (Forde, 2001). The use of 
agency labour creates a specific work arrangement whereby agency workers perform their job 
functions at a client premises. The relationship between the client company and the 
employment agency is based on the contract of work, and agency workers do not have any 
employment contract with the client company.   
The traditional bilateral relationship between employer and employee with an explicitly 
defined employment contract, is replaced by one in which employer responsibilities are not 
only divided with the employment agency, they are also characterised by an ambiguity as to 
where the division of responsibility reside. The client company, on the one hand, tends to 
assume that the employment agencies are the employers, and rely on this assumption when 
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choosing triangular employment relationships. The employment agencies similarly rely on the 
same assumption when offering their new services. It is not explicit in the legislation of most 
countries what responsibilities can be anticipated to connect with the employment agencies 
(Davidov, 2004; Druker & Stanworth, 2004; Purcell, et al., 2004; De Cuyper et al. 2008, 
Forde and Slater, 2005). 
For example, in most EU countries, the legal frameworks of the employment relationships are 
between the agency workers and the employment agencies, and the job relations are between 
the agency worker and the client company (Gonos, 1997; Forde and Slater, 2014). However, 
in the United Kingdom, due to the ambiguity of the legislation, the agency worker has, 
through case law, been refused the status of employee (Rubery, et al. 2010). Likewise, in 
some EU nations, including those that have currently reformed labour laws for this form of 
employment (such as the Netherlands), the official legal employer is the employment agency. 
Although in France this shared responsibility is not explicit, there is a strong protective 
regulation in place, health and safety responsibilities are borne by the client company 
(Davidov, 2004). However, where there is ambiguity over responsibilities, as in the United 
Kingdom, the risk leans towards the shoulders of the employment agency (Deakin, 2001). 
Accordingly, ambiguities generated by the nature of the triangular employments have been 
exacerbated by differing definitions of workers’ status under employment law and tax 
regulations. Even the ruling of the courts, when challenged, have left this group of workers in-
between-the-cracks, because verdicts have ruled that agency workers are neither workers of 
the employment agency nor the client company, which left them more vulnerable (Davidov, 
2004 cited in Forde and Slater, 2005, p.  250); this study found that the complexities 
associated with triangular employment relationships, make for significant challenges for trade 
unions to mobilise this specific workforce.  
Whilst legislative regulation has been a contested issue in relation to the growth of agency 
labour, it has also been demonstrated that the increased usage of agency labour is viewed as a 
market-oriented reaction from the employers to respond to changes in the level of demand for 
products and services, construed as market-based activities and relatively short-term 
contractual arrangements (Dundon and Rollinson, 2011, p. 73; Jacoby 1999). Several other 
commentators have argued that the new knowledge economy, which places a premium on 
expertise and inimitable products, has propelled the wider usage of this labour force, which 
implies that the employment relationship has become mediated by the market rather than 
insulated from the market (Forde and Slater, 2005; Cappelli 2000; Moss et al. 2000). As 
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rational as this may sound, this study challenges the dual labour market segmentation analysis 
which states that agency workers occupy a peripheral labour market segment, which is 
separate from and not necessarily in competition with the core workforce.  
This analysis seems to have overestimated employers’ interests which are supposed to 
maintain coordinated and flexible labour market segments in a dual equilibrium. However, the 
marketization of the employment relationship in the Nigerian oil industry has not spared the 
core of the coordinated economy par excellence, with highly-skilled workers increasingly 
choosing to sell their labour services to a series of clients through labour market 
intermediaries- employment agencies (Forde and Slater, 2005: 251). This consequently has 
led to a shift from the traditional usage of agency workers for ancillary activities to that of 
highly-skilled agency workers. 
The emergence of these skilled and highly-skilled agency workers implies a rapid growth in 
professional, managerial, scientific and technical occupations (Forde and Slater, 2005), thus 
crippling the dual-equilibrium of the coordinated and flexible labour market segment theory 
(Judge and Tomlinson, 2016; McCann, 2006). The new contractual status of employment 
relations of the knowledge-based workers denies them the right to organise and be organised, 
which steadily erodes the size of the traditional permanent workforce, and a steady decline in 
union membership notably in the Nigerian oil industry.  
Traditionally, trade union memberships largely comprised of core employees on standard- 
permanent employment contracts with job security, and succeeded in mobilising members 
around issues, such as rights and entitlements (Campbell, 2005, p. 1).  However, the old idea 
of conventional employees as a unified vanguard in a common workplace and a common 
locality might have no importance in contemporary society as most workers live and work at a 
considerable distance from fellow colleagues and pursue different cultural and recreational 
activities. 
The polarization and fragmentation of the workforce have led to broader working-class 
challenges in terms of solidarity and organisation; interestingly it has been argued that trade 
unions are likely to include agency workers in their representation domain when their 
presence in the workplace starts threatening the standard and the future existence of the 
permanent workforce (Hyman, 1997).  Although, Hyman suggested that trade unions have 
always had issues of mobilizing employees under common interests, and as workers have 
become more fragmented this strategy would not survive or workout, they clearly must devise 
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new strategies to coordinate and harmonise the perceived different interests of the workforces 
that they seek to represent (Hyman, 1997, p. 310)   
The fundamental aim of trade unions is to represent members, or in broader terms, workers’ 
interests (Hyman, 1997; Simms and Charlwood, 2010). However, there is a widespread 
consensus in the literature on one point: “trade unions capacity of representation is in crisis” 
(Cervino, 2000, p. 4). This consequently reflects a decline in membership rates, since their 
membership domain is limited and centred more on existing employees who are on permanent 
employment contracts, than the emerging group of workers on non-standard contracts of 
employment (Cerviňo, 2000, p. 4).This has led to conflicting interests not only between trade 
unions and employers, but also between the permanent employees and agency workers in the 
Nigerian oil industry, which consequently leads this study to the issues to be investigated.  
 
1.4.     Issues to be investigated  
 
Agency work, which is designated to be a kind of short-term engagement, has become a long-
term employment contract within the Nigerian oil industry, without the right to union 
recognition or statutory benefits that are associated with full-time employment status. An 
example is the recent controversy surrounding the Schlumberger Group who compelled all its 
full-time employees to quit and then re-absorbed most of them as agency workers in a new 
company known as Schlumberger Services on the same job functions, but without the right to 
unionisation (Danesi, 2012).   
Thus, the common usage of the phrase ‘contracting of labour’ in the context of employment 
related practices, does not only imply an indirect reduction of the labour force of the principal 
companies, but also implies that the workers supplied by employment agencies are substituted 
for the principal company’s employees (Pulignano, 2005). It follows the positioning of 
employment agencies within and outside the premises of the principal companies creates a 
certain type of labour process leading to more complex employment relationships 
(Marchington, Grimshaw, Rubery, & Willmott, 2005; Rubery, et al. 2003). 
Contending with this new development in employment relations, the Nigerian oil industry 
trade unions, the Petroleum and Natural Gas Senior Staff Association (PENGASSAN), and 
the National Union of Petroleum and Natural Gas Workers of Nigeria (NUPENG) have 
consistently opposed the use of agency labour since 2000. The unions have alleged that the 
management of the oil MNCs have altered the traditional work arrangements by not only 
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increasing the use of agency workers, but the deployment of these workers into the core 
production areas.  
 
They have argued that the presence of agency workers in the core production areas suggests 
that labour processes, work arrangements, management style, employment practices, and 
workers’ representation are possibly going to be altered. Although, it can be assumed that the 
permanent employees of the principal company and the agency workers are hired by different 
employers, working side-by-side causes the roles and responsibilities of the workers and 
management of these companies to become interwoven and complicated, which may lead to 
conflicting interests between and within workplace actors. 
Clearly trade unions may perceive the pool of agency workers as a potential threat to the 
terms and conditions of their members, as well as membership levels (Rubery, et al. 2003).  
Evidence suggests that unions have made efforts to outweigh numerical decline in traditional 
union membership through the mobilization of agency workers into their organisation and 
through efforts to restrain the undermining of terms and conditions of existing members 
(Danesi, 2012). This specific link between trade unions and agency workers relate to the 
debate on the revitalisation of unions generally and the need to adjust forms of representation 
to a changing labour force (Heery, 2003, pp. 279-283). Nevertheless, this move has not been 
successful due to employers’ hostility towards trade unionism.  
This study argues that several workplace issues arising from the increasing use of agency 
labour and by extension into the core production process add complexity to employment 
relationships. Such relationships between workplace actors have the potential to generate new 
problems and unintended consequences for management and labour. This presents an 
opportunity to rethink the employment implications of the growth and expansion of agency 
labour. This is essential given the extent to which the use of agency workers subverts internal 
labour markets structures (Forde, et al. 2008: 680). 
 
As mentioned earlier, this emerging trend raises questions that can only be answered through 
an empirical research on the changing nature of labour. A major concern is the impact of this 
phenomenon on employment relationships, particularly, on the labour movement.   In this 
regard, a search of the literature reveals a great number of scholars are contributing to the 
body of knowledge of agency labour and the issues that trade union and workers experience. 
However so far, very little attention has been paid to the changing nature of work 
arrangements in the workplace, as it has grown beyond the marginal labour market 
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attachment, into activities not normally associated with this form of employment, and the 
impact of this new development on trade unions (Kalleberg, 2009; Cobble and Vosko 2000; 
Williams, 2002).   
Some studies have shown the beneficial effects of trade unions’ reaction to the increasingly 
use of agency workers in the developed nations, and how these struggles have yielded positive 
results, such as the enactment of the minimum wage in the United Kingdom (UK) (Acas, 
2014; Cerviňo, 2000; Heery and Abbott, 2000; Heery, Conley, Delbridge, Simms, & Stewart, 
2004; Heery, 2009), while, in the developing nations, particularly in Nigeria, less has been 
achieved.  
Whilst studies on agency labour in Nigeria, although limited have focused on a specific form 
of non-standard labour, for example, casualization and the constitutional rights of workers 
(Danesi, 2012), others on subcontracting of labour, have focused relatively on low wages, 
terms and conditions of work (Kalejaiye, 2014; Fajana, 2005). However, little attention has 
been paid to the changing nature of the use of agency workers as it has expanded from the 
peripheral to core production activities of the oil industry, and its possible effect on trade 
unions. The impact of this phenomenon in the developing economies, particularly Nigeria is 
far less, researched.  There is an amazing dearth of analytical and empirical study on the 
changing nature of labour in the Nigerian oil industry. As a result, there is need to bridge this 
research gap, which is the key focus of this study. 
The study considers that the limitation of past studies in conceptualising the employment 
and extent of the use of agency labour lies in the narrow interpretation of employment 
relations. In this regard, this study argues; that the integration of the labour force in the core 
activities and the accompanying workplace changes require a reconsideration of the 
employment aspect of the use of agency labour. This new phenomenon reveals gaps in 
knowledge in terms of the implications of employment practice, workers’ rights and 
relationships. There is however a need to understand the great transformation in the use of 
agency workers in-depth both empirically and analytically, which consequently leads to key 
research questions. 
1.5.   Research Questions  
This study set out to investigate the management rationale for the increasing use of agency 
labour in the Nigerian oil industry and its impact on employment relationships, and 
particularly the trade unions. The investigation sheds light on the roles of, and relationships 
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between social actors in shaping employment relationships, and the tensions inherent in the 
workplace. This focus allows a systematic critical examination of the interests and conflict 
embedded in the complex relationships between workplace actors, as well as the strategies 
they have adopted to deal with changes in their internal and external environments. To this 
end, the thesis aim, objectives and specific research questions are as follows: 
 
1.6. Aim 
To assess the way, the shift from standard employment to non-standard work arrangements in 
a crucial Nigerian oil industry arena of employment has been a source of on-going dispute 
between trade unions and employers as well as challenge for the trade unions. 
 
1.7.    Objectives  
i. To investigate the driving motives and extent to which management have engaged 
in agency labour in the Nigerian oil industry 
ii. To investigate the impact of agency labour on employees in the Nigerian oil 
industry 
iii. To examine the effect of these new employment relations on management-labour 
relationships in the Nigerian oil industry and  
iv. To explore the challenges created for trade unions and their subsequent responses. 
 
1.8.   Research Questions 
 
i. What factors influence managerial decision-making in the implementation of agency 
labour in the Nigerian oil industry? 
ii. To what extent have the differential terms and conditions of a two-tier workforce had 
negative consequences on employees under this new employment system? 
iii. How have trade unions attempted to address the challenges created by the changing 
nature of labour? 
iv. What are the causes, nature and extent of any exacerbating industrial conflicts between 
trade unions and management?  
 
1.9. Methodological Considerations 
The new work arrangements raise questions that can only be answered through critical 
empirical investigation of the changing nature of labour relations in the Nigerian oil industry. 
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In order to achieve this, a case study approach that mainly utilises mixed methods was 
adopted. Three oil MNCs (Shell, ExxonMobil and Chevron Nigeria) were selected for the 
research. These cases were selected on the basis of their sizes, interests and diversity. The 
mixed-methods approaches applied for the data collections were: semi-structured interviews 
and a questionnaire survey. The semi-structured interview involved management, trade 
unions, employment agencies and agency workers, and the supplementary semi-structure 
interviews involved the Ministry of Labour and Employment, and community’ leaders). The 
interviews involved 38 respondents, while 176 questionnaires were collected. 
Data gathered from interviews and questionnaires were triangulated to facilitate comparisons 
across the stratified domain explored. The findings allowed understanding and insight into the 
manner in which employment relationships are shaped and, in turn, influence workers’ 
representations, which consequently led to trade unions antagonistic behaviour towards the 
growth of agency labour in the Nigerian oil industry. 
This research contributes to scholarly efforts in using a multidimensional approach, and 
making available detailed knowledge and understanding of the nature and extent of agency 
labour in the Nigerian oil industry. The research furthers the current discussion on workers’ 
exploitation and the ‘high-road decent work principles and equality’ of the International 
Labour Organisation (ILO), and its associated policy agenda, as advocated by the trade 
unions. It is hoped that it provides the possibility to appreciate the impact of the growth and 
expansion of agency labour on the labour force and Nigerian society in general. 
1.10.     The Significance of this Study  
 
The Nigerian oil industry is the major driver of the country’s economy and every other sector, 
even the government, depends on its existence. It constitutes about 90% of Nigeria’s foreign 
exchange earnings and 83% of its Gross Domestic Products (Ogbeifun, 2009). 
However, the dominance of oil has been a mixed blessing for the employees of this industry 
as it has never been without struggle, mostly in the form of strike action, as this has often 
been the only way grievances could be expressed (Fajana, 2005, p. 20; Solidarity Centre, 
2010, p. 8). Therefore, this study attempts to explain the impact of the use of agency labour on 
the observable changes in the employment relationships, and further identifies mechanisms 
whereby the employment relationships could be improved in the context of work flexibility. 
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1.11.  Justification 
The intention of the researcher in undertaking this study is to take a critical view of 
employment relations in the Nigeria oil industry to contribute to a rethinking of employment 
relations generally. The need for a changed view of employment relations is particularly to be 
appreciated considering the recent economic changes that do not favour the status quo 
position that has previously often characterised employment relations systems. 
As Nigeria’s economy increasingly becomes global, and as competition becomes the key 
survival strategy of organisations, the state dominance of employment relations is under 
pressure to change fundamentally. Also, the often-displayed reactive protest behaviour by the 
trade unions will be challenged. The fundamental task of this study is to chart out the aspects 
of this equilibrium in the face of contemporary changes in the economic environment and 
workplace. 
1.12.     Structure of the Thesis 
This study is organised in eight chapters. Following this introductory chapter, which has set 
out the research agenda for the study; chapter 2 reviews the diverse literature surrounding 
contemporary employment relations, agency labour, flexible work, fragmented employment 
relations and trade union perspectives towards agency labour. The last part reviews Marxist 
theoretical perspectives on employment relations; it aims to assess its usefulness to unlocking 
the problem and thus providing some theoretical bases for its resolution.   
Chapter 3 provides the background to the context of this study. It gives a brief historical 
background of oil industry in Nigeria, with a focus on the political-economic corporate 
restructuring. A critical review of the source of restructuring, legal regulation, collective 
bargaining systems, and union governance, may enable an understanding that institutions 
matter in shaping union behaviour but institutions alone are not sufficient enough to explain 
it, therefore there is an urgent need to establish an approach that integrates both institutional 
and non-institutional factors in a single analytical framework. This chapter identifies and 
analyses the form, trends and limitations of actions undertaken by trade unions in Nigeria 
within the context of neoliberal policies.  
 
Having introduced the basic themes and the historical context of the Nigerian oil industry, 
chapter 4 presents an extensive methodological discussion and the philosophical paradigm 
guiding the research, including the rationale for the methodological choice and accounting for 
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the strategies and tactics employed in the conduct of the fieldwork. The process of data 
collection, and problems encountered are discussed as well as the decision taken at various 
stages of the fieldwork. This is followed by the presentation of the results of the fieldwork 
and associated discussions.  
 
The findings of the fieldwork are spread over two chapters. Chapter 5 presents the 
quantitative findings among the permanent employees and agency workers across the 
spectrum of work from the three cases. It enables insight into whether the rise of this group of 
workers has affected the terms and conditions of work of employees on permanent 
employment contracts, and how the trade unions have perceived this trend, and attempted to 
provide representation. Chapter 6 presents an account of the two main parties involved: 
management and trade unions, as well as supplementary interviews from agency workers and 
employment agencies. The analysis of the data is contained within each chapter and therefore 
unfolds thematically. 
 
Drawing on the findings presented in the two previous chapters, Chapter 7 returns to the 
literature reviewed in Chapter 2 and 3 to discuss how the results of this study add to existing 
debates, arguments and theories. This chapter shows four key contributions. First, this study 
expands an understanding of the management rationale for the two-tier workforce, however, 
uncovering the contradictory nature of functional and numerical flexibility as propounded by 
the flexible firm and segmentation model. Peripheral workers were discovered to be utilised at 
the core production areas of the oil MNCs.  Secondly, it provides new insight into trade union 
responses to triangular employment relationships with the three parties involved, exploring 
the ways in which unions responded, faced with the new challenge of agency workers. 
Thirdly, the study discusses the explanatory power of factors addressed in industrial relations 
literature to explain the complex dynamics of union behaviour beyond mapping and 
evaluating union responses which have been addressed in existing literature. It shows the 
importance of four institutional factors in shaping union behaviour: the source of 
restructuring, legal regulation, collective bargaining systems, and union structure and presents 
significant aspects of non-institutional factors such as the role of leaders, and the attitude and 
unwillingness to act by agency workers. Lastly, drawing on the findings, this study argues 
that a focus on institutions alone is not sufficient in explaining variations and commonalities 
of union responses and suggests the importance of an integrated approach in a single 
analytical framework. 
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Finally, chapter 8 sums up the thesis bringing the various previous material together and 
spells out its main conclusions as a basis upon which some projections about the future 
prospects of the labour movement in the Nigerian oil industry can be made. It also sets out the 
contribution to theory and policy implications of the research findings, and proposes areas for 
further research. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 
2. Introduction 
 
In all advanced political economies, increasing competition in national and international 
markets, the progressive deregulation of labour markets through state policy, and labour 
power decline have contributed to the growth of agency labour (Kalleberg, 2009, Forde and 
Slater, 2005). Studies since the mid-1990s have shown that agency labour has been growing 
at an alarming rate throughout the labour force, from manufacturing to services, and from 
peripheral to core functions (Hoque and Kirkpatrick 2006; Stanworth and Druker 2004; 
Purcell et al. 2004; Grimshaw, et al. 2001; Cappelli, 2001; Osterman 1996). While studies on 
trends in agency employment contracts agree that casualization of work has affected all 
categories of workers, other studies have raised debates regarding the pervasiveness of agency 
work because the triangular employment relationships have long been argued to represent a 
fundamental trait of these political economies (Hall and Soskice, 2001; Amable, 2003; 
Pollert, 1991; Hyman, 1991). On this note, this chapter become the inspirational foundation 
for establishing the underpinning argument of the study. 
 
The chapter reviews the key debates and arguments in relation to agency work and trade 
union responses. The first section discusses employment relationships and agency work, and 
proceeds to explore some of the reasons for the growth of agency labour. This is followed by 
an extended discussion of existing analytical studies of the “flexible work model”, dual labour 
market segmentation strategies, labour fragmentation, and the triangular relationships. While 
the fields of labour market economics and management studies tend to privilege the rationales 
of flexible work arrangements to both the employers and the workers involved, the field of 
industrial relations identifies the outcomes of flexible work arrangements on both workers’ 
conditions and the employment relationship. As discussed in chapter 1, agency workers are 
not a homogenous group and the emergence of this fragmented workforce has provided trade 
unions with a new challenge of mobilization.  
This section further examines the existing literature on trade union responses to agency work. 
In the process it considers the challenges and dilemmas for trade unions attempting to defend 
the terms and conditions of employment of different groups of workers. As well as the limits 
and potential of solidaristic forms of unionism within a highly fragmented context (Hyman, 
1999). Based on a review of studies of union responses, this study adopts Heery’s (2004) 
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typology on union responses to agency workers. Heery’s classified system is of valuable use 
for analysing union responses to agency workers on the basis that it clearly reflects the 
distinctive feature of triangular employment relationships as a key factor in mechanisms of 
control in the labour process. 
 
At the same, in considering the emerging trend of sophisticated employment agencies as 
active agents in the spread of agency work, and reappraising theories of labour control in the 
context of a triadic employment relationship (Williams, 2017:52, Coe et al. 2010), the final 
section of the chapter provides the analytical framework which underpins the study.  
 
2.1. Contemporary Employment Relations  
 
Contemporary employment relationships are asymmetrical (Ackers, 2014, p. 2615), 
asymmetrical in the sense of power, on the one hand, which implies ownership and authority 
over means of production and on the other hand, implies, labour power and means of 
sustenance (Ackers, 2014, p. 2612). The concept of work refers to the actual process whereby 
this inherently asymmetrical employment relation is realised. This power differential however 
is not a static or a given phenomenon. It is both a context and an outcome of an on-going 
process of cooperation and conflict, a dynamic concept of coercion and consent as a result of 
every day work and its management (Colling and Terry, 2010).  
 
The power of the employer needs to be demonstrated continuously, on a daily basis through 
the act of the management and occasionally through the intervention, symbolic or real, by the 
employer, or the group or the association of employers. On the other hand, the employees are 
not simply the docile types or the recipient of disciplinary and control power. They are active 
agents shaping to a certain degree the patterns of labour process, the limits of employers and 
management control and through their formal and informal association they can influence 
both the rate of their remuneration and even in certain cases the internal organisation of the 
company (Ackers, 2014; Colling and Terry, 2010). 
 
The workplace is not only a field of production but also effectively a field of social 
interaction, power struggle and societal reproduction. It is a field where actors assume and 
play out different roles requiring different behavioural patterns and the development of 
different technical and social skills in the process of value production and its social 
circulation. The division within the workplace are sometimes clear, sometimes blurred, but 
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always definite at moments of crisis or moments of restructuring which may act as 
transformative or turning points in the history of the organisation, the industry or even the 
national economy in general. 
At the same time the workplace is not a bounded or closed system, but subject to a wider set 
of influences and forces from actors that arise above and beyond the specific conditions of an 
individual and/or a collectivity of workplaces - such as, government policy, legislative 
framework, management strategies, trade union activity and inactivity strategy are important 
determinants of real workplace life. For example, in today’s fast moving business 
environment, management needs to address two basic issues. The first is the ability to alter 
products and production methods in order to cater for changes in consumer’s demands by 
taking advantage of the new knowledge-driven economy (Forde and Slater, 2005). While the 
second issue, is the ability to respond swiftly to changes in the level of demand for goods and 
services.  
To address these problems, employers need to be flexible in two distinctive ways: - firstly, 
swift adjustment of products and process necessitates organisations to have functional 
flexibility, and secondly, coping with changes in the level of output necessitates numerical 
flexibility (Williams, 2017; Williams and Adam-Smith, 2015; Dundon and Rollinson, 2011). 
The key to achieving these is to structure the workforce into two main groups: the core 
standard workforce of highly skilled and multi-skilled and the peripheral group with skills 
that are important to the organisation, but skills which, by their nature, are generally and 
easily imitable (Dundon and Rollinson, 2011, p. 73). Since the political economy of the 
neoliberal agenda has made the global market environment more competitive and unstable, 
employers have tended to offer more flexible labour relations, focusing on the potential 
problems, such as fluctuation in market demands, and the possibility of lay-offs (OECD, 
2002). 
One of the ways employers do this is to hire temporary agency workers according to the 
requirements of the market at any given time and circumstance (Martinez et al., 2010). This is 
done in order to minimise the cost of production, and maximise profits, thereby evading being 
held accountable for their own workers, and also undermining the trade unions (Standing, 
2011; Kalleberg, 2009). Organisations are daily increasing the number of non-standard 
workers to enhance their competitiveness in the global market (Adewumi, 2008; Kalleberg, 
2000). 
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Non-standard labour is growing at an alarming rate all over the world. Although the lack of 
robust data complicates cross-national statistical comparisons across nations. For example, 
estimates of the extent of agency work suggest that in the last decade, agency work has 
accounted for between 0.2% and 5% of total employment in European Countries (Vosko, 
2009).  In 2010, France had one of the highest rates of agency work in the EU (3%), while in 
the UK according to CIPD (2015) December report, the number of workers on zero-hours 
contracts in UK has almost tripled in less than three years, from 252,000 in October – 
December 2012, to 744,000 by April-June, 2015. Although, the UK has performed well on 
employment compared to other countries worldwide (CIPD, 2017, p. 12) 
 
A most recent case is the 2017 report for the Trades Union Congress (TUC), a study on the 
‘gig economy’. Usually defined as including two new forms of work types, ‘crowd-work’ and 
‘work on-demand via apps’ (see De Stefano 2016; Kessler 2015a; Smith and Leberstein, 
2015), the gig-economy provides efficient matching between demand and supply for labour 
and services and also allows for flexible work patterns. It also leads to a severe 
‘commodification’ of work, where ‘humans become a service’, which can be provided ‘just-
in-time’ and compensated on a ‘pay-as-you-go’ basis. De Stefano (2016) notes that the 
commodification of workers are not confined to the gig-economy, but can rather be seen as 
part of a wider trend with the proliferation of non-standard forms of work” (Hudson-Sharp 
and Runge, 2017, p. 11). The developed countries are not alone in this precariat work 
arrangements, non-standard work remains dominant forms of engagement in the developing 
nations. Although, accurate statistical details across nations on the trends of non-standard 
labour is lacking, regardless, it is evident that non-standard work arrangement has become an 
integral part of the global labour market, much more so than in the developing nations, 
particularly, Nigeria.  
Agency labour has become an integral part of employment relations amongst MNCs and 
indigenous organisations in Nigeria, particularly in the private sector, such as the oil industry, 
telecommunication, and banking sector (Danesi, 2012; Adewumi and Adenugba, 2010). It is 
not uncommon to have more agency workers than permanent employees in most of the 
multinational companies. It is also feasible to have a situation whereby virtually all the 
workers are on triangular employment relationships (Omoyibo, 2012). This has raised much 
concern for the trade union.  
It is however argued that the challenges of the changing market environment and way forward 
into the 21st Century, promoted non-standard work arrangement in form of numerical 
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flexibility, and labour market deregulation as key components in driving employment growth. 
This was further legitimised by the OECD 1994 Job Study which focused on removing 
institutional barriers to jobs growth (Purcell, 2014, p. 14). It is well now established that 
Flexible labour market has become a great strength to most nation’s economy, underpinning 
job creation, business investment, and competitiveness (CBI, 2017, p. 42). In view of this, it is  
argued that work flexibility should be sustained and enhanced on the condition of equity.  
Flexibility and fairness can be complementary characteristics rather than an increase in one 
leading to a decrease in the other.  Before proceeding to the theoretical perspective on the 
growth of agency work, the next section sheds more light on the concept of agency work. 
 
2.2. The Concept of Agency Work  
Agency work is a process whereby workers are hired by employment agencies, then deployed 
to work under the supervision of the client company, it is a three-way or triangular 
employment relationship. This approach enables organisations to speedily respond to staffing 
levels in meeting consumer demands (Kalleberg et al. 2003; Houseman, 2001), but in the 
process sparing the client company the costs, statutory benefits, rights to representation, and 
collective bargaining rights of the workers.  These amounts to nothing less than the complete 
outsourcing of employers’ responsibilities by client companies to employment agencies 
(Williams and Adam-Smith, 2015: 53; Dundon and Rollinson, 2011: 81; Arrowsmith, 2006; 
Storrie, 2002). 
 
 Accordingly, agency workers fall within the scope of non-standard employment, a diverse 
and heterogeneous category of workers covering anything from casual, temporary, agency 
workers, and zero-hours contracted workers. These forms of work arrangements are 
complementary in the sense that they migrate from the traditional employment relationship, 
but in a triangular employment relationship and are denied of privileges accrued to employees 
on permanent employment contracts. Purcell and Cam (2002) have argued that there is little 
doubt that agency work has in the main offered workers less desirable terms and conditions 
than their permanent counterparts. They are identified at the lower hierarchy of earnings, less 
job security, lower union representation and less access to collective bargaining (Hakansson 
and Isidorsson, 2012: 487; Willaims and Smith, 2010; Evans et al. 2007: 86; Burgess et al. 
2005: 354; Forde and Slater, 2005: 250; Davis-Blake, et al 2003: 475; Connelly and 
Gallagher, 2004: 959).  
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This form of employment relationship frequently generates ambiguity concerning work 
relationships and raises issues as to who are the workers, and the employment rights 
associated with this status. An equally critical issue is who bears the responsibility of an 
“employer” between the employment agency and the client company in terms of providing 
employment rights and obligations (Davidov, 2004). These concerns have emerged partly due 
to the blurring of organisational boundaries and also the lack of transparency surrounding the 
status of agency workers in most nations’ labour laws (Danesi, 2012; Rubery et al. 2005). The 
blurring of organisational boundaries between employment agency and Client Company can 
practically erode standard employment conditions and it raises questions about the 
employment rights of agency workers (Burgess, et al.  2004; Davidov, 2004; Rubery et al. 
2005). For example, employers often exclusively exclude these workers from collective 
bargaining and representational rights, thus creating a non-unionised labour force within a 
unionised workplace (Heery, 2004; Gray, 2002). 
 
One of the most cited studies on work flexibility that promotes agency work is that of 
Atkinson (1984), the flexible firm business model. The flexible firm model categorises 
agency workers as a peripheral group contributing to numerical flexibility, characterised by 
numerous forms of flexible labour options (Williams, 2017, Williams and Adam-Smith, 2015; 
Dundon and Rollinson, 2011). It is argued that the emergence and growth of these flexible 
labour options has greatly impacted trade unions membership and strength.  
Studies have shown that employers are said to be generally hostile to the prospect of 
unionization (Haynes, 2005). For example, it was reported that Sport Direct is an anti-union 
company, who employs staff through employment agencies, with about 90% of its staff at its 
Derbyshire warehouse as agency workers, and denied representation by unions (Grut, 2016). 
Sport Direct has been branded as a 'sweatshop' with working conditions compared to the 
Victorian era and management accused of punishing workers when they complain (Creighton, 
2015). Such agency workers are treated as commodities rather than human. They are made to 
sign up to punishing contracts that leave them powerless and unable to adequately voice their 
concerns for fear of been fired or not given shifts. The infringement on the constitutional 
rights and more, are the dilemmas of agency workers globally, thereby negatively impacting 
on trade unionism. 
Meanwhile, there is a growing body of literature that recognises the challenges agency labour 
poses to the labour movement (Heery, 2004; Hyman, 1991). In considering trade unions’ 
dilemma, Olsen (2005) has logically explained that the growth of agency workers decreases 
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trade union recognition due to unions’ inability to mobilize them as a result of employers’ 
hostility. Critical reasoning would assume that trade unions are likely to oppose the use of 
agency workers, but interestingly, trade unions are not always against the use of agency 
workers by their organisations (Olsen, 2005; Heery, 2004). The explanation for this is that for 
highly unionised organisations the use of agency workers can be seen to serve to heighten job 
security for permanent employees (Heery, 2004; Olsen, 2005).  
However, recent evidence suggests that the conditions supporting such an attitude towards 
agency workers may be threatened due to more contemporary utilization. Agency work has 
moved from dualism towards a more fragmented field of labour relations, where traditional 
distinction between the standard core and insecure peripheral is replaced by a growing margin 
of precarious and vulnerable workers (Holst, 2013; Rubery, et al. 2005). Thus, the growing 
fragmentation of labour relations contributes to the weakening of traditional socio-political 
practices in the workplace (Rubery, et al. 2005). The question is, if the use of agency labour 
undermines the working conditions of the permanent employees, why would the trade unions 
not resist it? 
It has been argued in one study that societal differences in the systems of workplace 
representation and collective bargaining (Heery, 2004), to which in turn unions identities are 
tied, explains the different practices unions adopt locally towards agency workers. This 
intersects with the socio-economic conditions of the organisation in order to account for 
different trade union behaviours and their effects on the job conditions of agency workers. 
Specifically, this study refers to local unions’ capacity to contribute to reducing the 
precariousness of agency labour. However, in the case of the Nigerian oil industry, the trade 
unions act as rational actors both opposing and accepting agency workers to maximise the 
utility of their members.  
On the one hand, the Nigerian oil industry trade unions have been reluctant to accept agency 
workers into their folds, considering them as a threat to the unionised workforce (see also 
Heery and Abbot, 2000). The unions have considered these workers may experience 
instability in their jobs, which may likely affect their exiting the union. Indicatively, union’s 
rejection of agency workers implies that membership is likely to lapse when workers become 
unemployed.  
On the other hand, significant changes have occurred in the composition of the workforce 
over the past two decades in the Nigerian oil industry, leading to the steady decline of 
traditional coordinated employment relationship, which consequently has led to increase in 
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agency labour. As such, trade unions had to contend not only with compositional changes in 
the workplace, but also, with more challenging changes in the nature of employment relations, 
which they have considered as a serious deterrent to unionization, and a negative impact on 
union membership and strength (Danesi, 2012; Fajana, 2005). 
Faced with these competing pressures, the unions have decided whether to accept agency 
workers as part of their constituency or whether to try to exclude them both from the union 
itself, the job and labour market generally (Heery et al. 2004). This is not visible, because the 
drive and expansion of agency labour has come to be seen as a welcome and inevitable 
outcome (Forde and Slater, 2005), particularly in the Nigerian oil industry. Pragmatically, it 
may be assumed there are advantages to mobilizing any group of unrepresented workers, 
given that bringing them into membership may help the trade union to reverse the severe 
decline it has suffered over past years. Hence, the inclusion of agency workers who are a 
growing part of the economy may halt and reverse membership decline, although agency 
workers in the Nigerian oil industry are not well disposed to join the trade unions due to 
employers’ hostility to the prospect of unionisation. 
 The International Labour Organisation (ILO) Committee on Freedom of Association has 
repeatedly noted the violations of trade union rights by employers across several industries, 
particularly in Nigeria, and have persuaded the Nigerian government to revisit its policy and 
to set up amendments to the Trade Union Act in 2005, with the sole object of democratizing 
the trade union and collective bargaining process (Fajana, 2012: 78).  
Conclusively, the polarised conceptualization of trade unions being in support or opposed to 
agency labour is traced in segmentation theory of (Lindbeck and Snower, 1988 cited in Olsen, 
2005: 291), emphasising the uneven market power of different groups.  Delsen (1990) 
suggests that, the continuing weakness of the labour market position of these workers may be 
their historical rejection by trade unions, as trade unions do not bargain for them. Likewise, in 
practice, as Erickson et al (2002) have argued, it is difficult for trade unions to organise 
workers when the 'employer' is elusive and where responsibility for them is shared between 
several labour market actors. Against this backdrop, there have been a series of debates on the 
theoretical perspective on the rationales why organisations use agency labour. 
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2.3. Rationales for the Growth of Agency Labour 
There are no simple answers to the growth of agency workers, (Carre, et al, 2000). However, 
most accounts refer to cost advantage, labour legislation and technological changes as the 
driving force. Thus this section presents the theoretical perspectives of different authors on 
the rationale for agency labour. 
2.3.1. Cutting-Costs 
First, the debate about the increasing usage of agency labour has gained fresh prominence 
with scholars maintaining that it seems to be the pathway for organisations to generate value 
(Williams, 2017; Elmuti, 2003: 33). With a contracting strategy, an organisation can benefit 
from cost reduction (Dekker and Koster, 2016: 3; Forde and Slater, 2005: 252). For example, 
the wages of agency workers were observed to be on average 68% to that of the full-time 
employees (Eun, 2012: 86-87). The reasons for this have been that agency workers lack fringe 
benefits, the cost of health insurance and employer funded pension plans. Indeed, hiring and 
managing permanent employees involves a variety of costs which bring an organisation very 
limited benefits and may be viewed by the firm as an unnecessary constraint on its use of 
resources. 
 
 Employers may try to reduce these constraints through externalisation of labour (Casey, 
1997), thereby consciously excluding certain workers from permanent positions (Forde and 
Slater, 2005:253).  Supporting this view, Williams, (2017) reveals that cost reduction is the 
key rationale explaining why firms utilise agency workers. By using agencies, not only can 
firms benefit from recruiting, screening and matching advantages, new workers can be paid at 
lower rates without upsetting internal wage structures (Forde and Slater, 2005: 253). Market 
cost economic theory argues that employers take contentment in work flexibility as a result of 
the cost advantage in hiring and screening temporary workers (Forde, 2001; Houseman, 
2001:150).  It has been argued that most of the employment agencies provide a high quality of 
labour pool (skilled knowledge workers) that leads to a high quality of service with minimal 
cost. 
 
 Likewise, Houseman et al. (2003: 107) observed that the economic benefits can be high when 
product markets fluctuate because employers are relieved from the tensions of raising wages 
to pay permanent workers. Thus, contracting out employees’ responsibilities can lessen the 
workload of organisations, thereby enabling the management to focus on strategic decision-
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making and developing core competencies (Hansen, 2009). It is further argued, that the 
present trend in the use of agency labour does not only focus on cutting labour costs, rather it 
seeks competence and expertise not available in-house through employment agencies. 
2.3.2. Competence and Expertise  
 
Second, the emergence of the new-knowledge economy necessitates organisations to rely 
more on highly-skilled knowledge workers to remain competitive (Forde and Slater, 2005: 
251). Workers with creative minds whose skills are not easily imitable, particularly in this era 
of technological innovation, thus, the drive for competence and efficiency makes 
organisations seek the best fit. This is achieved with the help of sophisticated employment 
agencies with multiple sourcing networks and recruitment software that can easily find 
thousands of qualified applicants, thus increasing the chances of hiring the best candidate for 
any vacant position (Potkany, 2008; Cooper, 2007; Forde and Slater, 2005; Maidment, 2003). 
Today’s business market is very competitive and it is only the fittest that survives, hence the 
best fit candidates keep business organisations floating. Accordingly, employment agencies 
are seen as playing an important role in matching skilled and professional workers with a 
series of short-term appointments (Forde and Slater, 2005: 251). 
2.3.3. Competitive Market Environment 
Third, the growth of agency labour has been argued to be influenced by the global market 
environment, competitive pressure and economic conditions. Employers have had to respond 
to these determinants by restructuring work organisations and modifying their labour force 
accordingly. This has to a great extent fuelled the flexible labour market and the flexible work 
arrangements in an attempt to improve efficiency, reduce costs and remain competitive 
(Evans et al. 2007:85; Connelly and Gallagher, 2006:95; Adenugba and Jawadu, 2014:96).  
 
Dealing with employees’ responsibilities has been observed to be the highest expenditure for 
employers (Hansen, 2009; Potkany, 2008). Hence, organisational competitiveness necessitates 
employers’ usage of agency labour in order to lower resource costs and avoid increasing 
production costs (Mouhammed, 2008). For example, extensive research has shown that global 
competitiveness and the intent of organisational development constantly mounts pressure on 
management to invest in human capital.  
 
This investment can be very costly and demanding, for instance, Samsung as a transnational 
company (TNC) spent close to $50,000 annually for each employee on foreign assignment, 
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and spent $100 million on training programs to aid such assignments (Leeuwen and Foldvari, 
2008; Potkany, 2008; Abdoolcarim, 1993). The sustenance and development of organisations 
to administer and manage such a large and diverse labour force is compelling, hence, Jeffay, 
et al. (1997) recommends that using agency workers can yield better-quality services at a 
cheaper rate. This strategy enables organisations to remain competitive in the global market, 
particularly in the world of technology. 
 
2.3.4. Innovative Technology 
 
Fourth, recent studies suggest that the impact of modern technologies, which in many cases, 
have undermined the logic of existing job boundaries and job classifications, demands higher 
levels of knowledge. Thus, flexible work arrangement may offer an organisation a way to 
access highly specialised skills that are needed only for a short period of time (Williams and 
Adam-Smith, 2015, Forde and Slater, 2005). Dundon and Rollinson (2011) argue that the use 
of a flexible workforce allows an organisation to offer a wide range of products in demand 
without risking a large fixed investment in labour.  The investment in modern machinery is in 
line with Marx’s prognosis, that at a certain point in the development of production, science 
and technology become qualitative forces of production that can increasingly generate value 
removed from workers (through automation). The ongoing rise in the organic composition of 
capital through investment in innovative machineries intended to increase the rate of work 
flexibility and/or to undercut workers’ resistance eventually resulting in a qualitatively new 
situation in which value-generating technology makes the labour power of a large working 
mass unnecessary (Robinson and Barrera, 2012, p. 16).  
 
2.3.5. Recession 
Fifth, the effects of world recession in the 1980s and post 2008 contributed to the widespread 
reductions in workforce levels, and subsequent re-casting of job boundaries. Indeed Brown 
(1990) argues that the recession of the 1980s caused many financial problems for both private 
and public sectors, which encouraged many employers to embrace a numerical flexibility 
strategy in the face of consumers’ unpredictability for goods and services. Forde and Slater 
(2010) reported from a study conducted by the Confederation of British Industry (CBI) in 
2009, that the majority of firms restructured their work patterns by introducing more flexible 
working arrangements. Although, evidence has shown that while some employers laid-off 
agency workers during the economic crisis of 2008 and 2009, others appear to have increased 
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their usage. Thus, recession compelled most organisations to reassess their staffing mix, and 
the dominant response was to reduce recourse to temporary labour, alongside or as an 
alternative to shedding direct labour (MacKenzie, et al. 2010: p. 613), and bringing in agency 
workers. Thus, the use of temporary agency workers may increase an organisation’s 
flexibility in dealing with changing market conditions and organisational requirements. 
For organisations, work flexibility does not only aid in reducing labour costs but also provides 
greater flexibility in the production process and work organisation. However, the promotion 
of organisational flexibility based on the use of agency labour, implies that agency workers 
are exposed to the risk of job insecurity and low wages. As earlier mentioned, the idea of 
work flexibility is advanced in theories of the Flexible Firm model developed by Atkinson 
(1984), and the Dual Labour Market Segmentation of Doeringer and Piore (1971). Notably, 
the flexible firm model (Atkinson, 1984), suggested the core-peripheral work arrangements 
and triggered debate in the scholarly literature of employment relations (Pollert, 1991). 
 
2.4.  Conceptualization of Labour Market Flexibility 
 
The concept of flexibility is complex and bears different meanings in different contexts. The 
focus of this study is on labour market flexibility and in more detail the processes of 
casualization and externalisation.  Casualization refers to the process whereby an increasing 
share of the labour force is hired on a temporary basis (part-time, temporary and seasonal 
work). Externalisation involves labour or employment outsourcing and is related to the 
practice of labour intermediaries.  
 
The ability to introduce labour market flexibility in recent years is another factor for the 
growth in agency labour (Williams, 2017: 51). The term ‘flexibility’ refers to hours worked in 
a week, and/or what hours are worked (Greenberg and Landry, 2011: 1165). Thus, by 
extension, flexible work arrangements are a process whereby employers or workers vary the 
amount, timing or location of their work. 
2.4.1. Flexible Firm Model 
Atkinson (1984) classified flexibility into three categories, functional, numerical and 
financial. Agency workers fall into the numerical category- the easily dispensable segment of 
the workforce. This model was further advanced to include the concept of a core and 
peripheral labour force. The core workforce is likely to have skills that are scarce and firm 
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specific (Williams, 2017; Callaghan, 1997: 3-4). These categories of employees are more 
likely to be on permanent employment contracts, and enjoy a high-wage, and job security. 
They therefore represent valuable assets and are highly regarded and rewarded by their 
employers.  
On the other hand, there are two categories of peripheral workers. The first category has skills 
that are needed at certain times but which are not specific to the organisation and are available 
in the external labour market. The second category involves workers who have limited skills 
or are unskilled.  Thus, to achieve numerical flexibility, these two categories are likely to be 
hired on a short-term basis either through companies on a direct hire basis on temporary 
terms, or through a third-party agent. 
The major criticisms of the flexible firm model are to be found in the book edited by Anna 
Pollert (1991) Farewell to Flexibility. Pollert argued the model was based on flawed 
economic theories and equally questionable concepts of post-Fordism and the post-industrial 
society. In contrast to these theories she suggested that the flexible firm model offers an 
arbitrary mechanism for work intensification associated with Taylorism. Secondly, it is 
argued that the flexible firm model does not fit the facts in many important respects. She 
argued that the recession, market competition, and rigidity are not only contemporary issues 
for organisations. Employers are more concerned with improving efficiency and reducing 
labour costs, hence flexibility can be a mechanism for labour exploitation.  
The key argument is that there is limited empirical evidence for the existence of a 
core/peripheral model and no precise distinction between core and peripheral workers. 
Therefore, the classifications of the core and periphery only polarises the workforce and 
undermines their strength. It is argued that, whilst legislation has reduced the rights of the 
vulnerable periphery workers, high unemployment and the decline of trade unions influence 
has disciplined and disempowered the core workforce. 
Pollert’s arguments are extended by Hyman (1991) who recognises that the flexible firm 
model raises the constant contradiction in industrial relations between trust and constraint in 
the need to establish both consent and control. Hyman carefully analysed and concluded that 
employers are likely to use a different mix of strategies for different workers, with the flexible 
firm model also restricting core workers as they become locked in internal labour markets. 
Status as a core employee therefore removes the ability to ‘exit’ whilst the demand for loyalty 
and individuality as opposed to collectively removes the voice of core employees.  
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Finally, both Pollert and Hyman argued that flexibility is inherently political- a neoliberal 
agenda. For example, Pollert acknowledged that the model is connected to changes in the role 
of the state and its adoption and implementation of neoliberal policies. Hyman contended that 
flexibility is synonymous with the interest of capital as the basic goal is to shift risk and costs 
from the employer to the worker. 
In view of the above analysis, it is argued in this thesis that an emphasis on flexible 
specialization reflects a managerial agenda that seeks to promote the positive side of 
flexibility. Flexible functionality relates largely to core employees and can be given an air of 
legitimacy by claiming moves towards upskilling, and multi-tasking. On the other hand, it is 
much more difficult to attach any such remarks on numerical flexibility which remains a form 
of non-standard labour. 
 Similarly, the concept of Ackroyd and Proctor (1998: 164) the “new flexible firm” 
recognised the transformative trends of labour and suggested that capitalist modernity dictates 
labour utilization. Although, Ackroyd and Proctor recommended an understanding of the 
conflicting views of the Flexible Firm Model and Farewell to Flexibility, they argued that the 
new flexible firm is rooted on a best fit between employers and employment relationship 
systems, and operates as a coordinate or an understanding between the management and 
workers. They argued that organisations and workers may embrace different flexible working 
terms, and these preferences needs to be considered. For example, a flexible work system may 
appeal to some specific social classes of people who desire to enter or re-enter the labour 
market, such as women, nursing mothers, students and retirees who are still fit enough and 
interested to remain in the labour market under a new status (Voudouris, 2004: 131; 
Phillipson and Smith, 2005: 2). 
 By contrast the study by Forde and Slater (2005: 257), in their study found that 
women/nursing mothers are no more likely than men to be working in agency jobs. 51% of 
agency workers were found to be male, while a lower proportion of agency workers are 
married, or have a dependent child. A relative high proportion of agency workers were aged 
16 - 24, and less than 7% in full time education, while on the other hand, a smaller proportion 
of agency workers were aged 55 and above. But despite male making up a higher share of the 
part-time workforce, it is still argued that women are significantly more likely to work part-
time than men, report from Resolution Foundation found that women are more likely to work 
on a zero-hours-contract (Tomlinson, 2018). 
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This confounding the theoretical expectations and claims made in the debate that neither 
marriage nor the presence of children significantly increases the likelihood of being in agency 
labour relative to permanent employment. This possibly undermined the argument that agency 
working meets ‘a genuine demand for flexible work from workers’ as put forward by 
Ackroyd and Proctor, (1998), and CIETT (2002). 
Furthermore, flexible work practices in most instances are more appealing to low-skilled 
workers who have an unsteady attachment to employment, and who may have multiple 
sources of employment based on their financial needs (Doeringer and Piore, 1985: 10). 
However, Forde and Slater, (2005: 259) argued that indeed some professional and associate 
professional occupations are associated with agency work, using teachers and health 
professionals as an example. In their findings, teachers were three and half times as likely, 
and as health professionals (nurses, therapist, welfare workers) three times as likely to be in 
agency work, although the percentage relatively remain a few. Despite these changes in the 
traditional structure of agency works, the consequences still remain that agency work is more 
beneficial to the employers, because it enables organisations to adapt rapidly to changing 
technology and consumers’ demands. On the other hand, little has been done to mitigate the 
negative effects of such forms of working for those that undertake it (Forde and Slater, 2010, 
p. 25; Cam et al., 2003 cited in MacKenzie, et al. 2010, p.  607). 
Zeytinoglu, et al. (2008) develop this line of reasoning, predicting the use of agency workers 
as more beneficial for organisations. The concepts of Pollert, Ackroyd and Proctor are central 
to Zeytinoglu et al. (2008: 22) study, which highlights the importance of flexible work 
arrangements with regard to the Canadian context. They argued that organisations might offer 
flexible work arrangements as a measure of work life balance. However, the organisations end 
up more beneficial from such employment relationships. In view of this, Zeytinoglu et al. 
(2009: 555) argued that they do not classify flexible work practices as being either 
management or worker focused; rather, the employers introduce flexible work systems for 
their own benefits, while the workers consent to make ends meet. Nevertheless, these scholars 
attempted to analyse the benefits attained by the employers and workers and stated in a 
competitive market conditions, flexible work arrangements obviously yield more results that 
are beneficial for the employers. 
While flexible work arrangement is argued to benefits employers, labour economists have 
been criticised of being too fixated on the benefits of flexible work arrangements to 
employers without considering the experiences of workers (Green and Heywood, 2011). 
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Several authors argued the benefits of flexible work arrangements on workers, which include 
greater autonomy, increased earning potential, it is a way of gaining work experience, act as 
an entry point into the labour market for school-leavers and reintegrate people who have been 
out of the labour force (Gangl, 2003; McGinnity et al., 2005). Work flexibility also provides 
the opportunity to develop both job-specific and general skills, strengthen labour market 
attachment and expand social and professional networks (Rubery, 2015), and more 
importantly control over work-life-balance allowing workers to balance work and family 
obligations (Booth et al. 2002), it is some workers choice to engage in this kind of 
employment (Fagan et al., 2014). Generally the advantages include higher flexibility and 
better work-life balance. In contrast, key risks include low pay and the lack of job security. 
Furthermore, because workers’ rights and protections have generally been built around the 
open-ended contract, people on flexible work arrangements may lack access to some 
employment rights and social benefits due to the temporary nature of their contract 
(Broughton et al. 2010). 
 
Within the literature, these debates have led to the emergence of two opposing theoretical 
models (Smeaton, 2003). On the one hand, some scholars are of the views that the move into 
flexible work arrangements, such as agency labour, or self-employed as being voluntary move 
with workers attracted by the illusion of better conditions. For example, the work of Kunda, et 
al. (2002), depicted a free agent perspective, where small proportion of highly-skilled workers 
preferred to work outside the traditional arrangements in order to gain a range of benefits, 
such as, greater financial benefit, autonomy over their work conditions and lifestyle. Besides 
the attractions of better wages and a desire for work-life-balance, the drive for flexible work is 
also a response to a perception that the conventional benefits of promotion and job security 
are no longer in existence in standard employment relationships, as employers move to 
levelled organisational structures with no promise of long-term job security. Thus, managing 
self-career, maintaining employability through a variety of skills and experiences, having 
autonomy, and other such non-pecuniary aspects of work, all become valued essence 
(Kirkpatrick and Hoque, 2006). 
 
On the other hand, an alternative marginalization view argues that people involuntarily accept 
non-standard work arrangements due to lack of possible choice. The growth of non-standard 
form of work arrangements is perceived as resulting from organisations eliminating their less-
valued workers and rather opted for agency supplies. Workers in this form of work 
arrangements are largely economic refugees who are unable to find standard employment. As 
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a result, they are marginalised, treated as external workers, and exploited by employers. The 
issues attributed to non-standard work arrangement, involves lack of job security, low and 
variable earnings, lack of benefits and training. This category of workers are seen as 
dissatisfied with non-standard form of employment, and would rather prefer the standard form 
of employment ((Kalleberg, 2009; Kirkpatrick and Hoque, 2006). 
 
These two opposing views do not, however, tend to be exhaustive nor necessarily even to 
account for the majority of non-standard workers, but rather they relate to tendencies of 
change (Smeaton, 2003, p. 380). Scholars recommend that a key issue for policy makers and 
employers is the need to achieve a balance between the benefits of flexibility, and workers 
desire for certainty and security (Burgess et al. 2004). The conflicting views depicts flexible 
work arrangement as having the ability to generally bring either costs or benefits for workers, 
but there may be lack of clarity as to where the balance presently lies. The herculean task, 
therefore, is to clarify to what extent either views is supported by evidence regarding present 
experiences. 
 
The field of industrial relations recognise that flexible work arrangements work best, and of 
benefits to both parties (employers and workers) when it runs alongside a fair and effective 
framework of employment rights. It is argued, that effective enforcement mechanisms 
underpin a well-functioning labour market by upholding the employment rights of workers 
and protecting organisations from operating on an uneven playing field. For example, 
recognising the need for effective enforcement, the UK government has created a director of 
labour market enforcement saddled with setting the strategic direction of the enforcement 
bodies (CBI, 2017’ p. 43). This enforcement policy is what is lacking in most of the 
developing nations, particularly, Nigeria.  
As we have seen, there is no legal framework that regulates the terms and conditions of 
agency work in Nigeria, hence an easy access for employers to take advantage of this 
economically profitable group of workers (Okafor, 2012), who perennially uses them as 
means of cutting cost, profit maximization and de-unionization (Danesi, 2012). Despite 
Section (7) of the Nigerian labour law specify, “A worker should not be engaged for more 
than three months without the regularization of such employment”. A great number of these 
workers get their appointment terminated before the end of the three months and are 
reabsorbed as daily paid casuals (cited in Fapohunda, 2012: 259). The deficiency of the 
Nigerian labour law on this group of workers possibly explains the motivating factor for the 
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increasing usage of agency workers by the Nigerian oil MNCs and the reason for their power 
and control (Fapohunda, 2012: 259).  
In addition, there is a growing body of literature that recognises that employers use flexible 
labour with the aim of attracting and retaining highly skilled workers (Forde and Slater, 2005; 
Wood et al. 2003: 226; Osterman, 1995: 681). Some have anticipated the desire for high 
commitment, high performance and high involvement work environments as motives for 
implementing flexible work practices (Berg, et al. 2003; White, et al. 2003; Felstead and 
Gallie, 2004: 1294; Ortega, 2009: 1). Flexible work arrangements under such companies 
become a way of allowing workers to answer for the demands of what White et al (2003) 
perceived as new employment relations and to enact a more successful work-life-balance. 
Even though, some workers may consider having a flexible employment relationship, most 
workers desire not to remain as temporary workers. They would prefer a full-time job, as the 
insecurity and instability that are associated with flexible work can affect their physical and 
mental wellbeing (Kalleberg, 2009: 9). Therefore, the argument of using flexible work 
arrangements as means of creating jobs for the unemployed and to act as a bridging stone for 
further employment opportunities as proposed by some EU countries is relatively unattainable 
(EuroCiett, 2012). For example, Forde and Slater (2005, p. 263) review the debate over the 
nature of temporary agency work in the UK, using Labour Force Survey data on short-term 
transitions and prospects, and found 48% of the sample had moved to permanent work, while 
38% remained in temporary employment, 7% became unemployed and 7% left the labour 
force. Less than half of all agency workers in the study made the transition from agency work 
to permanent work. Thus, agency work can be viewed as either a bridge to secure 
employment or a trap in which workers are caught. 
Overall it can be argued the fundamental aim of agency labour is the support of corporate 
competition through the eradication of barriers and incompetence in the operation of capital. 
To achieve this aim, several basic principles must be implemented. Key among these is the 
elimination of regulations protecting workers and reduction of the state involvement in labour 
relations and processes of labour conflict resolution. This action results in the annulment of 
tripartite arrangements and the enactment of labour regulations, which alleviate the process of 
hiring and firing at will.  In accomplishing these principles, the state rejects its role as 
protector of workers, thereby leaving them more exposed to the predators.  
Thus, work flexibility cannot guarantee an improvement in workers' job security or long-term 
prosperity. These goals are only achieved as a result of collective bargaining processes, which 
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balance the collective strength of workers with that of capital, as well as the state, in a 
democratic political climate, a situation that is incompatible with the expansion of the flexible 
work system. 
This study therefore anticipates job retention in the following instances. First, organisations 
who are experiencing economic downturn attempt to retain valued employees by offering 
them reduced hour contracts, in the hope of being able to offer them permanent employment 
in the future. Secondly, valued employees may be able to negotiate reduced hour employment 
within their current job description, in a part-time compatible working environment. Such an 
understanding between labour and management may likely promote a more conducive and 
harmonious working environment. 
 
2.5.  Dual Labour Market Segmentation Strategies 
The following sections 2.6, 2.7 and 2.8 present theories of management dual labour market 
strategy, labour market segmentation and triangular employment relationships. After this the 
likely implications/consequences of flexible work arrangements on both the core and 
peripheral workforces will be examined in section 2.9. 
 
Employers’ allocation of different employment opportunities to different forms of 
employment contract is presented as an essential mechanism of market segmentation.  Market 
segmentation, in turn, is likely to shape the labour market outcome of agency workers, 
determining the transitions available to them, and structuring their job opportunities. 
 Doeringer and Piore (1971) argued that the labour market is composed of two categories, the 
protected core and the unprotected periphery. The core labour market is for highly skilled 
employees to protect a product market in great demand and to maximise on organisations’ 
specific human capital. The core labour market has advantageous employment conditions, 
advanced large-scale capital-intensive production and is specifically internalised. In contrast, 
employment within the peripheral segments is regarded as unskilled and exposed to greater 
job insecurity as a result of strong competitive pressures. 
 In light of this, employers’ two-edged strategy towards their labour force accounts for market 
segmentation with employers’ divergent strategy a function of (i) increases in the use of 
innovative technologies within the organisation, which necessitate highly skilled employees. 
Such employees from this point of view are presented as highly skilled and core to the 
production of the company. They are highly responsive technology-driven expertise which 
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swiftly changed the object of their productive output according to demand. (ii) Shifts in 
consumers’ demand of product markets. Hence, the dual burden of a shift in consumer 
demand and skills specific was relieved through the creation of peripheral group. 
A review of dual market theory by Piore and Sabel (1984), suggests that the shift in 
production process is such that new forms of workplace organisation are required to achieve 
greater flexibility. The power to act and recognise changes in product demand necessitates 
alternate forms of workplace arrangement that are more adaptable to change. This form of 
work arrangement is characterised by the removal of workplace hierarchies and the opening 
of channels for employees to contribute to efficient means of workplace organisation. Such 
employees, from this point of view, are presented as being highly skilled and core to the 
production of the company. They are highly responsive technology-driven expertise which 
swiftly changes the object of their productive output according to demand. 
While the above scholars attributed the emergence of the gap within the labour market to 
innovative technology that necessitated a highly skilled labour force, other theories of labour 
market segmentation have attributed the segmentation to organisational strategy, 
organisational strategy seeking to ‘divide and rule’ an increasingly homogenised workforce in 
an effort to maintain control over the workforce (Gordon, Edwards and Reich, 1982). Labour 
market segmentation can be viewed as a mechanism of weakening the essence of workers’ 
solidaristic forms at the same time as increasing employees’ alienation through more and 
more fragmented workplaces (Edwards and Reich, 1982).  
 
Edwards (1979: 180) alleged that the employment relationship is a disputed terrain where the 
contesting agenda of management and labour are fought over such that the struggle for 
workers’ autonomy and management control is core to the understanding of all market 
dynamics. The means by which management achieve segmentation is through the 
restructuring of the labour process. Edwards alleged that the economic context within which 
organisations find themselves cannot be used to justify management restructuring of labour 
process, rather, he argued that any organisation can decide to either develop or minimize 
employees’ previous skills or educational qualifications in the production process. 
Managements that are organised in view of reinvigorating employees’ previous skills or 
educational qualifications will produce employment which is core in nature, whilst peripheral 
employment is regulated with less recourse to workers’ skill or competence.  
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In addition to segmentation of the market as a result of management restructuring of labour in 
accordance to the principles of skills reinvigoration or skills depreciation, the segmenting 
impact of this dual strategy are reinforced by its operation in terms of workers’ fragmentation. 
The application of different work allocation to different types of workers facilitates labour 
fragmentation inevitably increasing management control in instances of industrial action. 
 
2.6.  Labour Fragmentation  
Labour fragmentation is a process whereby the conditions of work and employment are 
becoming increasingly diverse not only at global level, but also within nations, industries, 
sectors and organisations. Organisational restructuring contributes to this value-chain of 
fragmentation of employment, because restructuring is entangled with shifts in the forms of 
employment and the composition of labour (Flecker, 2010). As a consequence, the condition 
of work and employment are increasingly diverging from direct coordinated employment 
relationships to triangular employment relationships through growing sophisticated 
employment agencies (see Figure 3 below). Rather than approaching the goal of the same 
wage for the same job within any one organisation, or country, it has given way to multiple 
and complex corporate structures (Flecker, 2010:8). This is assumed to constitute barriers to 
workers’ representation and collective bargaining (Kalleberg, 2000; Peck and Theodore, 
2003).   
 
Workers are segregated from one another due to their different employers, contract terms, and 
locations, which would have naturally formed constituency for union mobilization and 
collective bargaining. This separation inhibits collective organisation and employee voice, 
thereby weakening the ability of agency workers to fight low-wage and unfavourable working 
conditions, and aggravating their precarious position (Cheng, 2010: 81), albeit in rare cases 
collective bargaining can occurs in employment agencies with longer-term stable relationship, 
as is the case in France and Sweden (Davidov, 2004; MacKenzie, et al. 2010). 
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Figure 3- Labour: From Integration to Fragmentation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Itegboje, 2018 
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potential source of tension in the workplace. The client company dictates its terms and 
conditions to the employment agency, and failure to adhere, means contracts will not be 
renewed. With the growing use of employment agencies, no agency would want to lose its 
contract with any big client. Therefore, as we have seen the relationship between the principal 
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2.7. The Triangular Employment Relationship 
Triangular employment relationships involve a business relationship between an organisation 
and employment agency; a contractual relationship between worker and employment agency 
(which is either full-time or part-time) and lastly; an employment relationship between worker 
and Client Company (see Figure 4, page 43), which has a time frame based on the period of 
the project. These forms of employment relationships are what McLean, et al. (1998: 699) 
have termed a triadic employment relationship, characterising the perceptions of how agency 
and Client Company deal with the workers (Liden et al. 2003). For Vosko (2009) the 
precarious nature of workers in a triadic employment relationship relates not only to the short-
term nature of the contract, but also its exploitative nature. 
Figure 4- Triangular Employment Relationships 
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assumption when choosing triangular relationships. The employment agencies similarly rely 
on the same assumption when offering their new services.  It is not explicit in the legislation 
of most countries what responsibilities can be anticipated to connect with employment 
agencies (Davidov, 2004; Druker & Stanworth, 2004; Purcell, Purcell, & Tailby, 2004; De 
Cuyper et al. 2008).  
For example, in most EU countries the legal framework of the employment relationships is 
between the agency workers and employment agency, and the job relations is between the 
agency worker and organisation (Gonos, 1997: 85-6; Forde and Slater, 2014).  However, in 
the United Kingdom, due to the ambiguity of the legislation, the agency worker has, through 
case law, been refused the status of employee (Rubery, et al. 2010).  Likewise, in some EU 
nations, including those that have currently reformed labour laws for this form of employment 
(such as the Netherlands), the official legal employer is the employment agency.  Although, in 
France, this shared responsibility is not explicit, there is a strong protective regulation in 
place, and health and safety responsibilities are borne by the organisation (Davidov, 2004). 
However, where there is ambiguity over responsibilities, as in the United Kingdom, the risk 
leans towards the shoulders of the employment firm (Deakin, 2001).  
According to Vosko, (2009: 389) “the employment agency takes on employment-related 
responsibilities such as hiring and firing, as well as administrative responsibilities related to 
wages and benefits”. The client company continues to be in control of overseeing the direct 
management of the labour and production processes, and outsourcing other employers’ 
obligations and responsibilities (Davidov, 2004). The organisation of work, which is 
controlled by the management, takes place at the job location, while the contractual 
understanding of the social and economic risk is shifted to the employment agency (Deakin, 
2001). This thesis found that the complexities associated with triangular employment 
relationships in the Nigerian oil sector, underline the challenges of trade unions mobilising 
this group of labour force.  
However, evidence from a variety of studies has shown that flexible work arrangements may 
have a negative impact on both the core and peripheral, (Aronsson and Goransson, (1999: 
152). Although the peripheral seems to be the most affected, given their non-standard status 
which is subjected to a dual managerial control structure of the principal companies and the 
employment agencies (Coe, et al. 2009), the next section sheds more light on the likely impact 
of flexible work arrangements on both the core and periphery labour force. 
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2.8.  Implications of Flexible Labour on Both the Core and Peripheral Workers 
 
As labour market flexibility extends within the contemporary business world, there are, 
increasing concerns over the likely implications on a two-tier workforce. Below the most 
identified common implications are explored. 
 
2.8.1.  Job Insecurity 
In recent years, organisations have been confronted with many changes in the business 
environment, caused by processes such as intensified global competition, innovative 
technology and fluctuation in consumer demands, as well as the introduction of new products 
and services. To meet the increasing demands of this unpredictable business market in which 
organisations operate, the keyword has become flexibility, which has often meant downsizing 
and restructuring the organisation and work processes. As a result, this study anticipates that 
job insecurity is a major implication of such flexible work arrangements. 
 
These developments have rendered many jobs superfluous, resulting in mass retrenchment 
and redundancy. Accordingly, the traditional assumption of a job-for-life has been steadily 
eroded, giving rise to anxiety, stress and insecurity. On the one hand, both the professionals 
and skilled can no longer assume that their jobs are for life, but live with the psychological 
feelings of job insecurity. For instance, the fear of the unknown may constrain core 
employees to remain in a position that does not befit their choices or ambitions. This may 
impact negatively on their behaviours, well-being and characters. 
 
On the other hand, agency workers are also likely to be more insecure, because they lack 
statutory legal rights and regulatory security compared with standard employees. It is well 
established in labour market theory (Atkinson, (1984), De Cuyper et al. 2008), and labour 
market segmentation theory (Doeringer and Piore (1971), that the flexible labour force is seen 
as a secondary labour market in which employers are not likely to train and empower 
compared to the core standard workforce, thereby making the former dispensable at will 
(Reich, et al. 1973: 360).   
 
2.8.2. Work Pressure 
It is also worth noting that core functional employees may have their skills improved through 
vertical and horizontal work enlargement. Horizontally, work enlargement seeks to broaden 
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the nature of job functions carried out by an employee in a similar skill level.   This involves 
crossways extension of a job, where additional functions are added in pursuance of the 
development of multi-skilled workers (Sheila, 2001: 18).  Vertically, work enlargement 
involves developing the skills and capabilities of employees or an expert performing a semi-
skilled job functions (Barnett and Miner, 1992).  Ideally, this requires employees performing 
additional job functions besides the original job responsibilities, thereby increasing the quality 
output, without commensurable pay. 
  
Workers on numerical flexibility are likely to experience more work pressure than the core 
employees. For instance, managers may deliberately assign tasks that are high in both 
cognitive and social demands to the permanent employees, and assign hazardous job 
responsibilities to agency workers (Connelly and Gallagher, 2004).  Also, for the fact that 
they are not covered under any statutory rights, managers take advantage of this gap to mount  
pressure on agency workers by setting unimaginable work targets, that affects their well-being 
(De Witte and Naswall, 2003: 152; Zeytinoglu et al. 2004: 518-9), and they are also unlikely 
to report any poor health conditions as it may either lead to their disengagement or reduce 
their chances of becoming a permanent employee (Reevy and Deason, 2014; Liukkonen, et al. 
2004: 2455; Virtanen et al. 2005: 610), more especially in an era of growing unemployment 
(Virtanen et al. 2005). 
 
2.8.3. Lack of Identity 
Workers on numerical flexibility are likely to have little or no help from trade unions, because 
they are unlikely to be unionised and their rights have often not appeared to be a key problem 
for the labour movement (Gallagher and Syverke, 2005: 195; Byoung-Hoo and Frenkel, 2004: 
509). Standing (2014) has categorised this group of workers as a rising class, albeit non-
homogeneous, lacking a meaningful professional identity, and lacking work-based securities. 
This poses a great challenge for agency workers to raise a voice in the workplace.  
 
Trade unions may not want to identify with them on the basis that the high pedigree position 
and positive social status of the core based membership is threatened by the pool of agency 
workers, particularly when they construe the presence of these workers as employers’ agenda 
to change the in-house structures, or screen for potential skilful worker(s) (Forde and Slater, 
2005), they may react unfavourably (Kraimer et al. 2005: 389; Chattopadhyay and George, 
2001: 787). 
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In conclusion, evidence has shown that flexible work arrangements are likely to have negative 
implications on both the core and peripheral, although the peripheral seems to be the most 
affected given their non-standard status subject to dual managerial control structures (Coe, et 
al. 2009). In a similar vein, some authors have argued that the emerging segmentation of the 
labour force has hindered the formation of working class-consciousness and integration 
among workers with different employment status (Cho, 2012; Kalleberg, 2000). 
 
This study therefore argues, that most previous studies exclusively focused on employers’ use 
of labour segmentation in order to remain competitive, maximise profit, and to have total 
control over employees, but neglected the role of trade unions (Reich, Gordon et al. 1973; 
Stone 1974). Doeringer and Piore (1971) acknowledged the role of labour but they did not 
analyse the bargaining dynamics between labour and management, limiting their discussion of 
industrial relations institutions to the observation that they influence the use of agency labour.  
In response to this gap in the literature, Rubery (1978) and Elbaum (1983) have contended 
that the segmentation literature should integrate labour as strategic actor in the analysis. 
Unions have the power and the interest to bargain and to limit competition among workers 
and to maintain control over skill supply and workers’ knowledge. In light of this, this thesis 
discusses trade union strategies in relations to flexible work arrangements. 
 
2.9. Trade Unions and Employment Relationships  
 
In this section, we can explore the limits and potential of trade union strategies in mobilizing 
agency workers. The power of unionism is ultimately linked to the workers which they 
represent and the power potential of their collective action. An important foundation of this 
thesis study is the assumption that in the context of a global trend in the growth of non-
standard labour, some categories of workers are more difficult to organise than others, due to 
their fragmentation, and this pose several challenges for trade union.  
Accordingly, trade union strategies and more generally their potential to organize agency 
workers are partly shaped by the organizational structure that exists within a firm. This study 
does not claim that organizational structure is the only determinant, but find it to be an 
important factor that can influence the choices made and options available for trade unionism 
when developing strategies.  
 
Trade unions are the best known type of collective employee organisations. Various definition 
of the term ‘trade union’ exists. Sidney and Beatrice Webb (1964) classically defined a trade 
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union as a continuous association of wage earners for the purpose of maintaining or 
improving the conditions of their working lives (Webb and Webb, 1964: 1). Rollinson (1993: 
58) defines a trade union as an organisation, whether permanent or temporary, which basically 
involves workers of one or more descriptions and is an organisation whose principal purposes 
includes the regulation of relations between workers of that description and employers or 
employers’ association. Trade unions are known to always provide a wide range of services 
for their members which do not involve employers or any outside agency. 
 
In view of these definitions, the term trade union as it applies in this study is defined as a 
heterogeneous entity with diverse interests becoming more homogeneous with a common 
culture. It is both a socio-political movement and a moral vanguard. It constitutes workers’ 
voice in national and international economic and socio-political development processes. This 
study definition of trade unionism is informed by the contemporary nature of their objectives 
and functions, of an economic, political and social dimension as discussed below. 
 
2.9.1. The Economic Objective of Trade Unions 
As economic actors, trade unions attempt to manage the internal employment relationship of 
an organisation between their members and management in their members’ favour. They act 
as a channel through which issues concerning employment contracts are handled and 
legitimise decisions jointly reached through negotiations with management.  Importantly, 
trade unions protect their members’ jobs, seek the objective of full employment, improvement 
of pay and other conditions through collective bargaining. 
 
2.9.2. The Political Objective of Trade Unions 
 
Trade unions in their capacity as political agencies are intermediary organisations positioned 
as collective organisations representing workers to both employers and the state. This 
objective, as Fairbrother (2000) argues, is predicated on an assumption that trade unions are 
organisational entities which are distinct and separate from the state and employers, although 
union representatives may enter into alliances with the state or employers or be drawn into 
partnership relationships at both management and state levels. Thus, trade unions have a 
broader political agenda in protecting the economic interest of workers. Essentially by 
humanising working conditions and providing a liveable wage for all. 
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2.9.3. The Social Objective of Trade Unions 
 
Trade unions provide social and welfare benefits to their members such as educating their 
members on unionism, economic, social and political matters, as well as the provision of legal 
aid. They also maintain or advance terms and conditions of employment. This function 
includes both the obvious terms of employment (wages, hours of work), and the nature of the 
contract of employment, as well as the procedures to be followed in amending it, that is, both 
procedural and substantive issues in the employment contract. 
 
Trade unions also protect and increase the employment opportunities of their members. As 
Fairbrother (2000) observes however, this role of unions has come under increasing threat in 
the face of the changing terrain of workplace unionism, which includes, the privatization of 
the public sectors, migration/relocation of businesses, downsizing, flexible work 
arrangements and the fragmentation of the labour force. 
 
All these trade union functions are steadily being eroded in the face of contemporary 
employment relations. The increasing utilization of agency workers has been perceived as a 
barrier to trade union efforts to improve the working conditions of their members, which have 
been inherent from their struggles in the past (Olsen and Kalleberg, 2004: 328; Campbell, 
2005: 3). Also, the complexities of the employment relationships surrounding this group of 
workers, implies that the trade unions need not only to consider their various employment 
status and conditions of work, but also, that of the employment agencies in determining their 
strategies. 
   
Logically, contemporary employment relations have created negative relationships between 
employers and trade unions on one hand, and trade unions (permanent employees) and agency 
workers on the other.  The unions might not want to mobilize the agency workers for fear of 
conforming to the new work arrangements and the agency workers may likewise not want to 
join unions for fear of losing their jobs, this further contributes to the global decline of union 
membership (Campbell, 2005: 2).  
In view of this dilemma confronting the trade unions, Heery (2004: 437) systematically 
classified four possible ways trade unions can respond to agency workers. These are 
Exclusion, Inclusion, Partnership and Social Movement.  Each of which is characterised by a 
combined policy regarding agency workers, whether or not trade unions seek to represent 
them and whether or not unions accept the legitimacy of employment agencies. 
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Table 3: Heery’s (2004) Possible Options for Trade Unions Responses to Agency Workers 
 
 
Employment Firm/Labour Contractors 
Rejection Acceptance 
Contingent Workers 
 
 
Exclusion 
 
Exclusion 
 
Regulation 
Inclusion Replacement Engagement 
 
Table 3 above shows Heery’s suggested trade union options to the growth of agency workers.  
Exclusion implies trade unions reject the legitimacy of both employment agencies and agency 
workers, while engagement implies acceptance of both. For the case of replacement, trade 
unions combine a rejection of the private employment agencies by replacing them with public 
employment services, with inclusion of agency workers in order to raise both labour standards 
and labour quality. Regulation means that trade unions seek to regulate agency workers’ terms 
and conditions through engagement with employment agencies, rather than representing 
agency workers directly. 
2.10.  An Analysis of Trade Union Strategic Options 
The first option is exclusion, which implies that trade unions can reject the legitimacy of 
agency workers in the workplace where they have representational rights. This is not strange, 
since they have been very antagonistic towards the use of non-standard labour. This option 
indicates the strong existence of trade union position, and that agency labour signals a danger 
to traditional jobs (Gallagher, 2008: 485).  This is a view based on the kinds of relationships 
that can exist between permanent employees and agency workers (Heery and Abbot, 2000: 
158). 
The interpretation of this negative relationship is the consciousness of conflicting interests 
between the permanent employees and agency workers, and the determination to safeguard 
the work and wage level of the standard employees. However, this option has a negative 
impact on trade union memberships, because employers are currently depending more and 
more on agency workers in executing their businesses. Evidently, the protected permanent 
workforce is shrinking, while the insecure agency labour is rapidly increasing (Koch and 
Fritz, 2013: 133). 
Secondly, as earlier discussed, a trade union is a body whose main aim is to represent 
workers’ interests (Hyman, 1994:120). This function of unionism raises a question of whose 
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workers interests they seek to represent. As Hyman observed trade unions can act on behalf of 
specific constituencies, with the criteria of inclusion which of necessity are the same 
principles of exclusion, and they focus on distinctive aspects of their constituents individual 
and collective experiences. 
Clearly constituencies can represent dual functions. First there is the problem of which section 
of employees’ unions mobilize, while the second is the extent of unions representation. Either 
they are focused exclusively on their membership or they diversify their interests to 
encompass non-members within their specific domain.  
 
This analysis clearly connects to the question of whose agenda trade unions attempt to 
represent, going by the fact that interests may differ between employees. Likewise, trade 
unions may choose to pursue the traditional core agenda of improving work conditions, or 
they may also decide to widen the scope of representation to address the role of the state, as it 
concerns labour regulations, wage or broader problems in the community, such as, 
environmental degradation and pollution.  
 
Having analysed trade unions’ scope of interest representation, we can now turn attention to 
examine how interests are developed. The style of strategies trade unions adopts when 
confronted with the emergence of agency workers can mirror the expectations of current and 
potential members, of how their interests would be represented and protected within the 
workplace. Various groups of employees may have diverse interests or even conflicts because 
interests “may be inherent in the work exchange” (Simms, 2007: 444). 
 
 Accordingly, existing union members might resist the inclusion strategy of the trade unions 
to represent the interests of agency workers. They may assume that their statutory interests 
may be marred by embracing the interests of the non-standard labour force, likewise that their 
interests may be neglected if unions represent this group of workers, considering the 
organisational resources available.   
 
From the on-going, the entire workforces, both those on permanent and triangular 
employment contracts, are in an imbalanced power relationship with capital (Offe and 
Wiesenthal 1980), albeit such a working mass can have a common interest, which could form 
the basis of collective resistance to capital (Turner, 1997). 
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The third option for trade unions confronted with agency labour and the insecurities it 
represents is to form partnership with management. It has been suggested partnership is 
necessary in order to provide protection for members, with guarantees for future employment 
through close management-labour relationships (Heery and Abbot, 2000: 160). The extent of 
job security that can be sustained through alliances will vary, for instance, such compromise 
can involve getting rid of the practice of disengagement during economic recession, with 
assurances that employees’ reduction will not occur by forced redundancy or retirement 
(Heery and Abbot, 2000: 160). 
Meanwhile trade unions may attempt to influence state policies and secure changes in labour 
regulation in order protect the jobs of their members and cut down on the insecurities 
experienced by agency workers (Heery and Abbot, 2000: 161). In this regard, trade unions 
may attempt, through political parties and government to make changes in the labour 
legislation and such amendments aimed at safeguarding the workforce from exploitation. The 
fundamental aim of this effort is to extend labour privileges enjoyed by the permanent 
employees to agency workers. 
 
However, some critics have questioned the fundamental integrity of the trade union and 
partnership arrangements under neoliberal economic pressures, pointing to the inherent 
underlying dangers of such partnership (Darlington, 2009: 19; Kelly, 1996). Of key concern is 
the possibility that partnership might lead to incorporating trade unions into organisational 
goals, perhaps leading to compliant trade unions.  This   may hinder the ability of trade unions 
to attract and mobilize union members, consequently resulting in losing their strength and 
militancy, which is the essence of trade unionism (Kelly, 1996; Taylor and Ramsay, 1998).  
 
The last option that trade unions may adopt towards agency labour is the strategy of assuming 
the nature of a social movement. Social movement unionism is defined as having two 
affiliated facets: on one aspect is the attempt to reform trade unions as social movements, and 
the other aspect, is the attempts to submerge trade unions in a wider social movement.  The 
previous aspect of social unionism aim is to extend trade unionism to agency workers through 
aggressive mobilization drives. While the later aspect is the creation of labour community 
collaborations which seek to draw upon the resources of the community, in the pursuance of 
trade union’s goals. At the same time developing a wider idea of union purpose, that embraces 
community and environmental principles alongside promoting quality of work (Heery and 
Abbot, 2000: 164-165). 
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In respective of the strategies that trade unions may seek to adopt, the way and manner in 
which they are structured and organised plays an important role in deciding if they will be 
able to manage with the dramatic changes in the labour market. The structure of trade unions 
relates to the representational structure upon which the union is premised (Fiorito and Jarley, 
2008: 190). Representation refers to the degree that union members take charge of their union 
directly or by representative government. 
Regarding the representation argument, several trade unions are said to have a powerful 
democratic internal set of arrangement, and members are able to influence policies taken at 
workplace or shop floor level to the highest policy-makers. For example, in Germany, 
although Work Councils are not directly trade unions bodies, the unions have a major 
influence on their operations (Fulton, 2015).  By this scheme, it assumes that members should 
be able to lobby for the arrangement of agency workers and their representation by the trade 
union. However, given the contentions between permanent employees (unionised) and agency 
workers (non-unionised), it may be more challenging for trade unions to reach a compromise 
to mobilize them, because a compromise to mobilize this group of workers may be seen as an 
admission and acceptance of atypical work arrangements. 
In view of the above arguments, the Nigerian oil industry trade unions are operating in a very 
hostile environment dominated by powerful oil MNCs (Adewumi and Adenugba, 2010: 66). 
The purpose of having trade unions in the industry was to foster members’ satisfaction and 
rights against exploitation, as well as, to promote the welfare and interest of the workers in 
general through mobilization and collective bargaining with the employers. However, this 
purpose is being undermined by the increasing utilization of agency workers and the denial of 
their rights to association (Danesi, 2012, George et al. 2012:1). For example, in 2012, 
NUPENG declared trade dispute between Shell Nigeria and its employment agencies, based 
on Shell management’s refusal to permit agency workers to join unions, and the arbitrary 
dismissal of workers due to their participation in union activities. The dispute was taken to the 
Industrial Arbitration Panel (IAP), and after careful deliberation and consideration on the 
dispute by IAP, it was held, that the dismissed workers be reinstated within 30 days and the 
right to association be permitted.  
 
However, Shell Nigeria refused to reinstate, declaring that the position of agency workers no 
longer existed. The Ministry of Labour and Employment was involved but nothing positive 
resulted. Thus the violation of the rights of agency workers in the Nigerian oil industry was 
perpetrated with impunity and should not have been condoned by the Nigerian government 
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and its monitoring agencies responsible for monitoring and enforcing compliance (Danesi, 
2012: 10).  
 
However, the Nigerian trade unions have not been alone in this war against the use of agency 
labour, it is a global issue. The next section presents selected examples from the global world 
on trade unions struggles in the face of such contemporary employment relations trends. 
 
2.11. Trade Unions Reactions towards Flexible Work-Selected Examples from the 
Global World 
2.11.1.  INDONESIA 
The weakness of the Indonesian unions to respond to the threat posed by work flexibility has 
been due to internal and external factors. Until 2005, Indonesian trade unions at the local level 
accommodated work flexibility due to their powerlessness. However, a powerful rare reaction 
became evident at the national level towards the end of 2005, when unions began to campaign 
against the government’s intentions to allow more work flexibility by revising the Labour 
Law No. 13 of 2003. 
Unions' resistance towards the proposed revision was supported by activists, NGOs and 
academics, who joined in protests and provided both moral and logistical support. In 2006 
unions from different industries and sectors flocked to the streets to oppose the proposed 
revisions in Jakarta, Bandung and Surabaya, the most important industrial and manufacturing 
centres in Indonesia. In Jakarta, the demonstration was directed to the heart of the central and 
provincial government, the President and Governor's offices, the institutions which were 
responsible for the law. 
Protesters targeted these two institutions in an attempt to insist on state support for workers 
who were vulnerable in the face of capital. The demonstration proved effective insofar as the 
government declared it would return to the revisions and repeat the entire revision process. In 
addition to forming a tripartite national forum in which the three major union confederations 
were involved, the government also employed five national universities to legitimate the 
revision process and called for an independent evaluation in an effort to guarantee objective 
results in the revision process (Tjandraningsih and Nugroho, 2008: 8-9). 
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2.11.2.  CHINA 
China, especially the province of Guangdong has become a major nexus of the global market 
since the early 1980s. Companies such as Nike, Wal-Mart, Mattel and others have taken 
advantage of the low corporate tax, poor environmental controls and inexpensive labour 
(Barboza, 2008). China’s high growth has been uneven between regions and provinces 
(Nordhuag. 2012:407). However, with the help of mobile phones friends and families who 
worked in other provinces of China often communicated and compared incomes and working 
conditions, upon the demand for equitable pay with those in other provinces and the refusal of 
management to grant comparable incomes and working conditions as that of their 
counterparts led to series of picketing, organised protests and strike actions. 
The unrest state of the society provides the framework for the Chinese government’s 
enactment of a new Labour Contract Law in 2008 (He, B and Xie, Y. 2012: 426). This 
legalises employees’ rights on a series of tension provoking issues, including the demand that 
management gives a documented contract letter to every agency worker, reduce overtime 
periods and appropriate greater responsibilities for the trade unions.  Undeniably, every form 
of self-organisation, strike actions and protests have been seriously discouraged by Chinese 
government, promoted trade unions in the delight of building social stability and what they 
called peaceful nation. 
It should be noted that the trade unions/workers cooperation has played an important role in 
fostering the reform of trade union language, structures and practices. Since workers 
constitute the largest single force in the industry, it is when they come together that they can 
conveniently challenge the dominance of capital (Hyman, 1975).  
 
Likewise, the restrictive labour laws of most nations in expanding the enclaves of the 
unprotected labour force has driven the unions/workers up against the wall, by inviting 
workplace activism in new and novel ways. In some circumstances it is possible that 
workplace activists will develop where none existed previously or had a minimal presence 
like Indonesia.  One feature of these developments is that past forms of a single union 
activism may no longer have been appropriate in this contemporary era under capitalism. In 
the most general terms one can say that the revisions of the labour laws in Indonesia and 
China have been driven by trade unions activism. The governments of both nations have been 
much more anxious about the political danger posed by industrial unrest, hence the revision of 
the nation’s labour laws. 
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Indicatively, labour legislation appears to be a determining factor in the growth and use of 
agency labour. Although, the debate about legislation has gained fresh prominence with many 
arguing that there are other factors that have contributed to the rise of agency work in this 
dispensation. Before looking at other factors, the next section looks at some countries labour 
legislation and their respective roles. 
 
2.12. Labour Legislation as a Precursor to the Growth of Agency Labour 
The International Confederation of Private Agencies (CIETT, 2011) posits that its success lies 
within the new regulatory contexts created by market liberalization and deregulation. A major 
outcome of labour market liberalization by national governments has been the widespread 
organisational use of agency labour, through legislation reducing regulatory barriers that had 
previously restricted the scope of services that employers and employment agencies can 
engage in (Campbell and Burgess, 2001). 
 Within the prevailing trend to deregulation, variations still exist among nations, which 
present an explanation for differences in the proportions of agency workers between nations. 
As earlier discussed, agency labour is a way of avoiding regulation guiding employees on 
standard employment contracts, it is therefore argued, that agency workers should be more 
widespread in nations with restricted regulations on employment relations (Mitlacher, 2007). 
However, recent studies have indicated that this is not the case in some circumstances. 
Nijssen and Paauwe, (2012); and Koene, et al (2004) observed that there was no link between 
national legislative frameworks guiding employment and proportion of agency workers. 
Among the European Nations (EU), France with the strongest employment legislation has one 
of the highest proportions of agency workers.  The United Kingdom, a nation with the 
weakest employment protection legislation amongst the EU, also has a large proportion of 
agency workers. Whilst agency work has thrived within the underlying context of 
liberalization of the employment agencies, the comparatively high rates of agency labour at 
opposite ends of the employment legislation spectrum, as well as the growth of agency 
workers in the nations that lie between these extremes, point to a general increase of agency 
labour irrespective of the circumstances of the regulatory context. 
Koene et al (2004) have attempted to address nation variation by bringing other less 
substantial evidence to explain high proportions of agency work into their analysis; 
concluding that the general business requirements and national culture may further explain 
variations. Lower proportions may be attributable to the persistence of deeply embedded 
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negative attitudes towards agency work. They argue that the relatively lower proportion of 
agency work in Sweden, a nation that has immensely liberalised legislation guiding the use of 
agency work, may be due to cultural animosity towards agency labour (MacKenzie, et al. 
2010: 606), unlike, the Netherlands, where agency work is culturally more acceptable (Taht 
and Mills, 2015:66). Thus, while permanent employment and the termination of standard 
employment contracts is greatly regulated in Sweden, the level of agency work remains 
relatively low (MacKenzie, et al. 2010), whereas in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, 
rates of agency labour are higher, although there is less of an imperative to avoid regulations 
guiding standard employment in these nations since it is much easier to terminate 
employment contracts. 
Accordingly, this explains the dilemma in clarifying national characteristics as analytical 
determinants behind the employment trend of agency labour. For the case of Sweden, it is not 
simply cultural prejudice towards agency labour that has slowed its growth; strong trade 
unions have also played a significant role in shaping the employment terrain (MacKenzie, et 
al. 2010; Koene, 2004). This influence may be both direct and indirect, that is, influencing the 
modus operandi of agency labour. In contrast to France, where there is a strong tradition of 
hostility to agency labour and all forms of precarious work, a strong attachment to the 
traditional norms of employment, agency labour thrives (Barbier, 2005). According to Koene 
(2004), this is due to the weakness of French trade unions, hence their inability to fight the 
growth of agency labour. In line of this argument, it is imperative, that the factors that gave 
rise to agency labour are complex and not easily explained.  
In view of the above, some scholars have focused their attention on examining the role of a 
rather overlooked factor in the growth of agency labour, the employment agencies. Coe et al. 
(2010); and Forde et al. (2008) have argued that the growth of agency labour is as a result of 
the presence of employment agencies, which act as passive agents responding to market 
dynamics, providing organisations with flexibility to adjust their labour force, as well as, 
responding to changing employment preferences. 
An emerging body of research, mostly based in the United States, has challenged this concept 
of employment agencies by analysing how these agencies have actively engaged in practices 
that have transformed the structure of employment relations at both national and international 
levels (Coe et al. 2010). These authors have observed that employment agencies are rendered 
invisible in much of the literature even though, as profit-making entities (MacKenzie, et al. 
2010), according to CIETT (2016: 16-18), the total global annual sales revenue for the entire 
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employment and recruitment industry was €450.4 billion and agency work is by far the 
biggest part of the sales revenue of €316.6 billion. Nations with the top markets sales revenue 
are, Europe; include UK, 29.5%; China, 23.1%; USA, 21.0%; and Japan, 10.1%.  Thus, in all 
indications, employment and recruitment industry is a legitimate object for research. 
2.13. The Growth and Functions of Employment Agencies 
As we have seen, the rapid growth of agency labour is attributed in part to the emerging trend 
of employment agencies supplying outsourced workers, explained by UNCTAD as a new 
breed of multinational (UNCTAD, 2004).   
They are sophisticated employment agencies with innovative technology, which aids their 
operations (Ciett, 2015). The expansion of these multinationals both in terms of market share 
and in terms of employment, make it possible for them to offer economies of scale that are 
difficult for indigenous or smaller competitors to compete (Hunter and Saunders, 2007), thus 
promoting a trend of continuous internal labour outsourcing as employers look for the most 
economical solutions (Acas, 2012:8). 
 
In 2013, there were approximately 260,000 private employment agencies globally, with 
236,283 local branches, and internal staff strength of 1.66million (all employment services) to 
source for job for every individual, and individual for every job. This indicates that most of 
the employment agencies have broader labour market networks globally (Ciett, 2015: 14).  In 
2014, about 71.9 million gained access to labour markets globally and 67.2 million in agency 
work (Ciett, 2016).  The biggest market for agency work is India, 27.8 million workers, the 
United States (US) with approximate 14.6 million people, closely followed by China with 8.1 
million people. While Europe represents 11.3 million workers (Ciett, 2016). 
 
Eastern Europe is presently experiencing a rapid growth of recruitment firms (Labaye, et al. 
2013: 7). In order to penetrate the cheap and skilled multilingual workers who are fluent in 
English, French and German, Hewitt human resources centre recently opened an office in 
Poland and Krakow (Marquez, 2006). Accenture has offices in Bucharest, and Prague. 
Outsourcing has an office in Ukraine, Staff Poland has office in Warsaw and ADB has a 
location in Prague.  Moving human resource outsourcing work to Eastern Europe is more 
beneficial for numerous French and German employers where unemployment is a contending 
national issue than moving to India. 
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Most of the leading recruitment firms such as EDS Corp, Accenture, IBM, CDP, DDC, 
Desktop Staff and Convergys now have branches in Africa and Asia, such as Nigeria, Delhi, 
Manila, China, Shanghai, Dalian, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia and Indonesia. Philippines have 
become a hub for offshoring of employment arrangement outsourcing, while Thailand is an 
emerging participant (Hunter and Saunders, 2007: 28). 
These employment firms are now supplying workers to organisations and offering a wider 
range of services beyond performing the peripheral activities such as clerical, administrative 
functions, to the provision of core activities to client companies (Forde, et al. 2008: 281). 
Their functions cover virtually all operations of human resources, from, recruitment to 
selections, training, payroll, benefits and many more (Forde, et al. 2008). The debate about 
the wider range of task and functions of these profit-making employment agencies has gained 
fresh prominence with many arguing that the growth and expansion of agency workers in core 
production areas is possibly a subversive strategy to internal labour markets (Forde, et al. 
2008: 680). By contrast others perceive contemporary changes in their functions as 
complementary to internal labour market structures, particularly in the new knowledge 
economy, whereby organisations rely more on skilled knowledge workers to remain 
competitive (Potkany, 2008; Cooper, 2007; Forde and Slater, 2005; Maidment, 2003).  
These forms of collaborative business deals are reflective of the lengths to which firms can go 
in pursuit of economic scale of savings. Many companies now enjoy cost reduction, labour 
flexibility, risk diversification. Quiggin (1996, cited in Holland, et al. 2013:14) emphasises 
that the mainstream economic rationale is that employment outsourcing provides a means of 
transferring the significant or unpredictable risks of running a business, particularly financial 
risks, to employment firms, who in turn shift to agency workers, while still enabling the 
principal company to retain control over the service. Likewise, the transfer of employment 
relations to a third party avoids strong or militant unions (Teicher, et al. 2006: 245). 
Accordingly, the need to undermine union organisation and individualize the employment 
relationship is both an ideological and theoretical proposition of neo-liberalism.  
As Coe, et al. (2010) have suggested, employment agencies cannot be viewed as merely 
embedded in national markets. They greatly have an institutional place that enables 
organisations to engage in forms of intermediated employment practices which otherwise 
would be logically and socially impracticable. As a result, studies need to expand from a 
narrow focus on organisations and/or legislation, in order to take account of the institutional 
space that employment agencies occupy. To do otherwise is to underestimate the broader 
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institutional context in which the employment and recruitment industry operates and is likely 
to result in missing the complex and variegated ways in which distinctive staffing markets are 
continually produced and reproduced through interactions between these various elements 
(Coe, et al. 2009: 15-16).  
On the basis of such considerations, this study argues that the employment and recruitment 
industry has facilitated the commodification of labour power, thereby driving wages below its 
value, Smith (2016) called this “super-exploitation”. Thus, the superior power of management 
over labour does not only affect the financial value accrued to labour but also affects working 
arrangements and conditions of work. As observed by Walker (1977: 311), employers drive 
for flexible work arrangements, is how best to extract surplus value. 
This inherent exploitation builds conflict into social relations in production, and thus affects 
employment relationships. Therefore, conflict in the employment relationship is not just an 
issue of labour’s reaction; it is what triggers the reactions. However, it has also been 
observed, that it is not only the underlying organisational nature of conflicting interests 
between labour and employers that gives rise to industrial disputes, it is also encouraged by 
what are perceived to be the genuine resentment and legitimate demands of workers that 
encourages trade unions to revolt at employers’ action (Darlington, 2012: 519). In this regard, 
the next section presents the analytical framework that underpins this study. 
 
2.14. Analytical Framework  
 
2.14.1. Marxist Concept of Capital Accumulation and Conflict 
 
This research is located within a Marxist analytical framework which defines trade unions as 
the conveyor belt of workers’ desires to put an end to labour commodification and radically 
transform society (Hyman, 1999: 94).  For Marx, capitalism’s social structure is inherently 
exploitative, an everyday occurrence of immediate resistance to managerial authority or 
workers action against capital. Employers unending drive to accumulate, to expand and shape 
workers’ lives activity into the commodity form, produces a conflictual response that in turn 
compels employers to innovate and the state to reform.    
 
The once stable proletariat has been replaced by a network of agency workers with the result 
of a structurally disaggregated and disorganised labour force. This development of capitalism 
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has been viewed as undermining Marx’s ideas of social change which hinges on the 
oppressiveness and emancipation of the proletariat to overthrow the disintegration of capitalist 
system.  Thus, workers’ fragmentation has not only posed substantial challenges in achieving 
this motive, but also, has had direct effect on employees’ collectivism and representation. It is 
more challenging for a culture of cohesion and collective solidarity to grow when workers’ 
status and differences in the nature of work divide them.  
 
As the labour market becomes increasingly fragmented, the task of building solidarity 
between workers, in and between work places, has become problematic for trade unions. In 
view of this Offe and Wiesenthal (1980: 71-74) analysed the structural constraints that labour 
faces and how these forces restrict labours’ organisational possibilities.  
 
Applying a worker perspective, the authors comment on how ‘social scientists’ are often 
concerned with the subjective awareness of differences, while ignoring the equality of the 
objective conditions to which all wage workers are subjected (Offe, and Wiesenthal,1980: 
70).  As capitalism forms divisions among the proletariat, employees are more exposed to 
interest bias, but that does not change the uniformity of their stand in the capital-labour 
relationship. 
 
In order to succeed in this mission, trade unions have to deal with what Hyman refers to as 
internal issues, undifferentiated from what Offe and Wiesenthal attributed to as the internal 
strength of a union. For Hyman, inner confrontation is similar to the constituency of unions. 
The historical union member is a male employee in full-time employment relationship. 
However, the focus of full-time employees is speedily eroding (Gleason, 2006: 99), and 
agency labour is becoming increasingly normal. Based on these trends, it is imperative to 
revolutionize trade union approach to involve agency workers, or rather, to widen the 
constituency.  In addition, to widen the faction, unions must build solidarity between workers 
(Hyman, 1999).  
Unions traditionally have compartmentalized solidarity (Hyman, 1999: 3). The idea of 
‘mechanical solidarity’ is adopted from Durkheim (1893: 129-130 as cited in Hammond, 
1983), whose concept is on the unity of proletarian interests with trade unions’ goal being to 
articulate this solidarity. Hyman highlighted three determinants as cause of the crisis, firstly, 
is the growing inner differentiation between the proletariat, increased market coercion, and 
the deterioration of equal commitments within labour bodies. 
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In view of the above, Hyman shared the facts that trade unions have always had issues of 
mobilizing employees under common interests, and as workers have become more 
fragmented this strategy would rarely not survive or workout. Beyond the fragmented 
workforce, Hyman likewise pointed to the separation between work and community. The old 
idea of conventional employees as unified to a common workplace and a common locality has 
no importance in contemporary society. Most employees now live and work at a considerable 
distance from fellow colleagues or workers and pursue different cultural and recreational 
activities. The issues regarding these inner differences are linked to a crisis of representation. 
For Hyman, trade unions have two key choices regarding this issue, either establish their 
strategies on restricted professional interest, or appeal to a diverse set of interests based on 
social movement unionism. Trade unions can either adhere to the declining core or they can 
fight to represent the periphery. However, it is a big challenge to develop an action plan that 
will effectively address all these problems (Hyman, 2004).   
The aftermath of this crisis is to build what Hyman calls ‘organic solidarity’. Hyman explains 
a unionism that changes organisational conformity with co-ordinated diversity (Hyman, 1999: 
14). Organic solidarity lies in understanding and recognising the various interests between 
workers, among unions and between unions.  However, the weakness in Hyman’s study is the 
lack of explanation on how this ‘organic solidarity’ is adequately going to deal with the issues 
of representation.  Offe and Wiesenthal (1980) argued that the strength of the trade union is 
ultimately connected to the unity within the workplace, but this unity is challenged as 
organisations recruit more workers and thereby become heterogeneous. Hence the theory of 
‘organic solidarity’ faces a challenge, there is the possibility of a trade-off between mobilizing 
contemporary kinds of workers (accepting difference) and inaugurating solidarity among 
members (arguing for common ground). Solidarity itself depends on unity and it is inevitably 
more challenging to build this among a workforce not based on the notion of them all being 
workers, and objectively all being equal in their relation to capital. 
From a Marxist vantage point of analysis, it can be argued that as, Hyman (1975) has asserted, 
industrial relation is about power, interests and conflict. The interests of capital and labour are 
asymmetrically opposing and conflictual. Employers attempt to buy labour at the lowest 
possible price, whilst labour on the other hand, attempt to sell his labour-power at the highest 
possible financial value in order of sustenance. The employers tend to accumulate profit, 
whilst labour tend to maximise wages/benefits. Hence, under capitalism, the interests and 
aspirations of both capital and labour are contradictory and in conflict. Conflict is viewed as a 
disorder precursor to change and to resolve conflict means to change the imbalance and 
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inequalities in society in terms of power and wealth. Thus, trade unions are viewed as 
employee response to capitalism (Chidi and Okpala, 2016). Accordingly, Marxist views 
exemplify workplace relations as a reflection of the occurrence of societal inequalities and the 
inevitable expression of this at the workplace.  
Marxist theory emphasises capital accumulation and exploitation. This approach is critical of 
capitalists’ society and its system of production, distribution and exchange and emphasises 
the importance of collective action including strike action and action short of strikes (Rose, 
2008). Hyman (1975) argues that given the nature of capitalist society, industrial relations can 
be analysed from a more radical perspective. 
While the Marxist theory is a generic theory of society and social changes, it nevertheless 
remains a powerful framework for the analysis of industrial relations within capitalist 
societies of social enquiry into the power relationships under capitalism. The starting point in 
this theory is that employers are motivated by the generation of surplus profits with which to 
finance further accumulation of profit, and the source of profit is an exploited workforce 
which is less paid of which it is the one which produces. Job stability and regularity in this 
case, is not an item of the agenda of capitalists.  
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2.15. Conclusion 
 
Increased global competition has put pressure on organisations to look for new ways of 
cutting costs in order to remain competitive and cope with economic instabilities. Hence, 
employers found solace in flexible work arrangements, particularly, numerical flexibility. 
However, employers increasingly utilization of agency workers in getting their jobs done, has 
raised much concerns and worries in the workplace, particularly, the infiltration of agency 
workers into the core activities that have been traditionally highly unionised and covered by 
strong collective bargaining (Acas, 2012: 18; Kalleberg, 2000). 
The utilization of agency labour offers employers an attractive option for a number of reasons, 
firstly, by subjecting the contractual nature of the employment relationship to commodify 
labour power. This is more pronounced as agency labour falls through the inadequacies of a 
legislative protective net. These triangular employment relations exemplify the unequal facets 
of employment relationship identified by Marx.  The power imbalance is laid bare in the ease 
with which the employers can offer and withdraw employment contracts. 
 
The increasing use of agency workers is a barrier to unions efforts to improve the working 
conditions of their members, which have been inherent from struggles in the past (Olsen and 
Kalleberg, 2004: 328; Campbell, 2005: 3).  Accordingly, unions perceive agency labour as a 
threat and management strategy to undermine trade unionism, hence, Heery’s possible options 
(Heery, 2004; Olsen and Kalleberg, 2004). 
 
Therefore, this research conducts an empirical analysis of the increasing utilization of agency 
workers in the case of the Nigerian oil industry. An understanding of the contextual 
environment is necessary to better understand the purpose of this study. Hence the next 
chapter presents the historical background and operations of the Nigerian oil industry and the 
trade union’s struggle against oil companies. 
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Chapter 3: Contextualization 
3. Introduction 
This chapter provides a brief background of Nigeria, and the political and economic 
environment within which the oil industry is embedded in order to contextualize the research 
agenda, and to provide the necessary background for understanding the rationale for the 
research, the underlying issues that influence the behaviour of the oil multinational companies 
and the trade unions. It also provides a brief overview of the three oil MNCs use as case 
studies, and some background on the oil-producing Niger Delta region. 
3.2. A Brief Background of Nigeria 
The Federal Republic of Nigeria is situated in the West of Africa with a great population of 
over 170 million (World Bank, 2015) and the largest in the African Continent. Between the 
year 1914 to 1960 Nigeria was fully part of the British Colony, though had her independence 
in 1960 (Falola and Heaton, 2008; Azaiki, 2006; Okonta and Douglas, 2003). Currently, 
Nigeria is a federation of 36 states and the Federal Capital Territory (FCT), Abuja. Below is a 
typical map of Nigeria, showcasing the 36 states and the FCT. 
Figure 5: The map of Nigeria 
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Nigeria has diverse and complex ethnic groups, languages, religions and traditions which 
structures individual perceptions in the way they think and act. The predominant tribes are the 
Yoruba’s (West), the Hausas (North) and the Igbos (East). The South-South, which is the 
Niger Delta is a picture of diversity on its own and dominated by the Ijaws, which is also the 
source of oil production.  
These three ethnicities have constantly contended for the political control of the nation since 
independence. This battle for political control is apparent in the coups and counter-coups by 
the military rulers who assume all of the functions of government. During these periods of 
military rules, legislatures were either demilitarize or rendered ineffective in favour of the 
military governments (Azaiki, 2006). Under military rules, citizens’ opinion became 
inconsequential, as power is not gotten through the acceptance of the populace but through 
coercion and control of resources (Falola and Heaton, 2008). The country has predominantly 
been under the military government since independent until recent years. See Table (4) below 
for the chronicles of Nigeria leadership since 1960: 
Table 4: Annals of Leadership in Nigeria  
NO DURATIONOF 
REIGN 
PRESIDENT/HEAD OF STATES TYPE OF 
GOVERNMENS 
STATE OF 
ORIGINS 
1 1960 – 1966 Tafawa Balewa Civilian North 
2 1966  Johnson Aguiyi-Ironsi (Assassinated) Military East 
3 1966 – 1975 Yakubu Gowon Military Central North 
4 1975 - 1976 Murtala Mohammed (Assassinated) Military North 
5 1976 - 1979 Olusegun Obasanjo Military West 
6 1979 - 1983 Shehu Shagari Civilian North 
7 1984 - 1985 Mohammadu Buhari Military North 
8 1985 - 1993 Ibrahim Babangida Military North 
9 1993 Shonekan (Interim) Civilian West 
10 1993 – 1998 Sani Abacha (Died in active service) Military North 
11 1998 – 1999 Abdulsalami Abubakar (Interim) Military Central North 
12 1999 – 2007 Olusegun Obasanjo Civilian West 
13 2007 – 2010 Umaru Musa Yar’ Adua (Died in 
active service) 
Civilian North 
14 2010 – 2015 Goodluck Jonathan Civilian South 
15 2015 - till date Mohammadu Buhari Civilian North 
Source: compiled by Itegboje,  (2017) 
Nigeria was formerly an agrarian nation before independence in 1960; farming was the 
fundamental source of the economy, accounting approximately over 50% of the Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP), as well as one third of export earnings. However, with the 
discovery of crude oil in commercial quantity, agricultural production was neglected and the 
sector relegated into relative decline (Buren, 2001). Within the phase of 1960s and 1980s, 
Nigeria migrated from the responsibility of being an independent production of food to one of 
strong reliance on food importations. Presently, crude oil accounts for approximately 90% of 
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export earnings and 83% revenue of the federation account (Ogbeifun, 2009). More 
importantly, the Nigeria economy has become a mono-economy of crude oil.  The US and 
United Kingdom (UK) are Nigeria’s major business associates and foreign investors, with 
investment largely in the oil industry. 
3.3. The Political and Economic Corporate Re-structuring in the Nigerian Oil 
Industry: The Genesis of Labour Contracting     
The administration of General Ibrahim Babangida marked the beginning of SAP, in an 
attempt to align the Nigerian economy with the global trend. Despite this bogus economic 
agenda, Nigerians were determined in returning the nation back to democratic rule as they 
perceived the economic objectives of General Babangida were not significantly different from 
that of his predecessors. This led to severe human rights agitations against General Babangida 
administration and the call for a democratically elected government.  
 
In 1999, President Olusegun Obasanjo who was once a military president from 1976 – 1979, 
became a democratically elected president, and his administration came-up with 7-agenda 
reforms of how to position the economy abreast with the rapidly growing global trend, and 
among President Obasanjo economic policy reforms were the following (Nigerian Economic 
Review 2000:23): 
 
- The Government shall be honest, efficient, co-operative, and operate on the basis of 
extensive devolution of power and shall therefore function as a facilitator. 
 
- That government shall, in co-operation with the private sector ensure adequate and 
efficient provision of infrastructure especially energy, telecommunications, water and 
financial services so as to promote internationally competitive environment for 
economic activities. 
 
- That private enterprise, private effort and non-government actors shall play the major 
role in achieving the set targets. 
 
- That effort shall be made to promote strong work ethics and induce productivity. That, 
it is envisaged that the economy would be market- oriented, private sector led, highly 
competitive, internally and globally, particularly in the areas of comparative advantage, 
technologically driven, broad-based, and internationally significant.  
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President Obasanjo regime promoted neo-liberal policies and generous incentives which 
included the lowering of labour standard to attract FDI.  The administration created an 
enabling business environment by entering into both bilateral and multilateral contracts on 
investment security, by creating the Nigerian Investment Promotion Commission (NIPC), 
which was saddled with the responsibility of co-regulating and monitoring of all foreign 
investments activities.  This agency operates as a machinery to entice, promote and co-
regulate international investments to boost the economy at a yearly estimate of 10%, create 
jobs and react to market dynamics (Awosolu and Esugbohungbe, 2002). 
 
The revitalization of private sector was channeled at enticing the much needed FDI into the 
country. Despite the fact that it attracted FDI particularly in the oil industry, it however 
lowered labour standards (Adewumi, 2008; Mokwenye, 2008; Ogundare and Elijah, 2011).  
Thus, the corporate restructuring that followed the influx of the private sector involved 
mergers and acquisitions, privatization, commercialization, re-engineering and liberalization, 
which ultimately led to downsizing and mass retrenchment.  The Bureau for Public 
Enterprises in charge of regulating the sales of states enterprises failed to take adequate 
employment protection measures for the affected employees, for instance, the state’s policy 
did not reflect employees concerns to establish collective agreements in the new structures 
and this resulted in mass unemployment (Fajana, 2005).  
Organisations took advantage of the unemployment dilemma by subjecting most of the 
employees to non-standard workers. Employees’ freedom of employment choice was 
completely restricted, and as a result, the negotiations in which they found themselves tend to 
favour those placed in a stronger bargaining position. This category of workers was unfairly 
treated because they were compelled to accept jobs remunerated at a financial value which 
was below the equilibrium price of their labour. Hence, management exploitative tendencies 
in accumulating surplus value, while workers earn less for their labour than they would have 
if they were to trade their labour in a perfect competitive market (Carens, 2008:12-14; Attas, 
2000:75-79). Thus, employers discovered contract labour as cheap means of getting the job 
done, without interference from the trade unions (Danesi, 2012). 
 
Another disturbing situation was the subtle monetary enticement of early retirement offered to 
the permanent employees and replaces them with agency workers (Okafor, 2007:175; 
Adenugba, 2004). For example, in September 23, 2013, the National Union of Petroleum and 
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Natural Gas Workers (NUPENG) directed its members to embark on an indefinite strike over 
the alleged moves by Mobil Producing to sack some members from its labour force. 
NUPENG claimed that permanent employees have been systematically paid-off, and their 
positions occupied by agency workers on new contract terms, a move that breached the 
contractual collective bargaining agreement with the union (Eroke, 2013). In this regard, this 
study sheds more light on the modus operandi of the Nigerian oil industry. 
 
3.4. The Nigerian Oil Industry 
Nigeria is one of the top ten oil-producing nations in the world and the sixth biggest exporter 
within the Organisation of Petroleum Export Countries (OPEC) (Hanner, 2015). The oil 
industry drives the economy of Nigeria; in essence, it holds a strategic position to the growth 
and development of the nation.  It constitutes about 90% of Nigeria’s foreign exchange 
earnings and 83% of its Gross Domestic Products (GDP) (Ogbeifun, 2009). A brief historical 
record indicates that the Nigerian Bitumen Corporation, a subsidiary of a German Company 
first explored oil between 1907 and 1914. The company was forced to pull-out from Nigeria 
as a result of the first world-war. Afterwards, the company was never allowed to continue its 
operations as the British colonial authorities gave preference to only British companies for oil 
exploration (NNPC, 1976). 
However, in 1938 there was a merger between Shell petroleum and British petroleum, Shell-
BP was granted licence for oil exploration in the whole of Nigeria regions.  In 1956, the 
company discovered oil in commercial quantity for the very first time at Oloibiri, Bayelsa 
State, in the Niger Delta (Ihua et al., 2009). The success of Shell-BP and the support from 
British colonial authority ushered in more oil firms to operate in Nigeria. Towards the end of 
1950s non-British oil companies were likewise granted the privileged for oil exploration. 
This new development ushered in Nigeria as a member of Organisation of Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OPEC) in 1971, and in line with OPEC Resolution No. XVI.90 of 1968, 
the Nigerian National Oil Corporation (NNOC) was established in 1971 by the Nigerian 
government, which encouraged all member states to “acquire 51 per cent of foreign equity 
interests and to participate more actively in all aspect of oil production” (Khan, 1994:20). As 
a result, the Nigerian Petroleum Decree No. 51 of 1969 granted total control and ownership of 
all crude oil in the country with the government. By 1977, the Nigerian National Oil 
Corporation was changed to Nigerian National Petroleum Company (NNPC).  
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In 1956 when oil was first discovered in commercial quantity, the nation was still under the 
control and authority of the British Colonial Government, hence the citizens had no means to 
the industry.  As at 1960 when Nigeria gained her independence, there were national skills 
shortage and expertise in technological and infrastructural development of the oil wells. 
Hence, the decision by OPEC was a welcome resolution, despite the lack of the required 
knowledge to develop the resources, acquiring more than 50 per cent of the equity share gives 
a right of ownership in the oil capitalist industry. 
Adopting OPEC regulations, the NNPC signed joint venture agreements with the Europeans 
and US oil MNCs, which were already in full operations of oil production in the country. The 
partnerships that exist between NNPC and the oil MNCs are joint ventures and production 
sharing agreements. The oil MNCs are the key operators and NNPC share in the running cost, 
mainly onshore operations, while in the production sharing agreements (offshore), the MNCs 
expend all funds towards the operational costs (Okeke and Sobotie, 2000). Analytically, the 
state through NNPC does not share in the production cost agreements, however, shares in the 
surplus after the MNCs regain their running investment. 
Despite the fact that NNPC (2010) report shows that 169 oil firms are registered with the 
industry, there are indeed 5 leading oil MNCs in joint venture agreements with the NNPC.  
They are:  Shell Petroleum, a subsidiary of Shell, a British-Dutch company; Exxon-Mobil 
(American); Total-fina-elf (French); Chevron-Texaco (American) and AGIP oil (Italian). 
Exxon-Mobil and Chevron-Texaco operates mainly offshore exploration, while Shell operates 
mainly onshore production. These American firms, produces more than half of Nigeria’s oil, 
likewise, the United States is the largest exports market of the Nigeria’s oil, consequently, the 
position of these two American companies regarding Nigeria had been mostly one of self-
interest, as they claimed to be the only companies with the capital power to maintain the oil 
exploration in Nigeria (Davis, 1998:6). They are the industrial drivers of the joint ventures, 
which means, they are in charge of all exploration and production activities, thereby solely 
takes all the daily decisions in the running of the business. 
The joint venture partners (government and oil MNCs) both own the oil wells. It is essential 
to note here that, irrespective of the state through the NNPC owns more than 50 per cent in 
the partnership arrangement (see Table 5, page 88), however, power and control virtually lies 
with the oil MNCs, which implies, the state has no authority and control over the company’s 
policies and decisions (Omoweh, 2005).  The state is relatively an investor, bearing expenses 
and earning profits in relation to its shared involvement in the joint venture agreement. 
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The joint ventures agreements (JVA) are mainly for downstream operations.  Businesses 
pertaining to upstream wells have been structured as “production sharing contracts” in which 
the state is not a legal associate as compared to the joint ventures. In the production sharing 
contracts, the oil MNCs bears all the exploration and production expenditures and pay tax and 
royalties to the government.  All the oil blog licenses and drilling subleases granted in the 
deep-water wells off the Nigerian shore have been on these arrangements. According to 
Ogeifun, (2009), the upstream operations have a considerable number of expatriates, thereby 
violating expatriate quotas, hence the agitation for national bill of content. These oil MNCs 
wield so much power within the Nigeria state and communities. They have been able to 
explore, extracts and exploits both the citizens and environment without any corresponding 
development. 
Table 5: Nigerian JVA (Equity Interests of Major Partners) 
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By this singular act of the oil MNCs having all the will power to take the day-to-day 
decisions, they have become increasingly powerful, and some critics described the oil MNCs 
as having superseded the governments in the running of national affairs (Halcrow, 1998: 7).  
However, while government consented that their primary role is to provide and protect its 
citizens, and by that signed documents such as the Declaration of Human Rights, MNCs more 
particularly the ones in the oil industry have no such obligations (Adler, 1999:20). Their 
commitment to such issues is left to the goodwill and somewhat ambiguous course of codes-
of-conduct (Banfield, 1998:1).  
NIG ERIA’S O IL EXPLO RATION AND PRO DUCTIO N 
AR RANG EM ENTS  
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More precarious is the situation where the national government is not stable and non-
democratic. It is in situations as this the law of the land may compromise the laws of ethics. 
For example, the fight by the trade unions against agency labour and massive retrenchment of 
employees on standard employment contracts, made the then military junta General Sani 
Abacha to dissolve NUPENG and PENGASSAN in 1994. And the multinationals took 
advantage of this default to casualize their workforce; it was also an avenue to boost their 
expatriate quota at the detriment of the indigenous workers. Despite several regulatory 
measures in place, such as the ministry of labour and employment, evidence have shown how 
oil MNCs exploits workers, violates human rights and depletes the environment in which they 
operate. More hopeless is the situation when the affected labour force and the communities 
have no effective means to fight such despicable and deplorable act (see Danesi, 2012, 
Aborisade, 2010).  
The total dependence of the Nigerian government on oil revenue and its partnership with the 
Oil MNCs, explains the promulgation of stringent labour control measures and policies. The 
control becomes necessary so that both the government and Oil MNCs can maintain high 
rents and profits respectively, for example, the removal of automatic trade union membership 
and the restriction of no right to strike by the Amendment Act of 2005 (Solidarity Centre, 
2010; Fajana, 2005:6; Ihonvbere, 1996), promoted precarious work in the Nigerian oil 
industry.  
The overarching issue with workers on precarious work arrangements is that they do not fall 
within the traditional purview of employer-employee relationship with the oil companies, but 
known as workers of the employment firms. These workers are termed flexible workers, and 
do not earn same wage as the employees on standard employment contracts who are directly 
employed by the oil MNCs. They do not have any welfare benefits, and their conditions of 
work are usually very precarious. Furthermore, their tenure of work is not certain, thereby 
lacking security, unlike their colleagues on standard employment. 
3.5. The Causes and Nature of Agency Labour in the Nigerian Oil Industry  
As earlier explained in Chapter 1, the implementation of neoliberal policies gave rise to mass 
unemployment, which the employers took advantage of, along with the country’s economic 
uncertainty, and adopted the flexible work arrangement model (Fapohunda, 2012). While on 
the other hand, labour power being the only means of sustenance for an average Nigerian 
man, workers were left with no other option than to accept any kind of work to survive. For 
example, in 2017 the working age population of Nigerians stood at 111million, with 
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85million labour force participation. 51million (60.1%) of this  population were fully 
employed, while 18million (21.4%)  were underemployed (working less than 40hrs, but at 
least 20hours) translating into a labour force participation rate of 81.5 per cent. While 29% of 
the working age population were unemployed, this percentage is likely to increase due to the 
unstable employment status of the underemployed. Table 6  below shows that the rate of those 
fully employed in 2017 (60.1 million) was lower than the one reported in the preceding year 
of 2016 with 64.7 million, this saw to the increase of the underemployed from 19.3 in 2016 to 
21.4 million in 2017. 
Table 6: Trends of both Standard and Non-standard Employment in Nigeria (2004-2017) 
Source: Compiled by Itegboje, (2018) from National Bureau of Statistics (2016, 2017); Kale and 
Doguwa, (2015) 
The periods between 2004-2005 records the highest rate of full-time employment, followed 
by a steady decline from 2006. Although, there was no comprehensive statistics of the 
underemployed from 2006-2009, however from the declining nature of full-time employment, 
it is argued that there was a steady increase in the growth of non-standard labour. For 
example, the graph indicates a steady growth in non-standard form of employment from 2010 
(16.3%), although dropped to 14.8% in 2013, with a steady increase since 2014. The highest 
rate of non-standard form of employment was in 2017 (21.4%). The trends indicate that the 
Nigerian labour market has been steadily dominated with non-standard form of  labour. This 
supports the arguments that people engages themselves in non-standard form of employment 
in the absence of permanent employment in order to have a means of sustenance.  
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Non-standard form of employment is more evident in the private sector of the Nigerian 
economy such as the oil MNCs, telecommunication, and  banking  sectors  (see Tables 
below).  
Table 7: Agency Workers in the Telecommunication Sector 
s/no Name of Company No. of Perm. 
Employees 
2012 
% No of Agency 
workers 2012 
% Total 
1 MTN 151 2.6 5570 97.4 5721 
2 Airtel 105 2.1 4800 97.9 4905 
3 GLO 92 3.4 2650 96.6 2742 
4 Etisalat 67 4.6 1376 95.4 1443 
5 Starcomms 46 3.9 1130 96.1 1176 
 Total 461 2.9 15526 97.1 15987 
Source: Fapohunda, 2012, p. 267 
 
 
Table 8: Agency Workers in the Banking Sector 
s/no Name of Company No. of Perm. 
Employees 
2012 
% No of 
Agency 
workers 2012 
% Total 
1 UBA 595 15.8 3178 84.2 3773 
2 GTB 358 14.1 2180 85.9 2538 
3 ZENITH 325 16.2 1680 83.8 2005 
4 SKYE 264 16.0 1376 84.0 1640 
5 FIRST BANK 1830 30.0 4270 70.0 6100 
 Total 3372 21.0 12684 79.0 16056 
Source: Fapohunda, 2012, p. 267 
 
 
These organisations indulged in some unfriendly industrial relations practices borne out of the 
drive to remain competitive and maximise profit. The increasing utilization of agency labour 
has been so steep that some have questioned whether these forms of labour should continue to 
be called atypical. This is because triangular employment relationship has systematically been 
built into today’s business model globally. Employers of labour find this form of employment 
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relations as the best alternative for their business in the face of global competition (Adewumi 
and Adebimpe, 2012).  This is due to the fact that management saves a lot through labour 
contracting, and are relieves of the anxieties involved in maintaining internal employees on 
full-time employment contract (Hall, 2000). Accordingly, while organisations are extracting 
surplus-value from agency workers in maximising profit, the key assets (workers) that are 
responsible for the success of the business are not well taken care of, hence, unions’ 
agitations. 
 
Likewise, agency labour in the Nigerian oil industry has become a subject of great concern, 
not until the late 1980s of oil production in Nigeria, the oil Multi-National Companies where 
integrated in forms of structures, operations and staffing (NUPENG Bulletin, 2013). The main 
objective of contract staffing then, which was direct hire by the oil companies, was a type of 
transitory phase of contract worker becoming a permanent employee and this aimed at 
reducing unemployment. Unfortunately, over the past twenty years, an unpleasant situation 
started unfolding, which is labour contracting, which marks the beginning of agency labour. 
 
In the 1990s, Nigerian oil industry operates full-time employment system, which consists of 
approximately 70 per cent of full-time workforce and 30 per cent contract workers, who were 
all directly hired by the oil MNCs. For example, Mobil Producing Crude Oil had more than 
400 junior full-time employees in the 1980s and by 1991, these figures dramatically dropped 
to 80 junior permanent employees. By 2002, there was no direct junior employee of Mobil Oil 
(Okafor, 2012: 7615; Adewumi and Adenugba, 2010: 68). However, this percentage has 
greatly changed in that there is now great increase in the percentage of agency workers. 
Danesi, (2012:3) in her report revealed as at 2010, the percentage was 40 per cent against 60 
per cent agency workers. For example, ExxonMobil employed 1,650 agency workers through 
employment agencies and 1,927 permanent employees, but the interview conducted reveals 
that ExxonMobil hired 3,835 agency workers against 2,118 full-time employees. In same 
manner, Shell Petroleum hired 17,000 agency workers against 3,625 full-time employees. 
Likewise, Chevron hired 2,400 agency workers against 2,000 full-time employees and 
majority of these agency workers perform same job functions as the full-time employees. 
Furthermore, the report, estimated the increased growth to a ratio of 1:4, for every one 
permanent employee to four agency workers. Some of the employees interviewed placed the 
ratio 1:9, and this is against the backdrop of ILO estimation of 1:2. 
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Table 9: 2010 Graphical Statistics Of  Employment Contracts in the Nigerian oil industry 
s/no Name of Company No. of 
Perm. 
Employees 
2010 
% No of 
Contact 
workers 
2010 
% Total 
1 Shell 3625 17.58 17,000 82.42 20,625 
2 ExxonMobil 2118 36 3835 64  5,953 
3 Chevron 2000 45.45 2400 54.55 4,400 
Danesi, 2012 
However, the empirical findings of this study conducted in 2015, found that Shell Nigeria has 
approximately 6,000 permanent employees and 35,000 non-permanent workers. While 
ExxonMobil Nigeria has 4,000 against 8,000 non-permanent staff, and Chevron has 3,100 to 
3,500 non-permanent staff, see Table 6 below for Graphical Statistics 
Table 10: 2015 Graphical Statistics 
s/no Name of Company No. of 
Perm. 
Employees 
2015 
% No of Contact 
workers 
2015 
% Total 
1 Shell 6,000 14.6 35,000 85.5 41,000 
2 ExxonMobil 4,000 33.3 8,000 66.6  12,000 
3 Chevron 3,100 47.6 3,500 53.0 6,600 
Source: Shell Sustainability Report 2016, Management Interview 2015 
 
The declining nature of permanent employees as indicated in the Table 6 above suggests a 
steady demise of trade unions under the economic neo-liberal agenda (Adenugba, 2003; 
Okafor, 2011:7615). Although, in spite of the clear evidence of the increase usage of non-
standard workers, Fajana, (2005), reported, that there are no accurate statistics showing exact 
number of contract and casual employees in Nigerian oil industry, due to lack of official 
statistics showing the extent and trends of non-standard workforce. However, Animashaun 
(2007) alleged that some companies have 60 to 90 per cent of their employees as contract and 
casual workers. While there seems to be no comprehensive data about the extent of this 
phenomenon, it appears to be quite significant, particularly in countries without legal 
restrictions such as Nigeria.   
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Graham, (2012) observed among the oil producing nations worldwide, the Nigerian oil 
industry makes great use of non-standard labour in its complexity. It is not the typical contract 
employment status and agency work in other sectors of the economy. One significant issue 
here is the relationship between the oil multinational companies (MNCs) themselves. Some 
companies are mainly concerned with exploration and production, some with refining and 
distribution, while others integrate the whole processes right from the upstream to end 
consumption. Some oil MNCs are simply contractors and provide professional services to the 
operators.  These can range from exploration, logging, shaft sinking, construction, marketing, 
maintenance, transport, catering, medicals and security. The complexity of this is that 
exploration and production operators can, intermittently functions as contractors, such as 
Schlumbeger group and services. An operator may contract to provide services to another. 
Subsequently, the term “non-standard employment” can cover a wider range of employment 
relationships in the industry. It encompasses non-standard employment contracts, such as, 
contract, service, and manpower staff, these are the common names amongst others. Majority 
of these workers are in triangular or multiple employment relationships, with differential 
terms and conditions of work. 
A worker who is in this form of employment relationships oftentimes is concerned about who 
is the real employer. What are his/her rights? Who is responsible for him/her? For example, 
the client company might have interviewed a candidate for a job, and then the client company 
will thereafter transfer the potential worker to an employment agency who will now issue the 
employment letter. This offer letter oftentimes includes the imposition of the “yellow-dog” 
contract terms, meaning workers are compelled to sign a contractual agreement not to be a 
member of any trade union. This is almost similar to the Swedish Derogation or Pay between 
Assignment Model where employers subject their workers to sign a Pay between Assignments 
Contracts. This kind of contract prevents workers from having equal rights with the direct 
employees performing same job functions, but assured of regular work (Fajana, 2005: 26; 
Danesi, 2012: 12; Forde and Slater, 2014: 27-28). 
Even with the above imposition of unethical labour practices by both the oil MNCs and 
employment firms, trade union have maintained aggressive unionisation drive in engaging the 
non-standard workers across the big oil multinational companies, which the management 
vehemently opposed. This has relatively aggravated the tension between trade union and 
employers’ relationship (Ogbeifun, 2004: 25; Graham, 2010).  
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This antagonistic behaviour between employer and union is due to the fact that the Nigerian 
Labour Act did not explicitly define contract labour and Casualization, thereby not providing 
a legal framework for the regulations of these categories of workers. It is generally believed 
among the employees of the industry that those who are privileged to be members of the trade 
unions have been able to achieve the desire of many Nigerians since the discovery of oil. That 
is, benefits for middle Nigerian oil employee come from belonging to either of the two trade 
unions, PENGASSAN and NUPENG. However, with the contemporary work arrangements in 
the workplace, achieving this benefit is gradually becoming a mirage. 
The Following are typical categories of labour structure in the Nigerian Oil Industry: 
3.5.1. Permanent Employees 
These direct staffs of the oil companies have the standard terms and conditions of 
employment. These include both indigenous workers and expatriates. Their job functions are 
spread across both the downstream and upstream. Majority of the expatriates work and head 
most of the oil platforms (oil rigs), their job functions covers, offshore installations, drill 
superintendents, logistics coordinators, medical officers, safety officers, dynamic position 
operators and tool pushers. Although there are few indigenous employees heading some oil 
platforms, while majority of them work downstream in different department such as, 
operations, marketing, accounts, human resource, logistics, and IT. The indigenous employees 
are of three classifications: they are managerial, senior and junior employees; however, those 
in the managerial positions are but few in number, approximately 15 per cent and have no 
right to association. While PENGASSAN unionize about 80 per cent of the senior employees, 
and about 10 per cent of junior workers are unionize by NUPENG. (Adewumi and Adebimpe, 
2012). 
3.5.2. Contract Workers 
These workers are in triangular employment relationships and work alongside permanent staff 
but do not have a direct employment relationship with the client companies (oil MNCs). They 
are engaged for renewable fixed periods through third party. Their job functions span across 
upstream and downstream and engage to perform jobs such as, drilling operators, fork-lift 
operators, fire-service personnel, Human Resource (HR) personnel, Account officer, 
Medicals, Secretaries, flow station operators, Catering and house keeper. 
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3.5.3. Service Workers 
The oil MNCs have innumerable labour service for various kinds of work activities to 
executes by servicing companies in support of crude oil exploration and production activities. 
In most instances, the workers from these servicing companies are deep-rooted in the oil 
companies because of the kind of services that their employment firms are rendering to the oil 
MNCs. However, they are not permitted to associate with the trade unions. This group of 
workers basically work offshore, and are mainly hired by the oil servicing companies, such as 
Schlumberger services, Halliburton groups, Polmaz, Plantgeria, Baker Hughes, and others. 
They are specialists in their respective fields, such as geologist, Data Engineers, Technicians, 
IT, Derrickman, and Motorman. 
3.5.4. Manpower Workers 
This group of workers have different employment contracts terms for specific task and 
subsequently discharged thereafter. They are mainly indigenous workers, who work basically 
downstream and engage as clerical officers, flow-station operators, flow-station guards, 
transporters and many more functions. 
These four categories of labour frequently work as a team but managed under differential 
terms and conditions of work. Besides the permanent employees who are direct hires of the 
oil companies, the other forms of employment status are in triangular employment 
relationships, known as agency workers. These workers are hired by the employment agencies 
but rendered their services to the oil companies, they are answerable to the management of the 
oil companies, while their complaints and grievances are channelled to their employment 
agencies. The conventional bilateral relationship between employer and employee with an 
explicitly defined employment contract, has been replaced by one in which employer 
responsibilities are not only divided with the employment agency, but characterised by an 
ambiguity as to where the division of responsibility resides. The next section explicitly 
elaborates on the shared responsibilities in a triangular employment relationship in the 
Nigerian oil industry. 
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3.5.5. Division of  Responsibility in a Triangular Employment Relationship  
 
Figure 6: Framework of Employment Relationships and Responsibilities in the Nigerian oil 
Industry 
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Source: Itegboje, (2018) 
Notes: 
A. Employment Contract              E.  Commodity Relationship 
B. Right to Unionization               F.  No Right to Unionization 
C. Business Contract                    G.  Labour Rights Protected 
D. Commercial Contract               H. Outside the Purview of Labour Law 
I. No Relationship 
 
In terms of hiring agency workers, the management of the oil MNCs and the employment 
agency are both involved in the hiring decisions. The agency place the adverts, based on the 
criteria from the oil MNCs, shortlist qualified candidates are directed to the management of 
the oil MNCs companies, for interviews, and thereafter the profiles of successful candidates 
are forwarded back to the agency who then issue letters of appointment. Their contracts are 
open-ended, and could be ended by either of them depends on the project and circumstances.  
OIL MNCs 
EMPLOYMENT AGENCY                   
PERMANENT 
EMPLOYEES 
AGENCY 
WORKERS 
TRADE 
UNIONS 
LABOUR LAW 
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Theoretically, there is no formal relationship between the oil MNCs and agency workers, 
however, the relationship may not be always clear-cut in practice as there is a scope for a user 
company being involved in supervision (Olsen, 2006; Kalleberg, 2009), which is operational 
in the oil MNCs. While employment agency is the supplier of agency workers for the oil 
MNCs, the oil MNCs are responsible for the control of the work process. The employment 
agency is not involved in the allocation of job functions and work supervision.  
 
In the case of industrial accident or sudden health issue at the workplace, the oil companies 
take care of the wounded agency worker. Thereafter, whatever costs incurred, the expense is 
deducted from the employers confers, who subsequently deducts the amount from the wages 
of the wounded worker. In effect, neither the oil companies nor the employers are liable for 
the medical care arising from the workplace accident 
 
 In the issue of dismissal or redundancy, agency workers are made redundant without any 
compensation or benefits. Notice of termination is an issue between the oil MNCs and their 
employers. The employers are privileged to know when and why such exercise would take 
place by the oil MNCs. The workers are accordingly informed. Likewise, where the intention 
is initiated by either the employers, the oil MNCs are accordingly informed. But most often, 
agency workers are fired by their employers without notice or when they suspect militancy 
activities. These workers experience relatively inferior wage and conditions of employment as 
explained in Chapter 5 (p. 141-3). 
Wage-setting is determined by both the management and employment agency, without trade 
union involvement. The employment agencies receive payments from the management of the 
oil MNCs on a monthly basis, retain their commission, and then pay the workers. Under the 
Nigerian Constitution Section 17(3), the principle of equal pay for equal work without 
discrimination on account of gender and protection against workers exploitation is 
guaranteed. But the reality in practice is that, although there is equal pay for equal work for 
employees on standard employment contracts, there is nothing of such for those workers on 
triangular employment relationships. 
 It appears that agency workers are being discriminated against solely on the basis of their 
employment status and this amount to a flagrant breach of Section 17(1) of the Nigerian 
Constitution. Thus there is discrimination with respect to pay in Nigeria with regard to 
employment status (Danesi, 2012). Indicatively, agency workers may earn less than the direct 
hires even if they have same educational qualifications, skills, and perform same task of equal 
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value. There is no law that permits such a practice. If so, the law would be contrary to the 
provisions of the Constitution. It is a practice promoted by the industry, which has become a 
norm. It is therefore argued, that the differences or discrimination in wages of employees on 
standard employment relations and workers on triangular employment relationship in the 
Nigerian oil industry is unconstitutional since the Constitution guarantees equal pay for equal 
work. Thus, by using agencies for ‘payroll’ purposes, the oil MNCs companies avoid 
equitable basic benefits accrued to permanent employees without facing legal implications. 
This is against ILO’s declaration (ILO, 1994, Annex 1) which states that labour is not a 
commodity; this implies every practice that treats workers as commodities should be 
prohibited. It is therefore recommended, that commercial contracts through agency work 
should be changed into employment contracts (Eun et al, 2011). 
Further to abdicating employers’ responsibilities in terms of lawful employment benefits to 
the agency, the oil MNCs companies effectively excludes agency workers from bargaining 
systems within their workforce, by virtue of the “Yellow Dog Contracts” agency workers are 
made to sign by their employers, thereby creating a non-unionised labour force within a 
unionised system (Gray, 2002; Heery, 2004). Agency labour is an effective way for 
employers to shed responsibility and by that agency workers have no industrial relations 
contact with their real employer (Wills, 2009).This raise the question of how trade union 
perceive this complex form of employment arrangement subject to two to three parties 
involved in the supply and management of labour and how they deal with the issue of agency 
workers. While issues of direct employees present unions with the challenge of mobilization, 
those on triangular employment relationships present unions with greater challenges, which 
supposedly not to be according to the Nigerian Constitution. 
 The Nigerian Labour Act 1974 protects the right of workers to associate for trade union 
purposes. Workers membership in trade unions and trade union activities are protected by 
sections 9(6a and b), which states that No Contract shall: 
(a) Make it a condition of employment that a worker shall or shall not join a trade union or 
shall or shall not relinquish membership of a trade union; or  
(b) Cause the dismissal of, or otherwise prejudice, a worker 
By reason of trade union membership, or  
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(ii) Because of trade union activities outside working hours or, with the consent of the 
employer, within working hours, or  
(iii) By reason of the fact that he has lost or been deprived of membership of a trade union or 
has refused or been unable to become, or for any other reason is not, a member of a trade 
union.  
It should be noted, however, that in spite of the above regulations, workers on triangular 
employment relationships are deprived from becoming union member by reason of the 
“yellow dog” contracts signed, which denies them unionization right. This is a serious 
infringement of workers’ right, and does not promote the principle of democracy and best 
practice in the workplace (Danesi, 2012). The only explanation for the degree of breach of 
this provision by employers is that the Act does not provide a penalty for breach, and the 
various government agencies that are responsible for monitoring and enforcing compliance 
have not done so (Danesi, 2012).  
Although, the management of the oil MNCs denied their involvement on the infringement of 
worker’s right, and declared, that agency workers are not their employees.  Indicatively, the 
deficiency in the Nigerian Labour Law concerning legal categorization of workers is one of 
the propelling factors for the growth of agency labour in the Nigerian oil industry. Only one 
class of worker is defined in the Labour Law, and that is, a worker is:  
 “Any person who has entered into or works under a contract with an employer, whether the 
contract is for manual labour or clerical work or is expressed or implied or oral or written, and 
whether it is a contract of service or a contract personally to execute any work or labour” 
(Labour Act, 1974, Oshintokunbo, 2015: 414). 
This description does not recognised workers in triangular employment relationship. In this 
context, it is often argued that not only is the law under-protective, but also it is difficult for 
workers under triangular employment relationship to prove their identity as workers of the oil 
MNCs under the labour law, and the employer-employee relationship is also not easy to 
establish (Kumar, 2002), In addition, whatever little is provided for under the law, is often not 
adhered to in practice. This is because agency workers rarely have the means to get legal 
support and to seek redress against violations; any complaint would only leads to loss of job. 
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With regard to the issue of legal and social protection for workers under triangular 
employment relationships, and  observing that the traditional notion of employee and/or 
employer in terms of labour regulations and social security programmes does not reflect the 
present dispensation of reality in the employment relationship, some scholars have 
emphasised on the need to broaden the scope of labour laws and social security coverage 
(Danesi, 2012, Davidov, 2004).  
ILO (2003, 2006) particularly emphasised on the  need for an institutional approach to the 
mitigation of social exclusion as a result of gaps in most nations labour law. For instance, a 
significant portion of the sources of work stoppages and other forms of industrial conflicts in 
the Nigerian oil industry arises as a result of the ambiguities involve in a triangular 
employment relationship. This simply calls for a rethinking of the way forward, if the nation 
really wants to have a harmonious working environment that promotes economic 
development. This is because the traditional  model of employment relations in which the 
employees at any given workplace are workers of the same employer, or have same terms and 
conditions of labour can no longer be taken for granted (Acas, 2012: 2). Thus, the quest for 
cheap labour has significant effect on employment relationships, and trade unions in 
particular.  
3.6. Trade Unions and Non-standard Labour 
The neo-liberal ideology that became prominent in the 1990’s has brought about significant 
changes in the global economy, particularly in Nigeria, with adverse effect on employment 
relationships, and by great implications on organized labour, particularly, PENGASSAN and 
NUPENG.  
In response to the changes in work arrangements, the trade unions maintained aggressive 
unionization of contract workers across the major oil MNCs in 2002. To a certain degree over 
60 per cent of contract workers were mobilized and the unions successfully negotiated on 
their behalf, although not comparable to the permanent employees’ terms and conditions of 
work but somewhat includes the application of minimum labour standards.  
 
The contract workers were more enthusiasts to associate, perceiving it as a great privilege for 
them to start enjoying some basic employment packages like their full-time colleagues. 
However, mobilizing these employees then was very challenging as most of the employers 
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fiercely opposed the move (Lumumba Okugbawa: PENGASSAN Deputy General Secretary 
2009).  
 
In order to hinder trade union’s aggressive drive, Chevron engaged the services of 
employment agencies to supply non-standard workers all through the company’s operational 
bases in Lagos, Port Harcourt and Warri. Trade union’s attempt to implement a standing 
agreement with Chevron, the employment agencies and government to mobilize the non-
standard workers, Chevron further introduced a service contract clause in the employment 
relationship with its agencies. Thus, making it compulsory to renew their contract on a yearly 
basis with the employment agencies, all these were attempts to frustrate the trade unions 
mobilization. 
 
Thus, pressure was mounted on the employment agencies to ensure they fired union activists 
in their labour force or they would have their contract with Chevron terminated. Regrettably, 
two of the employment agencies ran into trouble with Chevron, and got their contracts 
terminated in December 2002 and 2003 respectively. The other agencies got the message, 
which prompted one of the agencies, Delog Nigeria Ltd to sack 11 workers, many of them 
were emerging leaders of NUPENG unit, and this prompted Delog workers to go on strike. 
Likewise, this incited their colleagues from other firms to join in the strike actions for the 
reinstatement of their colleagues, it was recorded that about 400 workers lost their jobs 
because of these strike actions.  
 
In a solidarity move, Chevron workers went on strike to protest the unethical treatment meted 
out to their members. Understanding the economic implications of this crisis, Chevron 
management consented, and called the oil workers for dialogues and those fired were 
reinstated. However, in furtherance of resisting unionization drive, in March 2005, the 
Nigerian government reform the existing labour law, thereby putting an end to automatic 
trade union membership and making union membership voluntary (Fajana, 2005: 20). This 
move by the government gave impetus to employers’ refusal to recognize trade unions in 
relations to agency workers, which has since made it difficult to mobilize these segmented 
and fragmented labour force. 
 
However, irrespective of the government and the management of oil MNCs disposition 
towards trade unionism, the unions are not relenting. They have decided to move against the 
use of agency labour in the industry, as this has been perceived as a modern strategy of taking 
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the people back to the days of slavery.  This move usually is through strikes actions. The 
industry has been experiencing high level of strike actions since 2000 to date (see Appendix), 
where employers and employees’ relationship is influenced by distrust, antagonistic 
behaviours, and confrontation. The situation is particularly serious where opposition and 
confrontation lead to clear conflict and strife (Solidarity Centre, 2010:8). Strike is the most 
common and most visible expression. But conflict with the management may also take the 
form of peaceful bargaining and grievance handling, of boycotts, of political action, of 
restriction of output, of sabotage and absenteeism. Several of these actions, may take place on 
an individual as well as on organised basis. Even the strike action is of many varieties, it may 
be in form of a refusal to work over time or to perform a certain process. 
The industry has been experiencing frequent industrial crises in recent years emanating from 
interests and rights confrontations coupled with the crises from the oil rich regions of Niger 
Delta influenced by the struggles of host communities where crude oil is produce and 
exploited. The industry is personified by expatriate quota violation, non-implementation of 
collective agreements and all forms of unethical labour practices such as labour contracting of 
various shades of work flexibilization, and the denial to rights of association (Ogbeifun, 
2008). The employment relationship crisis in the oil industry are the product of neo-liberal 
policies which oftentimes have been criticised and condemned by labour movement, coupled 
with the lack of legal framework protecting this emerging group of workers. 
3.7. The Nigerian Legal Framework and Labour Relations 
Essential for the application of the Nigerian labour law is the presence of explicitly defined 
employer-employee relations. The Nigerian Labour Act Section 91, defined contract of 
employment to mean, any agreement, whether oral or written, express or implied, whereby 
one person agrees to employ another as a worker and that other person agrees to serve the 
employer as a worker” (Nigerian Labour Act, 1974). By implication, an employment 
relationship begins with two parties, the employer and employee, the contract of employment 
can be for life or fixed-term.  
In addition, the Nigerian Common Law specifies two types of employment contracts: (i) 
contract for service, and (ii) contract of service. The first is a process whereby employer 
instruct an employee what to do, how to do it and when. Once an employer exercises this 
form of control then it is a contract for service, an employee under standard, permanent 
employment contract falls in this category, while under the contract of service, the employer 
does not have any control where and how the job is to be done. This is the category for 
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employment agency and agency workers. By these definitions, the labour law did not clearly 
specify what should be the relationship between agency workers and the employment agency 
or the oil MNCs. Although, the principal companies (oil MNCs) claims that the workers 
supplied by employment agencies are not their workers, but that of the agency.   
The above explanations suggest that the Nigerian legal framework is not applicable to most 
segments of the non-standard labour; this form of labour relations lacks a clear employer-
employee relationship. Non-standard employment relations are mostly established on casual 
relations rather than contractual. This process partly contributed to trade unions inability to 
mobilize them. They are unorganised, hence, lacks institutional support and advocacy, thus 
making them vulnerable. 
The Labour Act further, defines a worker to mean, “any person who has entered into or works 
under a contract with an employer, whether the contract is for manual labour or clerical work 
or is expressed or implied or oral or written, and whether it is a contract of service or a 
contract personally to execute any work or labour…” (Nigerian Labour Act, 1974 (7). To 
analyse the above definition of who a worker is, it means that not all classes of workers are 
covered by this definition. The definition refers to clerical work or manual labour. Although, 
the Labour Act did not expatiate on the meaning of clerical work or manual labour, from 
Common Law perspective, clerical work is job such as stenography, bookkeeping, and letter 
writing. While manual labour involves the use of the hand in carrying out the real and 
substantive work hired to be executed. 
By implication therefore, those workers not hired for these two functions under the Nigerian 
Labour Act do not qualify to be called workers. What do professionals such as, engineers, 
doctors, lawyers, nurses, and others as administrative officers, technicians then called? This 
indicates that there are inadequacies in this definition. The Labour Act is therefore outdated, 
ancient and does not reflect the realities of contemporary employment and work arrangements 
in the Nigerian society, therefore, there is need to review the Act. Also, since the labour laws 
are directed at workers then most employed people are not qualified to benefit from the 
provisions of the labour law and collective bargaining in its present form.  
These deficiencies in the Nigerian legal framework and labour regulations appears to be a 
significant factor why the management of oil MNCs are deliberately taking advantage of the 
workers, hence, the predominance of nonstandard forms of employment in the industry. The 
two trade unions have since the past years been fighting to unionize agency workers, even 
when management enters into agreements with the unions, they routinely renege on 
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negotiated terms. This act of the management, coupled with the lack of recognition by the 
Nigerian labour law, have since relocated agency workers outside the organizational structure 
of the trade unions. The prevailing reality in respect of workers’ right is not because the 
unions did not try. Within the limits imposed by the law and the political and economic 
regimes, they tried to organize workers and protect them but were overwhelmed by the 
hostility of employers and the indifference of the State. 
 
3.8. Oil Workers Trade Unionism 
 
The present trade unions structure in Nigeria was established in 1976 and 1978 respectively 
by the Generals- Muritala Mohammed and Olusegun Obasanjo. Four central union 
organisations were replaced by one, the Nigerian Labour Congress (NLC). A great numbers 
of other trade unions were reorganised into 42, subsequently 29 industry-wide unions 
affiliated to the NLC of which their members are junior employees. NUPENG is one of the 29 
industrial unions currently affiliated to the NLC, it operates on regional and branch levels. 
NUPENG represent all junior permanent employment employees in the Nigerian oil industry. 
Workers include tanker drivers, technicians, administrative staff, and many more junior 
workers. 
While on the other hand, senior employees were also permitted, but are not allowed to be part 
of NLC. However, the senior staff created their own umbrella organisation, known as the 
Trade Union Congress (TUC) (Fajana, 2005: 6). PENGASSAN is one of the 24 senior staff 
associations in Nigeria under the TUC. PENGASSAN is also affiliated to the International 
Federation of Chemical, Energy, Mines and General Workers' Unions (ICEM).  
 
Both PENGASSAN and NUPENG co-exist peacefully and in harmony, occasionally joining 
ranks against management. Given the importance of the oil industry in national economic 
production and development, PENGASSAN and NUPENG, regardless of their membership 
size, can exercise a potentially significant degree of social power. The basic mechanisms are 
intuitively obvious: A vital resource is vulnerable to expressions of contention; even minor 
attempts at disrupting its production, distribution and consumption will have extensive 
economic and political effects. Given the industry’s high capital intensity, moreover, it may 
make more sense for management to accede to unions’ demands than to risk strikers’ which is 
far costlier disruptions of production. Hence, the drive to externalize the internal labour 
market, where there would be nothing as organization of workers and collective bargaining 
(Lawrence, and Fairfoul, 2014: 3). 
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 PENGASSAN key activity is to aid workers at the enterprise level, by administering day-to-
day trade union activities in the nation's four geographic regions: Lagos, Warri, Port Harcourt 
and Kaduna. At each regional office, there is an Executive Council consisting of one elected 
chairperson, a few national officers and one secretary (Fajana, 2005: 7). PENGASSAN aims 
to improve the rights, terms and conditions of work for its members and to resolve any 
problems raised by them. It promotes economic, social and educational programmes and 
provides financial services such as loans, thrift and savings schemes.  
Union organisation occurs at various levels including branch/company level, regional, zonal 
level, and state level. The structure of union organisation is similar across industrial sectors. 
At the branch or company level, workers are usually organised by representatives from the 
national union. For instance, if workers in a particular company are non-unionised, the 
national union under whose jurisdiction the company falls may decide to organised a branch 
in that company. The regional or zonal organising secretary then undertakes the task of 
organising the workers, and collectively bargains at the company level on their behalf.  
 
3.9. Collective Bargaining  
The system of collective bargaining in the private sector has largely been multi-employer 
sectoral bargaining since 1978 as a result of the creation of industrial unionism by law. 
Enterprise level negotiations prevail as well, however, industry-wide bargaining is the most 
prevailing. But the enterprise level bargaining is what is operational in the Nigerian oil 
industry and there is a clear movement towards decentralization by maintaining company-
level bargaining. This seems to be the general trend in most of the oil and gas industries of 
other oil producing nations such as Argentina, Romania, Singapore, Japan, Finland, China, 
Thailand and Turkey (ILO, 2002). In the Nigerian oil industry, collective bargaining at the 
enterprise-level takes the pleasure in accomplishing the determination of contractual terms 
and conditions of work. This is as a result of the non-existence of strong employers’ body in 
the industry regulating terms and conditions of work. Thus, company-level bargaining has 
succeeded and it is the only industry in Nigeria where collective bargaining is solely carried 
out at the enterprise level (Imafidon, 2009). 
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3.10. Background of the Case Study Companies 
3.10.1. SHELL 
Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC) Nigeria Plc is a subsidiary of Anglo-Dutch 
Multinational oil and Gas Company, with headquarters in the Netherlands (Galvez-Murioz, 
and Jones, 2005: 188).  The company is a merger of the British Shell Trading and Transport 
Company and the Netherland’s Royal Dutch Group of Companies. It is geographically and 
operationally diverse and highly decentralized with businesses all over 90 countries and 
produces about 3.1 million barrels of oil per day.  
Shell Nigeria Plc began its operations in 1937, then known as Shell-D’Arcy, which was 
jointly owned by the oil conglomerate D’Arcy Exploration Company and the British Colonial 
Administration (Udeke and Okoloie-Osemene, 2014). In 1941, there was an interruption on 
oil and gas production because of the Second World War, and operations began five years 
after under a new name known as the Shell-British Petroleum (Shell-BP) Development 
Company.  This new company first discovered oil in commercial quantity in Oloibiri, Bayelsa 
State of the Niger Delta-Nigeria in 1956. Between 1972 and 1973, the Nigerian government 
acquired BP’s share equity in the Shell-BP joint venture, as a result of the implementation of 
the OPEC directives (Udeke and Okoloie-Osemene, 2014). In accordance with this 
appropriation, NNPC became a joint venture with what is known today as Shell Petroleum 
Development Company of Nigeria Limited.  
The joint venture operates 50 per cent of Nigerian’s total oil production output of 900,000 to 
1.7 million barrel per day from over 80 oil fields. This comprises of NNPC 55 per cent, Shell, 
30 per cent, TotalFinaElf 10 per cent, and Agip 5 per cent with a staff strength of above 
40,000, which comprises of 6,000 of direct jobs and 35,000 of indirect jobs (Sustainability 
Report, 2013: 23), which is the focus of this study.   
SPDC is the biggest oil and gas producing multinational company in Nigeria, it has other 
three subsidiary production companies known as Shell Nigeria Exploration and Producing 
Company (SNEPCO), Shell Nigeria Gas (SNG) and Shell Nigeria Oil Products (SNOP), and 
investments in the Nigeria Liquefied Natural Gas Limited (NLNG). Approximately 14 per 
cent of Shell production, the highest production volume outside of the United States, comes 
from Nigeria. With Shell operating profit falling well below projections in 2000, it was clear 
that further organisational change and cost reduction would be essential, hence, organisational 
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restructuring that resulted to the closure of some branches and consequent management 
restructuring. Below is Shell management structure. 
Figure 7: Shell Nigeria Management Structure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The above Figure 7 illustrates Royal Dutch Shell PLC Management structure.  The 
organisational structure is a mainly hierarchical concept of subordination of entities that 
collaborate and contribute to serve one common aim. The Board of Directors has the highest 
authority in the company and oversees the committee of Managing Directors whose 
responsibilities are share into geographical and functional responsibilities. They in turn 
monitored the Managers who oversee corporate centre comprises of personnel in Exploration 
and Production, oil Products, Financial, Legal, Human Resources Issues and Health, Safety 
and Environment. 
The Old complex matrix system with multiple reporting lines was transformed in 2009 to 
personally accountable managers, who reports directly to the committees of managing 
Board of Directors 
Committee of Managing Directors 
Geographical Responsibility       Functional/Sectoral Responsibility 
             
 
Exploration 
and 
Production     
Managers 
Gas and Power 
Managers 
 
Chemicals 
Managers 
 
Oil Products 
Managers 
 
Transport 
Managers 
Finance  
Managers 
Legal 
Managers 
Shell Trading 
Line Managers           
Corporate Centres 
HR 
Managers 
 
94 
 
directors, uncomplicated. The numbers of employees reduced, this has resulted in a 
significantly improved profile and cost reduction. 
3.10.2. EXXON-MOBIL 
Exxon-Mobil is an American owned oil company, and second largest oil-producing firm in 
Nigeria. The company commenced operations in 1955 under the name Mobil Exploration 
Nigeria Incorporated (MENI), though through fruitless exploration efforts in the northern and 
western regions of Nigeria, MENI was offered two offshore licences to operates in the Eastern 
Region.  The company made its first oil discovery in 1964 and the prospecting two oil 
licenses were change to four oil-mining licenses in 1968, following this development MENI 
was changed to Mobil Producing Nigeria (MPN) (Udeke and Okoloie-Osemene, 2014). 
MPN commenced exploration in 1970 in the South Eastern Region of Nigeria known as 
Akwa-Ibom with a profit sharing with the Nigerian Government, through the (NNPC) of 60 
per cent, and MPN 40 per cent (Olufemi, 2010: 27; Mbat, et al. 2013).  After 15 years of 
exploration, MPN hit one-million-barrel mark and in 1991 MPN entered into loan 
arrangements of USD900 million along its joint venture partner (NNPC) from the 
international lenders to build and produce its Oso field condensate, with a peak production of 
110,000 barrels per day (Omeje, 2006: 103; Mbat, et al. 2013).   
In 1999, MPN, Esso Exploration and Production Nigeria (EEPN) and Mobil Oil Nigeria 
(MON) merged and now known as ExxonMobil Nigeria Plc. These companies have good 
records of their contribution to the development of the Nigerian economy. The entire 
operational activities are concentrated offshore and presently have above 88 platforms, 9 flow 
stations, natural gas liquefied plant and hundreds of oil wells.  In the downstream, 
ExxonMobil Nigeria have interest in producing petrochemicals as well as marketing of 
associated goods such as lubricants, and presently operates over 200 retail outlets with a staff 
strength of 12,000 which comprises of 66.6 per cent non-standard workers (Omeje, 2006: 
104; Danesi, 2012: 4). Authority flows top to bottom, below is ExxonMobil Management 
structure. 
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Figure 8:- ExxonMobil Nigeria Management Structure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The matrix above in Figure 8 illustrates the hierarchical management structure of ExxonMobil 
Nigeria. Managers are essentially in charge of departmental activities, and control the labour 
process. Like the trade unions, managers act in a representative capacity, promoting and 
materialising the interest of the owners of capital. They effectively exercise the legal rights of 
the employers on a daily basis, by driving the work process is a conservative way. The 
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general managers expect the departmental managers and their assistants to be loyal to the 
organisational goals, while the management depends on the general managers in order to rule 
the company and must be able and willing to trust them 100%. Often it is a condition by the 
management upon the appointment of departmental managers that they will refrain from trade 
unionism. This often takes the form of an oral agreement or a tacit understanding. Just as the 
general managers expect the departmental managers to refrain from trade unions activities, so 
do the departmental managers with respect to their assistants. 
Departmental managers and their assistant enforce their power through labour process of 
hiring and firing workers, supervising and evaluating them, determining whose contract 
would be renewed and not. They control the entry and exit from labour force according to the 
needs of the company. The goal of numerical flexibility is much more pronounced in this 
company; this is achieved in practice by compiling lists of employable persons and contacting 
their agencies to send them forth when the need arises. Job security for agency workers in this 
company remains a dream as they have to prove on a daily basis their best qualities, and not to 
antagonise their managers or superiors. 
3.10.3 CHEVRON NIGERIA 
Chevron Nigeria Limited (CNL), which has similar corporate structures as ExxonMobil, has 
been operating in Nigeria for over 50 years, is a subsidiary of Chevron Overseas Petroleum 
Corporation and based in California, the United States. The company interests span across 
crude exploration, production, refining and marketing. 
The company functional activities are at Escravos, Warri and Port-Harcourt both of Niger 
Delta axis, which is the core of its exploration and productions, while the headquarters is 
located in Lagos, the Western part of Nigeria. 
CNL commenced its operations in Nigeria in 1961 and got its first prospecting oil licence 
from the Nigerian Government. By 1962, CNL fortifies its operational interests with the 
acquisition of another licence, which entitled the company to extend its prospecting right over 
5178 square kilometres onshore in the Niger Delta Axis. This square spread across Akwa-
Ibom, Delta, Imo, Ondo, and Rivers states (Chevron Nigeria Limited Policy and Government 
Public Affairs Record). The company functionality cut-across upstream oil fields and 
downstrem, in 1963 Chevron Nigeria Limited discovered oil at the Okan field few kilometres 
from the Atlantic Ocean and started exploration in 1965, as at 1992, the company hit a 
milestone of 500 million barrels of crude and it has been growing since then.   
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In addition, the company has flourished into the deep-water exploration and presently 
operating in the Agbami Field, which is the largest deep-water discovery offshore of Nigeria 
until date. Its production capacity estimates to be approximately 900 million barrels of crude 
oil and gas, anticipates to climax on a daily production basis of 250,000 barrels. It is the 
biggest crude oil producer in Africa (Eweje, 2007: 222.) In 1973, Nigerian Government, 
through the NNPC, entered into a joint venture agreement with CNL and shared 60 per cent 
profit in the joint venture, while CNL has 40 per cent interest rate as the operating partner. 
Besides having interest on crude oil and gas, other areas of interests are petrochemicals, 
transportation, marketing, geothermal and power generation. Chevron is a top producer of 
petroleum jelly, lubricants, greases and many more. Its staff strength is above 6,600 
employees with more than 53 per cent as agency workers.  
The company has different welfare packages for its permanent employees such as house 
ownership scheme, health care insurance (employees and families), saving scheme, 
educational assistance scheme and non-contributory pension scheme, which is a secured 
monthly allowance to employees after retirement, all these benefits are denied of agency 
workers, hence the increasing usage of agency labour. 
 
3.11. Conclusion 
Economic development scholars have showed much concern of the richness of a country, yet 
its citizens are impoverished, which is very peculiar to the Nigeria nation as well as some 
other oil producing nations which are perceived to be contradictions of wealth (Sachs and 
Warner, 1995).  
This chapter has gone at length to give the historical background of Nigeria, the discovery of 
oil, the political and economic interplay of the ruling elites, the roles played in destroying the 
once enjoyed bilateral employment relationships that previously existed in the industry. The 
employment relations in the Nigerian oil industry, and other institutional factors, as well as 
the background of the three oil companies (Shell, ExxonMobil and Chevron). It could be 
deduced from all indications that the most prevalent reason for the implementation of 
neoliberal policies was not only to attract foreign direct investments, but mainly associated 
with the extermination of labour movement, to enable industrial capitalist operates laissez 
faire employment relations. 
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Trade union generally, and for whatever cause has been considered a luxury that developing 
nations like Nigeria could not afford. In this regard, the state mainly through labour law has 
been out to see that union’s free work environment is assured. This study therefore argues, 
that equality of powers of the actors in employment relations is more of an illusion than 
reality as raised in the Marxist school of thought is valid for much of the Nigeria’s 
employment relationships.  
 
This action of the state consequently promotes flexible work arrangements and the consequent 
fragmentation of the labour force in order to achieve the objectives of the industrial elites. 
There is also a conception prevalent in the neoliberal agenda that the industrial elites, 
particularly the owners of the big oil MNCs and the state are enjoying their positions of 
economic advantage at the expense of the vast majority of the working masses, since these 
majorities could not be allowed free reign to pursue their economic interests by associating 
with the trade unions. 
 
But even more precarious is the government and industrial capitalist’s myopic mind-set that 
successful suppression of trade unions through legislations is what good employment 
relations entails. The restriction of automatic trade union membership and the cap on strike 
actions may not necessary constitute a relaxed and productive work environment. Despite the 
restrictiveness, strikes action still ensues. Just to consider the period of 7 years between 2010 
and 2017 as shown in Table 48 (page, 283-4) the number of strike actions which occurred is 
enough evidence to show that restrictive industrial relations is not a remedy to weaken the 
unions and industrial unrest. 
This approach to industrial relations despite its obvious limitations even in the modern 
economic context is at its most challenging period when subjected to the new competitively 
guided economic environment. This is more so given that the concern of employment 
relationships presently is not how trade unionism should be curbed, but how employment 
relationships can be utilised as a strategic tool for efficient productivity without 
compromising good working relationships so as to be able to compete favourable in the global 
markets.  
The neoliberals fail to acknowledge that the presence of a trade union could work to the 
advantage of the organisation. Trade unions may help organisations to seek other possible and 
beneficial measures of improving developments in employees’ productivity rather than just 
exerting downward pressure on earnings and good working conditions (Elliot and Freeman, 
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2003).  Thus, the direction and thrust of modern employment relations perspective should 
give priority to productivity and acknowledge that the key to a better economic future lies in 
the workplace by making it more productive environment. This would bring about a new 
perspective to employment relations that emphasise a harmonious workplace. 
 As earlier stated, the Nigerian oil industry holds a strategic key position in the national 
economy (Ogbeifun, 2009), earnings from crude oil export is well above 90 per cent (ICFTU, 
2005). It is however, expedient to have a more conducive working environment for the 
interest of all relevant stakeholders, which encompasses the management, trade 
unions/employees, state, host communities, clients, the society and the international 
community at large through social democracy of workers right and collective bargaining. 
It is however observed in Nigeria, that the only point when the trade unions come close to 
articulating the interests of their members has been in defence of the economic gains and at no 
time have they pressed for issues of greater participation in the decision-making machinery at 
the work place. In other words, the trade unions have assumed more of a reactive role than an 
innovative one. The future challenges will necessitate that trade unions change this position if 
they are to achieve their cardinal objective of defending the fast-changing interests of the 
labour force. 
Thus far, this study has critically gone through the necessary literature and linked through 
contextual section in shedding light on the underlying nature and dynamics of employment 
relations under capitalism. Although a growing body of literature recognizes the importance 
of labour contracting, and as argued by different scholars in Chapter 2, labour contracting can 
be viewed as an attempt to alleviate the financial burdens on capital as represented by the 
competitive market. 
 
However, there is need to unravel the generative mechanism of this lopsided phenomenon on 
labour. Understanding managerial rationale for labour contracting and trade unions opposition 
possibly depends upon combination of variables, and its complexities. Thus, understanding 
these complexities would require a critical examination of various components which will be 
discussed in the next chapter. Accordingly, Chapter 4 sets out the methodological strategy 
adopted for this study, with detailed overview of the philosophical position that underpins the 
generative mechanism of the subject under investigation. This is essential, in order to achieve 
the aims and objectives of this study. 
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Chapter 4:  Research Methodology 
 
4. Introduction 
This chapter outlines and justifies the methodology and research methods. It presents the 
philosophical position employed in the study, followed by the research strategy and design; 
the case study and rationale for selecting research cases. Lastly, it considers the fieldwork 
experience, findings triangulation and limitations of the study. 
 
4.1.  Critical Realist Paradigm 
This section reviewed key concepts and principles of critical realism and discusses the extent 
to which they served as a useful methodological instrument for the research study. By 
presenting the ontological and epistemological positon of critical realism, this section also 
provides explanations about other philosophical worldviews, and why there were not adequate 
in finding answers to the research questions. The research questions are closely related to the 
process of understanding the main concepts of critical realism, the importance of 
understanding structures and processes, of the generative mechanism between variables, and 
the relation between agency and structure (Edwards, 2005: 7).  
 
This research answers questions about (i) what factors influence managerial decision-making 
in the implementation of agency labour in the Nigerian oil industry, (ii) to what extent have 
the differential terms and conditions of a two-tier workforce have negative consequences on 
employees under this new employment system, (iii) how have trade unions attempted to 
address the challenges created by the changing nature of labour, and (iv) How have, and to 
what extent has this phenomenon impacted labour-management relationships. With respect to 
other philosophical worldviews, positivism with a focus on empirical regularities prevents 
from raising a question why things occur as they do, while subjectivism based on the fact that 
the world wholly socially constructed seems to ignore the causal influences of structures 
(Edwards, 2005: 268).  
 
This is the starting point for the philosophical understanding employed in this study. This 
section first explains the philosophies of social science such as Positivism and Subjectivism 
worldviews, and then explains the key concepts and principles of critical realism and 
discusses the extent to which they served as useful methodological tool for the study. 
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4.2.  Research Philosophy:  Positivism, subjectivism and Critical Realism 
 
4.2.1  Positivism 
 
Within the positivist worldview, a researcher takes the ontological reality, which represent 
observable objects, considered real. Positivism believes that an objective reality exists 
independent of individual attitude and not a creation of human minds (causes and effects 
reactions).  This depends upon the researcher/observer having an objective account with the 
world as a factual entity separated from human intention and purpose (Creswell, 2014:7; 
Saunders et al. 2009).  Indicatively, positivist worldview firmly upholds that the only real 
knowledge is the one build on sense experience and positive verification.  
 
However, critical realism opposes the one-way view of attaining authentic knowledge of the 
world as claim by positivism. The real in critical realism is classified in the domain of the 
actuals of events or empirical observations whether, observed or not (Hedlund-de Witt, 
2012:13). If an object or event observed, then it becomes an empirical fact (Easton, 2010: 
120). For example, within a set of social relationships of power, and a level of material 
productivity, empowerment and subjugation exists (actuals of events- labour law reform, 
outcome- work flexibility), which constitute today’s management and labour employment 
relationship in the Nigerian oil industry. The opportunities and limitations brought about by 
the enabling and inhibiting work arrangements shapes individual’s perceptions, from 
management to trade unions/workers, who thus acts their perceptions through actions. 
 
There are circumstances and events that can be describe in causal terms: enabling conditions, 
instigating conditions, cause and effect. All these imply that there is an alternative way of 
thinking the causes and effects of both management and labour conflicts and what social and 
environmental conditions framed their perceptions and choices of action. As a result, the 
positivist worldview is inadequate for this study due to its single way of attaining a ‘real’ 
understanding of the changing nature of labour in the Nigerian oil industry. This makes this 
study skewed towards subjectivism. 
 
4.2.2.  Subjectivism: Interpretivism and Constructivism Paradigm 
 
Subjectivism worldview claims that social phenomenon is created from individual’s 
perceptions and consequent actions of the social agents through the process of interaction 
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(Denzin and Lincoln, 2005). There are two types of subjectivism worldview – the 
interpretivism and social constructivism paradigm. From the interpretivist point of view, a 
phenomenon emanates from individual’s perceptions of what constitute an action. On the 
other hand, constructivism claims that people actively construct new knowledge as they 
interact with their environment, this point to the unique experience of individuals within a 
social context (Crotty, 1998: 58). Individual’s experiences, feelings, thinking and 
interpretations of the phenomenon investigated are fundamental issues in the constructivist 
worldview. This involves comprehensive explanation why and how individuals view different 
experiences, rather than searching for external causes and basic principles to explain their 
behaviour.  
 
Thus, exploring the changing nature of labour and trade union challenge research within 
environmental context with political, economic, social and legal factors, subjective 
constructivism may perceive agency workers as a ploy by the management to weaken the 
strength of the union; this assumption may and may not be correct in this context. Although 
this view is subjective in the sense that, trade union perceives agency labour as inhibiting their 
mobilization strategies due to their fragmentation. In a different light, they as well perceive 
agency labour, as a ploy of the management to accumulate surplus value and increase capital 
at the detriment of the employees. Hence, their perceptions/meanings about agency work 
arrangements, thus affects their behaviours and the degree of actions (strike) they embark 
upon. 
 
Although, this study attempts to make sense of the environment in which agency labour is 
operated and the researcher attempt to understand the subjective reality of trade union in order 
to be able to make sense and understand the motives for the resistance and the intentions for 
actions (strike). However, because constructivism worldview rejects the existence of objects, 
and events, which are real (such as, strike actions) as documented in this study, it is therefore 
viewed as inadequate for this research, hence the alternative way of thinking, critical realism. 
 
4.2.3.  Critical Realism Worldview 
 
Bhaskar (1978) advocated critical realism as an alternative philosophy of knowledge. This 
philosophical paradigm is of the view that theories refer to the real features of the world, such 
as, forces, structures and events that cause the phenomena we can perceive through our 
senses. Bhaskar (1980) argues that the domain of the real, as a distinct analytical entity, is 
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significant for critical realism since it is from this domain of enduring structures that 
generative mechanisms develop which may or may not be sense at the level of experience.    
 
Bhaskar (2008: 47) further expanded scientific realism as encompassing the identification of 
generative mechanism, which are not observed directly, but have real causal effects in 
generating events, which can be observed. For example, the operation of the law of value as 
an ultimate explanation for the successful suppression of trade union through legislations, and 
the consequent growth of agency workers in the Nigerian oil industry. 
 
 To explain events and identify generative mechanisms and structures, realism makes 
assumptions about the social world and its observable and unobservable mechanisms and 
objects (Reed, 2009; Sayer, 2000). This is a process of abstraction similar to Marx’s account 
of dialectical materialistic approach to social world (Patten, 1993). However, Marx never 
systematically explained his dialectical method, it can be inferred from the way in which the 
various levels of abstraction at which Marx operates capture both the “moment” of social 
phenomena and the historical evolution of those phenomena as products of “intersecting and 
overlapping contradictions arising out of the past and arching towards the future” (Ollman, 
2003: 164). 
 
Like dialectical materialism, critical realism considers structures and agential dimension of 
social reality to be in a dialectical, multi-directional relationship (Sayer, 1992: 142). Thus, this 
philosophical worldview aims in understanding causes of events and the necessity to explore 
the deep of the real world to identify the generative mechanism that gives rise to phenomena 
observed or perceived. Accordingly, this research evaluates and analyse, the ontology and 
epistemology realism in accordance to their general possibility in explaining the observable 
surface and behind surface events (Chalrwood, 2003: 41-42). 
 
4.3.  Ontological and Epistemological Critical Realism 
 
This section presents the fundamental issues of the ontological and epistemological approach 
that underpins the methodological position of this research. Ontological and epistemological 
critical realism are distinctive from positivism and constructivism. Ontologically, the research 
is an objective reality that really exists, for example, there is conflict of interests between 
labour and management, which often leads to strike actions (see chapter 7, Table 48, pages 
283-4). Nevertheless, in critical realism, ontology refers to the belief that there is a real world 
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that exists independent of our knowledge and explanations. On the other hand, epistemology 
refers to what is considered as knowledge, its sources and extents of knowledge (Easterby-
Smith, et al., 2012:17; King and Horrocks, 2010; William, 2006).  For critical realism, 
epistemology informs, that it is not possible for individuals to achieve absolute or objective 
explanation that is independent of their specific perspectives.  
 
While the ontology in positivism and constructivism is restricted to the fused domains of the 
empirical/experiences and the actual/events, critical realism adds another domain, the 
real/mechanism (Bhaskar, 1975: 65; Ackroyd and Fleetwood 2000: 13). These three concepts 
constitute overlapping domains of reality called stratified ontology. The reason why it is vital 
to stratify domains is that it is hard to explain natural/social phenomena by using empirical 
resources obtained in surface reality. 
 
Different mechanisms might interact with each other in stratified ways and one mechanism 
might restrict or distort other emerging mechanisms. It is important to investigate ‘which 
mechanism’ is needed to understand events occurring at the level of the empirical or actual, 
and the structures operating behind surface reality. 
 
Thus, critical realism, argues that there is a deeper social world that lies beyond these two 
forms of surface appearance (objective observations and interpretations/meanings). In other 
words, reality and our descriptions of reality are not in perfect correspondence, although our 
descriptions constitute an aspect of reality. For example, class is a contested concept 
depending on whether priority given to reality at the level of what we can easily observe (our 
impressions) or to some deeper dimension of reality from which class emerges (the social 
relations of production). Thus, definitions of class based on observation and subjective 
identification (such as, Weberian approaches to class), may define class with reference to 
lifestyle and market position. Marxists, on the other hand, understand class in terms of the 
position of individuals in relation to the process of production. These social relations are not 
directly observable at the level of experience, though social actors engaged in these relations 
experience their effects. 
 
Despite critical realism criticism of positivist and subjectivism views, this study exploratory 
and interpretive nature is situated within the concepts of both objectivism and subjectivism 
though within the critical realism paradigm, why within this paradigm? 
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4.4. Justification 
Critical realism rejects the view of abstract concepts and terms or logical constructions based 
on predictions of observable data making, which has no claim on reality. Critical realism 
holds the view that mental states and attributes, including meanings, intentions though not 
directly observable are part of the real world, which is denied by both positivism and 
interpretivists (Chisenga, 2014). Critical realists consider mental and physical entities such as 
interests as real though conceptualised by means of different social classes. For example, a 
workplace comprises of different groups of individuals or group of people (workers, 
managers, shareholders and union) with a distinctive set of material and symbolic interests. 
Social actors have to choose which of their distinctive interests they represent in opposition to 
other interests. Thus, critical realism endorses the concept of cause and effect in both the 
natural and social science and views it as real phenomena. 
Cause and effect is viewed as an explanatory concept intrinsic to either the nature into the 
world or understanding of it. However, critical realism opposes the view of causation by 
positivists in quantitative research, which states that regular causation or association between 
events or variables form a pattern in data. Realist argues against predicting causation as 
having patterns because the context constantly changes (Chisenga, 2014; Maxwell, 2004).  
Critical realist acts as both ontological framework and an approach to social inquiry in a (non-
exhaustive) exploration of different conceptual tools, alongside and in combination with other 
tools, can credibly claim explanatory power with respect to broader social, political and 
economic (Thompson and Vincent, 2010: 7). The rationale is that the apparent empirical 
variables indicates that the multi-layered causal interrelationships which exist across the 
workplace are simply too complex for any one theoretical tool to claim jurisdiction. In this 
regard, adopting critical realism perspective offers opportunities to develop more robust 
appreciation of the usefulness of different methods available for understanding the growth of 
agency labour under capitalism and union challenges. 
Ontological realism can be useful for qualitative methodology, practice and contradictions as 
it can provide a new and helpful way of approaching problems and generate important 
insights into social phenomena of agency labour and trade unions challenges. Critical realism 
claims that verbal expressions are as valid for a claim, and mental statements about one’s 
beliefs, reasons, or motives for doing something can be as valid explanation of the person’s 
actions (Chisenga, 2014; Putnam, 1999). Mental phenomena in the study context are the 
causes of behaviour related to whether the increasing utilization of agency workers by the 
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management is to exploit the workforce and undermine the trade unions or not. Individual 
intentions have consequences of how people react, think and make sense of what is going on. 
Neglect of mental phenomena is what qualitative researchers identify as a main flaw in 
quantitative research. However, in realism, both physical phenomena and mental aspects are 
considered as real. 
Critical realism therefore provides a clear argument to accept the causal role for the outcomes 
of the growth of agency workers. From the realist perspective, both management motives and 
trade unions arguments are real phenomena and causally interact with one another, thus 
integrating a realist ontology and constructivists epistemology. 
4.5.  Philosophical Argument 
 
Critical realism gives a fundamental insight into this study, which investigated the changing 
nature of labour and its challenges for the trade unions. The factors, and under what 
circumstances they have contributed to unions challenges, and how the trade unions 
responded. In other words, union responses are shaped in the context of an interaction of 
factors, such as, legal regulation, and trade union structures. 
 
It is important to understand management use of agency labour as an outcome of interacting 
factors in a certain context. As Edwards (2005: 265) argues, industrial relations institutions 
and processes are grasped in context. Besides the increasing utilization of agency labour by 
management, it is expedient to look into the trade unions behaviour towards agency workers, 
by exploring what has happened at the workplace level through the activities of the unions’ 
leaders and branches.  There might be considerable variation in outcomes between the 
workers, trade unions, and within each union and their branches. In order words, the 
increasingly usage of agency workers may not be the only factor for this challenge, there 
might be other contending factors. Thus, this study argues that by carrying out investigations 
on managerial rationale for the growth of agency labour in the Nigerian oil industry, there 
might be a risk of overlooking trade unions variations in the workplace. 
 
Given the fact that the extent of workforce polarization in an organisation is strongly 
influenced by management strategy, the study of trade union branches allows the researcher to 
evaluate to what extent employment relations and workforce arrangements at the workplace 
level have an influence on union behaviour. In terms of reconciling common interests among 
workers on different contract terms, the analysis of trade union branches enables the 
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researcher to explore the relationship between permanent employees, who are the trade unions 
members, and agency workers. The latter are possibly to be excluded from the chance of 
union representation since they are usually segregated from the standard workforce and 
confined to a different and separate set of tasks (Druker and Stanworth, 2004: 233).  
 
Trade unions members as well as their leaders may not be willing to act in solidarity with 
agency workers who are considered as outsider due to their triangular employment 
relationships, particularly, if supporting the latter brings a loss of their own members. There is 
no dispute, that the growth of agency workers has presented trade unions with a two-fold 
challenge, as stated in Chapter 2, as to whether or not they include these workers as part of 
their constituencies, and whether trade unions accept agency workers as part of them for 
collective bargaining. Since such decisions are taken at branch level, it became increasingly 
evident that union branches can be also viewed as a generative mechanism. This is consistent 
with Edward’s assertion ‘the feature operates only in the context of other factors’ (2006: 13). 
In other words, union responses are shape in the context of an interaction of factors within a 
social structure. As a result, critical realism descriptive explanation of the relationship 
between enduring features and the interactions of social actors within these structures 
provides a compelling response to the debate around the nature of structure, agency and realm 
of the deep. 
 
Critical realism combines both extremes of the positivists and constructivists paradigm and it 
has of late become one of the most used research paradigm to investigate various disciplines 
(Easton, 2010: 119). For example, in industrial relations the study of Edwards (2006) “the 
link between strikes and payment-by-results systems”, the study demonstrated that despite 
theory that underlines the payment-by-results is likely to promote strikes, this association is 
not found in some circumstances, which means that the ‘causal power’ of payment-by-results 
systems may or may not be actualised depending on the conditions such as the size of 
workplaces and their industrial sector. Other disciplines are Business Management (Devitt, 
2005); Natural Resource Management (Evely et al. 2008); Marketing (Eston, 2010; 
Fleetwood, 2006); Information Technology (Wikreg, 2005); Media (Lau, 2004); Education 
(Hatch, 2002). 
 
Critical realism acknowledges that an independent reality exists but that our knowledge of it 
is relative rather than absolute, but it is knowable and changeable (Benton and Craib, 2001: 
120). Bhaskar (1979: 57) upholds that the only way to identify these necessarily unobservable 
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structures is to examine their observable causal effects. This worldview emphasises the desire 
to examine patterns of events to uncover the real generative mechanism and use this 
knowledge to change undesirable or unacceptable realities, hence its emancipatory intent.  
 Benton and Craib (2001: 120) distinguish four key features of critical realism that 
differentiate it from other philosophical worldviews. (i), critical realism does not assess 
whether the truth claims of any given science at any given time are true or not. (ii), the 
approach is reflexive about the conditions under which knowledge is generates and accepts 
that there is a variety of ways of representing reality. As earlier said, this research involves 
several subjective variables and reality is multiple. (iii), critical realism accepts that the 
appearance of things can be misleading.  
 
In attempt to understand reality and uncover misleading appearances, in-depth analysis and 
further research is required.  For example, there might be contradictory circumstances, it 
could be possible is not the use of agency workers that is proving as challenge for the trade 
union mobilization. There is possibility of other factors- national institutions and the 
unwillingness by the agency workers to join the unions. Such contradictory circumstance 
would call for further investigation. For instance, during the researcher empirical 
investigation, a contradictory issue emerged between the management and union on the right 
of agency workers to be unionised. This contradictory circumstance necessitated further 
investigation, which saw the inclusion or involvement of agency workers who were originally 
not in the scheme of work at the beginning to unravel the contradictory situation. 
 
Lastly, the insistence on the existence of an independent reality and the necessity for in-depth 
research to uncover misleading appearances implies that currently held beliefs would always 
be subject to correction by future research findings. Critical realism requires a more complex 
and sophisticated explanative account of research findings than often seen under positivism. 
For a critical realist, it is not sufficient to seek to explain ‘why’ something happens but goes 
further to seek the unobservable (Outhwaite, 1987: 21).  
One of the key significant inferences of critical realism is that reality is itself based on the 
assumptions of both objective and subjective attributes (Ashley and Orenstein, 2005). For 
instance, reality stems from the assumption that whatever is understandable is likewise 
directly observable, quantifiable and statistically measurable outside the observer. 
Accordingly, critical realism involves facts, value judgement and credible processes that exist 
in generic patterns (Ashley and Orenstein, 2005).  
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4.6. Limitation of Critical Realism 
 
Some scholars have however criticised the views of critical realism as being subject to biases 
by the observers because they interpret their views in a manner that can lead to self-
fabrications of meanings. On this premise, it is acknowledged that critical realism combines 
several attributes of positivism and constructivism research approaches (Edwards, 2006).  
 
It has also been criticised for being abstract and vague, hence, few researchers adopt this 
philosophical worldview (Hartwig, 2007; Edwards, 2006: 5). However, Bhaskar, interpreted 
Marx’s analysis of capitalist mode of production on whose premise this study is based, as 
previously characterised social structures, which possess relatively autonomous causal powers 
and tendencies in relation to the interacting agents who occupy the positions of capitalist, and 
worker in this structure. From this perspective, this study sheds light on structure and agency 
interdependency. 
 
4.7.  Interplay between Structure and Social Agents 
Bhaskar (1979: 32) accounts, which refer to Marx’s work, argue that society does not only 
consist of individuals; but likewise signifies the sum of the relations within which, or the 
individuals’ stands. In other words, conceptualizing social relations between the position one 
occupies and practices, and not between the persons’ who occupies them. In Bhaskar’s view, 
social structure and their connection have to be distinct from persons’ presently occupying 
such positions and their social interactions. Accordingly, the terms people/groups and society 
radically mean different kinds of thing (Bhaskar, 1979: 42). 
For Bhaskar, social structures, which as well constitute society, are associations of internal 
relations between social positions, abstracted from the continuous interaction between social 
agents. These types of social structures are relatively independent in connection to the 
interacting agents that presently occupy the structurally constituted positions, and the causal 
powers of social structures cannot be ontologically reduce to the social interactions of agent 
(Fleetwood, 2013). Example of the internally related social positions is the positions of the 
management (capitalist) and the trade union/employee (labourer) (Bhaskar, 1979: 36 & 54). 
The internal relations between these social actors constitute the essential properties of the 
positions occupied, which thus, dictate causally the privilege for action and social 
identifications of the individual agents who occupies these positions. Thus, an individual who 
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assumes the position of a capitalist is not a capitalist himself, except there is the reality of one 
or more employee (s) as the object of the capitalist exploitative tendencies. 
However, for an individual to maintain his or her position as a capitalist, the individual would 
not only have to act in a manner that is both enable and enforced by virtue of the position, but 
he or she would also have to obtain the social identity of a capitalist. An individual who 
presently occupies a capitalist position, is however privilege to move to the position of 
employee, for instance, by virtue of the person (capitalist) selling his/her possession of the 
means of production to another capitalist and become hired by the capitalist.  
In addition, anyone who occupies the position of a capitalist may at the same time occupies 
the positions of a president, legislator, councillor, husband and father. Thus, social agents 
usually interconnect in many structurally constituted social positions at the same time and 
may likewise change their positions within a social structure (e.g. the Nigerian government 
and oil MNCs capitalist - joint venture partners). 
On the other hand, an employee can likewise move in the opposite direction, though this 
might prove very difficult (e.g., the capitalist subjugation will never allow any labourer to 
move smoothly up the hierarchical ladder). The privileges and social identities of the 
individuals who change their positions are however, unusually changed in the process. 
Therefore, commodity relations of production, which constitute the positions of management 
and trade union/employees, remain unchanged, irrespective of the structural position 
movement in the Nigerian oil industry. 
In view of this, Bhaskar (1979: 52-56; 83-91) gave a comprehensive example of social 
structure of Marx’s (1974) early work of the capitalist mode of production. In his analysis and 
interpretation, Bhaskar described the critical realist ontological, epistemological and 
methodological views. Thus, relations of production in Marxist theory explains as social 
structures, which possess relatively independent causal powers and tendencies in relation to 
the interacting actors/agents who occupy the positions of capitalist and employee.  On this 
premise, the internal relations between the positions of capitalist (management) and 
employees (trade union) causally dictate the opportunities, interests, functional roles, and 
resources (psychological and material) of those actors/agents who occupy these positions.   
The internal relations between these positions does not, in anyway dictates which privileges 
agents/actors seize and which causal powers they exercise at any particular time. For example, 
management as a virtue of the position they occupied does not mean they can formulate 
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policies or strategies at the detriment of the workers and expect the union not to react. For the 
fact that actors/agents (management and labour) are capable of making relatively independent 
choices within their positions as a result of their inherent causal power, indicates that they can 
exercise their causal power at any given circumstances.  
In addition, actors operating in the positions of management and employee are capable to 
either transform the employment relations of production and, thus their own positions. 
Transformation of the employment relations of production occurs mainly by unintended 
consequences of the actors’ intentional actions. For instance, an agent (trade union) who 
occupies the position of an employee would not normally deliberately intend to transform the 
management employment relations, because the employee’s intention of working is generally 
to earn a living. However, Bhaskar alleged that in order to transform the capitalist 
employment relations, actors have to acquire at most partial understanding of the real nature 
of these relations. Following Marxist theory, Bhaskar (1979: 81-90) alleged that actors need 
to understand the real nature of social reality in capitalism because they are systematically and 
ideologically deceptive and this is a necessary condition for the capitalist employment 
relations.  
In light of the above, it is important to examine how contemporary employment relations in 
the Nigerian oil industry fit well with Marx’s work. How some of the essential features of 
capitalism that was common in the capitalist factory when Marx wrote the Capital, better 
describe in its pure sense, today’s capitalist state.  
The employment relation of production in the Nigerian oil industry is currently about labour 
commodification and surplus-value/capital accumulation. Workers sell their labour power to 
the management in a way and manner that is different from the traditional forms of work (see 
Danesi, 2012). It is undeniable that the relations of labour commodification, exploitation and 
alienation, which were consistent to the capitalist employment relations in Marxist work, 
perceived to be in operations in the industry today. This is not peculiar to Nigeria alone, but to 
almost all the developing economies, which lacks decent labour legislation and organised 
trade unions. Therefore, the fate of the trade union/workers in the developing countries, 
particularly in the Nigerian oil industry is as cruel as it was in Marx’s times. 
Archer’s (1995), analytical dualism captures Marx’s argument that the conditions in which 
people make history are inherent from the past. At any given time in history, human action 
can reproduce or transform these social structures that preceding action has given rise to. The 
reproduction and transformation of structures is driven by social position of agents as 
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collective agents (as class or group), and as reflexive agents who possess powers to actualise 
or block generative mechanism, this is contingent upon how they perceive or define their 
interests (Archer, 1995: 174-176). 
Likewise, action not only has the ability to reproduce, shape and transforms social structures’, 
it can as well transform social agents, and an action defines within Marxism transformative 
impact of labour on the employee (Pratten, 1993: 417).  Similarly, Archer’s reveals the 
dialectical and historical approach in understanding the way the past interacts with the present 
through the social structures are historically constituted by the actions of past generations of 
social agents. This prior knowledge, thus, introduced elements of objectivism and inductive 
research. Thereby facilitating the development of a common understanding on what constitute 
knowledge of agency labour and trade union resistance, based on critical realism research 
strategy. 
  4.8.  Critical Realism and Research Strategy 
Critical realism does not define methods for analysing the social world; but it guides the 
researcher in a direction that could unearth the underlying structures and mechanisms that 
gave rise to agency labour, and the consequent challenges for the trade union. Realism 
acknowledges mental processes as existent phenomena just that they are not observed. 
Maxwell, (2008) further argues that a realist design represents what is actually happening, on 
the context other than what was initially planned. The setting may alter the direction over the 
conduct of the research, making the present design implemented to differ from the planned 
design. So, the design finally is the outcome of what was planned, interactions with the 
physical and social which are external to the initial design, which the researcher may not have 
been aware of at the beginning. In order words, the design did not only pay attention to what 
was planned but also what was happening within the study context. 
The lack of explicit methodological preferences has been criticised and seen as a major 
setback of critical realism (Yeung, 1997). Nevertheless, drawn by the attention of the 
combined importance of previous social structures that restricts and enables social actors, thus 
interpretations and reactions arising from such relationship, critical realism is able to draw on 
the principles of both positivism and constructivism for selected insight and methods (Sayer, 
1992: 36).  
For the critical realism, the nature of the research questions and objectives determines the 
choices of methodological approaches (McEvoy and Richards, 2006). In this study the mixed-
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methods approach was adopted, the combination overcomes the limitations of a mono-
method, particularly, with positivist approach.  Although, positivist approach to agency labour 
and trade union challenges, generates knowledge about various facets of employment and 
labour relations, such as, employment contracts, right to association and nature of work, while 
the constructivist approach provides a new and useful way of approaching problem by looking 
at the patterns of events and generate important insights into the phenomenon. 
Putnam (1999) argues that subjective statements about person’s beliefs, reasons, or rationale 
for doing something can be as valid explanation of the person’s actions. The constructs and 
conceptualisation that people use to make sense of agency labour represent a valid dimension 
of reality (Kirkpatrick and Hocque, 2006; Carey, 2007). However, their conceptualization 
may be partially correct or completely incorrect (Ackroyd and Fleetwood, 2000: 11). For 
instance, trade union may be experiencing decline in membership because of increasingly 
utilization of agency workers, but lack a deeper knowledge of the structures that generate the 
declining nature. 
The triangulation of different domains of a stratified social reality enables the researcher to 
gain in-depth knowledge of the phenomenon under investigation.  The intransitive domain, 
the domain of the deep, which is unobserved, is revealed through theoretical abstractions that 
serve to explain the phenomena (Edwards, et al. 2014: 319-20).  
However, Flick (2002: 227-229) argued, that “triangulation is not a tool or strategy of 
validation, but an alternative to validation; the combination of multiple methodological 
practices, empirical materials, perspectives, and observers in a single study understood, then 
as a strategy that adds rigor, breadth, complexity, richness and depth to any inquiry”. 
Therefore, concept abstracted from the empirical domain is the lens through which critical 
realist access the realm of the deep, thereby providing the explanations of the structures from 
which social phenomena arises.  Bhaskar (1993: 339-40) reveals that these theoretical models 
constitute truth-like theories which aid as a bridge to the intransitive dimension.  Risjord et al. 
(2002) expresses that the validity of truth-like claims about reality depends on the analytical 
generalizations through a process of retroductive inference, similar to the notion of abductive 
inference which seeks explanation rather than prediction. According to Danermark et al. 
(2002: 7), the ideas generated about a phenomenon provides the basis for conceptual 
framework that can best explain the phenomenon, as theory is refined by repetitively moving 
between lived experience and propositions about the underlying structures.  Accordingly, the 
analytical generalization, therefore, is premised upon the explanatory power of theory, and it 
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is through the perceivable or observable realms that theories about the deep, intransitive 
domain of reality are maintain and develop.  
This applies to Marxist criticism of the 19
th
 century explanation of a fair day’s pay for a fair 
day’s work.  The mode of operations over the working lives of the English proletariat as 
observed at the empirical level, which was rooted in his theoretical abstractions, which 
discloses social relations from which surplus value and capital accumulation emerges, thereby 
revealing the unperceivable structure necessary for the perceivable or observable phenomenon 
through retroductive reasoning. Critical realism’s use of theoretical constructs to apprehend 
unobservable structures that give rise to observable empirical outcomes is compatible, 
therefore, with the Marxist distinction between “surface appearance” and “essence”. Essence 
for Marx refers to the nature of phenomena, made knowable through the use of theoretical 
abstractions (e.g. the operation of the law of value as an ultimate explanation of the 
accumulation of capital, rather than classical economics’ focus on price and wages as 
phenomena that can be observed). 
 
4.9. Research Strategy and Design 
Critical realism recognises a deep knowledge of different dimensions to research study 
(Brown and Roberts, 2014: 300). Therefore, the research strategy applied in this study was 
premised upon the quest for possible explanation through a broad understanding of the 
diverse dimensions that feeds into, and constituted the phenomenon of agency labour in the 
Nigerian oil industry.  The motive of integrating diverse sources of data (mixed methods:- 
qualitative and quantitative) was to get the perceptions of more than one stratified domain to 
understand the social reality of the phenomenon. The exploration of associated generative 
mechanisms (Reed, 2005: 1636), enables the researcher to gain knowledge of the domain of 
the deep not observed at the surface.  
 
4.10. The Mixed Method Design 
Researchers using the mixed methods approach are recommended to demonstrate the model 
that matches their research purpose (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 2010). The design below, is one 
of the visual model of  mixed methods approach developed by Creswell and Plano Clark 
(2011; 2007:63) and deployed in this research. See Figure 9 below: 
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Figure 9: Triangulation Design: Convergence Model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Creswell and Piano Clark (2007; 2011) 
Creswell and Plano Clark (2011: 66) reveals key factors to be considered when choosing 
designs- understanding the intent, processes and advantages and disadvantages associated 
with each design. They went further to identify four determinants of mixed-method designs, 
they are: time, weighting, mixing and theorising. Timing refers to how best to collect both the 
qualitative and quantitative data, either concurrently or on a sequential basis.  Concurrent data 
occurs when the researcher carry out both methods at the same time on a single phase. This 
implies qualitative and quantitative data are collected, results examined and interpreted 
simultaneously.  
While in a sequential form, qualitative and quantitative data are collected one before the other 
in different time frame and it could be either any one of them first.  The significance here is to 
use the results of one method to structure the other (Creswell and Plano Clark, (2011). By this 
way, the sequential method enables collaboration and complementarity. 
Considering the timeframe for the completion of this study and the financial implications, the 
researcher adopted the concurrent mixed method approach as the best appropriate option. The 
researcher collected both qualitative and quantitative data concurrently on the same phase, 
and also analysed the result separately.  The findings were converged at the interpretation 
stage.  The aim of this was to have a robust and well-justified result of the research problem 
(Creswell and Plano Clark, 2011; 2007:65). 
The second determinant is the weighting, Creswell and Plano Clark refers weight to the 
importance or priority accorded to qualitative and quantitative approaches in answering the 
research questions. The priority choice here is for the researcher to decide if great importance 
is to be accorded to one of the methods above the other or if both methods carry equal weight. 
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In this study, the researcher resolved in giving more weight to the qualitative method, due to 
its explorative nature in finding answers to the research questions. This indeed provides in-
depth understanding of the employers’ motives for the increasing utilization of agency 
workers and the denial of right to association. 
The third determinant is mixing, which has to do with how the researcher should mix 
qualitative and quantitative methods and how the mixing of data should arise. The mixing of 
qualitative and quantitative methods may occur at different phases; the gathering of data, 
results, and interpretation or in all three phases (Creswell and Plano Clark, 2007:83). A 
research project that uses both methods without particularly mixing data collected from each 
is a collection of multiple methods.  However, these authors described three overall strategies 
of how to combined data, they are: merging, embedding and connecting.  
Merging of data is a process whereby the researcher collects both qualitative and quantitative 
data simultaneously and combines both data sets by transforming qualitative themes into 
counts and comparing these counts to the more explanatory quantitative data. In order words, 
separate both results during analysis phase and integrate both data sets at the interpretation 
phase. In this study, mixing of the qualitative and quantitative data occurred at the 
interpretation level, with the qualitative findings and quantitative results complementing each 
other, thus enabling triangulation. The main reason for using the triangular design is for the 
researcher to either directly compare or contrast qualitative and quantitative information or to 
substantiate or develop quantitative results with qualitative data. 
Embedding of data at the design stage occurs when the researcher’s main aim is to collect 
qualitative or quantitative data sequentially and use one of the other method to give 
supporting data. This strategy do not either merge or connect across stages, rather, the 
researcher may decide to embeds qualitative data within a larger quantitative design or 
conversely (Creswell and Plano Clark, 2007:83). 
Connecting strategy applies to the process where the researcher decides to connect both data 
sets. Connecting may occur in the cause of data analysis of one method which may lead to the 
demand for other form of data, for example; a researcher may obtain quantitative results that 
lead to the subsequent collection and analysis of qualitative data (Creswell and Plano Clark, 
2007:84). For example “the researcher obtains contradictory qualitative results that lead to 
the subsequent collection and analysis of qualitative data from other sample in the study”. 
The last strategy is theorising, is the choice to either explicitly or implicitly use a theoretical 
stance to direct the research design. The researcher practically addresses research 
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phenomenon with some form of political connotation, structures or anticipations; these might 
be made explicit or implicit in a mixed method research design (Creswell, 2014:54). Theories 
act as the orienting lens when there are explicitly applied, which frames the kinds of research 
questions asked, the people involved, and how data is to be collected. This study is theory 
guided and has considerable influence on the research questions asked, the selected samples 
involved and the methods of data collection. The integration of theoretical descriptive and 
narrative analysis, perceptions and meanings of social actors, addresses the various 
(interconnected) levels of investigation, interrogation and analysis through the process of case 
study (Creswell, 2003; Yin, 2003). 
4.11. Research Strategy (Case Study Approach) 
 
Yin (2014: 16) defined “Case study as an empirical research that investigates a contemporary 
phenomenon within its context, or within a number of real-life contexts. Therefore, by the 
disposition and exploratory nature of the research questions the case study approach was 
considered much appropriate for this study. (Yin, 2014: 4). This approach permits for a 
comprehensive investigation and understanding of management rationale for the increasing 
usage of agency labour and the oppositions of the trade union in the context of the Nigerian 
oil industry (Creswell, 2009; Yin, 2009).   
In essence, this approach aids the researcher in understanding the phenomenon, more also as 
it is conducted in a real-life context.  Likewise, as most scientific experiments are repeatedly 
examining by using multiple cases, so also is case study research using multiple exploratory 
samples on same research phenomenon (Yin, 2014: 4). Hence, this study adopted three-
selected oil MNCs (Shell, ExxonMobil and Chevron) from the Nigerian oil industry as cases 
to be treated. Gummesson (2000) argues that, even in the medical field, doctor’s competence 
hinges on knowledge based on several people cases. Therefore, the mixed methods strategy 
adopted, as well as the three companies employed in this study enables some flexibility in 
terms of generalisation.  
Yin, further ascertained, that the singular need for case study, proceeds out of the quest to 
understand complex social phenomena. This enables the researcher to close on a case and 
have holistic and important features of real-world events such as the trade unions actions, 
organisations and management behaviours. The case study requires a face-to-face interaction 
with the people involved through semi-structured interviews.  Yin (2014: 106) recommends 
other forms of evidence, which can be applicable to case study method, that is distinct from 
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qualitative and quantitative methods, and observational evidence. Yin provides the following 
illustrations by evaluating their advantages and disadvantages. See Table 7 below:: 
 
Table 11: Yin Source of Multiple Exploratory Samples 
 SOURCE OF 
EVIDENCE 
ADVANTAGES DISADVANTAGES 
1 Interviews Targeted - focuses directly on 
case study topic. 
 
Insightful - provides 
explanations as well as personal 
views. 
Bias due to poorly constructed 
Questions. 
 
Response bias. 
Inaccuracies due to poor recall. 
Reflexivity - the interviewee gives what 
interviewer wants to hear. 
2 Direct 
Observation 
Immediacy - covers events in 
real time. 
Contextual - covers context of 
event. 
Time consuming. 
 
Selectivity - unless broad coverage. 
3 Physical artefacts Insightful into cultural features 
Insightful into technical 
operations 
Selectivity 
Availability 
 
4 Documentation Stable - can be reviewed 
Repeatedly. 
Unobtrusive - not created as a 
result of the case study. 
Broad coverage - long span of 
time, many events and settings. 
Retrievability - can be difficult to find 
Biased selectively, if collection is incomplete. 
 
Reporting bias-reflects (unknown) bias of author. 
 
Access may be deliberately blocked 
5 Archival 
Records 
[No editing for documentation 
above] 
 
Precise and quantitative. 
[No editing for documentation above]. 
 
Accessibility due to privacy reasons. 
Source: Yin (2014: 106) 
Based on the above table, the researcher resulted in using interviews and questionnaires. 
Triangulating these sources of data in a complementarity form provides answers to the kind of 
questions that are perfectly addressed by case study research, the “what, why” and “how” 
questions which are posed by contemporary event and mainly concerned with presenting valid 
representations of reality (Yin, 2014: 10).  
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The ‘what and why’ questions enquired of the management rationale for the growth of agency 
workers, ‘why’ the trade union resistance, and the ‘how’ has this attempted to meet the 
challenges. However, physical artefacts are considered inappropriate, because this study 
focuses on investigating the managerial rationale for agency labour, and its impact on the 
employment relationships in the Nigerian oil industry. 
A rare strength of the case study strategy is the capability of incorporating a range of 
information, for instance, interviewing, documentations, and observations. Multiple data 
sources can aid to address the problem of formulating validity as these provides multiple 
ranges of the same construct (Yin, 2009). The Multiple methods of investigations also enable 
data to meet in a triangulating pattern.  However, there is the likelihood to see the case studies 
as purely qualitative; this is certainly not the case here (Bryman, 2008).  This case study goes 
beyond being qualitative; it is a collection of both qualitative and quantitative evidence. The 
combination and contrasting of different viewpoints can formulate a robust and 
comprehensive understanding of the phenomenon (Schirr, 2012: 473). 
However, a major criticism of the case study strategy is the external validity or 
generalisability. According to Bryman, (2004: 51) cases are anticipated to provide the right 
context for specific research questions to be answered and not because cases are the ultimate 
or very great. However, Yin (2014: 57) indicates that the most significant issue is not whether 
the findings can be generalised largely, rather how well the researcher generates theory out of 
the findings.  
 
4.12. The Rationale for the Case Study 
More significantly is the socially constructed nature of reality (ontology). Ontologically, the 
study is an objective reality that actually exists and the investigator believes in both singular 
and multiple realities.  
Epistemologically, the study is objectivist and positivist. It is a positivist because of the 
phenomenon investigated, which is an objective social reality and required involvement of the 
researcher by means of interactions and observations and the reviewing of distinctive and 
verifiable objects and phenomenon. Case study allowed the use of multiple means for data 
collection and since this research utilises multiple means of data collection, case study is 
much suitable for the study. 
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Case study afforded the researcher the opportunity to study the phenomenon in its natural 
setting and meaningful theory emerged from the observation of actual reality. Also, since this 
study focuses on contemporary issues, the case study strategy was viewed as appropriate 
because it enables in-depth insights into the phenomenon investigated in its context. 
Welman et al. (2005) emphasized on the use of case studies as a single system of analysis, 
which involves human beings, companies or groups comprehensively investigated. Therefore, 
a case study leads towards understanding the distinctiveness and traits of a particular 
phenomenon in its complexity.  Welman et al. (2005) buttresses on the importance of carrying 
out investigation in its context, it helps to understand the natural situations of the 
phenomenon. 
The case study research goes beyond ensuring an in-depth understanding of complex 
problems, but can also increase experience or enhances the knowledge of existing research. 
 
4.12.1.  Why Three Cases 
Yin (2014) argues that the only way to guard against bias is to use multiple cases and “the 
evidence from multiple cases is often considered more compelling, and the overall study is 
therefore regarded as being more robust. A major insight is to consider multiple cases as one 
would consider multiple experiments” (Yin, 2014:57).  Likewise, Stake (2005) alleged, to get 
a better understanding of the research problem, there is need to choose cases that are very 
significant, thus the three oil multinational companies selected amongst others in the industry.  
Voss et al (2002) alleged that although a single case study can proffer an in-depth 
understanding, but its drawback is in the area of generalizability of the findings.  Likewise, a 
single case study can lead to misinterpretation of the representativeness of a single event and 
the propensity to amplify data is likely. 
Despite the fact that there are arguments on the number of cases that should be used, Perry 
(1998) believed three cases is appropriate. Voss et al (2002) noted that a smaller number of 
cases would yield greater depth of understanding. 
 
 
4.12.2. Justification for the Three Companies Cases 
This study conducted an empirical investigation on three-selected oil MNCs: Shell, 
ExxonMobil, and Chevron Nigerian and these represent a fair reflection of size and diversity. 
The rationales behind these three companies are: 
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i. They are the largest oil producing companies with joint ventures with the 
Government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.  
ii.  They have the highest number of workers on triangular employment contracts. 
iii. They have the highest number of strike actions 
iv. Yin (2003) suggested that researchers should cautiously select cases to be studied so 
that each case selected either, predicts similar outcomes or predicts conflicting 
outcomes, but for predictable analysis. Thus, collecting data from these companies 
using mixed-methods approach facilitated comparisons across three giant companies 
and better understanding of the phenomenon.  
v. Before considering research site(s), accessibility should be paramount (Stake, 2005).  
Silverman (2002) observed that accessibility and accommodation should be the basis, 
which guides researchers in their selection of case studies, since accessibility aids in 
providing with relevant and precise information. Thus, in this study, accessibility is 
one of the major factors for choosing the three companies.  
4.12.3.   Accessibility 
An official letter(s) from the Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR) is the first point of 
entry into the oil industry for research purposes. Hence, an official letter was sent to DPR (see 
Appendix 3, page, 308), although, delayed in response from the DPR, prompted the 
researcher to devised other means of gaining physical access to the oil MNCs. The researcher 
gained access to the interviewees through the trade unions representatives who are employees 
of Shell and Mobil, as well as a management staff of Mobil and a senior staff of Shell 
respectively.   
4.13. Sampling 
Merriam (2002: 179) noted that the selection of the cases is not done randomly but 
purposefully, in that, the individual, site, event, process, community, or other bounded system 
to be studied is selected because the researcher is interested in the characteristics it exhibits. 
Therefore, selecting the study population in this research, purposive sampling techniques were 
adopted in choosing the participants that were most suitable in answering the research 
questions and meeting the research objectives.  
 Purposive sampling was considered to be the most suitable methods for the study, since the 
research questions and objectives demands selecting specific participants who are considered 
well-informed and have the necessary information required to answer the research questions. 
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Sekaran (2003) argued that purposive sampling is limited to a particular set of participants 
that can proffers the desired information, either because they are the only ones who have it, or 
to conform to some criteria set by the researcher. Hence, the selected respondents were in the 
best position to provide the necessary information the researcher needed. 
 Accordingly, sample for this research were drawn from various departments that interfaced 
with human resource practices in the above companies. These includes senior management, 
professionals in the field of Human Resource Department, Line- Managers, Trade Union 
Representatives, Employees, Ministry of Employment and Labour, Employment Agencies, 
and Community Leaders from the Niger Delta region who frequently interacts with the oil 
companies and from the preliminary investigations, it was revealed that the management of 
the oil MNCs give them more attention. Besides, the host communities are the major 
beneficiaries of the social intervention programs of the industry.   
Therefore, to have a comprehensive understanding of the growth of agency labour and its 
threat to employment relationships, it was expedient that the views of various stakeholders 
who have interests in, or are affected by the practices were taken into considerations.  This is 
essential if the study is to produce a more balance viewpoint on the subject or matter of 
concern under investigation. 
4.14. The Fieldwork/Data Collection 
The fieldwork span between the period of May and October 2015, in Nigeria, and the 
interviews took place in Lagos, Port Harcourt, and Eket. In Lagos, visits were made to the 
head offices of the Directorate of Petroleum Resources (DPR), Chevron, ExxonMobil, and 
Shell. Other institutions visited were the Petroleum and Natural Gas Senior Staff Association 
of Nigeria (PENGASSAN), and Nigerian Union of Petroleum and Natural Gas Workers 
(NUPENG), as well as Accenture and Kimberly Ryan Ltd. While in Port Harcourt, the 
researcher visited Shell Office and Ogoni land Community leader, and in Eket, the researcher 
visited ExxonMobil and a community leader. The government institution visited was the 
Ministry of Employment and Labour. 
These visits were imperative to intimate the participants of the research purposes and to build 
trust with the participants. An informal discussion based on preliminary interview questions, 
questionnaires ensued in these visits, and through these discussions, and the researcher was 
privilege to know the names of the participants to proffer the right answers to the research 
questions. Thereafter contacts exchanged and appointment for the first interview was 
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scheduled. However, the informal discussion that ensued based on the preliminary interview 
questions and questionnaire led to a Pilot study of both the qualitative and quantitative 
questions.  
4.14.1    Pilot Study Aim 
A pilot questionnaire is a feasibility approach carried out to clarify or modify the research 
questions in the event of any challenges in understanding the questions by the sampling group 
before conducting the final phase of the fieldwork (Pilot, et al. 2001:467). In the same 
approach, Saunders et al. (2003: 308) argued, "the purpose of the pilot test is to refine the 
questionnaire so that respondents will have no problems in answering the questions and there 
will be no problems in recording the data. In addition, it will enable researcher to obtain some 
assessment of the questions' validity and the likely reliability of the data that will be 
collected".   
The pilot questionnaire helped to understand the practical features and to explore the concept 
of agency labour at the industry level. Spending time carrying out the pilot study had added 
advantages. It presented the knowledge to assess the logistics of the fieldwork, such as, 
appropriateness of questions, response rates, timing, and resources. The Pilot study was a 
useful mechanism in the planning process of the actual fieldwork; it improved the 
effectiveness of the research questions. 
The pilot study established that semi-structured interview is a suitable exploratory method. 
They allowed for a formal set of questions to drive the interview forward as well as allowing 
for the exploration of other issues of concerns should the need arises. In this regard, the 
researcher could raise issues that warrant more explanation or which are unlikely asked under 
structured approach. The semi-structured interview requires time management skills, acquired 
through the pilot study.  The acquisition of time management skill was particularly useful at 
this point, as it helps the researcher identifies areas of interests and focus quickly on the 
questions. This was very helpful as some of the interviews were conduct during strict official 
hours. 
4.14.2.    Pilot Study Technique 
The appropriate participants for the pilot study identified through the contact of two senior 
managers and two trade unions representatives who assisted the researcher to pilot the 
questionnaires and check for any ambiguities.   
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The study involved one-on-one interviews with six ExxonMobil managers as well as 
PENGASSAN and NUPENG representatives in Lagos. This zone harbours the headquarters 
of oil MNCs, as well as that of the PENGASSAN and NUPENG. This was also within the 
access of the researcher base, which means that interviews could be arrange at relatively short 
notice if necessary.   
The general observations were that the questions for the management were too many, that no 
manager has all the time in the world to sit and answer all the questions. The researcher 
advised to prudently cut down on the questions or modify them. The trade unions 
representatives discovered that the questionnaire questions, drawn from previous literature, 
were articulately specific; however, three questions advised to be redrafted for clarity 
purposes, which the employees might misconstrue. At the end of the Piloting phase, the 
researcher was confident that both the interview questions and questionnaire were appropriate 
and acceptable.  
The researcher simultaneously administers both qualitative and quantitative methods; this act 
was more economical and time saving, however, followed by supplementary interviews with 
the agency workers. With the semi-structured interview, it implies that, the researcher had 
predetermined themes and questions to be asked; however, there were provisions for 
contingencies should the need arise as it was later discovered after the informal preliminary 
discussions. This study adopts the mixed- methods approach, the primary source (qualitative) 
was used to find out the rationale and extent employers engage in the use of agency labour 
and why the opposition by the trade union. While the secondary source (quantitative) was 
used to find out workers’ views on this phenomenon. 
4.15. Qualitative Phase: Semi-Structured Interviews 
The overall approach to the interviews was one of a guided conversation facilitated by a 
checklist of semi-structured questions (see Appendix 6, pages, 311-12) to be covered. The 
researcher has anticipated that unforeseen themes would emerge from the interviews, for this 
purpose, the researcher did not intend to restrict interviews by assigning many predetermined 
categories to the interview schedule (Patton, 1990). The purpose was to draw out a range of 
relevant themes, including unanticipated ones (Bauer and Gaskell, 2000). 
This study from the outset targeted to interview only key number of informants, using 
purposive/purposeful sampling. Purposive/Purposeful sampling, is a selection based on how 
valuable respondents are for the pursuit of the investigation (McEvoy and Richards, 2006: 
67), it is a popular sampling technique in qualitative research. However, as the interview 
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phase progresses, there were emerging contradictory and confusing themes that needed more 
clarifications, this prompted the researcher to involved agency workers who were not in the 
original plan from the outset. Agency workers are key informants as well, because they are 
the cause of the contentious behaviour in the industry. 
 
Key informants are respondents that can provide vital information on the phenomenon under 
investigation. They can be experts on the phenomenon, either through their official roles, or 
informally given their absorption in research settings. They may likewise have insight into the 
wider social, political and economic context. They can also act as a link to individual 
respondents, and therefore, play a significant role in the research process.   
 
Thus, respondents selected across the three oil MNCs, are significantly crucial to the 
phenomenon under study. They are of various categories: the management, trade unions 
officials, employment agencies, ministry of employment and labour, community leaders and 
agency workers. The total respondents interviewed were 38 in number as shown on Table 8 
below. To Bauer and Gaskell (2000: 9) large numbers of respondents do not guarantee a 
better quality dataset, however, argues that it is more appropriate to employ wider range and 
variation of experiences, views and perceptions, which will enhance findings.  
 
Table 12:   Interviewee Participants: 
No. DESIGNATION     SHELL EXXON-MOBIL CHEVRON TOTAL 
1  HR Generalists 2 2 1 5 
2  Exploration/Production)Line 
Managers 
2 2 1 5 
3 HR Officials(Operations and 
Compensation/Benefit 
Specialists) 
1 1 1 3 
4 Finance 1 1 1 3 
4 Trade Unions Representatives  2 2  4 
5 Employment Agencies    2 
6 Community Leaders    2 
7 Ministry of Labour and 
Productivity 
   1 
8 Agency workers 5 5 3 13 
 SUB-TOTAL    38 
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The researcher asked some introductory questions before the relevant questions. These set of 
questions sought to provide demographic and employment overview of the participants, as 
stated below: 
 Name of Company 
 Length of Time in the job 
 Position Occupied 
 Work Location 
Some of the interviews were conducted in the respondents’ offices this provides the privilege 
of giving the researcher relevant documents and communique to validate their assertions.  
Others were conducted outside the office setting as a result of their busy schedules, the 
respondents’ choses the place and the time that were most convenient for them which was 
basically in the evenings. The itinerary permits the researcher to spend between 35minutes to 
2 hours’ maximum with each interviewee. The interviews conducted in English language but 
with the exemption of the two community leaders who spoke in “Pidgin English”. 
The researcher made known to the respondents of the recording purpose both in the consent 
form and verbally, based on anonymity and confidentiality, which some of the interviewees 
consented before the interview commenced.  A Sony Olympus voice recorder was helpful in 
this regard. Some of the interviews that lasted for two hours were because few of the 
respondents who wanted to be sure of the information provided, asked the researcher to play 
back their interview section, which the researcher humbly obliged. The researcher reassured 
the interviewees of utmost confidentiality of information given, as the researcher could 
deduce anxiety surrounding an element of prying into company affairs and gaining inside 
information on the strength and weaknesses of the management. At the end of each interview, 
the researcher thanked the interviewees for their time. 
However, the needed cooperation from the employment agencies was not forthcoming.  
Armed with the address of these companies, formal letters were sent asking for their 
cooperation in the fieldwork, there were no responses from them except one, stating that due 
to the sensitive nature of their business they did not feel comfortable in accommodating the 
researcher presence. 
This disheartening response necessitated the researcher to have a rethink of how to approach 
these companies to allow access, rather than taking what was in effect a cold calling approach. 
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The researcher felt the option now, would be an introduction or a link from previous contacts 
from the oil MNCs.    
The only disadvantage of opting for this strategy is that, personnel from the oil industry would 
recommend employment agencies who comply with their norms. There is this logical 
tendency to recommend companies with good relationship and this might reflect trade unions 
bias within the companies. More so, there is the inclination that the oil personnel are likely to 
pick companies that are compliant with the conditions of the oil MNCs and employment 
contractors’ agreement on agency workers. Likewise, having handpicked companies may 
contradict the aspects of having random responses from a list of participants. The primary 
benefit of this approach was that, there was open access to the interviewees both in Lagos and 
in Port Harcourt. The researcher got access to two of the employment agencies through Shell 
and ExxonMobil personnel. 
4.16. Quantitative Phase 
In the cause of the researcher visits to PENGASSAN AND NUPENG headquarters in Lagos, 
it was advised that the researcher be present at the emergency joint National Executive 
Council (NEC) meeting between PENGASSAN and NUPENG on the 13
th
 of August, 2015 
for the onward distribution of the questionnaires. The researcher had anticipated that activists 
attending this meeting would be more than willing to participate in the survey, and likewise 
distribute among their members in their respective zones; the researcher fieldwork itinerary 
includes covering the three geographical zones and to collects the questionnaire on arriving in 
each of the zones.   
By mid-way into the meeting, they invited the researcher to brief NEC about the research and 
solicit for their support, thereafter; about 250 questionnaires handed out on that same day to 
the unions’ officials. The response was overwhelming with zonal representatives agreeing to 
help distribute and collect the questionnaires, although, there were constant telephone calls 
made by the researcher as a follow-up to the officials before arriving at each zone for 
collection.   
However, the researcher experienced some challenges in collecting some of the 
questionnaires at the agreed time during the NEC meeting, which consequently saw the 
researcher staying longer than planned in the Niger Delta region, thus leading to financial 
constraints. Out of 250 questionnaires distributed, 100 questionnaires were administered to 
Shell, and 73 were completed and returned. 100 questionnaires were given to ExxonMobil, 
and 66 were completed and returned. While 50 questionnaires were delivered to Chevron, and 
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37 were completed and returned. Therefore, a total of 176 (70.4 per cent) completed 
questionnaires were retrieved by 10
th
 of October 2015. 
Table 13: Respondents 
Nature of 
Employment 
Shell Mobil Chevron Frequency Per Cent 
Permanent 
Staff 
25 24 11 60 33.1 
Contract 
Staff 
26 20 12 58 32.0 
Service Staff 7 12 9 28 15.5 
Support or 
Manpower 
Staff 
15 10 5 30 17.14 
TOTAL 73 66 37 176  
 
From the Table 9 above, respondents with various employment contracts participated in the 
survey. The ratio of the permanent employees’ respondents (60) is more than each category of 
the agency workers (contract 58; service 28; and manpower 30 staffs). However, the total sum 
of agency workers are more than the permanent employees, this indicates that agency workers 
are likely to be more in the oil industry. 
In summary, it is an interesting mission. It is fair to admit that the fieldwork was a good 
moment for the researcher to meet and know more people as it relates to employment 
relations in the Nigerian oil industry.  The trade unions and employees were more than willing 
to provide all the necessary supports they could render in seeing to the successful completion 
of the study; however, both the NEC officials and two of the senior managers from 
ExxonMobil and Shell want to have copies of the research at the end of its completion.  
4.17. Triangulation, Validity, and Retroduction 
Since critical realism believes that our knowledge of the world is incomplete, and that the aim 
of research is to produce a thorough and robust explanatory account of a phenomenon, 
procedures involves in evaluating critical research hinges on approach of completeness. For 
research informed by critical realism, mixed or multiple methods can bring the researcher 
closer to the nature of the phenomenon through the exploration of its various dimensions, and 
the triangulation of these numerous methods of data collection (Denzin and Lincoln, 1998:9).  
Easterby-Smith et al. (1991) analyses of four types of triangulations namely: data, 
investigator, methodological, and theoretical. Data triangulation is the acquisitions of data 
from various sources. Investigator triangulation is when different investigators utilize to 
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collect the same data. Methodological triangulation has to do with using different methods to 
collect data (e.g. quantitative and qualitative methods). Theoretical triangulation brings to a 
successful conclusion when different theories bear the same results. In this study, 
methodological triangulation was applied to examine transcripts from interviews and data 
from the questionnaires. This form of triangulation, where researchers employed various 
resources is highly acknowledged, and the easiest to implement. The methodological 
triangulation verified the validity of the study (Yin, 2011). 
Olsen (2004) argues that triangulation is not necessarily an aim just to validate research but 
also, and more importantly at deepening and widening of understanding. This is contrary to 
the positivist approaches to validity, which hold firm to rigorous codification of research 
procedures, while qualitative approach lacks operationally defined tests of validity (Eisner, 
1991: 53). Qualitative research is often criticised for lacking scientific rigour, and one of the 
disapprovals is that it is strongly subject to researcher bias and therefore, may not be objective 
(Ghauri and Gronhaug, 2005:58). Notwithstanding the fact that there are arrays of terms 
within qualitative approaches that act as substitute markers for validity and reliability, for 
instance, authenticity, credibility, dependability and trustworthiness (Lincoln and Guba, 1985: 
53), there is no general agreement as to what validity entails (Creswell, 2003: 196).  
 
However, researchers can only have attained Validity in qualitative research through various 
forms of crosschecking. Validity is a form of in-built checks and controls, which is construed 
through four tests of: construct validity, internal validity, external validity and reliability 
(Saunders et al., 2009). Validity is about efficacy (Silverman, 2011: 275), hence, this research 
defines it as the extent to which a report accurately represents the utilization of agency labour 
and trade unions’ challenges. Validity is also, about how accurate the flexible work 
arrangements influence the issue of mobilization. 
 
Internal validity is about causal relationship, whereby certain actions shown to have led to 
other actions as distinguished from bogus relationships (Silverman, 2004; Easterby-Smith et 
al, 1999; Yin, 1994: 33).   In this study, this was achieved by purposive sampling, which was 
employed during management, trade unions, workers, and the subsequent addition of agency 
workers’ interviews, which proffers the desired information on the way and manner agency 
workers are utilised in the industry and the consequent opposition by the trade unions. 
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Construct validity is concerned with the idea that the research design fully addresses agency 
labour and unions challenges (White, 2000: 25, Kasanen, 1993; Easterby-Smith et al, 
1991:41). Construct validity was achieved through triangulation of the multiple data sources, 
that is, management, trade unions, government, employment agencies, agency workers and 
community leaders’ interviews with that of the general workers’ data from questionnaires. 
Construct validity was also incorporated within the research design by ensuring the research 
questions were worded in semi-structured forms for the interviewee. The semi-structured 
pattern was to enable the researcher probe for further questions when the need arises focusing 
at the phenomenon from different perspectives (Rao and Perry 2003). 
 
External validity establishes the domain to which a study’s findings can be generalised to 
other oil companies and sectors in Nigeria (Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill, and 2012: 194; Yin, 
1994: 33). External validity indicates the ability of the research findings be represented 
beyond the immediate cases under study (Cresswell, 2007). This research achieved this as it 
followed a critical realist paradigm and case study, which permits theoretical or literal 
replication.  
 
Literal replication simply means cases yielding results that are similar for predictable reasons; 
however, if cases produce contrary results for predictable reasons, it is theoretical replication. 
Thus, by adopting a critical realism paradigm, the context is influence by other factors like 
political, social; economic hence selection of cases based on contextual replication. As the 
study premised on contextual replication, multiple cases employed to improve external 
validity. 
Ordinarily conditions for reliability can only be achieved through the replicability of a study 
(Gray, 2009). Reliability is about consistency of research, and whether another researcher 
could use the same research design and obtain similar findings (Gray, 2009; Saunders, et al 
2009: 192), or whether the researcher would expect to obtain the same findings if she tried 
again in the same way (Silverman 2011: 275). In the quantitative research, this is achievable 
by the consistency of measures, while in a qualitative research; reliability can be increased 
using semi-structured framework of themes (Yin, 2003). In this current study, the reliability 
of the interview data was increase by the discovering nature of the interview themes, which 
subsequently leads to the inclusion of the agency workers in the interview.  
 
In addition, reliability was achieved by producing data extracts through cross-examination of 
the agency workers who were originally not in the scheme of plan of this study. This move 
131 
 
encourages this helpless class of workers to give more information, which further added 
vigour to this study. Reliability was also achieved as there was a comparison of researcher’s 
results with those in literature about flexible work arrangements and trade unions struggle 
(Danesi, 2012; Fapohounda, 2012; Adewumi and Adenugba, 2010; Atkinson, 1984).  
 
As a critical realist, the value of the research project is established through an emphasis on 
depth and extent of research aimed at building a more thorough, robust, and compelling report 
and clarification of social life. Several approaches employed by critical realism for evaluating 
research work are to some extent shared with interpretivist research methodologies, such as 
Creswell (2003: 196) eight approaches for verifying the accuracy of any research work. 
 
 It is feasible to recognised three approaches, which can apply to a critical realist perspective- 
(i) is the application of various data sources, (ii) clarifying researcher bias through reflexivity 
(self-reflection) - researchers should adopt a reflexive approach to the data they collect by 
creating an open and honest narrative that will resonate well to the readers. This point often 
overlooked in quantitative research where the data takes on an objectivist existence once 
converted to “manipulatable” statistics. Lastly, (iii) Creswell recommends researcher presents 
conflicting information that is at variance to themes or assumptions constructs or inherent 
from the literature. Problems arising from conflicting perspectives can therefore results in a 
deeper probing, identifying and resolving inadequacies, for example, the involvement of 
agency workers in this research. 
 
Generally, the aim of this research has been to produce a robust and comprehensive report of 
the phenomenon, through the interpretation, which can be held up against the various data 
sources, and the theoretical framework that underpin the study. Hence, the adoption of a 
critical realist approach to triangulation, which involved corroboration and completeness with 
a retroduction approach, was adopted (McEvoy and Richards, 2006). Retroductive inference 
built on the premise that social reality consists of structures and internally related objects but 
that knowledge can only be attained of this social reality if the researcher go beyond what is 
empirically observable by asking questions about and developing concepts that are 
fundamental to the phenomenon under investigation (Meyer and Lunnay, 2013). 
 Danermark, et al. (1997), argued that in the social sciences, retroduction is a mode of 
inference that is essential. Retroduction is a means of knowing the conditions fundamental to 
the existence of phenomena. For example, it could be possible that the growth in the use of 
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agency labour is to enable organisations to remain competitive in the global market. It could 
also be a cost reduction motives, or to weaken the labour movement.  
Accordingly, understanding the fundamental concepts of this study, confirmation was sought 
through an examination of various facets of the phenomenon, while corroboration occurs at 
all levels of data analysis, through the process of retroductive abstraction, and completeness 
(McEvoy and Richards, 2006: 72). In its wider-dimension, triangulation is the integration of 
more than one group perspectives, appropriating as much of reality as possible in order to 
increase the validity of the evidence given and reinforce the accuracy and representativeness 
of the data (Downward and Mearman, 2006: 79; Denzin and Lincoln, 1989: 89). 
The ways and manner these multiple sources are analysed and interpreted likewise influences 
the potency of the report. According to Flick, (2002: 227) “triangulation is not a tool or a 
strategy of validation, but an alternative to validation; the combination of multiple 
methodological practices, empirical materials, perspectives, and observers in a single study 
understood, then as a strategy that adds rigor, breadth, complexity, richness and depth to any 
inquiry”. For example, the management of the oil MNCs argued that the Nigerian Oil Industry 
Content Development Act authorised them to outsource 90% of all jobs in their companies, 
thus, a justification to engage in triangular employment relations. However, the trade unions 
refuted this claim. As they have consistently asked, the management to show them the 
specific provision(s) in the Nigerian Content Development Act that permits them to do so. 
In the above scenario, the proven documentation of the Content Act can only justify this 
argument. Hence, multiple sources enable the researcher to recognise and avoid bias. This 
study, therefore argues that, while it is essential to acknowledge and make known the 
standpoint of the researcher, it is inadmissible (and impossible) to completely eradicate bias 
from the research process. Thus, the findings of this study are shape by the data and by the 
interpretation given to the data. 
The interpretation has been premised upon the philosophical and theoretical positions that 
were earlier discuss in this chapter. This approach to research is informed by an appreciation 
of critical realism emancipatory goal (Wilson and Green, 2004). Taking into consideration 
that readers need to be reassured that data is not simply manipulated to fit the arguments, but 
the integration of multiple sources, critically analysed according to the logic of theoretical 
retroduction, seeks to provide a compelling report of agency labour and trade unions 
challenges in the oil capitalist industry of Nigeria. 
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4.18. Ethical Approval 
 
The University of Salford Business School Ethics Approval Committee approved the 
researcher’s Ethics Approval Form (see Appendix 1, page, 305) before embarking on the 
fieldwork. This is important for the protection of the participants and their rights. The 
researcher was armed with two-sets of letters for the participants, one of the letters contained 
information of the purpose of the study and what it intends to achieve. The second was a 
consent letter (see Appendix 2, pages, 306-7), which provided information of consent to 
participate in the interview and to voluntary withdraw from participating in the interview at 
any point in time.  
The consent letter provides information of the anticipated interview timing as well as audio 
recording device, which was promised to be very confidential. The interviewees were asked to 
sign the consent letter to indicate they understood what the research involved and if any 
queries could be directed to the researcher supervisor whose information was provided in the 
consent letter. The participants guaranteed that the information provided would be solely used 
for the purpose of this research under anonymity, confidentiality and securely protected. 
McNeil and Chapman (2005: 12-14) indicated six ethical guidelines that a researcher must 
adhered to: first, all participants must be informed of what the research is about (consent 
letter). Secondly, must not be deceptive of the purpose of the study. Thirdly, the participants’ 
privacy protected. Fourthly, anonymity and confidentiality should be the watchword and 
upheld. The fifth, the interviewees should be protected from any harmful object both physical 
and emotional, and lastly, avoid situations of being drawn into crime of deviant behaviour.  
However, Burns and Grove (2011) observed that with qualitative method, complete 
anonymity is impossible, as the interviewer will be aware of the interviewee. To safeguard the 
interviewee’s privacy and confidentiality, the researcher solely transcribed the interview data 
and conspicuously avoids the use of real names, rather, fictitious names created to represent 
interviewee’s identities. 
4.19. Limitations 
There were no responses from the employment agencies except one, stating that due to the 
sensitivity of their business, they did not feel comfortable in accommodating the researcher 
presence. There was no cooperation from the employment agencies.  Having hand-picked 
well organised and compliant companies by the oil MNCs personnel contradicts the aspects of 
having random responses from a list of participants. 
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Another problem encountered was the refusal of tape-recording by the employment agencies, 
despite the assurance of anonymity. The researcher also had similar issue of recording with 
some of the management staff of the oil MNCs, but on the assurance of anonymity, most of 
them agreed. Although some asked for a replay, which was time consuming. 
 
The possibility of bias (researcher and facilitators) in questionnaires may exist. The researcher 
was privileged to be invited into PENGASSAN and NUPENG National Executive Council 
Meeting of the 13
th
 August, 2015 for onwards distribution of questionnaires. A total of 250 
questionnaires were handed over to all the zonal leaders for onward distribution in their 
respective zones or branches. However, the researcher had anticipated that activists would be 
more willing to distribute to their members only. However, from the statistical analysis of the 
respondents, it was discovered that the questionnaires were evenly distributed among the 
permanent employees and agency workers, as can be seen from Table 9, page, 119. 
 
Lastly, the researcher would have desired to stay longer in Nigeria, to collect more of the 
questionnaires, however, due to time constraints and additional cost of the research, 
particularly because of the financial constraints faced by the researcher as self-sponsored 
researcher, the research was guided against any extended stay and kept within the bounds. 
 
4.20. Summary  
This chapter has presented a comprehensive analysis of the research methodology, whereby 
after careful considerations, critical realism was adopted, due to its relevance in finding 
answers to the research questions.  The methods utilized in data collections explained, as well 
as, the approach for data collection through semi-structured interviews, and questionnaires. 
 A case study strategy was adopted to gain in-depth understanding on the managerial motives 
for agency labour and the challenges confronting trade unions in the Nigerian oil industry. 
This strategy permits the researcher to focus on limited cases and other relevant participants.  
The rationale for the choice of the three oil MNCs were duly justified. The sample size for the 
research was discussed and justified. Lastly, the study significantly elaborates on data 
triangulation, validity and retroduction inference to show the rigor and robustness of the 
research. The next two chapters present the outcomes of the fieldwork which is both 
quantitative and qualitative research findings.  
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CHAPTER 5: Quantitative Research Findings  
5. Introduction 
This chapter presents the findings from the quantitative survey conducted in this research. The 
initial plan for the presentation of the data evidence was to present the qualitative results then 
followed by quantitative responses. However, the responses from management and trade 
unions necessitated some basic amendments in the questionnaire. This was needed to uncover 
the underlying conflicting issues between the management and the trade unions, particularly, 
with regard to the terms of employment contracts of agency workers and their relationships 
with the trade union, as well as, their attitudes towards unionism.  
Employment relationships in the Nigerian oil industry cannot be fully understood without 
considering the wider employees’ views on the growth of   agency labour upon which the 
management formulate their strategies. Therefore, the responses from the broader workforce 
perspectives through the questionnaire, provides robust data to the afore-mentioned 
clarifications. This fore-knowledge is needed to unravel the contradiction on management and 
trade unions views. 
5.2  Quantitative Data Analysis and Presentation 
This section presents the results of the quantitative data analysis and interpretation. The 
questionnaires were handed out after the first phase of interview. The statements from some 
of the interviewees prompted the researcher to redesign some questions to address all the 
possible points that were raised in order to achieve the purpose of the research. The unit of 
analysis was mainly drawn from the agency workers of Shell, ExxonMobil and Chevron 
Nigeria. This is due to the fact that they are the ones at the receiving end of managerial 
policies and directives which impact on their rights to association, although, both the 
unionised standard employees and the few unionised agency workers in the industry also 
participated in the survey.  Sekaran (2003: 266) defines a research population as the entire 
group of people, events, or things of interest that the researcher wishes to investigate. Hence, 
the entire categories of workforce were well represented in the survey (see table 2); to 
checkmate every possible bias. 
 
The questionnaire below is divided into eight sections (A-H), which further comprises of sub-
sections. Section A-B questions were merely to tick which is applicable. Section C-H was 
closed-ended questions. It is more of Likert-ordinal Scale which comprises a statement and 
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five response statements.  The respondents were asked to choose response categories that 
already had figures assigned to them. For example, the response, which was also pre-coded, 
comes in these forms “Strongly Agree (5); Agree (4); Neutral (3); Disagree (2) and Strongly 
Disagree (1).  
The first section (A) requested the respondents to provide personal information, the name of 
their company, industry and company experience.  This is needed to differentiate the 
respondents’ company’s level and the level of experience. The second section (B) is about 
employment and union status, involving: current employment status, annual takes home 
income and trade union membership. This is to enable the researcher to ascertain if the 
questionnaire were well appropriated across the purposive sampling, as well as, to acquire 
first-hand information on which of these purposive sampling belongs to union and which do 
not belong, and why.  
The third section (C) is to discover what the workforce considered as the major rationale for 
the utilization of agency labour. This is to ascertain if the most perceived factor (s) is in 
conformity with the outcome from the managerial interviews. The fourth section (D) deals 
with the trade unions resistance to the growth of agency labour. This is to establish from the 
broader views which is the most considered factor(s). 
The fifth section (E) relates to any perceived wage related issues as a result of two-tier 
workforce. This section is to determine if there are any consequences as a result of income 
deferential, particularly as it concerns wages and social benefits. The sixth section (F) is 
related to trade unions organisation. This is to find out how the workers perceived or relates to 
union’s representation. 
The seventh section (G) is about the likely implications/consequences of the new work 
arrangements on both the standard employees and agency workers. The last section (H) is 
related to the causes of the exacerbating conflicts in the industry. This is to ascertain the 
perceived factors that frequently give rise to labour and management conflicts in the industry 
and the consequent outcomes, such as strike actions. 
Questionnaire 
Table 14:  Questionnaire administered to the participants 
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SECTION A: PERSONAL INFORMATION 
A1. Gender  
 Male 1 
 Female 2 
A2. What is your marital status? 
 Single  1 
 Married  2 
 Others(Specify)____________________  3 
A3. Which of the following best describe your age 
bracket? 
 Under 20 years 1 
 21 – 30  2 
 31 – 40 3 
 41 – 50  4 
 51 – 60  5 
 Over 60 6 
A4. Which of the following best describes your 
nationality?  
 Nigerian 1 
 Expatriate 2 
A5 Which of the following best describes your ethnic 
background (for Nigerians only)? 
 Hausa 1 
 Igbo 2 
 Yoruba 3 
 Niger Delta 4 
 Others (Please Specify)______________ 5 
A6. Which of the following best describes the highest 
level of education you have completed? 
 Never attended school  1 
 Primary School  2 
 Junior Secondary School (JSS)  3 
 Senior Secondary School 4 
 National Diploma (ND)/National Certificate of 
Education (NCE) 
5 
 Bachelor’s degree ( B.Sc., BA)/Higher National 
Diploma (HND) 
6 
 Higher University degree (e.g. Masters, 
Doctorate, PGD) 
7 
A7. How many years of experience do you have in the oil 
and gas industry? 
 Less than 1year 1 
 1 – 5  2 
 6 – 10  3 
 11 – 15  4 
 16 – 20  5 
 Over 20  6 
A8. What is the name of your current company? 
 Shell Nigeria 1 
 ExxonMobil 2 
 Chevron 3 
A9. How long have you been working in this company? 
 Less than 1year 1 
 1 – 5  2 
 6 – 10  3 
 11 – 15  4 
  16 – 20   5 
 21 -25 6 
 26-30 7 
 31-35 8 
A10. What is your position in this company? 
 Senior Position 1 
 Junior Position 2 
 
 
SECTION B: EMPLOYMENT AND LABOR STATUS 
The focus of this section is to gather information about your 
current employment and trade union status. In case you have 
been in any form of employment status before now, kindly 
focus on the current one and answer the following questions.  
 
B1 What is your current employment status 
    Permanent Staff 1  
 Contract Staff 2 
 Servicing Staff 3 
 Manpower Staff 4 
B2 How did you secure the present job? 
 Direct with the company 1 
 Servicing company 2 
 Contractor 3 
 Employment firm 4 
B3 What type of contract do you have? 
 Written contract with no fixed term 1 
 Written contract with fixed term 2 
 Verbal understanding with no fixed term 3 
 Verbal understanding with fixed term 4 
B4. In which section of the company do you work? 
 Upstream 1 
 Midstream 2 
 Downstream 3 
 All the sectors 4 
B5. On the balance, are you in this company because you 
 Think this is a good company to work for 1 
 Interested in working here mainly for the 
money 
2 
 Interested in the kind of work you do 3 
 Like very little about working here but cannot 
find a better job 
4 
 Like coming to work because of the friends you 
have here 
5 
 Work experience here increases your 
employability security 
6 
B6. On the average, your annual take home income is 
within which range? Please be accurate as possible. 
 Less than N1 million ($) 1 
 N10-20million ($) 2 
 N20-30million 3 
 N30-40million 4 
 N40-50million 5 
 Over N50million 6 
B7. Your wages as compared to that of similar workers in 
the same or other oil and gas multinational 
Companies in Nigeria is? 
 Higher 1 
 Lower  2 
 About the same 3 
B8 Are you a member of any of the following trade 
unions? 
 PENGASSAN 1   
 NUPENG 2 
 NONE 3 
B9 If none, why are you not? 
 Company’s policy 1 
 Not Interested 2 
 Don’t know about union 3 
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SECTION C – INFORMATION ABOUT MANAGEMENT 
RATIONALE 
The focus of this section is to gather information about your 
views on the new management rationale for outsourcing and 
contracting of labour. Please indicate to what extent you 
consider the following reason for the increasing use of non-
permanent staff. 
C1 If there are preference for the 
use and increasing use of non-
permanent staff; what are the 
reasons: 
Technological Innovation SD D N A SA 
Cutting-Cost (wages, 
training, benefits and 
others) 
     
Focusing on Competence      
Union Militancy      
Lack of human capital      
Fluctuation in the demands 
of product market 
     
Global competition      
Restructuring and 
reorganisation 
     
Aiding the community      
To have total control of the 
workforce 
     
Focusing on the critical 
functions 
     
Efficiency and Expertise      
Shifting responsibilities 
(health and safety) 
     
Technological Innovation      
SECTION D – INFORMATION ABOUT TRADE UNIONS 
OPPOSITION AND WORKERS ORGANISATION. 
The focus of this section is to gather information about your 
views on trade unions resistance to contracting of labour 
 
D1 They have been great oppositions in the camp of the 
trade unions against the increasing usage of non-
permanent staff because 
DQ1 Contract staff are  
 Yes (permitted to join union) 1 
 No (not permitted to join union) 2 
DQ2 Service staff 
 Yes (permitted to join union 1 
 No (not permitted to join union) 2 
DQ3 Manpower staff 
 Yes (permitted to join union 1 
 No (not permitted to join union) 2 
DQ4 All non-permanent staff are  
 Yes (permitted to join union) 1 
 No (not permitted to join union) 2 
D2 If there are preference for the trade union resistance to 
outsourcing and contracting of labour, what are the 
reasons: 
 SD D N A SA 
Profit maximization      
Hiring of expatriate      
To have control over the workforce      
Denial of the non-permanent staff to 
join union 
     
Affects union membership      
Cutting-cost ( hiring and firing at will      
Division among the workforce      
Weakens trade union’s strength      
Irrational wages      
Weak Legislature      
 
SECTION E – INFORMATION ABOUT INCOME AND 
SOCIAL BENEFITS. 
The focus of this section is to gather information about your 
views on how outsourcing and contracting of labour best 
describes your income and social benefits. 
E1 What are the wage related problems faced as a result 
of outsourcing of labour 
 
No wage  problem SD D N A SA 
Low wages      
Wage not paid in time      
Cut in wages      
No overtime payment      
No bonus      
No allowance given      
No increment      
Inadequate bonus      
Laying off wages not given      
 
E2 Besides your monthly salary, do you get any other 
benefit such as : housing, transport, health, feeding 
etc. 
 Yes 1 
 No 2 
 
E3 Are you entitled to any retrenchment or lay-off 
benefits? 
 Yes 1 
 No 2 
 
E4 Please indicate your degree of satisfaction with the 
following: 
 VU U N S VS 
Sick pay      
Holiday pay      
Pension provision      
Job security      
basic salary      
Hazardous work environment      
 Responsibility at work      
Advancement (promotion)      
Unpredictability of work      
Time spent waiting for 
another project to come 
     
 
E5 What factors would make you consider moving to a 
different work 
 MU U N L ML 
Better pay      
Better benefit      
Better prospect      
Greater security      
Change in circumstances 
(demotion) 
     
Job satisfaction      
Good career move      
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SECTION F – INFORMATION ABOUT WORKERS 
ORGANISATION AND LABOUR MANAGEMENT 
RELATIONS 
 
To each of the statements 
below, please indicate the 
degree of your agreement or 
disagreement 
SD D N A SA 
F1 There is just unnecessary 
agitations on the camp of 
the trade unions over the 
usage of contract workers 
as the unstable global 
economy has necessitated 
these actions of the 
management 
     
F2 the union find it difficult in 
mobilising the non-
permanent workers  as a 
result of workers 
segregation  
     
F3 There are no any threats, 
harassment and 
victimization from any 
quarters for joining trade 
unions. 
 
     
F4 Both the State and the 
management of oil MNCs 
are of the view that 
unionization disrupt 
production and increase 
tension and conflict, hence 
the restriction on the right 
to unionise. 
     
F5 Non-permanent staffs are 
made to sign a ‘yellow-
dog’ contract by their 
employers of not joining 
any trade unions. 
     
F6 With regards to the 
Nigerian Constitution 
workers have right to 
belong to a trade union 
     
F7 There should be demand 
for labour laws reform in 
conformity to 
contemporary 
employment system 
     
F8 Trade union in your 
workplace has been very 
helpful in this regard of 
workers’ rights 
     
F9 The roles of trade unions 
in the counter-movement 
of the employment 
evolutionary trend is 
highly applauded 
     
F10 Flexible form of labour is 
however admitted and 
necessary in a competitive 
market, are these flexible 
workforces protected 
under the new labour 
system  
     
F11 Employees take-up 
contract employment 
because that is what they 
want (work-life balance) 
 
     
F12 The management carried 
along employees/trade 
unions when taking 
decisions on issues 
affecting the workforce 
and the company in 
general 
 
     
F13 There are effective 
mechanisms in place, 
promoting good working 
relationship between the 
management and trade 
unions/employees (for 
example, seeking redress 
in case of violation of 
rights 
     
F14 On balance, do you 
support the continuation 
of worker organisation in 
your company? 
     
F15 the union find it difficult in 
mobilising the non-
permanent workers  as a 
result of workers 
segregation  
     
F16 As a contract employee, do you feel adequately 
represented by the Union? 
 YES 1 
 NO 2 
 In the last 10 years, I believe that the management has 
positively change in the following areas 
 From aggression to 
understanding/dialogue 
1 
 From dialogue to aggressive stand 2 
F17 Over the last 10 years, what change has there been in 
the activities of worker organisation in your company 
 No change 1 
 From militant actions to 
negotiations/court cases 
2 
F18 In what capacity and how often do you participate in 
workplace organising activities in your unit? 
 As a union member 1 
 Potential member 2 
 Freedom Fighter 3 
 Don’t Participate 4 
F19 I did not participate in order 
 To avoid being victimized 1 
 Because I still need my job 2 
 For my contract to be renewed 3 
 Because the struggle favours only the 
permanent staff 
4 
F20 How would you describe relations between 
management and workers in your workplace 
 Very co-operative 1 
 Somewhat co-operative 2 
 Not co-operative 3 
F21 What do you think is the major issue with workers 
organisations 
 Workers have divided interests  and 
priorities 
1 
 Non-permanent workers believed that the 
trade unions want to use them as a shield 
2 
F22 In your opinion, to what extent  would you describe 
management action/relationship with union 
 SD D N A SA 
 Avoidance      
 Marginalisation      
 Co-determination 
through information 
     
 Aggression (union 
bursting) 
     
 Bypassing unionization 
attempts through 
channels of direct 
communication with 
workers through 
information sharing 
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 Bypassing unionization 
attempts through 
channels of direct 
communication with 
workers through 
information sharing 
     
SECTION G – INFORMATION OF ANY LIKELY 
IMPLICATIONS/CONSEQUENCES OF 
OUTSOURCING AND CONTRACTING OF LABOUR 
ON NON-PERMANENT STAFF 
 
G1 Which of the following do you think is the most 
likely implication/consequence of non-
permanent staff 
 There are no implications/consequences 1 
 Kills their morale (seen as second-hand 
citizens) 
2 
 Lack of commitment 3 
 Sabotage 4 
 Bunkering 5 
 Crimes (kidnapping, robbery, and 
bombing) 
6 
 
SECTION G2 – INFORMATION OF ANY LIKELY 
IMPLICATIONS/CONSEQUENCES OF 
OUTSOURCING AND CONTRACTING OF LABOUR 
ON PERMANENT STAFF 
 
G2 Which of the following do you think is the most 
likely implication/consequence of permanent 
staff 
 There are no implications/consequences 1 
 False  retirement 2 
 Increase workload (responsibilities) 3 
 Retaining one position for long 4 
 Lack of  confidence on their employer 5 
 Lack of commitment and productivity 6 
 
SECTION H – This section seeks to understand the 
causes, nature and extent of the increasing industrial 
conflicts and its implications? 
H1 Did your company face any kind of 
workers’/union protest during the last 10 years  
such as strike, boycotting, walk-out and protest 
 Yes 1 
 No 2 
 
H2 From the following which would you say are the 
main causes of conflicts between the 
management and unions in your company 
 
  SD D N A SA 
 The shift from 
permanent work to 
more of contract 
work 
     
 Denial of the non-
permanent  right to 
unionise 
     
 Refusal to honour 
Collective Agreement 
     
 Union recognition      
 Retrenchment      
 Wage demand      
 Increase usage of 
expatriates 
     
 Unlawful termination 
and victimization of 
union reps contract 
     
 Unlawful termination 
of contract staff 
contract for joining 
the union 
     
THANK YOU FOR TAKING TME IN COMPLETING 
THIS SURVEY 
 
Key:  SD-STRONGLY DISAGREE 
VU-VERY UNSATISFACTORY  
MU- MOST UNLIKELY 
 US-UNSATISFACTORY 
 UN-UNLIKELY 
 N-NEUTRAL 
 NI-NOT IMPORTANT 
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The completed questionnaires were manually cross-checked for suitability, and coding was 
relatively straightforward, although with caution as majority of the questions were pre-coded 
with figures. The data were computerised into the Statistical Package for Social Scientists 
(SPSS) software program version 22 for the purpose of analysis. After the first phase of the 
compute data, the data inputted was vetted to establish this had been keyed-in correctly. Also, 
the SPSS presentation software was checked for errors by undertaking basic frequency 
analysis, and performing cross-tabulation.  
In order to achieve the objectives of this research, varieties of statistical techniques were 
applied in the analysis, such as: 
 
Descriptive Statistics (Frequency and Mean) 
One-Way ANOVA 
Chi-Square 
 
5.2.1.  Justification for using the above statistical techniques: 
 
Descriptive statistics, also called exploratory statistics, involves the transformation of raw 
data into a form that would provide information to describe a set of factors in a situation. 
Robson, (2011: 424) characterise; descriptive statistics as include frequencies, measure of 
central tendency (mean, median and mode) and measure of dispersion (range, standard 
deviation).  
The researcher discovered that Descriptive, or Exploratory statistics, is the most suitable 
technique, since the nature of the research objectives and questions is to explore, discover and 
explain the current phenomenon (agency labour) in the Nigerian oil industry. As well as, to 
explore how this phenomenon affects labour and management relationship or what is the 
relationship between agency labour and the trade union resistance.  
 Hair et al. (2003, p. 252) argued that “data is collected in business research for two broad 
purposes: discovery and hypothesis testing. When the purpose is discovery the researcher uses 
Descriptive Statistics. When the purpose is hypothesis testing the researcher uses Inferential 
Statistics”. Inferential Statistics makes inferences about the population based on the samples 
gathered, and hypothesis testing is one form of inferential statistics.  However, testing of 
hypotheses was not originally design for this study, but for the fact that inferences have to be 
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made about relationships between variables after data collection; to have clear expectation of 
outcomes thus necessitated some hypotheses testing (Robson, 2011). 
In this study, hypotheses testing to determine significant differences among the responses by 
Company employed were framed.  The level of significance is set to 0.05, which means that a 
p-value less than 0.05 are considered significant and the following Statistical Tools were 
used: Parametric Statistics was used since the sample size is adequate enough to do so (n = 
176).  The purpose of parametric test is to make inferences from the sample statistic to the 
population parameter through sampling distributions.  Parametric Statistics was chosen 
because it is more robust and more powerful than its Non-Parametric counterpart, hence One-
Way ANOVA (Robson, 2011:451). 
A One-Way ANOVA is like the T-Test use in comparing more than two groups, it compares 
differences in responses by companies.  This gives a clear picture whether the groups differ in 
their views as it relates to the use of agency workers.  
Chi-Square which is the only non-parametric statistics used, deals with a measure of the 
degree of association or linkage between two variables (Robson, 2011; Hair et al. 2003). This 
was used to determine associations for cross-tabulated data. The use of SPSS software 
facilitated the statistical analysis and reporting of the data collected, as the output showed the 
test results and the significance level of the association (i.e., p-value).  
5.2.2. Statistical Techniques as Applied to Each Section of the Questionnaire 
Descriptive Statistics provides a summary of data in a meaningful way, such that finding 
patterns emerges from the data (Robson, 2011: 423). The following are the Descriptive 
Statistics used in the study: Frequency Count was used to determine the distribution of the 
respondents’ Personal Information, Employment and Labour Statistics.   This was also used to 
determine responses for questions F7, F17, F18, F19, F20, and F21 (See Appendix 8, pages, 
315-318). Cross Tabulation was used to determine interrelationships between companies for 
Sections D1, G1 to H1 (Appendix 10, page, 327).  This was also used to determine Income 
distribution by Employment Status. Mean and Standard Deviation were used for items with 
Likert scales for Sections C, DSEC2, E1, SE4 to SE5, F, and H2. A One Way ANOVA was 
used to compare differences in questions (C1, DSEC2, E1, SE4, and SE5; F1 to F15, and F22 
and H2) by Company.  
Chi-Square which is the only Non-Parametric Statistics was used to determine associations 
for Cross Tabulated data for Sections D1, and G1 to H1 (see Appendix Table 10, page, 327). 
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5.3.  Findings  
5.3.1. Employment and Labour Status 
The findings from the survey evidently suggest that the three oil MNCs (Shell, ExxonMobil 
and Chevron) operates dual and triangular employment relations. The labour force is 
segmented into what Atkinson (1984) termed core (permanent) and peripheral (agency 
workers). See Figure 8 
 
Figure 10: Atkinson Flexible Firm Model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Atkinson’s Model 1984 
The internal labour market comprises of few permanent employees who are directly employed 
by the oil MNCs to carry out core functions, such as oil exploration and production processes, 
and this are basically engineers and geologist. These categories of employees are termed 
critical to the success of the organisations. They have long-term employment contracts, 
largely represented by the trade unions, and fall under the ambit of employment protection 
laws.   
However, Atkinson distinctiveness between the core and peripheral seems not to be fully 
operational in the three oil MNCs. Findings shows that some of the peripheral (agency) 
workers are been utilized at the core production areas. This group of workers are 
External Labour 
Market: Peripheral 
Groups- Numerical 
Flexibility 
Internal Labour 
Market: Core 
Groups-Functional 
Flexibility 
Flexible Firm 
Model 
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heterogeneous by nature, with varied contractual status, and occupational positions. They are 
fractionalized into what is known as contract, service and support staff (see Table 15). Their 
attitudes towards unionism were expected to vary depending on their own status and interests, 
which this study is about to unveil.  
 
Table 15: Employment Status of Respondents  
Nature of 
Employment 
Shell Mobil Chevron Frequency Per Cent 
Permanent Staff 25 24 11 60 33.1 
Contract Staff 26 20 12 58 32.0 
Service Staff 7 12 9 28 15.5 
Support or Manpower 
Staff 
15 10 5 30 17.14 
TOTAL 73 66 37 176  
 
 The table above shows the percentage of the total workforce that participated in the survey. 
The permanent employees have the highest participants 60 (33.1%), while the fragmentised 
agency workers are as follows: (Contract staff 58 (32.0%), Service staff 28 (15.5%) and 
Support staff 30 (17.14%), although when summed-up agency workers totally out-weight the 
percentage of permanent employees. Indicatively, agency workers are more utilised in the 
Nigerian oil industry. Below are their characteristics.   
5.3.2. Permanent Employees 
Employees classified as permanent staff are directly employed by the principal company (oil 
MNCs) and work in the core production units. These are the engineers, geologist, and 
geophysics, as well as, few functional and operational staffs. They enjoy better income, better 
terms and conditions of work, job security and opportunity for promotions. They are members 
of (PENGASSAN and NUPENG). They are privileged to have better bargaining power and 
their employment status is institutionalised through the machinery of collective bargaining. In 
unity they have found strength to effectively challenge adverse working conditions. Hence as 
indicated in Table 8 (see Appendix, page, 331), a permanent employee on same qualification 
and experience (6-10 years) earns annual income ranging from N30-N50 million compared to 
the contract staff in Table 11 (see page, 154) on same qualification and experience (6-10 
years) on salary scale of N10-N30 million per annum. This may not be unconnected to 
employers’ quest for cost-cutting and to generate surplus value. 
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5.3.3.  Contract Workers 
The contract workers are on triangular employment relationship, hired through the 
employment agencies, and work in the core and peripheral areas. Unlike the permanent staff, 
they work under much less secure and favourable employment terms and conditions, because 
they are outside the coverage of collective bargaining. Their bargaining power is 
fractionalised, and individualism terms to dominates. Hence their annual income is much 
lesser (as shown in Table 16, page, 155), as compared to the permanent employees who are of 
same qualifications and experience.  
Their terms and conditions of contracts are poor, employment insecure and in most cases 
access to social benefits and bonuses are denied. Contract workers are denied the many fringe 
benefits accrued to permanent employees. They are not subject to predetermined employment 
conditions, no income increment, advancement or pension provisions. Contract renewal is 
subject to profitability of production, and of course the impulse of the global market.  These 
conditions increase the unpredictability of employment terms and indirectly weaken trade 
union agitation towards the mobilization of this group of workers. 
This group of workers work in the premises of the oil companies; they do not belong to the oil 
MNCs that gain their services, rather that of the employment agency. They are restricted from 
having any direct access to the management of the oil companies. Indicatively, issues or 
concerns are not directly channelled to the management of the oil companies, but to their 
employer (employment agency). The contract workers take instructions from the principal 
company but cannot communicate their problems and needs back.  Instructions flows from the 
principal company to the contract workers, while the problems and complaints of the workers 
flows in another direction. Thus, the use of agency workers has become a strategy of shifting 
responsibility from the principal company to the employment agency, as indicated by 
Chevron workers, as well as, to weaken the strength of organised and unionised labour. 
5.3.4.     Service staff 
The service staffs are mainly from oil servicing firms attached to the oil MNCs to perform 
specific duties for a given duration. However, going by the nature of some of these services, 
some of these workers are usually embedded in the employ of these oil MNCs for the duration 
of the service. 
The workers involved provides specialized services to the oil MNCs, majority are expatriates 
with technical knowledge. However, there is contentious about the income of these 
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expatriates, although not evident in Table 8, (Appendix page, 331).  It is believed that 
expatriate that works in the Nigerian oil and gas industry are among the highest paid in the 
world, with an annual salary of $140,800 (see Hays oil and Gas Global Salary Guide, 2013:6). 
The concern was that most of the expatriate learn-on-the-job from the highly skilled Nigerian 
engineers and technicians.  
 
The underlying assumption was that, as much as these highly skilled indigenous engineers 
allows their labour and expertise to be used at the discretion of the employers’ agents 
(expatriates), the employment relationship effectively involves an act of subordination. Their 
annual take-home remains comparatively low as can be seen (in Appendix Table 8, page 332), 
only one of the service workers is within the range of $80,000 while majority of them are 
within the range of $55,000 - $66,000. This indicates the height of inequality and subjugation. 
5.3.5. Support staff 
The support staffs are supplied by the employment agency for the purpose of aiding the 
workload of the permanent employees.  They are found in different units of the organisation 
structures.  This group of workers knows the end of their contract right from the inception. 
Their employment nature characterised the most precarious situation with a high risk of job 
insecurity. However, few are privileged to have their contract terms renewed, which depends 
on the global market economies. Their income is relatively low (as indicated in  Appendix 
Table 8, page, 333) as compared to other categories of workers, despite their qualifications 
and experience (See Appendix 8 Table 8D, page 333).   
The polarization of this workforce is of utmost concern.  If agency workers are seen as having 
the same educational qualifications, and years of experience as that of the permanent staff, the 
question is, why have they (agency workers) not been integrated into full-employment system 
in the first place, since the oil MNCs so much desire their services? It appears there is a 
calculative impulse on the part of the management to fractionalize the labour force, 
commodify labour power, and maximise profit, as a ‘low-road’ strategy (Mehaut et al. 2010: 
339).  
It is therefore argued that the segmentation of agency workers is a strategy through which 
employers perpetuates its control over the workforce by fractionalizing labour’s bargaining 
power in order to weaken its resistance and make more profit by means of cheap labour. 
There is an indicative inference that the management adopted these forms of employment 
arrangements as an effective and efficient way of cutting labour costs, which according to 
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Armstrong (2009) contributes to the larger percentage of the cost of running an organisation. 
In other words, labour contracting yields innumerable benefits for management at the 
detriment of the workers and trade unions. Labour costs and overhead costs are reduced due 
to low wages and benefits.   
In addition, it has been noted that the lack of explicit definition of the broad spectrum of 
workers under Section 91 of the Nigerian labour law has left agency workers vulnerable. The 
Labour Act does not apply to all categories of Nigerian workers, but defines a worker to 
exclude any persons exercising administrative, executive, technical or professional functions 
as public officers or otherwise. 
The Court of Appeal defined a “worker or servant as any person employed by another to do 
work for him on the terms that he, the servant is to be subject to the control and directions of 
his employer in respect of the manner in which his work is to be done” (Omehia, 2011:8), this 
implies that, the overall power is vested on one of the two persons in the employment 
relationship. The one who exerts control over the other is the employer while the one who 
takes directives and obeys the order is the worker. 
Employers’ hinges on this clause to hire agency workers at will and majority of these workers 
are hired in jobs which are perennial by nature,  see Appendix 8 Tables 8B-D, pages 331-333)   
in comparison to Appendix 8 Table 8A, page 330)  for the number of years spent so far by 
some of the agency workers. The responses recorded in these tables indicates that some of the 
agency workers have put-in quite a good number of years and earn far lesser as compared 
with the permanent employees as indicated in Table 16 below.   
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Table 16: Cross-Tabulation to determine Income Distribution by Employment Status and 
Qualifications  
Employment 
Status 
Qualification 
Income 
Less 
Than 
N10 
Million 
N10 - 
N20 
Million 
N20 -
N30 
Million 
N30 - 
N40 
Million 
N40 - 
N50 
Million 
Over 
N50 
Million 
Permanent 
Staff 
Higher University Degree (E.G. Pgd; Msc; Mba And 
Phd) 
0 0 0 5 9 34 
Bachelor'S Degree(Bsc; Ba/Higher National 
Diploma(Hnd) 
0 0 4 2 1 3 
Senior Secondary School(Sss) 0 2 0 0 0 0 
Contract 
Staff 
Higher University Degree  0 3 5 2 2 1 
Bachelor's Degree  0 13 12 0 2 0 
National Diploma  2 4 3 0 0 0 
Senior Secondary School (Sss) 1 7 0 0 0 0 
Junior Secondary School(Jss) 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Service Staff 
Higher University Degree  0 2 4 0 1 0 
Bachelor's  Degree 0 6 13 0 0 0 
National Diploma 0 2 0 0 0 0 
Manpower 
Staff 
Higher University Degree  0 3 3 0 1 0 
Bachelor's  Degree 0 16 2 0 0 0 
National Diploma 2 0 0 0 0 0 
Senior Secondary School(Sss) 2 0 0 0 0 0 
 
The table above shows that Permanent Staff with Bachelor’s Degree and Higher University 
Degree mostly have higher incomes ranging from N30 – N50million per annum. It can also be 
seen that higher experienced Permanent Staff had higher income, see Appendix, page 331. 
While Contract Staff  with Higher University Degrees mostly range from N20 – N30 Million 
and there are some who have higher incomes. It can also be seen that higher experienced 
Contract Staff had almost similar incomes regardless of qualifications to those with around 6 
– 10 years’ experience (See Appendix 8B page 331). Those with Bachelor’s Degree earns 
between N10 –  N30 Million.  Service and Supports Staff  with higher university degrees are 
almost similar to those with Bachelor’s degree with incomes ranging from N10-N30 Million.  
  
Indicatively there is an element of income disparities among these workers and the extent of 
exploitation of labour under flexible work arrangements. In this context, exploitation is not 
applied in the strict Marxist terms. But it refers to the additional deficit in the share of the 
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workers return accruing to them as a result of their distinctive dispositions of been agency and 
non-unionised workers. Most of these fractionalised or segmented workers work under less 
much favourable conditions of employment due to the unilateral decision of the employment 
agencies, while the core employees enjoy the dividend of being a union member. On this note, 
the next section sheds light on workers’ perspective on the growth of agency workers in the 
industry. 
 
5.4 Workers’ Perspectives on the Growth of Agency Workers  
Table 17:  Respondent Response 
 
Innovative 
Technology 
Cutting 
costs 
To 
weake
n the 
Union  Competence 
Lack of 
Human 
Capital 
Fluctua
-tion of 
Product 
Market 
Global 
Compet
ition Restructuring 
Aiding 
the 
Communi
ty 
Control 
over the 
Workforc
e 
Focusing 
on 
Critical 
Issues 
Efficiency 
and 
Expertise 
Mean 4.60 4.55 4.33 3.26 2.02 3.40 3.22 2.22 1.90 3.93 2.85 3.96 
N 176 176 176 176 176 176 176 176 176 176 176 176 
Std. 
Deviation 
.986 .648 .922 1.228 1.017 1.042 1.086 1.037 1.109 .944 1.191 1.271 
 
Workers perspectives on the growth of agency labour in the Nigerian oil industry ranges from, 
innovative technology, cost-cutting, and to weaken trade union as indicated by the 
respondents in Table 17 above. Mean and Standard Deviation test was performed on why 
management uses agency labour and result shows overall Mean of 4.60 which indicates that, 
management highly preferred utilizing agency workers because of Technological Innovation, 
Cutting-Cost (Wages, Training, Benefits and others), and to curb union militancy. 
The above responses affirm a Marxist prognostic view (Marx, 1939, cited in Wendling, 2009: 
2), that at a definite point in the development of production, innovative technology will 
become a qualitative force of production that can increasingly generates value, thereby 
making the labour power of a large segment of the workforce unnecessary. Technical skills 
have displaced traditional skills, thereby making a great number of workers redundant. 
Management has been criticised for avoiding going through the demanding procedures of 
retraining and redeployment; rather, they phased-out workers with traditional skills, and hired 
new ones with the new-knowledge skills through employment agency to remain competitive 
in the global market (Forde and Slater, 2005). This has brought much concern and anxiety to 
the workplace, thus challenging the ability of the trade union to protect its members.   
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Technological transformation has redefined employment relations and opened opportunities 
for social and political restructuring, opportunities which have only been partially realized. 
The interpretation of changes and the growing utilization of agency workers conforms to the 
trends and explanations already identified in Chapter 2. The consensus is that agency labour is 
increasingly a structurally embedded form of labour, without which organisations would not 
be able to function and remain competitive. Whilst triangular employment relations are seen 
as growing at an alarming rate in general, for the Nigerian oil industry agency labour has 
become the norm (PENGASSAN Official). PENGASSAN representative described the pool 
of agency labour as an integral part of a system of production premised on the concept of 
technical skills and competition, in the context of unstable market conditions that relies upon 
excluding a considerable proportion of the labour force from employment norms, with the aim 
of producing a pool of easily disposable workers. These disposable agency workers perform 
as alternative variable arrangement for management who sheds permanent employees while 
engaging in a parallel process of increasing their dependency on agency labour. 
The drive for agency labour extends beyond the necessity of technical knowledge and 
expertise. It comprises of certain behavioural traits expected of workers in the workplace. 
Such as, attitude towards work involves being a good worker, who does not question 
authority, which implies, management and employer could do what they intended. For 
example, being ready to do overtime work at any time a worker is called upon, without 
hesitation, and any additional pay. They work harder and accept wages that falls below their 
efforts without complaint, this feed into the creation of the type of ideal worker neoliberal 
agenda facilitated 
Evidence has shown that the Nigerian oil industry agency workers’ overtime pay is 
embedded in their wages. Wages are set at the lowest salary scale with little chance of 
incremental progression due to interruption of work. The over saturated labour market, 
coupled with the changing employment practices in the industry, has left the agency workers 
with little bargaining power over the issue of salaries, particularly as they are outside the 
purview of collective bargaining. On this note, the study proceeds to workers’ perspective on 
trade unions opposition to agency labour. 
 
 
 
151 
 
5.5. Workers’ Perspectives on Trade Unions Opposition to Agency Labour 
When respondents from the three oil MNCs were asked their views on trade unions 
opposition to Agency labour, the results in Table 18 below indicate that: Affects Union 
Membership has the highest Average Mean of 4.89; followed by Profit maximization (4.77), 
cutting-cost (4.63), the denial of rights to association (4.44), and Weak legislature (4.07).  
Respondents indicatively attributed unions’ opposition to the growth of agency labour in the 
industry, as a result of the negative impact it has on union membership and strength. It 
suggests that the flexible work arrangements of the workers and its fragmentation may 
undermine the material base for bargaining and organising, whereby unions operate.  
Table 18:  Assessment of respondents’ response to trade union resistance: 
 
Profit 
Maximization 
Hiring 
Expatriates 
Total 
Control 
Denial of 
Rights 
Affects union 
membership Cutting-cost 
Division 
among the 
workforce 
Weakens 
Union 
Strength 
Irrational 
wages 
Weak 
Legislature 
Mean 4.77 3.47 3.87 4.44 4.89 4.63 3.33 3.24 3.67 4.07 
N 176 176 176 176 176 176 176 176 176 176 
Std. 
Deviation 
.593 1.100 1.111 1.083 .426 .550 1.005 1.128 .947 .929 
 
Constitutionally, every worker has the right to join a union, and the trade union as a collective 
body has the ability to organise and mobilise workers. The 1999 (Section 40) of the Nigerian 
Constitution empowers workers the right to freedom of association. It states that:  
“Every person shall be entitled to assemble freely and associate with other persons, 
and in particular he may form or belong to any political party, trade union or any other 
association for the protection of his interests”. 
This collective power basically enables workers to exercise collectively the control over their 
employment conditions, which cannot be obtained individually. Workers primarily join labour 
movement for the benefits that can accrue to membership, such as social, economic, political 
and educational benefits. But the process whereby these privileges are denied, trade unions 
have the moral obligation to resists agency labour if perceived it infringes on their 
constitutional right, and by extension, their membership. The process of trying to organise 
these groups of workers to maintain their membership strength and defend them, but are 
denied as a result of employers’ hostility, implies that the constitutional right to association of 
agency workers is being violated with impunity.  This also indicates that not only their 
constitutional rights are being denied but also their rights to collective bargaining 
As a follow-up question and to be sure respondents know their constitutional rights to 
association, they were asked the reasons for non-unionisation. 
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Table 19: Reasons for non-unionisation 
Why? Frequency Per Cent 
Company Policy 87 49.4 
Not Interested 12 6.8 
No Response 77 43.75 
 
As shown in the above Table 19, 49.4% broadly indicates that they are not unionise due to 
company’s policy, only 6.8% shows they were not interested in unionism. This suggests a 
desire of the respondents to join the union but due to the company’s policy they are limited, 
and probably, the fear of not getting their contract renewed must have likewise contributed to 
their indifference. This suggests that agency workers do not have the right to association due 
to company policy.  The absence of trade unions gives employers the privilege to act 
unilaterally in controlling the employment conditions of agency workers. An indicative fact is 
that workers’ terms and conditions that are unilaterally admitted and not negotiated can as 
well be unilaterally retreated without benefits. 
 
Suggestively, the oil MNCs dictates the tunes, while the labour intermediaries play the music 
to the workers, in order to get their own contracts renewed. It is therefore argued, that the 
employment agencies operate under the mercy of these oil MNCs to survive.  For example, 
the polarization of the labour force is perceived as management strategy which the 
employment agencies acted out against workers’ solidarity, thereby making mobilization 
difficult for the trade unions. This is why neo-Marxist scholars of power resource theory 
alleged that labour is structurally disadvantaged in capitalist economies because of the power 
asymmetry which characterises the relationship between the employer and the individual 
workers (Offe and Wiesenthal 1985, Coates 2000: 103).  
 
Although, Table 20 below indicates ExxonMobil permits some of the contract and service 
staffs to unionize as compared to other companies. The percentage is most probably a 
reflection of the low level of unionisation in the industry. Support staffs that are of 
considerable number of agency workers are completely outside of the purview of 
unionization. The implication of this is that, the traditional base of the trade union is rapidly 
shrinking, and its strength of unity is abating as a result of the relocation of employees from 
the organised category to unorganised zone where unionism is fiercely denied.  
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Table 20: Right to Unionisation 
Permitted to join 
union 
Company   
Chi-Square df p-value Description 
Shell ExxonMobil Chevron Total 
f % F % f % F %   
   
Contract 
Staff 
Yes 27 37.50 32 50.79 12 32.43 71 41.28 
3.31 2 0.19 
Not 
Significant No 45 62.50 33 52.38 25 67.57 103 59.88 
Service Staff 
Yes 22 30.56 25 39.68 11 29.73 58 33.72 
1.32 2 0.52 
Not 
Significant No 51 70.83 40 63.49 26 70.27 117 68.02 
Support 
Staff 
Yes 4 5.56 3 4.76 0 0.00 7 4.07 
1.68 1 0.2 
Not 
Significant No 68 94.44 61 96.83 37 100.00 166 96.51 
All the Non-
Permanent 
Staff 
Yes 4 5.56 3 4.76 0 0.00 7 4.07 
1.66 1 0.2 
Not 
Significant No 68 94.44 60 95.24 37 100.00 165 95.93 
Total 72 100 63 100 37 100 172 100         
 
Still on workers’ perspective why trade unions oppose the use of agency labour, in Table 21 
below, A One-Way ANOVA was performed to understand whether there are any significant 
associations among the companies in terms of preference of factors compelling trade union’s 
opposition, thus Hypothesis Testing was conducted. 
 
Null Hypothesis: There are no significant associations in the preferences of the companies 
(Shell, ExxonMobil, and Chevron) with regards to the trade union reasons for opposing the 
management of using agency labour. 
 
Alternative Hypothesis: There are significant differences in the preferences of the companies 
(Shell, ExxonMobil, and Chevron) with regards to the trade union reasons for opposing the 
management on the increasing utilization of agency labour. 
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Table 21, indicates the differences between groups and within groups. 
 
The ANOVA table 21 above shows significant differences in the preferences for each 
company for hiring of expatriates and to have control over the workforce which are set at 0.02 
and less than p-value of 0.05. Chevron gave a higher preference to these compared to other 
companies. This indicates that the three MNCs hire expatriates but on different level scales.  
There has been resistance against the use of expatriates by the union. For example, in 
November 2010, Nwaogu, the chairman of ExxonMobil PENGASSAN, Lagos branch 
accuses the management of the increasing usage of expatriates, which was perceived as 
violation of all applicable laws on the use of expatriates in Nigeria. This was against the back 
drop of April, 2010, when the immediate past President Goodluck Jonathan signed into law 
the Nigerian Oil Industry Content Development Act 2010 to guide against a paradigm shift in 
a manner in which expatriates were hired to executes low-status to technical jobs on the 
flimsy excuses of human capital shortage.  
According to Nwaogu, (2010) the expatriate quota policy requires the oil MNCs to first give 
Nigerians the privilege of vie for any vacant position before sourcing for expatriate to fill such 
    
Sum of Squares Df Mean Square F p-value Description 
Profit Maximization 
Between Groups .00 2 .002 
0.01 0.99 
Not 
Significant 
Within Groups 61.39 172 .357 
Total 61.39 174   
Hiring Of Expatriates 
Between Groups 8.97 2 4.486 
3.81 0.02 Significant Within Groups 202.54 172 1.178 
Total 211.51 174   
To Have Control Over 
The Workforce 
Between Groups 9.04 2 4.520 
3.78 0.02 Significant Within Groups 205.67 172 1.196 
Total 214.71 174   
Denial Of The Non-
Permanent Staff Right 
To Unionize 
Between Groups .51 2 .256 
0.22 0.81 
Not 
Significant 
Within Groups 204.61 172 1.190 
Total 205.12 174   
Affects Union 
Membership 
Between Groups .18 2 .088 
0.48 0.62 
Not 
Significant 
Within Groups 31.54 172 .183 
Total 31.71 174   
Cutting-Cost 
Between Groups .26 2 .132 
0.43 0.65 
Not 
Significant 
Within Groups 52.59 172 .306 
Total 52.86 174   
Division Among The 
Workforce 
Between Groups 5.75 2 2.873 
2.90 0.06 
Not 
Significant 
Within Groups 170.69 172 .992 
Total 176.43 174   
Weakens Trade Union 
Strength 
Between Groups .01 2 .003 
0.00 1.00 
Not 
Significant 
Within Groups 221.91 172 1.290 
Total 221.92 174   
Irrational Wages 
Between Groups .66 2 .332 
0.37 0.69 
Not 
Significant 
Within Groups 156.11 172 .908 
Total 156.78 174   
Weak Legislature 
Between Groups .48 2 .239 
0.27 0.76 
Not 
Significant 
Within Groups 149.83 172 .871 
Total 150.31 174   
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positions.  However, it appears the oil MNCs circumvent this policy by recruiting expatriates 
from countries where labour is cheap, pay them what they were supposed to earn in their 
countries but by documentation the employers claim they are paid what oil workers earn in 
countries such as Australia and the US. This suggests that the mechanism in place for 
monitoring and coordinating the activities of these oil MNCs are not effective or lacks the will 
power to execute their duties. Therefore, this study suggests that the Ministry of Labour and 
Employment should undertake the role of the supervisor in industrial relations instead of 
allowing unethical labour activities to be the dominant factor in the oil industry. Regardless of 
the false claim on expatriate wages, and as earlier mentioned, it is evident that they earn 
higher than the indigenous workers (see Hays oil and Gas Global Salary Guide, 2013, p. 6). 
Against this backdrop, the next section presents workers’ views on two-tier workforce. 
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5.6. Differential Terms and Conditions of a Two-Tier Workforce: Implications and 
Consequences 
When asked what are the likely implication/consequences as a result of the differential terms 
and conditions of two-tier workforce, job insecurity emerged as the most significant factor, 
having a statically high rate of “Not Satisfied” from the respondents of the three oil MNCs as 
indicated in Table 22 below.  Job insecurity can be defined as that subjective consciousness 
that workers have about the fear of losing their jobs at any point in time (Serrano, 2014: 13). 
Employment insecurity is an overarching feature of contemporary work arrangement that 
underpins the division of the workforce, which has a far reaching consequence on how the 
general workforce experience life on the line, more particularly, agency workers. 
 
 
Table 22:  EMPLOYEES’ LEVEL OF SATISFACTION 
  
Company 
Shell ExxonMobil Chevron Total 
Mean SD Description Mean SD Description Mean SD Description Mean SD Description 
Sick Pay 2.32 1.55 
Slightly 
Satisfied 
2.34 1.50 
Slightly 
Satisfied 
2.68 1.55 Satisfied 2.40 1.53 
Slightly 
Satisfied 
Holiday Pay 2.27 1.46 
Slightly 
Satisfied 
2.23 1.33 
Slightly 
Satisfied 
2.73 1.48 Satisfied 2.35 1.43 
Slightly 
Satisfied 
Pension Provision 2.23 1.49 
Slightly 
Satisfied 
2.23 1.40 
Slightly 
Satisfied 
2.57 1.50 
Slightly 
Satisfied 
2.30 1.46 
Slightly 
Satisfied 
Job Security 1.32 0.85 Not Satisfied 1.32 0.83 Not Satisfied 1.35 0.79 Not Satisfied 1.33 0.83 
Not 
Satisfied 
Low Basic Salary 3.12 1.55 Satisfied 4.78 11.96 
Highly 
Satisfied 
3.24 1.69 Satisfied 3.77 7.41 
Very 
Satisfied 
Hazardous Work 
Environment 
1.92 1.06 
Slightly 
Satisfied 
1.69 1.06 Not Satisfied 1.73 1.07 Not Satisfied 1.79 1.06 
Not 
Satisfied 
Lack Of 
Responsibility At 
Work 
3.49 1.32 
Very 
Satisfied 
5.00 11.92 
Highly 
Satisfied 
4.08 1.28 
Very 
Satisfied 
4.18 7.33 
Very 
Satisfied 
Lack Of Promotion 2.56 1.29 
Slightly 
Satisfied 
2.42 1.27 
Slightly 
Satisfied 
2.81 1.47 Satisfied 2.56 1.32 
Slightly 
Satisfied 
Unpredictability Of 
Work 
1.78 0.75 Not Satisfied 1.77 0.63 Not Satisfied 1.95 0.74 
Slightly 
Satisfied 
1.81 0.71 
Slightly 
Satisfied 
Time Spent 
Waiting Between 
Assignment 
2.53 0.85 
Slightly 
Satisfied 
2.37 0.88 
Slightly 
Satisfied 
2.57 0.77 
Slightly 
Satisfied 
2.48 0.84 
Slightly 
Satisfied 
 
As worrisome as the issue of job security seems, it is not only peculiar to the Nigerian oil 
industry, rather it is a globally recognised problem in the employment relations. In the study 
of Saloniemi and Zeytinoglu (2005) while exploring the intricacy of flexible work 
arrangement in Canadian and Finnish labour market, they asked respondents to appraise their 
job security, and it was reported that the class of workers who viewed themselves as having 
low level of job security were agency workers. They argued that employers were attaining 
flexibility through job insecurity.  
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However, Greenhalgh and Rosenblatt (1984) argued that job insecurity cannot be evaluated as 
a single unit, rather in a multidimensional form. They argued that the permanent employees’ 
jobs are not highly secured as assumed, the increasing utilization of agency labour pose a 
threat to their jobs.  The authors developed five basic principles for measuring job insecurity; 
the first four principles apply to the degree of threat to job loss and the severity of perceived 
threat to continuity in a job. The fifth principle deals with employee inability to prevent the 
threat which is peculiar to all employees.  
 
While the study of Sverke and Hellgren (2002, p. 28-9) present a brief account of different 
focus and measurement of job insecurity frequently examined in the literature, with the 
evidence of the kind of questions relevant to each group. The authors’ reveals that some 
scholars lean on unidirectional dimension for job insecurity, while others rely on multiple 
indicators.  For example, Probst and Brubaker (2001, p. 140) measures job insecurity by 
evaluating the degree of work activities that could threaten the disposition of each component 
(e.g. the acquisition of new machinery), and the unit of sources of actual threats; Hellgren et 
al. (1999) differentiate between quantitative and qualitative job insecurity. While quantitative 
job insecurity involves employees’ perceptive of the continued existence of their job on one 
hand, on the other hand, qualitative job insecurity concerns employee intuitive views of 
potential loss of important component of a job such as downgrading (shifting from permanent 
to agency labour), degeneration of terms of work, lack of advancement, and decreasing 
income. 
 
 All these and much more are a wave of concern and anxiety for both the employees on 
standard employment contracts and agency workers in the Nigerian oil industry. The strategy 
of deploying agency workers to the core production areas in order to trivialise workers’ job 
security and their conditions of service does not amount to internationally accepted best 
practices as campaign by the ILO Convention Nos. 87 and 98. 
 
However, agency workers are the most insecure; their contract can be terminated at any time 
without genuine cause (Piroe, 2011).  Their fear is that the Nigerian law does not protect them 
against unfair dismissal as compared to the employees on standard employment contracts, by 
virtue of their disposition as temporary workers.  
Despite this great level of dissatisfaction, the immediate intention to move to another job was 
very weak as indicated by the respondents, see Table 23 below. The most important factor 
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that would make them change job is, greater job security with mean scores of Shell, 4.78; 
ExxonMobil, 4.83; and Chevron, 4.76 respectively, and not even higher income. This is how 
crucial employees perceived the importance of having permanent job which is to a greater 
extent synonymous to greater job security. 
Table 23:  Factors that would make employee move to another job  
  
Company 
Shell ExxonMobil Chevron Total 
Mean SD Description Mean SD Description Mean SD Description Mean SD Description 
Better Pay 4.07 1.48 
Very 
Probable 
3.92 1.51 
Very 
Probable 
3.95 1.56 
Very 
Probable 
3.99 1.50 
Very 
Probable 
Better Benefits 4.51 1.08 
Highly 
Probable 
4.35 1.32 
Highly 
Probable 
4.27 1.37 
Highly 
Probable 
4.40 1.23 
Highly 
Probable 
Better Prospects 4.32 1.25 
Highly 
Probable 
4.32 1.28 
Highly 
Probable 
3.97 1.57 
Very 
Probable 
4.25 1.33 
Highly 
Probable 
Greater Security 4.78 0.79 
Highly 
Probable 
4.83 0.72 
Highly 
Probable 
4.76 0.93 
Highly 
Probable 
4.79 0.79 
Highly 
Probable 
Change In 
Circumstances 
(Demotion) 
4.75 0.78 
Highly 
Probable 
4.72 0.82 
Highly 
Probable 
4.62 1.04 
Highly 
Probable 
4.71 0.85 
Highly 
Probable 
Job Satisfaction 3.73 1.63 
Very 
Probable 
3.45 1.75 
Very 
Probable 
3.54 1.68 
Very 
Probable 
3.58 1.68 
Very 
Probable 
Good Career 
Move 
4.11 1.33 
Very 
Probable 
4.02 1.37 
Very 
Probable 
4.27 1.30 
Highly 
Probable 
4.11 1.34 
Very 
Probable 
 
Besides the issue of job insecurity, other benefit related problems such as low wages, no 
overtime pay, inadequate bonuses, and lay-off entitlements;  appeared to be other major 
implications/consequences for agency workers (See Appendix  Table 16, page 346) 
 
  
Table 24: Benefit Related Problems 
 
No problem 
Low 
wages 
Wage not 
paid on time Cut in wages 
No overtime 
pay 
No 
bonus No allowance  NO increment Inadequate bonus 
No 
severance 
pay 
Mean 2.14 3.99 2.22 2.12 4.69 3.30 3.26 3.10 4.23 3.14 
N 176 176 176 176 176 176 176 176 176 176 
Std. Deviation 1.503 1.166 .915 .857 3.738 1.380 1.369 1.357 1.170 1.280 
 
The respondents indicated “not having overtime pay and lack of bonus” as highly negative 
implications. Wages not paid on time and cut in wages, with Chevron having the highest 
negative response on low-wages and Shell scoring highest responses on lack of lay-off wages 
(See Appendix 15 Table 19, page 343). This suggests that most of the agency workers are 
hired by different labour intermediaries, who unilaterally negotiate their terms and conditions 
of work, hence the variations. 
There is no doubt that the variations in the terms and conditions of work between the standard 
employees and agency workers, even among the agency workers, particularly wages, are very 
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alarming. One of the implications of this is that the knowledge of these disparities by the 
agency workers may lead to defiant behaviours. 
 
The issue of income disparity has been a great concern to some scholars.  Bamber et al. 
(2011) alleged that equity theory suggest that social comparisons are significant influence on 
how workers evaluate their pay.  Workers make external comparison of their income and the 
income they perceived are earned by their colleagues within the oil industry. Such comparison 
is likely to have consequences on workers’ behaviour and retention.  Workers likewise make 
internal comparisons between what they earn and what they believe others within the 
company earns. These forms of comparisons may be anticipated to have implications and 
consequences, as well as, raise the question of equity. 
 
Given the peripheral nature of agency workers in the industry, it is therefore argued that the 
main objective of management utilization of agency workers is not only in attaining 
competitiveness. But, primarily in reducing labour costs through labour intermediaries in 
defence to the rapid wage increase of standard employees.  
 
5.7. Workers’ Organisation and Labour/Management Relationships 
The Nigerian oil industry trade unions have consistently been fighting the rapid growth of 
agency labour since the 1990s. In their struggle against flexible work arrangements, the 
unions issued a deadline to the Nigerian government before embarking on strike in 1991. This 
led to a tripartite arrangement involving ministry of employment and labour, management of 
the Nigerian oil industry and unions representatives. 
The tripartite actors arrived at a compromise in resolving the issue by acknowledging the need 
to unionise agency workers in the industry. However, in 2001, the unions issued another 
warning to the Nigerian government, regarding their willingness to embark on strike to protest 
against flexible work arrangements. The mediation from the government led to organisation 
of a flexible work seminar, attended by the tripartite actors, during which members agreed on 
several terms, including the unionization of contract workers, transition to permanent 
employment contracts, and same wage for all workers on similar jobs (Akinwale, 2014, p. 
93). 
The reality of the situation in Nigeria today shows that management has violated the above 
mentioned terms of agreement. It is also worth noting that the Nigerian government has 
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devised several strategies to weaken the power of trade unions as shown in Table 25 below, 
where 86.3% of the respondents indicate management and employers’ aggressiveness and 
hostility towards agency workers’ unionization. In affirmation to this view, respondents from 
the three oil MNCs (see appendix 8, page 315), with Mean: Shell, 4.93; ExxonMobil, 4.85; 
and Chevron, 4.70, indicates that labour law should be reform to accommodate the emerging 
workforce, by regularising their employment conditions. This suggests that the weaknesses in 
the institutional mechanism in place to protect employment standards have contributed to an 
observable implementation gap with regards to employment legislation and workers right to 
association.  
 It is argued in the literature that the relative weakness of the Nigerian labour law has left 
unions incapable of sustained resistance to growth and expansion of agency labour. The 
situation in Nigerian is in contrast to what is obtainable in other emerging economies, such as, 
China and India, where strict legislative framework, is complemented by strong based 
institutionalised trade union power, which has prevented management from introducing 
agency work on a large scale (Huw, 2010), as it has been observed to have expanded from the 
peripheral into the core production areas in the Nigerian oil industry. 
The utilization of agency labour in the core production areas has carried with it considerable 
changes in employment relationships between labour and management on the one hand, and 
on the other, between the workforces. In considering the mixed pattern of labour utilization in 
the core production areas, the unions are acutely aware of the consequences of a two-tier 
workforce on their membership and strength. Although, it is argued, regardless of the 
integration of agency workers into the core production areas, they are still treated as external 
workers, and, through their daily workplace experience, these workers are well aware of the 
situation (Barley and Kunda, 2006, p. 49).   
This perception has adversely affected the ability of the workers to see beyond their diverse 
interests and join forces together against the common enemy (capital). Findings suggest that 
there is a great resentment between permanent employees and agency workers on the issue of 
mobilization. More particularly when interests’ priorities are involved as shown in (Table 25 
below) where 85.7% respondents claims that the major issue with workers’ organisation is as 
a result of divided interest and priorities. 
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Table 25: Trade Unions’ Challenges 
 
Given that trade union is an organisation to represent, in a precise sense, the interests of its 
members (Simms and Charlwood, 2010); the more diverse members’ interests are, the harder 
a union needs to put forth efforts to reconcile them. The historical rejection of agency workers 
by the trade unions, although based in a progressive defence of the permanent employment 
relationship, had the effect of turning the unions away from adequately representing and 
defence of agency workers within the framework of their employment contract.  
Also, the organisational structures of trade unions do not facilitate the mobilisation of a 
workforce that is fragmented across different sites of work, which moves from one workplace 
to another, and is formally separated from the permanent workers they work alongside. 
Attempts to overcome this by organising workers according to geographical territories have 
demonstrated the potential of new methods of organisation and mobilisation.  Trade unions 
have since modified their approach and structure to accommodate agency workers, but 
success has been limited (this more elaborated in Chapter 6). 
  Frequency Percent 
As A Non-Permanent Staff, Do You Adequately Represented By The Union 
 Yes 64 36.3 
 No 112 63.6 
In The Last 10 Years, I Believe That The Management Has Positively Change In The Following Areas 
 From Aggression To Understanding/Dialogue 24 13.7 
 From Dialogue To Aggressive Stand 152 86.3 
Over The Last 10 Years, What Change Has There Been In The Activities Of Worker Organization To Your Company 
 No Change 16 9.0 
 From Militant Actions To Negotiation/Court Cases 11 6.2 
 From Court Cases To Negotiations To Militant Actions 149 84.8 
In What Capacity And How Often Do You Participate In Workplace Organization Activities In Your Unit 
 As A Union Member 75 42.6 
 Potential Member 2 1.1 
 Freedom Fighter 2 1.1 
 Don’t Participate 97 55.1 
I Did Not Participate In Order 
 To Avoid Been Victimized 14 7.9 
 Because I Still Need My Job 49 27.8 
 For My Contract To Be Renewed 26 14.7 
 Because The Struggle Favoured Only The Permanent Staff 6 3.4 
  (no response) 81 46.0 
How Would You Describe The Relationship Between Management And Workers In Your Workplace 
 Very Co-Operative 7 3.9 
 Somewhat Co-Operative 61 34.6 
 Not Co-Operative 108 61.3 
 
What Do You Think Is The Major Issue With trade unions Organization 
 Workers Have Divided Interest And Priorities 151 85.7 
 Non-Permanent Workers Believed That The Union Want To Use Them As A 
Shield 
25 14.2 
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Drawing on Hyman’s (1997: 516) study with regards to trade unions and interest 
representation, the question of whose interests includes a union’s constituency (parameter of 
membership). Once a union decides its constituency, its preference would be the interests of 
the specific constituency which could be disadvantage to others. Therefore, setting the bounds 
of membership is trade union key strategic preference because unions tend to act on behalf of 
specific constituencies. Hence 63.6% of respondents, (which presumably are agency workers) 
feel that they are not adequately represented by the trade union. 
As earlier mentioned, the absence of legal backing is also a contributing factor of the union’s 
inability to organise these group of workers. Likewise, the degree to which agency workers 
are not covered and protected by legal provisions is also contributing to their unwillingness to 
join the union. Against this backdrop, an agency worker is likely to cultivate the image of an 
ideal worker whose conduct and demeanour conforms to extant organisational norms, with the 
aspiration of transiting to permanent employment contract (Gottfried, 1992, p. 449). Agency 
workers can nurture this aspiration in spite of evidence suggesting it is unlikely (Forde and 
Slater, 2005). More significantly, agency workers tend to maintain good relations with 
management and their employers to avoid the non-renewal of employment contract, and to 
secure future assignments. 
 In this sense, employers are able to set out the “rules of the game” which are expected to be 
adhered to in order to secure future income, as indicated also in Table 25 above, where 27.8% 
of the respondents’ claims that they still need their jobs, while 14.7% seeks renewal of 
contracts, 7.9% claimed to avoid being victimized, and 46% chose to remain unresponsive.  
The unresponsiveness of the 46% respondents could implied, that they are willing to join the 
union or not interested. However, those who are willing to engage in collective forms of 
resistance find themselves at risk of unemployment, thus depriving trade unions of a new 
generation of potential activists (Danesi, 2012). Indicatively, the most important rules here are 
work, keep your head down, keep away from the unions, and sustain your livelihood.   Thus, 
agency workers’ attitude towards trade unionism are influenced by their employment terms 
and conditions, including their relationships with the oil MNCs and their employers. 
In summary, it might be a misjudgement to allege that trade union represents only the 
interests of its members. But rather it is the scope of the trade union limit of representation 
which tends to be compelled and restricted in part by the constraint of the labour law and the 
unwillingness of agency workers based on the employment contracts. Even if agency workers 
fall within the trade union boundaries, whether or not their interests get represented depends 
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partly on how compelling they make their interests known to the union. In most 
circumstances they are afraid to join or complain to the trade unions for fear of getting their 
contract terminated or not renewed.  
 
Irrespective of these analyses, it is believed that the regularization of labour legislation will 
aid in decreasing the gap between the permanent workforce and agency workers in terms of 
workers’ representations and collective bargaining which to a great extent will reduce conflict 
of interests between the workplace actors. In the light of this, the next section presents 
workers’ views on the causes of industrial conflict in the Nigerian oil industry. 
 
5.8. Causes of Industrial Conflict 
 
One of the important implications of neo-liberal policy in Nigeria was the restructuring 
process which resulted to thousands of workers becoming redundant, thereby increases the 
enclaves of unprotected labour, driving the trade unions up against the wall. When the 
government of Ibrahim Babangida first announced the new policy of Structural Adjustment 
Programme (SAP) in 1986, in more concrete and explicit terms the response of the trade 
union movement has been, at best, defensive. The variation has been merely in degree and in 
fact their perception was that the entire policy package was anti-working class and therefore, 
not acceptable to them and this was fiercely resisted by union through general strike actions 
(Onwe, 2014:288). These actions saw to the revocation of the Nigerian National Petroleum 
Corporation (NNPC) privatization in 2004. 
The trade unions are not relenting in their struggle for emancipation, according to the 
response in Table 26 below, respondents from the three oil MNCs indicated that the shift from 
standard employment contracts to agency labour is the major cause with a Mean (4.98), 
followed by the unlawful victimization of trade union members (4.69), and the denial of 
agency workers the right to unionise (4.49). This is contrary to the position of the Nigerian 
Constitution and  ILO, which states that there should not be barriers by the employers to 
workers right to association for the purpose of regulating their employment relations (ILO, 
1997). 
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Table 26: Causes of Exacerbating Conflicts 
 
The shift from 
permanent work 
to contract work 
 
Denial of the 
non-permanent 
staff right to 
union  
Refusal to 
honour collective 
agreement 
 
Union 
recognition 
 
Retrenchm
ent  
Increase in 
wage 
demand  
Increase usage 
of expatriates 
 
Unlawful 
termination 
and 
victimization 
of union 
members 
 
Unlawful 
termination 
of contract 
staff for 
associating 
with union  
Mean 4.98 4.49 3.90 3.47 2.34 2.23 2.90 4.69 3.87 
N 176 176 176 176 176 176 175 176 176 
Std. 
Deviation 
.130 1.031 1.026 1.180 .972 .886 1.138 .684 1.237 
 
 
 
 
However, the employers of labour in the Nigerian oil industry have become pervasive in their 
work arrangements by fractionalizing the workforces all through the organisational structures 
and work processes. Before now, employers hired agency workers strictly for the peripheral 
activities (non-critical work), however, recent years have witnessed the deployment of agency 
workers into core production areas, performing core functions, with intermittent renewal of 
contracts terms, thereby denying them the right to unionise. This indicatively has affected 
trade union membership, hence the fierce resistance of contracting of labour by the trade 
union.  
 
Labour segmentation theory (Doeringer and Piore, 1971) suggests that core and peripheral 
labour force are alleged to be in two distinctive labour market segments, which ought not to 
be in competition with one another as a result of the different purposes they serve 
(Emmenegger et al. 2012). However, this is not the case with the Nigerian oil industry; most 
core activities are now performed by workers supplied by labour intermediaries. This 
supposedly has compelled the trade unions to expand their representation domains towards 
agency workers, which the employers have vehemently refused. This possibly indicates the 
exacerbating conflicts in the oil industry as affirmed by the respondents.  
 
However, the incessant rate of conflicts in the industry does not portray good employment 
relationships among the actors in the workplace. The process where industrial harmony is 
lacking portends great danger for the Nigerian society, not just by the virtue of oil industry 
being the major source of income for the Nigerian government, but likewise scares aware 
foreign investors for lack of security (Okolo, 2010).   
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5.9. Conclusion 
 
Shell, ExxonMobil and Chevron operates two-tier labour markets, divided into the core and 
periphery segments. The core segment is similar to the character of Atkinson’s flexible firm 
model.  This is made up of workers with relatively stable employment, who are usually well 
remunerated with good benefits that keep them secured against the highly-fluctuating 
economic conditions in the world. Such contracts also provide enormous opportunities for 
career progression within the various departments of the organisations. Those in the core are 
often recruited through formal firm-specific recruitment procedures.  
 
While the peripheral are polarized into contract, service and support staffs. The employment 
status and working conditions of these groups’ of workers are generally characterised by 
precarious work with fewer employment benefits, limited workers’ rights, and/or, little social 
protection. The trend for increased utilization of agency labour has certainly been 
controversial, as it has played a role in changing patterns of work and employment. For the 
management, the utilisation of agency workers could be seen as a way to bring about 
employment flexibility, due to innovative technology, and to reduce labour costs, thereby 
enhancing firms’ market competitiveness, and the maximization of profit.  
 
However, the changing workforce composition presents significant challenges to the unions, 
given the growth of agency labour and the subsequent denials of workers right to 
unionization, there emerge a representational gap. This evidently affects trade unions 
membership. Furthermore, the challenges facing unions in representing agency workers may 
likely due to workers’ fragmentation, as well as, the variation in contracts durations, besides, 
workers’ attitudes towards trade unionism and the working environment might have various 
impacts on labour movement depending on the nature of work. In Shell, ExxonMobil, and 
Chevron Nigeria, agency workers find it difficult to be members of the trade unions as their 
employer (company policy) made this known from the beginning, or where their contract 
covertly suggests so. 
 
As the shift towards a two-tier workforce becomes more segregated with pronounced undue 
company’s policies, job insecurity is on the rise, wage is decreasing as the management 
moves towards offering different terms and conditions for different groups of workers. In 
Nigeria, there is a minimum wage for public sector workers, which is not enforced by 
employers in the private sector. As a result, wages and benefits in the oil industry are 
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determined by the management of the organisation and this differs significantly between the 
different categories of workers.  
 
As we will see in the next chapter, from the semi-structured interviews with some of the 
interviewees, it is clear that the oil MNCs operate a system of wage secrecy in which 
employees are kept in the dark regarding the wages of colleagues. However, information on 
wages and benefits are usually passed around during informal discussions among 
employees/workers. In this regard, the oil MNCs has inadvertently increased resentment 
among individuals right to association. This purposive employer segmentation or flexible 
strategy incentivised by economic motives provides a scope for internal conflicts of interest 
between labour and management, and among workers. Thus, the resultant multiple 
fragmentation of the labour force into various different, separate and sometimes even 
competing or at least non-cooperating groups, is essentially boosting employers power and 
the rule of capital. The dissatisfaction with the new forms of work arrangements has created 
an atmosphere of job insecurity among workers and severely curtailed trade union activity. 
Hence the exacerbating conflicts in the industry. 
 
Nevertheless, the difference in the position occupied by one group in social production 
indicates one group to appropriate the labour of another, hence, management appropriate the 
labour of wage workers through flexible work arrangements. This ultimately would lead to 
conflict and struggle in the system. This is more elaborated in the qualitative analysis which is 
the next chapter. This is one of the benefits of a mixed methods research strategy, as 
discussed in the previous section. The combination of quantitative and qualitative approaches 
is said to provide a better understanding of research problems and their outcomes than either 
approach does when used independently (Creswell and Plano Clark, 2007). The search light is 
now focusing on the qualitative findings in respect of this research. 
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Chapter 6:  Qualitative Findings 
 
6.  Introduction 
In the previous chapter, the findings of the quantitative study investigation into both the 
employees on permanent employment contracts and the fragmented agency workers across 
the three oil multinational companies on their views on management rationale for the 
increasing utilization of agency workers and trade unions challenges were represented. This 
chapter now proceeds to build on this evidence by presenting the interview material. The 
qualitative method was undertaken with respect to specific stakeholders- (management 
components, unions’ officials, agency workers and two employment agencies) with the 
intention of investigating management rationale for agency labour and the unions’ 
oppositions. The findings from this portion of the study further shed light on the results from 
the quantitative study. 
6.2. Structures of Findings 
The chapter is divided into four sections of investigations. The first section presents an 
account of the management findings on the rationale for the increasing utilization of agency 
labour in the Nigerian oil industry. Distinguishing the findings based on the three cases (Shell, 
ExxonMobil and Chevron Nigeria).  The second section, presents findings on trade unions 
challenges. This is further distinguished, based on the two oil industry unions (PENGASSAN 
and NUPENG). The third section is based on the findings from agency workers’ interviews, 
and lastly, the discussion held with the employment agencies.  
 
Below in Table 27 are the profiles of the management team interviewed and interview 
participants were secured by personal contact, which is the best approach to build and 
establish a strong trust and good rapport with participants. They are grouped according to 
their positions. 
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Table 27: Profile of Management Participants 
No. Designation Shell ExxonMobil Chevron Total 
1 Senior HR Managers 
(Generalists) 
2 2 1 5 
2 HR Line  Managers 1 1 1 3 
3 HR Talent Advisor  1 1 1 3 
4 Head Oil Accountants 1 1 1 3 
5 Line Managers (Oil 
Exploration and 
Production) 
1 1 1 3 
 TOTAL 6 6 5 17 
 
6.3. Codes for the Interviewees 
The researcher chose to refrain from the use of participants real names in order to maintain 
anonymity, instead pseudonyms for the respondents were generated, as shown in NVIVO 
Coding Process Table 28 below:  
Table 28: NVIVO Coding Process 
 
 
 
169 
 
6.4. Data Analysis 
Data transcription and analysis were immediately embarked upon after the completion of the 
fieldwork and the main challenge was how to synthesize this multiple information from 
different stratified domains which was practically more complex in attaining meaningful 
results (Miles et al. 1985: 279). Data analysis involves a number of stages namely; data 
management; generation; interpretation and presentation (Creswell, 2009; Yin, 2009).  
The transcription of the interview data posed a kind of challenge as the researcher did not 
have a foreknowledge application of the existing transcription software (NVIVO).  As a 
result, transcription was manually done using the Sony tape recorder, as strenuous and time 
consuming this was, it took more than three months to be completed and resulted in the 
generation of enormous volume of data that was classified as relevance. 
 The data from the three companies, the trade unions, agency workers and the employment 
agencies were transcribed separately for a cross-case comparison purposes. Further reading of 
the transcripts and notes were then undertaken and a structural coding technique (Saldana, 
2013) was applied to the interview transcripts using the interview questions.  
According to Saldana (2013), structural coding is more suitable for interview transcripts than 
other data, such as researcher-generated field notes, because it applies a conceptual phrase 
representing a topic of inquiry to a segment of data that relates to a specific research question 
used to frame the interview. MacQueen et al., (2008) alleged it is a question-based code that 
acts as a labelling and indexing device, allowing researchers to quickly access data likely to 
be relevant to a particular analysis from a larger data set (Namey et al., 2008). Thus, the 
research questions and interview questions were used as a basis from which to sort, label and 
categorize the interview data for analysis. 
This technique is also considered appropriate for studies employing multiple participants, and 
for standardized or semi-structured data gathering protocols (Saldana, 2013). A pattern coding 
technique was also employed to analyse the field notes and to identify emergent themes. 
Pattern Codes are “explanatory or inferential codes, ones that identify an emergent theme, 
configuration, or explanation (Saldana 2013). This technique of coding also facilitates “cross-
case analysis by surfacing common themes” (Miles and Huberman, 1994: 69).  
After the full transcription phase, the researcher however acquired NVIVO knowledge 
through YouTube tutorial training. This software helps to organise data but does not generate 
knowledge, such as coding, categorization and generating themes, the researcher has to 
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generate these categories. The manually transcript files were imported into NVIVO Software, 
Nodes (Code), Child Node (Categories) and Parents Node (Themes) were generated by the 
researcher based on the content of the relevant information identified.  
The next stage involved Codification, Categorizations and Themes, which involved a 
thorough coding of the data. 
6.4.1 Codification 
A code is a word, phrase or sentence that represents aspect (s) of a data or captures the 
essence or features (s) of a data (Saldana, 2013). Hsieh and Shannon (2005: 1281) alleged that 
“coding can begin with one or two strategies, depending on the research question.  If the 
research is to identify and categorise all instances of a particular phenomenon, such as 
emotional reactions, then it might be helpful to read the transcript and highlight all text that 
on first impression appears to represent an emotional reaction”. Therefore, code represents an 
interpretation of the researcher of the exact text in the transcription of the interview (Peter and 
Wester, 2006: 24). 
Open coding process was adopted to analyse the interview transcriptions. Open coding is a 
careful examination of all the interview transcripts line by line in order to separate the data 
and generate ideas that fit the data.  The view is that conceptual implications may arise which 
may later become themes. The data was disaggregated and analysed for similarities and 
differences. The use of disaggregation of data thus helps to generate themes and categories. 
The researcher labelled and sorted the raw data into themes and categories thus producing a 
visual understanding of the NVIVO Coding Process (see Table 29).  
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Table 29:  NVIVO Coding Process and Terms 
 
The Nodes (codes) were categorised by general themes that had a page link corresponding to 
the raw data from which the themes were developed and derived.  
6.4.2 Categorization 
The categorization of the data entails the copying of bits of data from one context (each 
interview transcription) to different categories as applicable, and then linked these categories 
(Dey, 2005: 120); this is to enable the researcher to generate explanation for the research 
question and objectives of the study. In substantiating this viewpoint, Yin (2014: 142) 
indicated that the purpose of the basic categorization strategy is to link interview data to some 
concepts of interest as relates to the research questions, then have the concept gives the 
researcher a sense of direction in analysing the data.  
Hence the categorised data were linked to the research questions and objectives with the 
anticipation of finding answers to the what, why and how questions. Eight themes emerged 
initially from the coded data that relates to the specific research questions and were merged 
into five categories of themes namely: - Optimization of Resources; Securing the future of the 
workforce; social inequality; Workplace Relationships, and Anti-labour practices. The five 
categories of themes were developed after a thorough examination of the transcribed data, and 
were used to draft the research analysis, in accordance to the research objectives and 
questions.  
172 
 
6.4.3. Words Frequency Query 
The researcher in a bid to know the kinds of words the participants frequently use ran words 
frequency query (Table 30 below). Query is all about getting to know your data. How 
participants responded to your questions, getting to know the kinds of words or phrase they 
use in describing issues or responding to your questions.  
Table 30: Word Frequency: Visual Display of Word Frequency Query 
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6.5. Management Rationale for the Increasing Usage of Agency Workers. 
6.5.1. Table 31: Exxon Mobil Management Responses to Rationale for agency labour    
 
 
When asked why management use agency labour, all the participants from ExxonMobil 
enumerated several factors, but the most outstanding factor is cost-cutting, followed by global 
competition as indicated from the Matrix Coding Results in Table 31 above. 
Ledefune (respondent) alleged that agency staffs serves as a significant value to the 
managements of oil multinational companies because it permits them to escape the inevitable 
expenses it would otherwise incurred if it had to fire permanent staff.  He noted that the 
absence of dismissal costs is a huge financial relief on the management, hence the increase 
usage of agency workers.  These expenses do not only involve severance costs and other 
dismissal expenses, but an indelible consequence, such as reputation damage, which can 
hinder such company’s ability to attract competent and highly skilled potential employees. He 
said: 
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“Presently, there is a great market competition both at the national and international 
level. Therefore, for a company to remain afloat, it is prudent for the management to 
sanitise their operations and keep or attract only the highly skilled core workers with 
rare knowledge”.  
He emphasised that the ability to attract and keep competent employees who are critical to the 
long-term success to the company has become more crucial to the management.  However, 
because there is no psychological contract and long-term relationship between the oil 
companies and the agency workers, management can discontinue their working relationship 
without incurring any of these charges. For management, dismissal expenses are reduced and 
this aid in reducing barriers to employment and thus increases their productivity and 
profitability. 
Segun (respondent) taking a global dimension emphasized that global competitive climate has 
promoted capital-intensive technologies, which necessitated skills for innovative 
technological efficiencies. He mentioned four strategic key drivers why management uses 
agency labour as: Cost-cutting; Global competition, technical competencies; and to great level 
trade unions militancy. 
He stressed on the attributes of a technical competence of an engineer which includes: 
educational qualifications and experience; rare knowledge, industry knowledge, and 
technological expertise. He noted that in most circumstances it is rare to find qualified 
personnel with such bundle of skills within the ambit of time and within the context in which 
the company operates, the management may decide to liaise with oil servicing company or 
employment agency, which gets expatriates to fill in such positions.   
Elaborating further, Segun noted that the hiring of such personnel with the requisite 
technological and technical skills may undeniably leads to the laying off of some employees 
who failed to meet the required skills and expertise fit with the company’s goals. 
Emphasising, it is a competitive world, rare and inimitable knowledge is what every company 
needs to remain in today’s competitive market. This key point was likewise noted by one of 
the interviewees from Chevron (Joy, An HR Talent Hunt Manager) who illustrated by giving 
an example of what took place in Chevron Nigeria when she went to head-hunt for engineers. 
She said: 
“In Nigeria, there are scarcities of engineers, if I see an expatriate who has the skills 
for core activities; the company definitely would hire such on contract terms. There 
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was a period Chevron Nigeria needed 10 engineers, and we ended up getting 2 that fits 
the criteria needed.  However, they were some who were mechanical engineers but did 
not meet the needed criteria in terms of qualifications and skills rather have lower 
qualification but by the virtue of their exposure and experience by working in another 
company as mechanical engineers, such were recruited not as permanent staff but as 
contract staffs”. 
However, data from the trade unions interview did not totally agree with this view. The trade 
union argues that, when these expatriates are hired, there are deliberate attempts by the oil 
MNCs to resists the transfer of technical knowledge.  They only train low and medium level 
technical assistants and few engineers; they restrict the transfer of technical know-how to a 
great extent and occupy the key positions such as, line-managers and supervisors. This is 
further discussed in the trade unions findings in the second part of this chapter. 
Ken (respondent) agreed agency labour is a necessity in an adversarial market environment 
such as the oil industry, and he was quick to add that it is an issue of supply and demand. A 
company that operates in a market environment that experience high fluctuations in demand 
has a higher need to adjust its labour force, otherwise the company would be placed at a 
competitive disadvantage. In recent times management are more and more inclining towards 
flexible workplace practices in an attempt to meet market fluctuations and increase 
productivity and efficiency.  He further explains that a company’s labour force may be 
anticipated to increase speedily when there is increase in production demands and to reduce 
when there is less production, which implies, hiring may be on the increase today and firing 
tomorrow.  
 He stated that: 
“The current fall in crude oil price has caused most of the oil companies globally to 
cut-down on their staff strength and have to hire more of agency workers to meet the 
business cycle fluctuations, so this is not peculiar to Exxon Mobil alone.”  
While admitting that the management of ExxonMobil contract out labour, Gerald 
(respondent) was swift to say, it is a strategy for efficiency and optimization of resources due 
to market dynamics. He noted that the management expectation is to focus on the areas or 
activities that are critical to the company and how to optimise the key personnel or resources 
due to market complexity. He emphasised, it is all about what is critical to the management 
and has a long-term benefit to the company. Hence the operational system is thereby 
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segmented into the key and non-key activities.  He uses the means of getting employees to the 
rig as an example, he said: 
“Prior to this time, the company had helicopters to fly staff to the rig, but now there is 
a very reliable and efficient company (Bristol Helicopters) with fleets of helicopters 
that can render the services at cheaper rate, so why would management not utilized 
such service and do not need to worry about maintaining fleet of helicopters and 
keeping crews of permanent employees.  This enables management to focus on their 
core business.  Therefore, the key motive for agency labour is to enable the 
management focus into the areas of their core; which is considered as more efficient 
alternatives”. 
Gerald was also quick to defend that some cyclical activities that are ad-hoc in nature could 
be core activity to the company but has a life-span. This could be a project that may last for 
six months or one year. Again, it is time bound; it does not make any business sense to hire 
permanent employees for such project, it is better to use agency workers. He laid more 
emphasis on career purposes, he noted that there are highly specialised positions such as the 
(Medical Doctors) that do fixed job, which have very limited career progression in the 
industry, in such positions, the management would not want to hire an individual or person (s) 
who remains in one position for years, such an employee would end up as an unhappy and 
disgruntled person. Taking a global dimension, he stated: 
“Agency labour is something that has come to stay and is not peculiar to the Nigerian 
oil industry alone, it is a global issue.  Please, you tell me why an organisation should 
employ a permanent staff for a project or work that the end is already known? At the 
expiration of such project what would such employees be doing?   People should 
understand that an employee is hired, irrespective of the kind of contract, for what the 
employee can offer in serving the need of the company. The noise about agency labour 
and their unions are absurd.  Rights has been given to the trade unions to organise 
agency workers, he availed the researcher a duly signed communique agreement 
between ExxonMobil, Trade Union and labour intermediaries to that effect”. 
PENGASSAN however take a swipe on Gerald’s notion on the signed communique 
agreement by the tripartite parties. Princewill (union official) said “yes there is a duly signed 
communique” but in reality, it is not operational. Challenging the management, he declared 
the degree to which this agreement was to be implemented were determined by so many 
factors. Common amongst these factors are, the fragmentation of agency workers, short-term 
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employment contracts of the workers and the non-cooperation of employment agencies 
(employers). It could be argued, in order to avoid getting their (employment agencies) own 
contracts terminated by the oil MNCs, they proactively embarked on shortening the contract 
terms of new agency workers and their unwillingness to renew the contracts terms of the 
existing workers.  Princewill accused both the management of the oil MNCs and Ministry of 
labour and employment of not been committed to the implementation of the agreement. He 
queried the fact that there is no effective mechanism in place that monitors the 
implementation of every agreement reached. In his words: 
“The government needs to put in place an effective implementation monitoring 
mechanism that will monitor the extent to which the management of oil MNCs and 
their collaborators (employment agencies) adhered to every agreement reached”.  
Ese has a different viewpoint why management uses agency workers, besides costs-cutting, 
global competition, technological competences and focusing on core activities that had 
already been mentioned. He noted that the use of flexible workers has to do with the 
relationship with the communities in which the oil multinationals operates. He alleged that, 
the management hired some of the natives through employment agencies as a way of giving 
them a sense of belonging and to learn new skills.  He perceived this as providing some of the 
natives the opportunities to gain innovative work experience and the necessary human capital 
that can launch them into the labour market for more desirable and permanent jobs. He gave 
an example of what happened in July, 2002, he said: 
“The women of Niger Delta region went stark naked to protest against Shell, Mobil, 
Chevron, Texaco and other oil MNCS operating in their communities. How they have 
succeeded in destroying their livelihood by polluting their land and waters and 
demanded that the 50 members of the communities who were agency workers should 
be upgraded to permanent status. They requested that more jobs should be given to 
their children rather than other tribes, that when they get old someday and becomes 
weak, it is their children who would feed and take care of them. If our children are not 
given jobs, then we the mothers and fathers cannot survive”. 
Ese further gave a brief detail of how the management of the oil MNCs have improved the 
living standard of the average natives, despite the fact that majority of them are agency staff, 
they enjoy relatively better wages compared to some permanent employees in other sectors.  
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But one of the arms of the trade unions (NUPENG) argued that not all categories of the 
workers enjoy the supposed better wages and conditions of work such as the casuals and 
workers on probations. He argues that before these groups of workers could attain their 
permanent positions (those on probation), the management would terminate their 
appointments and re-engaged some of them as agency staff. He highlighted, that the 
“supposed” better wage in the industry earned by these workers is not enough to compensate 
them for the risks they face in the cause of their jobs, most particularly those on the rigs, and 
the wage earned by these workers was as a result of the trade union militancy. 
In summary, management of ExxonMobil attributed the rationale for agency labour to costs-
cutting, competitive market environment, technological innovations, changing aspects of 
technology which requires expertise and flexibility in labour use so that the number of 
employees would not be fixed always, and a way of giving back to the communities. In this 
context, the management opt for flexible work arrangements to support the changing market 
demand. Hence the use of agency workers enables management to achieve both employment 
flexibility and cost adjustment objectives. 
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6.5.2 Table 32: Shell Management Responses to Rationale for Agency Labour  
 
 
When asked why the management uses more of agency labour. Tricia alleged that there are 
many factors militating against the company to contract out employment, primarily, are 
salaries and benefits which are perceived as the major financial burden for management, more 
particularly in the phase of global competition and drop in the crude oil price. In justifying 
this view, Dapo corroborating Tricia’s view alleged that using agency labour is an approach 
by the management to cut-down on organisational cost. These collaborate with the NVIVO 
Matrix Coding Table 32 above on why Shell Management uses agency workers. Result shows 
several factors, but the three outstanding are: Cutting-Cost, Global Competition and Profit 
Maximization. 
Dapo emphasized that there are considerable pressures on and opportunities for management 
to cut down on labour costs by subverting the aspects of standard employment relationship 
through the much availability of labour intermediaries to supply non-permanent workers at 
cheaper cost. He alleged that as the pressures for efficiency increases, so the problem of 
labour costs intensifies. Arguing that the rising levels of global competition, coupled with 
pressure from the trade unions, particularly the extent to which management regards the 
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provisions on unfair dismissal as inhibiting their capacity to remain competitive, management 
therefore are compelled to seek alternative means to efficiency at cheaper cost. Dapo 
emphasized that in the present world of technological innovations and market dynamics a 
company with high proportion of unskilled workers, dismissal or the threat of it remains an 
important form of managerial control. Hence the pay-off and early retirement of low-skilled 
workers to pave the way for skilled workers, they could be permanent or non-permanent 
workers. This is highly perceived by the management as the most sustainable path to 
competitiveness. He stated that: 
“It is wise to have a two-tier workforce where permanent employees are retained for 
core activities and below them are agency workers. It means that even in severe 
economic situations the company can still remain afloat.  Work flexibility should be 
promoted because it enables the management to react so much faster to economic 
conditions as it evolves”. 
Similarly, Tricia alleged that oil companies operate like organism that goes through some 
metamorphosis. In the phase of this transformation, they have to fine-tune their structure and 
in the process, it is imperative, that some employees may have to go. Staff reduction is the 
only option available for the management to cut-costs and increase profit.  When this 
happens, the management implements some HR policies that deemed beneficial for the 
successful operations of the companies, which is where agency labour may come into play.  
However, she observed, that most of the core job vacancies are filled with just few permanent 
workers which indicates a steady decline of the permanent workforce in the company. She 
said: 
“That the way and manner in which agency workers have been utilized in Shell does 
not seems contingence, pragmatic and calculative rather she argues that this appears a 
deliberate act by the management of Shell which becomes clearer when some core 
positions were filled with agency staff”.  
Concurring to this view, Joshua observed, that currently Shell is maintaining limited number 
of core labour force. Given that Shell Nigeria makes more profit than its other subsidiaries in 
other nations.  He alleged that the permanent workforce should be increase rather than 
increasing the non-standard workforce. Sam equally noted that presently, Shell Nigeria 
deliberately maintains small core labour force which was not consistent with the practice in 
other nations such as the Netherlands and UK. For instance, in 2012, Shell Netherlands 
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maintained that the company had approximately 9,000 core employees and 6,000 employees 
in its subsidiaries across the country. While he ascertained that Shell Nigeria in its payroll has 
more than 4,000 permanent employees and more than 30,000 agency workers. 
In view of this, trade unions (PENGASSAN and NUPENG) claimed that Shell Nigeria 
directly hired 520 core employees, and argued that the excess figures work in the core 
production areas but as agency workers.  It is presumed that the rapid change in the work 
arrangements is having a serious effect on union membership.  
Furtherance to this line of arguments and in a different view, Debiri emphasized that Shell is a 
multinational company, and the management implements different labour policies for 
different economies and nations.  Tricia take a swipe on the Nigerian government for the 
nation’s weak legislation that gave the oil MNCs the prerogative to cheat and enslaves the 
labour force. She noted that most of the oil MNCs disrespects the Nigerian labour law and as 
a result, agency workers are left at the mercy of the employers to accept whatever is offered 
as salary. Hence, today employment relations subjects’ workers to a system of employer 
control fashioned to maximise input which the workers comply for salary.  
 However, the colleague who shares the same office cautioned her and said, do not forget that 
the ‘walls has ears’.  By this caution, the researcher observed that interviewees were cautious 
of the kind of information provided, however, she surmised with the following: 
“A company exist to make profit, if not for anything else, for the sake of competition. 
Otherwise the company will be kicked out of the industry by competitors.  It is a 
simple mathematical arrangement; it is more cost efficient to hire agency workers for 
functions that are not core or critical to the success of the company”. 
On the issue of Global Competition, Arit was quick to make reference to the lifting of 
international sanctions against Iran. The implication of this is that, Iran as an OPEC member 
will now be able to export oil, thereby sending a wave of fear across the already weak market 
which has been plagued by crude oil supply surplus.  She emphasized that global market 
competition brought about uncertainty and fluctuations in the crude oil market which 
necessitated re-structuring and re-strategizing, hence the paradigm shifts in work 
arrangements. She alleged that for a company to remain competitive they have to keep 
strategizing their operational system to remain afloat. That is why some job functions that are 
critical to the success of the company, the management makes deliberate attempt to hire 
permanent personnel, or keep some agency staff termed critical to the company for years, 
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such as the engineers, geophysics, and geoscientist to mention but few, these are the highly 
skilled and skilled workers and they are the life wire of the company.  
Substantiating on this, Debiri attested that the retrenchment and compulsory retirements that 
took place from October 2014 still on-going in 2015 at the time of this interview, was not 
targeted at neither permanent nor agency staff, rather it was based on the job functions that 
were termed critical to the existence of the company. For example: 
“Placing of pipeline is a core project, and time-frame is usually allocated to such 
project which depends on the miles/kilometres they have to cover, which workers are 
expected to strictly work towards and after the completion of such project, the workers 
are relieved”. 
However, there is general consensus among Shell interviewees that agency labour is a 
necessity and critical to the existence of the company, although there are numbers of factors 
notably cutting-costs have been the primary cause amongst others. 
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6.5.3 Table 33: Chevron Management Responses to Rationale for internal labour 
Contracting 
 
 
Armed with the question of why Chevron Nigeria uses more of agency workers, the most 
outlined factors by the respondents were market dynamics, global competition and cutting 
costs amongst others. Howard noted that agency labour is a successful management strategy 
to adapt to market dynamics, and this strategy favours the employers more.  Highlighting that 
agency workers are easily laid-off when their services are no-longer needed or when their 
criterial no longer fit into the company’s goals. He however declared that the Government 
should strengthened the legal positions of this class of workers in a more sustainable way, 
whereby, were employers uses them as a strategy to reduce cost and increase productivity, it 
should be made to balance with the improvement of equal-treatment of a commensurable pay 
and rights.  
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In agreement with Howards’ view, Godspower asserts that using of agency labour lowers 
hiring costs since advertising and interviewing costs are shifted to the hiring firms. Employers 
have discovered this as a means of cost effective solution to remain competitive and 
profitable.  He declared that most of these agency staffs are mainly use for seasonal variations 
and in demand on short-term basis, they function at both core activities and peripheral, it all 
depends on the department and needs.  It is not viewed as a scheme to prevent trade unionism 
as being speculated. He also harped on the issue of high rate of unemployment in the country 
and the influx of job specialist firms as additional motivating factor why oil companies uses 
agency labour. Regrettably, he alleged that, Nigeria is a proud producer of thousands of 
graduates on a yearly basis without any commensurable jobs to meet these great populations.  
He lamented: 
“It is disheartening that our government has failed to eradicate the decaying ills of the 
system, and allows some industries that would have generated jobs migrated, and the 
few remaining taking advantage of the high rate of unemployment. This is the result of 
what you get in the midst of plenty with a handful of companies. Let the government 
first of all put his house in order, before you can fight the oil MNCs”. 
George attributed the motivating factors to global competition and changes in the product 
market. He alleged that the global competition in the oil industry has taken a fierce dimension 
and it is only the fittest that can survive.  He said:  
“The Nigerian oil industry is currently as never before, being exposed to the effects of 
global economy. The stormy competitive market has placed so much pressure on the 
management to increase production capacity as at when necessary.  In such 
circumstances, the primary aim for most of the oil companies becomes cost reduction 
and the way to achieve this, is by cutting down on staff strength, which affects mainly 
the permanent staff whose functions are not core to the business. Management 
perceived the monthly income and benefits of the permanent staff as huge financial 
burden and rather go for agency workers who are perceived to be non-financially 
burdensome”.  
However, he asserts, that there are some exceptional cases; most of these agency staff benefits 
the company by bringing in valuable knowledge such as the industry best practices, as well 
as, being a catalyst of innovative skills. He said, for example:  
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“One of our staff was highly celebrated of recent as a result of his retirement after 
putting in 40 years of his life working for Chevron. If the company needs to re-hire 
such person as a consultant or contract staff, with his wealth of knowledge and 
experience, the management cannot pay him. Before retirement his salary was about 
$100,000 monthly, if for any circumstances the company needs to bring him back, 
chevron would probably pay him like $135,000 for his wealth of experience”.  
Joy and Effiong have similar views, although Joy added that there is a dearth of human capital 
in Nigeria, particularly with regards to technological skills and this has given rise to the 
proportions of skilled agency workers in the oil industry, hence the influx of expatriates. 
Stressing on the issue of turbulent global market, Effiong noted that today’s management is 
efficiency driven, and how to maximise profit for its shareholders is foremost in their agenda. 
In summary Chevron management rationale for agency labour was mainly attributed to global 
competition, product market dynamics more importantly dearth in human capital with regards 
to technological skills. However, the insensitivity of the Nigerian government towards the 
regularization of the anomaly in the industry in a more sustainable and equitable way has 
likewise been attributed as a contributing factor. 
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6.6. The Growth of Agency Workers and Trade Unions Challenges 
6.6.1. Table 34: ExxonMobil management responses on union resistance 
 
 
Regarding the issue of unions’ challenges as it concerns the growth of agency workers, all 
ExxonMobil participants except Ledefune and Gerald as shown in Matrix Table 34, attributed 
the reason to employment insecurity. Segun noted that the increasing usage of agency labour 
is almost synonymous to the extinction of permanent employees and this is particularly a 
contentious issue among the trade unions. 
Employees who feel insecure are more likely to be resistant and opposed the use of agency 
workers. They feel their jobs are being threatened as well as membership. He however added 
that, strategically and tragically, management know that the Nigerian Labour Act makes 
provisions for retirement. Accordingly, they retired some workers with the notion that their 
jobs no longer exist. But then they bring in agency workers into the same positions, although, 
PENGASSAN and NUPENG have occasionally succeeded in preventing management from 
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retrenching permanent employees and filling their positions with agency workers. For the fact 
unions have been victorious in some battles, they however, seems to be losing the battle 
against the use of agency workers, as their presence continue to increase and the government 
remains unwilling to address or regulate the issue of the temporarily workers, as well as, the 
employment agencies. 
Most of the interviewees also ascribed union resistance to the polarization of the workforce. 
Ledefune asserts that the fragmentation and expansion of the labour force is almost by 
definition also unorganised labour. He expressed that labour movement is committed to a 
homogenous workforce, but the fragmentation of the workforce probably proved as a 
challenge to the trade union to mobilise. Also, the growing trend of agency labour could be 
perceived as a threat to permanent employees’ terms and conditions of work. Trade unions 
have direct representational interests in maintaining the wages and working conditions of their 
core members, as well as, protecting their jobs. So the influx and fragmentation of agency 
workers are viewed as a big threat to their existence. 
The evidence suggested that trade unions are not totally barred from mobilizing agency 
workers, the issue is the inability to effectively organise them as a result of their 
fragmentation and short-term contracts. Likewise, the upsurge in flexible work arrangements 
has been associated with increasing employment insecurity which is also perceived to be 
driven by the pool of agency workers. Indicatively and in this context the feel of employment 
insecurity seems to be higher for permanent employees. As far as labour market features are 
concerned, been a union member provides relief for job security.  However, in the process 
whereby union membership is being depopulated through early retirement, and the influx of 
agency workers, there is bound to be a reaction, hence the unions opposition. 
Segun and Gerald acknowledged that union resistance is nothing shortfall of the indirect 
demobilisation of trade unionism in the prevailing market conditions. Segun alleged that the 
supply of these temporary workers assumed the role of a safety valve for the management. 
These categories of workers form an integral part of the management mechanism to 
continually adjust the parameters of labour supply to the cyclical and seasonal movement in 
business activities. He alleged, this possibly may have a profound effect on trade union 
membership. Trade unions are generally bestowed with permanent employees, while the 
union’s presence among agency workers is limited. 
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He however stressed on the idea of placing undue pressure on the management to hire and fire 
worker. Agency work must be seen as stepping stone for both management and workers. It is 
for both parties good.  He summarised: 
“Even though the company does not automatically regularize agency workers, 
however the experience gained by these groups of workers in any reputable oil MNCs 
can pave the opportunities for securing good jobs in another sector or same industry. 
The trade unions should also see them as a buffer, which is why most of them are still 
in this company”. 
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6.6.2. Table 35: Shell Management Responses on Union Resistance 
 
On the question regarding the growth of agency labour and trade unions challenges, Shell 
Management enumerated the likely causes for the agitations as indicated in Matrix Table 35, 
which ranges from decline in union membership, employment insecurity, fragmented 
workforce, and threat. However, Dapo, Tricia, Arit and Joshua collaboratively alleged that the 
company is operating under a compelling force to optimized resources as regards to lean 
production. For example, Tricia specifically stated that: 
“Why would a company have 60 permanent personnel in the human resource 
department to do recruitment, same applies to accounts department, these are all 
supporting departments and not technical, these ancillary services can easily be 
outsourced to firms who are specialist in these fields, or bring in agency workers to do 
the job”. 
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In buttressing this assertion, Arit clarifies that the non-critical jobs, such as security, cleaners, 
catering are subcontracted to the labour contractors. They are mainly hired on a short-term 
basis; on few instances their contracts are renewed based on circumstances surrounding such 
projects, but oftentimes the end of such contracts, marks end of job for the workers.  She 
emphasised that the supplied workers are no longer direct hires of Shell and are not 
anticipated to earn some benefits and have same rights as those who are direct hired. Besides, 
the new permanent employees who are directly employed are no-longer privileged to benefit 
from the job-for-life scheme; the new company policy has abolished such privileges.   
She however summarised with the following: 
“For all the issues confronting management, employees issue is the most sensitive; it 
makes life easier for employers or Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) to use third party 
staff.  The sensitivity and unpredictability of human nature is what scares management 
for using agency labour, thereby shifting that part of responsibility to the employment 
agencies.  But they will not agree out rightly, they justify it by telling the world it 
enables them to focus on the core functions and to figure out on how to move the 
business forward”. 
It could plausibly be summarised from her conclusion, that agency labour, particularly the 
filling of permanent positions with agency workers can be viewed as a calculated impulse by 
the management to shift responsibilities to labour intermediaries and weaken the existing 
power of the trade unions. 
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6.6.3.  Table 36: Chevron Management Responses on Union Resistance 
 
 
 All the interviewees of Chevron indicatively attributed trade unions challenges to the impact 
the growth of agency workers may possibly have on union membership.  
Howard noted that the trade union has always opposed any resolution that would adversely 
affect its members, so opposing the use of agency workers is not least expected of the labour 
movement. He alleged that trade union would have anticipated that the growth of this labour 
force would consequently lead to reduction of permanent employees both through retirement 
and redundancy, and in effect on its membership, hence the agitation. He emphasized that the 
impact is not only on the trade unions, but also on every single permanent employee on the 
company’s structural hierarchy. In his assessment, agency labour makes for de-centralization 
of the workforce, and this may probably impact on union’s ability to hire and mobilize 
workers. 
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Joy boldly declared that trade unions are opposing to agency labour because the industry did 
not accord trade unions recognition to mobilize and bargain within the outsourced workers 
and this is affecting their membership. She maintained that her company and PENGASSAN 
had an agreement that covers only permanent employees which are but few as compared to 
the agency workers.  She maintained that management had never and by extension their 
employment agencies inclined to trade unionism in the workplace. She also declared that 
union’s inability to mobilize agency workers appears to have extended the frontiers of 
influence or role of some powerful personalities who negotiates promotions and protect jobs 
of some individuals within the oil MNCs in Nigeria. She mentioned that these powerful 
personalities who are found in the political arena and ethnic affiliation have to a high degree, 
undermined the trade unions. She noted that management are utilizing these personalities as a 
divisive mechanism in their control of the labour force. Joy maintained that this approach is 
perceived to be threatening collective bargaining which is the central point of trade unionism. 
Taking swipe again on the issue of unemployment rate in Nigeria, Godspower noted that the 
precarious situation in the Nigerian labour market has given rise to the vulnerability of 
workers to be enslaved by the oil MNCs in terms of cheap labour. He said the workers are 
compelled by the excruciating unemployment to sign any contract of employment just to have 
a job. The terms and conditions of work might possibly include denial of the right to unionise.  
This implies that from the onset, such worker had already signed-out himself/herself the right 
to unionization. Though in most instances, these contract agreements were never entered on 
equal terms but forced down the throat of the applicants by the realities of the nation’s labour 
market. This he said often heightens tensions and creates insecurity in the work environment. 
Godspower noted that agency labour is perceived by the trade unions as a “hydra-headed 
monster” in labour relations, which the unions viewed as a deliberate attempt by the 
management to weaken their capability to collective bargaining and threatens their very 
existence. 
George is of the view that trade unions are opposing agency labour because of the observable 
influx of these workers and the integrations of such into the production process which is 
known as the core unit. This trend has changed employment practices and how employees’ 
rights are exercised. In a twist he argued that management has good justification for this 
approach, its objective is driven by expertise, efficiency, cost saving and demand and supply 
factors, on the contrarily unions view things differently. George equally said from the 
management perspective, they are contributing to the reduction of high unemployment rate in 
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Nigeria, while on the contrary, trade unions are opposing, because they possibly perceived 
this strategy is characterised with uncertainty which may introduce complexities into the 
employment relations such as threat to job security and division among the rank and file of 
the employment relations. 
Effiong emphasized that the fragmentation of the labour force, could be the driving force for 
trade union opposition for agency labour. He maintained that the present work arrangements 
in the industry seemingly poses a challenge for trade unions as most of these groups of 
workers are on short-term contracts and as such, might not see the need to belong to any trade 
union. This approach may likely weaken the strength of the union.  He opined that the rapid 
movement from permanent work towards forms of low-costs flexible work arrangements and 
short-term contracting, by extension fragmentation of the labour force, is an attempt to 
weaken collectivism, as well as, breaking unions’ strength, thereby pitting workers against 
themselves in a struggle for job security.  
In summary, as the shift towards flexible work arrangements becomes more entrenched with 
resentments, management has inadvertently increases resentment among workers. This 
purposive management work flexibility strategy motivated by economic rationale plausibly 
underpins trade unions challenges. This strategy is opposed by the trade unions who perceived 
the purpose is to cause division and undermine their strength to collectivism, as well as, threat 
to their jobs. 
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6.7. Differential Terms and Conditions of Two-Tier Workforce 
6.7.1.  Table 37: ExxonMobil Management Responses on the Likely Implications on Two-
Tier Workforce 
 
 
From the Matrix Coding in Table 37, job insecurity, wage inequality and lack of appraisal 
system are termed as the most likely implications of a two-tier workforce by ExxonMobil 
respondents. 
Social inequality seems to be an overwhelming feature of the likely implications of two-tier 
workforce according to Edward and Ese.  According to Edward, the duality of the labour 
market promotes a process where one segment of the labour market faces inferior working 
conditions and greater insecurity, while the other segment relatively has better job security 
and career progression. 
Labour market segmentation points to unequal risk-sharing; not only between standard and 
agency workers’ regarding job security and income inequality, but also between agency 
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workers and employers in terms of economic adjustment, agency workers disproportionately 
bear the brunt of economic adjustments. 
Edward also noted the concern for job insecurity, he lamented over the high rate of labour 
turnover among the agency workers. His view corroborates PENGASSAN and NUPENG’S 
on management and their employment agencies deliberate act of firing agency workers 
through the process of re-strategizing by bring on-board new “compliant” workers on short-
term employment contracts. This was perceived as a deliberate act to prevent the workers 
from unionization. 
Ese equally agrees to job insecurity as another key implication, however, has a different 
viewpoint from Edwards. He noted, reforms and the introduction of flexible work marked the 
point of departure for job security for both permanent and non-permanent workers. In his 
words, 
“Job insecurity simply means that though an employee is working yet the person is 
being chased by the ghost of unemployment”.  
Making allusion to job insecurity, he revealed that job insecurity may results to too many 
precarious conditions, such as, motivation and stress if not well managed. For motivation, it 
may lead to lack of satisfaction for the agency workers. The undeniable fact is that the 
majority of the workers in the oil industry in Nigeria are agency workers who are also within 
the young adult age brackets (25-40). Stress may have more impact on male than female 
workers. This may not be unconnected to the fact men bears most of the family 
responsibilities especially in a nation like ours (Nigeria). He emphasized, the implications are 
enormous, because the fear of job insecurity affects employees greatly as not working at all 
does. 
Wage and lack of appraisal are perceived by Segun, Edward and Ledefune as the most likely 
implications of a two-tier workforce. Segun admitted that the agency workers’ wages are set 
at the lowest salary scale and stagnated with little or no chance of incremental progression due 
to interruption of work. He attributed this anomaly to the employment agencies as agents who 
facilitated the process of driving down income due to over-saturated labour in Nigerian. 
 He noted that the high unemployment rate in Nigeria, coupled with the shifting employment 
system in the industry, has left agency workers with no form of appraising system in 
determining their career progression, promotion and income increment. He stressed on how 
wage inequality is worsened by the exclusion of these workers from additional increases to 
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wage such as productivity bonuses, or the thirteenth month pay that the permanent workers 
are entitled.  
However, Edwards argued that the usage of a two-tier workforce also has implication on the 
permanent employees’ salaries. He declared that the progressive increase in salaries of the 
permanent workforce slows-down.  Maintaining this is not officially referred to, but that is the 
fact. 
 
6.7.2. Table 38: Shell Management Responses on the Likely Implications on Two-Tier 
Workforce
 
 
On the likely implications of a two-tier labour force, Arit, Dapo, Debiri, and Sam collectively 
indicated as shown in the Matrix Coding Results Table 38, that social inequality and wage 
inequality are the most likely notably common features among the permanent and agency 
workers. Arit alleged that the permanent staffs may, unconsciously or not, find themselves in 
a position of power in relation to agency workers, which they can employ to their own 
benefit. She noted that the relegation of agency workers to the worst positions and expected to 
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work harder is a significant feature of the likely implications of two-tier workforce. Referring 
to a workplace accident that happens to an agency worker, she said the post of the worker was 
assigned to two permanent staffs.  
Sam attested to this as a common practice in the industry, whereby strenuous and 
unrewarding jobs are assigned to agency workers. Stressing further, the workers cannot say no 
or complain of any tasks assigned as compared to the permanent employees. He declared that 
permanent employees have been witnessed to have evaded difficult tasks at the detriment of 
the agency workers. This is because of the job security accorded the permanent staff by virtue 
of being a union member.  
Arit attested that agency workers are not privileged to share the official transportation system 
provided by the company with the permanent staff. This could make them feel lack of 
organisational citizenship and possibly affects their morale and productivity. She however 
bemoaned the high level of unemployment rate in Nigeria and declared, irrespective of the 
precarious situation, one must show a good worker face in a struggle to stay in employment. 
Dapo noted that the existence of power differentials is most evident in the relationship 
between the permanent staff and agency workers, even among the agency workers’ inequality 
exists. Dapo explains, what is interesting to note here is the reproduction of power 
differentials based not only on different knowledge and work experience levels but also its 
consequence, which is the type of work being performed. The power differential between the 
permanent staff and agency workers is also reflected in the wage gap that exists between 
them.  
Majority of Shell management staff interviewed agreed that wage inequality is a likely 
implication. Debiri asserts that flexible work arrangement has gradually changed the nature 
and terms of employment from employment relationship to a commercial relationship with 
the worker at the receiving end. He however bemoaned the situation of the declining once 
robust employment relationship that traditionally existed in the industry to the present day 
commercial employment relationship that enables management to make use of labour power 
at a lower cost without health insurance, pension scheme and benefits. He maintained that 
most benefits which are associated with permanent staff such as training, medicals, bonus, 
retirement plans and welfare packages are all lacking in the terms and conditions of agency 
workers.  
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Dapo further added that unionization is usually low or non-existence among agency workers. 
While on the other hand, the increase usage of these workers, decreases the number of 
permanent staff, which likely affects union membership, thereby weaken their power to 
collective bargaining, which could keep the permanent staff on one salary scale for a long 
time. He reminisced that agency workers are hired to cope with seasonal variations in 
demands thereby reducing employment costs; however, their growth in the industry, 
indicatively, can be perceived as a strategy to avoid trade unionism. He stated: for example, 
“Those workers on short-term contracts are prone to enslavement and lack the 
mechanism to protect them from being enslaved. More pathetic is the situation where 
there is no statutory law protecting this category of workers”.  
Sam would not agree less of Dapo’s view, he alleged that job insecurity is a fundamental 
issue associated with workers on temporary employment; management can easily dispense 
their services at will without and any obligations. Agency labour is characterised by 
uncertainty with regards to job continuity and this can lead to stress which impact on workers’ 
health, attitude and commitments. The implication might be lack of job satisfaction for the 
agency worker. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
199 
 
 
6.7.3.  Table 39: Chevron Management Responses to the Implications of a Two-Tier 
Workforce 
 
 
The likely implication of a two-tier workforce from the Matrix Table 39 above indicates 
social inequality, job insecurity, and wage inequality, lack of advancement and lack of 
company citizenship.  These factors are quite similar to what Shell and ExxonMobil indicated. 
However, Howard noted that permanent employees hired by the principal company enjoy 
higher wages, better conditions of employment, work stability and opportunity for 
advancement. They are members of trade unions, they enjoy higher bargaining power and 
their contracts of employment are institutionalised through the machinery of collective 
bargaining.  
Howard emphasized, in unity they found strength to effectively challenge any unfavourable 
employment conditions. Agency workers work under less unfavourable conditions. Their 
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bargaining power is fractionalised as they bargain on individual basis, “that is, if anything of 
such still exist in the industry”.  The high rate of joblessness has compelled applicants to 
accept any salary offered them without negotiation. Their salary is very low; perks are not 
available, condition of employment appalling, job instability, and no right to association. He 
said, despite majority of them having equivalent qualifications and skills as their permanent 
colleagues. They are so reduced that they look at themselves as unskilled and feel like second-
hand fiddle, and as such, they may unlikely to find satisfaction and fulfilment in executing 
their duties, which can possibly, affects productivity.  
Effiong in agreement with Howard noted that agency workers feel less organisational 
affiliation. Lack of company citizenship is a quality he considered as a crucial element in a 
meaningful employment relationship. He maintained that despite some of the workers work in 
the production unit, they are still seen and treated as outsiders, which they are fully aware. He 
added, this perception reflects organisational barriers between permanent staff and agency 
workers. 
Godspower is of the view that wage inequalities do not only affect the good living standard of 
a family, it likewise means a high level of poverty. He maintained that, if you have more 
people in the secondary work system, it means the nation is living in poverty. Poverty if not 
checkmated can lead to ill-health and crime, this can place burdens on the economy and 
subsequently hinders the economic growth of the nation. He stressed, you see, the implication 
encompasses every facets of the society. 
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6.8.  Workplace Relationships 
6.8.1. Table 40: ExxonMobil Management Responses to Labour and Management 
Relationships 
 
 
Majority of the ExxonMobil participants said there is cooperative working relationship 
between labour and management. Ledefune mentioned that the prevailing economic condition 
allowed for the introduction of social partnership. He emphasized that in 2012, the initiative 
of the management to call for a joint consultative meeting between labour, management, and 
the employment agencies as it concerns the rights of agency workers to unionise, 
demonstrated a conviction of harmonious working environment between labour and 
management.  
Ken however added that management assumption is that, workers are being adequately 
represented. But majority of the agency workers interpreted the joint consultative meeting as a 
channel for passing on necessary information and communication regarding managerial 
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decisions. Ken noted that in reality, and as far as the agency workers are concerned, there is a 
separation between being represented, and just receiving information concerning the 
company’s activities. 
In Edwards view, such social partnership is patent by management dominated agenda, 
basically reflecting more of management interests and union compliance relations, rather than 
partnership.  Commenting further on the issue of social partnership, Edwards emphasized that 
when there is imbalance in the power relations arising from economic conditions, outcome 
could be in favour of either of the parties. Quite often, in such market conditions, trade unions 
are more weakened in terms of power base and resource, which then make the management 
secure more gains at the detriment of labour. He stressed on the aim of partnership is to seek 
for a balance of interests and to maintain cooperative labour-management relations and if this 
is not feasible, conflict may ensue as a remedial.  
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6.8.2 Table 41: Shell Management Responses to Labour and Management Relationships 
 
 
Respondents from Shell except one indicated adversarial working relationship between 
management and labour. Tricia in her opinion alleged that management claims property 
rights, while labour claims civil rights. These concepts enable the parties to work out their 
mutual rights and responsibilities. She observed that management often expect their 
employees to make themselves available for work, and exhibit loyalty and commitment to the 
organisation. Likewise, labour wants a commensurable reward for such obligations, however 
alleged that there is always a consensus between labour and management on issues of 
concern.  
Even though Arit corroborated Tricia on the issue of loyalty and commitment of employees to 
the management, she was quick to add that the relationship between management and labour 
is perennial by nature and the application of social equity will lead to the effective utilization 
of the entire workforce, in terms of their loyalty, commitment, and efficiency. She 
emphasized on the importance of unionization of agency workers, and argued that when 
labour feels relegated into insignificance in favour of profit maximization or decisions on 
workers not effectively communicated to them, in such cases, it is to be expected 
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that disruption of business activities might result as union conscientiously react to 
the insensitivity of management. 
In a different perspective, Dapo asserts that the most characteristic form of labour’s 
opposition is not against the management but against work itself. He further explains that 
labour-management relationship depends on how supposedly the working relationship is 
being perceived by both parties. Often labour is much more concerned about some decisions 
of the management which leads to labour resistance to work such as absenteeism, going-slow 
and sabotage.  
He affirms that the pressure of work and the feelings of precariousness usually proceeded 
beyond absenteeism and going-slow into more confrontational channels involving acts of 
sabotage as revenge against the management.  Sabotage is perhaps the most powerful weapon 
of workers struggle right now, and can only be based on a deep consciousness of the 
antagonistic interests between labour and management. He also uses strike action as a dire 
consequence which labour uses to challenge the supremacy of management. 
All these actions by labour challenged the intensity of work-time, and undermined 
management drive for efficiency and productivity. He asserts, this indicatively could also be 
responsible to the shift from full-time employment to agency labour by the management to 
precisely intensify the work pace. 
In a twist, Dapo emphasized that strike constitutes the ultimate function of labour movement 
as the par excellence expression of labour struggle. However, owing to the varied interests of 
the two-parties and their bargaining powers, collective agreements are frequently arrived at, 
which in most cases is in favour of the trade union, even when some of these demands are 
exorbitant and unrealistic. Because of the catastrophic effects of industrial action, the 
management dread to shut down production for a second and as a result many strikes 
ultimatum are always averted.  He surmised:  
“The issue of agency labour has come to stay, it is a question of labour and 
management going back to the drawing board and work out every modality as it 
concerns all parties involved”. 
Sam whose position on the issue of collective agreement did not tally with Dapo’s view, 
noted that collective bargaining, though is the core apparatus in any viable management and 
labour relationship; alleged that in most joint consultative meetings, collective agreements are 
most times not honoured by one party (the management). This he declared, always put a strain 
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in labour and management relationship. He emphasized that until recently it was discovered 
that, most of the collective agreements have had no legal backing.  This makes most of the 
enforcements of collective bargaining difficult where one of the parties reneged on an 
agreement. This deficiency frequently leads to conflicts between labour and management. 
 
6.8.3.  Table 42: Chevron Management Responses to Labour/Management Relationships 
 
 
When asked whether the utilization of agency labour has in any way affected labour-
management relationships, From the Matrix Coding Table 42, results show that George, 
Godspower and Joy indicated adversarial, which implies labour – management relationship is 
not as cordial as indicated by Howard and Effiong. 
Joy expressed that relationship is met to be a partnership, where both parties contributes 
equally. She noted that on the one side, workers are expected to commit their energy in 
meeting the economic objectives of the management. In return, management is expected to 
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share the economic returns with employees and invest those returns in ways that promotes 
long-term economic security of the labour force.  But in the process where one party is not 
living up to its expectation, there is bound to be conflict. She emphasized that conflict and 
partnership therefore are two sides of the same coin. The extent to which each can be 
evaluated or judged as good or bad or healthy will depend on the ends to which each is 
related. 
George supported Joy’s analysis, and said as far as conflict remains a permanent feature in 
labour and management relationship, any partnership tendencies between both parties would 
only reduce or minimise the frequency of conflicts and that does not mean they are having 
good relationship, it only means there is an interaction between them. But to say labour-
management relationship is cordial is far from reality and to eradicate strikes completely from 
labour –management relationship, is a mission impossible. He maintained that if management 
really wants a harmonious working environment, they should cultivate participatory 
management style that would foster labour participation at the planning and implementation 
stages, particularly when it concerns the workforces, direct participation and representative 
participation is recommended. 
However, Howard emphasized that though conflicts and strikes cannot be completely 
eradicated in labour-management relationship, but partnership building enable the parties to 
transcend and work through their differences towards successful achievement of the 
company’s objectives. 
Godspower in his opinion noted that environmental changes such as global competition, 
technology, market dynamics, political and legal, further escalated detrimental effects on 
labour – management relationships as a result of the rapid nature by which management 
introduced changes, particularly when the overriding effects of such changes have stimulated 
labour turnover, downsizing, retrenchment and early retirement thereby giving birth to 
deteriorating trade unions. 
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6.9.  Causes of Exacerbating Industrial Conflicts 
6.9.1. Table 43: ExxonMobil Management Responses to Causes of the Exacerbating Conflicts 
and Strike Action 
 
 
Matrix Coding Table 43 above, ExxonMobil participants attributed the major causes of 
conflicts in the industry to early retirement.  Ese lamented over what happened in 2004 and 
2005 whereby employees were placed on early retirement on the account of aging and 
unproductiveness. Surprisingly, some of them were immediately re-engaged as contract staffs 
through the employs of employment agency, this led to days of strike action. Which implies 
that their services were still needed despite been labelled as aging and unproductive. Trade 
unions waded into the issue, and some of the employees were discovered to be erroneously 
dismissed and recalled.  This cannot be said to be cost effective or reposition actions.  He 
bemoaned, this is currently and sadly repeating itself again in a different dimension, this time 
not for aging and unproductive purposes, but early retirement due to market dynamics and fall 
in the price of crude oil.  
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Ledefune who would not agree less, uses the current happenings in the industry, he said for 
example what is currently going in NNPC, is already causing agitations and anxiety among 
the labour force on the way and manner the restructuring exercise is being implemented. He 
Stated: 
“Who should not be worried as a 50-year-old employee, only to be alerted by a 
colleague of his or her dismissal on the pages of Newspapers? It is a very sad way to 
end an employee’s career. I am talking about crop of professionals who have laboured 
under the very difficult and a politically manipulated system. The only offence 
committed was to have been dedicated and work for so long with the company.  
Majority of the employees retired abruptly had served the company without fault, 
except the management are indicating otherwise”. 
Ledefune identified two categories of employees retired early as: first, those who are likely to 
have held some sensitive positions in which the searchlight of management is being beamed. 
He mentioned how some middle management staffs in the trade unions are always being 
watched and monitored during protest or picketing from the CCTV installed in the top 
management offices, which before now was unknown to the trade unions. The second 
category are those management staffs that still have about five or more years to their 
constitutional retirement periods. He said, 
“When an employee who did not take office at the pleasure of politicians is retired in 
the media before they are officially handed their retirement letters, that action cannot 
be said to have been fair and followed due process”. 
He however bemoaned that as far as one cannot restrain management from managing its 
workforce for productivity, management must be guided by the existing labour laws in the 
execution of their moral and depository obligations towards their workforce. Doing the 
contrary, will always be tantamount to industrial relations crisis and this should be avoided in 
a challenging time as this when the nation is going through economic recession. I am saying 
this because, the significance position this industry occupies in the Nigerian economy has 
given trade unions the enormous advantage, as a result could bring the economy activities to a 
complete halt whenever they decided to strike. 
In agreement with the views of Ledefune, Ken emphasized on why job security is as crucial to 
permanent employees as it is to the agency workers. He noted that in the past few years many 
permanent employees have lost their jobs while many jobs have been migrated from 
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permanent to contract and service employment.  Though the major issue confronting the 
industry is divestment, most of the oil multinational companies are selling off their onshore 
and shallow water assets and this is greatly impacting on the jobs of the permanent workforce, 
by extension depleting union membership.  
In his response to the causes of the exacerbating conflicts in the industry, Edwards stated 
injustice and inequality as the major factors. He noted that conflicts take place within a 
structured framework of relationship dominance, resulting in an unequal relationship. As one 
party termed to be more powerful and dominates the other party; the struggle by the 
disadvantage party in such a relationship could lead to fierce conflicts.  
Commenting further, he lamented on the injustice done to the communities in which these oil 
MNCs operates. Oil spills have destroyed the environment, contaminating the surface water, 
ground water, sediment and air.  He bemoaned the extensive pollution and destruction of the 
mangroves which had negative impact on the fish cycle. The pollution has also damaged the 
soil; our aged parents can no longer do their farming and fishing which is their main source of 
livelihood.  These communities have cried out for their wards to be awarded decent jobs as 
compensation so that they could have a good standard of living and the right to continuous 
improvement of living conditions. The denials of such requests often times compel the unions 
to act. 
In summary, there are several factors as expressed by the participants leading to conflicts in 
the industry, commonly among them is the early retirements of the permanent employees and 
the reengagement of such in same positions but as contract staffs without the right to benefits 
and unionization. 
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6.9.2. Table 44: Shell Management Responses to Causes of the Exacerbating Conflicts and 
Strike Action 
 
 
On the question regarding the causes for the exacerbating conflicts in the industry, Arit noted 
that the Nigerian oil industry has indeed experienced incessant industrial conflicts (strike 
actions) over the years arising from interests and rights disputes. This she particularly 
attributed mainly to the use of agency workers, which the trade union anticipated as a 
deliberate act by the management to undermine their strength, which however is not the case. 
The jobs performed by these workers are project-based, once the project ends, that means end 
of their jobs at that moment. Corroborating this view, Debiri attributed the incessant conflicts 
to all shades of unfair labour practices such as labour contracting and all forms of work 
flexibility.  He noted that some of these anti-labour issues have given rise to recurrent 
industrial action in the industry.  
He however observed that due to the strategic importance of this industry to the development 
of national economy, the trade unions (PENGASSAN and NUPENG) have attained 
considerable bargaining power through collective bargaining and they have repeatedly 
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exploited this to their advantage in the cause of championing the demands of their members. 
This is evident in the measure of both financial and non-financial perks that the unions have 
gained for their members both in the past and present day.  
Emphasizing on collective bargaining, Debiri noted that to a high degree, collective 
bargaining has gained root in the Nigerian oil industry and has been deployed in the 
regulation of employment relationship. He said:  
“In recent times there have been continuous processes of dialoguing, consultation and 
bargaining between management and labour on a wide range of issues such as work 
arrangement, unionization, early retirement, termination of appointment, hiring and 
welfare packages, which have abated the tension so far”. 
Arit who earlier harped on the need of synergy between management and labour maintained 
that the presence of a union in any organisation can be unsettling to the management. She 
noted that there is always a general resistance to the formation of union in any organisation. 
Such resistance often leads to interruption of business activities. She submits that the 
management cannot efficiently achieve its objectives even with hi-tech machineries without 
human effort and therefore admonished management to reconsider their stance on the drive 
for unionization. Particularly where there are prevailing demand and support for such 
demands. 
She said in her words: 
“It is not unusual to encounter cases whereby management pledges support for the 
unionization of agency workers only to turn around to do everything possible to 
frustrate the trade unions through diverse policies and strategies leading to threats; 
coercion and victimization. In some instances, unionization is encouraged all the way 
to the negotiating table where management resorts to intimidate labour to agreeing 
with certain terms. She expresses worry over some of these policies and strategies by 
saying there is no gainsaying those policies by management is definitely ill-considered 
thereby flaring organisational conflict”. 
Basically, the overall interest of the labour and management is both competing and 
complementary. Most of the labour demands represent cost to the management. For business 
to remain viable, cost must be minimised in order that profit can be maximised. 
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6.9.3. Table 45: Chevron Management Responses to Causes of the Exacerbating Conflicts and 
Strike Action 
 
 
All the interviewees from Chevron indicated the use of agency labour and the denial of the 
workers right of association as the causes of conflicts in the industry as shown by the Matrix 
Table 45 above. George noted the issue of conflict is mainly on the subjection of permanent 
workers to contract staff (transfer of permanent staff to third party vendor) and denial of right 
to unionization. He stated,  
“In 2010, the Port-Harcourt Zonal Branch of PENGASSAN resulted in the issuance of 
a 7-day ultimatum. It required that Chevron Nigeria to address the issues of unfair 
labour practices or face strike action. One of the unfair labour practices was the 
subjection of some of the permanent employees to the status of contract workers, 
which implies they no longer have the right to negotiate and had to agree to conditions 
of service and could be subjected to arbitrary dismissal”. 
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He declared lack of communication is a major issue here, when operational changes are not 
being effectively communicated to labour, there is bound to be a reaction. 
Effiong   noted that conflict in the workplace is centred on the opposed nature of the interests 
of labour and management.  These interests often conflict with one another. The management 
is seeking the greatest possible output at the least cost. Thereby constantly seeking to lower 
wage rate, increase the working hours, maximise workers’ inputs, fires and dispose of 
workers whenever it is temporarily economical. While on the other hand, the trade unions 
which represent the working class is seeking continuous employment for its members at the 
highest possible conditions in respect of hours of work, security and continuity of work, 
safety, comfort and opportunity for self-actualization. He however opined that internal 
sources of conflicts can better be understood by considering grievances that come from labour 
and management as separate sides within any work setting. 
He however declared that management likewise complains about unfair labour practices from 
the trade union. This often includes the misrepresentation or interpretations of management 
policies, particularly when it concerns the workforce, misinterpretation of contracts, for 
instance,  
“A worker whose contract of employment stipulates terms and conditions and duly 
signed, later turn-around to say he/she is denied the right to unionize or not entitled to 
certain privileges, or contract terms are not renewed. He declared if such worker is not 
satisfied, he/she can resign or alternatively go to the tribunal if feel cheated”. 
 
Commenting further, management grievances also stems from dissatisfaction with some 
workers, particularly those covered under labour umbrella. Sometimes management may 
extend workers attitudes to work to the trade unions, if the expectation or performance level 
seems not to improve; management has the prerogative to treat undesirable worker’s case as 
unsatisfactory performance and get rid of them.  This action of management in some cases 
does not seem to be acceptable by the trade union. The union usually misinterprets such 
decisions and threatens to call for industrial actions if the workers are not recalled. 
He maintained that the conduct of union activities during work without following the 
necessary due process, such as: illegal encroachment on management functions and other 
aspects of trade union indiscipline, are but a few of unions’ unfair labour practices in the 
industry. 
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6.10. The key similarities and differences of the three case companies 
Economic crisis and globalization have affected the Nigerian oil industry, which like any 
other industry culminated in trends of rightsizing, downsizing and employee dismissal and the 
ultimate engagement of agency workers. Shell, ExxonMobil, and Chevron outsources most of 
its labour needs to employment agencies that recruit skilled, semi-skilled, and unskilled 
workers on their behalf. Below are some of the similarities: 
6.10.1. Similarities 
 
1. Findings indicate that Shell, ExxonMobil, and Chevron are increasingly utilizing 
agency labour in a variety of their organisational activities from the core to peripheral 
functions. 
 
2. The three oil MNCs operates two-tier workforce similar to Atkinson flexible firm 
model. A two-tier employment relation was seen as a deliberate policy of the oil MNCs 
who created it in place of permanent employment. 
 
3. The rational for operating a two-tier workforce were very much similar. The three oil 
MNCs indicated costs-cutting as the major rationale for using agency labour, followed 
by technology, global competition and efficiency amongst others. In general, financial 
independence seems to be the major concern. Hence their workforces are 
heterogeneous by nature. 
 
4. Shell, ExxonMobil and Chevron have policies of directly employing limited proportion 
of permanent employees, without the benefits of job-for-life as it was in the past. The 
clause “job-for-life” was abolished due to global competition and cost pressure. 
 
5. There seems to be a great drive by these powerful oil MNCs to externalise their 
internal labour market and this is speedily impacting on trade unions membership. 
 
6. The three oil MNCs wield so much power within the Nigeria state and communities by 
virtue of their partnership with the government. They have been able to explore, 
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extracts and exploits both the citizens and environment without any corresponding 
development. 
 
6.10.2. Dissimilarities 
1. Different culture and dynamics plays out in these three oil MNCs. Shell operates 
mainly in the downstream, hence makes extensive usage of both permanent and 
agency workers. Consequently, a great number of the employees were made 
redundant and compulsory retirement was imposed during downturn. 
 
2. While in ExxonMobil, valued core employees are more protected. In the cause of 
the interview with the management it was noted that ExxonMobil from inception, 
had always maintained cost-conscious approach so that the difference between the 
core and the peripheral do not surpass the other. Hence, in the phase of the present 
financial crisis in the oil industry the majority of their core employees were 
secured.   
 
3. To a great extent ExxonMobil permits the unionization of agency workers, there is 
a duly signed tripartite agreement between the Management, Employment agencies 
and the union of right to organise agency workers. While the right to freedom of 
association is highly curtailed by Shell and Chevron.  
 
4. Exxon Mobil made effort to improve conditions of employment for agency workers 
by providing medical insurance schemes; this scheme is not applicable to Shell and 
Chevron agency workers. 
 
5. Chevron is more into upstream operations, hence, hires more of expatriates than the 
other two oil MNCs. 
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6.11. Summary of Management Findings 
The success of any organisation is said to largely depend on the expertise, skills, morale and 
commitments of its workforce (Fernando, 2011:38). Thus, contracting of employment is the 
process of attracting and selecting presumably these competent personnel for jobs and the 
employment agency is powerful niche in the labour market that supplies these expertise and 
competence to the oil MNCs.  This is because Shell, ExxonMobil and Chevron management 
are increasing utilization agency workers. 
The three oil MNCs indicated costs-cutting as the major rationale for using agency labour, 
followed by global competition and efficiency amongst others. In general, financial 
independence seems to be the major concern. Hence their workforces are heterogeneous by 
nature. 
Shell, ExxonMobil and Chevron are progressively using agency workers in both their 
core/peripheral activities. This is because flexible labour may allow companies the flexibility 
required to function productively in the phase of market fluctuations. However, none of the 
management of these three oil MNCs want to be obligated by offering a long-term contract 
employment any more, since most jobs seems to be project-based, coupled with the current 
fall in oil price amongst other factors. Thus flexible work arrangements have been seen as the 
prevailing means of eliminating labour dearth in the industry, as well as, maximizing profit. 
The management staff of the three oil MNCs, argued that agency workers are not their direct 
workers hence are not entitled to the welfare perks and privileges accrued to their direct hires, 
particularly, the pension and medical scheme. The pension scheme operated is concomitant by 
nature, with the management paying a comparable sum as the employees. Permanent 
employees along with four dependants have rights to medical treatment all through their life 
time.  They likewise have access to car and housing benefits, including other benefits such as: 
end of business year profit sharing allowance, Christmas allowance, maternity allowance, 
holiday pay, performance award, generator and fuel allowance.  These are some of the 
overhead cost and responsibilities the management intended to eradicate, hence the growth 
and usage of agency workers.  
The permanent employees who occupied the core positions of these three oil MNCs are 
termed as “residents’ employees” they are the standard workers who are direct employees of 
these companies and are privilege to unionized. However, these secured valued core 
employees are more protected in ExxonMobil, in the cause of the interview with the 
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management it was noted that ExxonMobil from inception, had always maintained cost-
conscious approach so that the difference between the core and the peripheral do not surpass 
the other, hence, in the phase of the present financial crisis in the industry the majority of their 
core employees were secured.   
This is quite different from the culture and dynamics that plays out in Shell Nigeria.  Shell 
makes extensive usage of both permanent and agency workers as a result of the numerous 
projects they execute. Consequently, a great number of the employees were made redundant 
and compulsory retirement was imposed. Presently, Shell, ExxonMobil and Chevron have 
policies of directly employing limited proportion of permanent employees, however, without 
the benefits of job-for-life as it was in the past. The clause “job-for-life” was abolished due to 
global competition and cost pressure. Regardless of this clause, the internal labour market of 
these oil MNCs, still remains a highly treasured niche for both graduates and professionals in 
Nigeria to occupy. 
However, there is an agreement between the management of ExxonMobil, trade unions and 
labour intermediaries of the rights of contract staffs to unionise, although this was refuted by 
the trade unions who declared that the agreement is operational in papers and not in practice.  
The trade union argued that, since the communique was signed in 2012, employers’ no longer 
hires workers on long-term contract of employment, rather, workers are hired for three 
months to one year, thereafter the employers terminate such appointments, and re-hires them 
or bring on board new workers. This trend the trade union perceived as a ploy to deny agency 
workers right to unionization. More of this argument is discuss in the next section on the trade 
unions findings. 
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6.12. TRADE UNION RESPONSES 
6.12.1. Introduction 
This section presents trade unions findings on management rationale for the increasing usage 
of agency workers and their oppositions. Four senior unions’ officials, who are also 
employees of the oil MNCs, were interviewed. Below are their profiles. 
Table 46: The Profiles of Unions Representatives 
No. Designation Shell ExxonMobil Chevron Total 
1 PENGASSAN 
(Public Relations Officer and 
Deputy President) 
1 1  2 
2 NUPENG 
(National President and General 
Secretary) 
1  1 2 
 TOTAL 2 1 1 4 
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6.12.2. Trade Unions Responses to why Management Contract out  
The Matrix Coding Result Table 47 below expresses Trade Union’s perspectives on the 
determinants why the management of the Nigerian oil industry uses agency labour.  
Table 47:  PENGASSAN and NUPENG Response 
 
When asked why the management of the Nigerian oil industry increasingly use agency labour. 
NUPENG acknowledged that this is a global issue, but he was quick to add that the increasing 
usage of these workers in the Nigerian oil industry threatens the jobs of the permanent 
employees and the existence of the trade unions, particularly, the deployment of this workers 
into the core production areas without the right to unionization. He alleged that NUPENG is 
not completely against the use of agency workers, rather is the dimension it has taken from 
ancillary jobs to core production areas, from direct contract to triangular employment 
relationships and the fragmented work arrangements. He said:  
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“Contract workers in the past were hired directly by the oil MNCs as a cover-up 
arrangement and to cope with some short- term projects.  But this is no longer the 
case.  It was observed that agency workers are now hired through labour 
intermediaries to perform functions of our members that were forcefully retired in 
order to undermine the labour movement. They think we don’t know what they are 
doing. They retired employees on permanent employment contracts; restructure the 
system and hires agency workers through employment agencies to fill such positions, 
thereby denying them of their fundamental human rights”. 
He disclosed that agency workers have different contract terms; some are contract staffs, 
service workers, and manpower staffs. He lamented that the management in collaboration 
with the employment agencies so disintegrated the workforce that there is no more spirit of 
collectivism. He observed that the growing fragmentation of the workers increases pressure 
on the permanent workforce, and declared we will not fold our hands and allows oppression 
and slave labour to take over collectivism that traditionally characterises trade union.  
NUPENG taking a swipe on the government, criticises the Nigerian government for taking the 
issue of agency labour with laxity. He alleged that the legal framework did not make adequate 
provisions for these workers. He is of the view that the government should reform the existing 
labour law to integrate these emerging groups, and maintained that the issuance of guidelines 
in addressing issues of this rapidly growing workforce is no-longer enough. He therefore calls 
for legislative intervention that will reinforce the section of the labour law that says “workers 
after putting three months in service should be regularised”. He maintained that legal 
regulations will aid in reducing the gap in wages and working conditions between the 
permanent and agency workers, as well as, giving agency workers collective rights.  He 
lamented that: 
“The Nigerian factor and deficiency in policy implementation are making it 
permissive for the oil MNCs to operate the way they wanted. Let me also state that the 
indigenous employees and the trade unions have championed the struggle for the 
increased involvement of Nigerians in decision making hierarchy of the oil industry. 
But what do we get today, regret. The same Nigerians who are beneficiaries of our 
struggles are the ones that now formulate all kinds of anti-labour policies channelled at 
suppressing and weakening the same body that saw them to where they are presently 
and gave their very own for slavery”. 
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He emphasised, that the existence of trade union as a representative body of the working class 
is at stake. The shrinking of manpower in standard employment is automatically reducing the 
power of organised labour and unionised workers.  The industry now uses flexible work 
arrangements as a strategy in fragmenting the workforce thereby creating a divide and rule 
among the rank and files of the labour force, and this makes it more challenging for 
recruitment. He said: 
“The inability for the trade unions to organise agency workers and voice on their 
behalf as a result of the employment fragmentation system is very challenging. The 
most worrisome of this whole thing, is that as much as the unions try to organise these 
workers, the more their contracts of employment are being shortened or terminated”.   
PENGASSAN alleged that the kind of complains the union gets from both their members and 
potential members are very worrisome.  He said the oil MNCs are destroying themselves, 
because, I don’t understand why management should set-up a division among the rank and 
file of their employees and expect teamwork of labour efficiency. He declared that in an 
attempt to organised these fragmented workforce, one of the contract staff said: what is the 
essence of joining a union, as this will put her job at risk. She said:  
“Why should I join the trade union and make myself a sumptuous meal of attack for 
the employer.  My contract is just for a year and there is no assurance that the trade 
union can fight for me to be a permanent staff or to renew my contract. Rather, my 
joining the union can only put me in trouble”. 
When confronted with this allegation of employers threatening agency workers with dismissal 
or denial of contract renewal, a manager with one of the employment agencies, Kimberly 
Ryan said: 
“It is not right to say we threaten our workers with dismissal when they join the union, 
every contract regardless of its terms, either tenured or fixed-term, have explicit 
contract terms detailing expectations. But frankly speaking, while should an agency 
staff of a fixed-term contract, be a member of the trade union? Such worker’s 
employment contract is just but for a short while and the union will only collect 
his/her money without gaining anything in return.  Remember the trade union is not a 
cooperative society where such worker is expected to get his money back”. 
NUPENG noted that the unethical labour market fragmentation in the Nigerian oil industry 
has had negative cause and effects on the influence of the trade unions. He emphasised, 
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employees basically join trade union based on the benefits that they may gain as members, 
and these benefits may include: economic, social, training, political perks.  But both the trade 
union and agency workers are confronted with a great dilemma of being unionise and being 
members of the trade unions.  He pointed out that:   
“Since the inception of Structural Adjustment Programme and privatization, it has 
always been warfare to organise workers and this has continued to undermine the 
strength of NUPENG.  Several attempts have been made to get the employers of these 
agency workers on the side of the union; however, the union later discovered, that the 
oil MNCs threatens not to renew their contract should they cooperate with the trade 
union. Agency workers are not cooperating either; they are scared of losing their 
livelihood”. 
Apparently, in agreement with the views of NUPENG, PENGASSAN noted that the 
anticipated impact of privatization and restructuring that took place in the industry was 
coordinated to have negative influence on labour movement and employment relationships. 
He emphasised that the government economic policy was known from inception as an anti-
union motive, a deliberate attempt to shrinks union’s membership, increase repression of 
employees and undermine the unions. He noted: the growing replacement of direct labour for 
atypical labour since the inception of privatization has greatly affected their membership and 
power in the workplace. He explained: 
“The typical Nigerian job has always been standard employment without fear of 
dismissal, early retirement or redundancy. The nature of the employment relations is 
work-for-life, as social security is obviously a non-existence aid in Nigeria and the 
only way a citizen can augment for the inadequate distribution of social amenities is 
by having a permanent job, and the denial of this is tantamount to a gloomy outcome”.  
He noted that the continuous shift towards fragmented workforce in which most of the 
indigenous workers have been sentenced to the unprotected secondary “theatre” of the oil 
MNCs labour market, evokes a clear sense of ill-feeling among the employees who seems to 
have the notion that work should be for life. He stated: 
“Loss of membership is definitely loss of income, losing members by extension your 
check-off is likewise affected, and the capacity to fight collectively is weakened.  So 
basically, and far more importantly is loss of membership”.  
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The trade unions are not only accusing the oil MNCs for the growth and deployment of 
agency workers into the core productions areas and the fragmentation of the labour force, but 
also the government has a brunt of their anger for its inability to appropriate adequate 
legislation. The unions argued that the insensitivity of the Nigerian government towards 
workers’ plight paved the way for the management of the oil MNCs to engage in various sorts 
of flexible work arrangements all in a bid to weaken labour movement. They maintained that 
the dehumanization of indigenous workers through unfair labour practices of employers has 
continued unabated in clear violation to the present labour laws, the Nigerian Constitution and 
ILO Conventions ratified by Nigeria. They argued that the fragmented work arrangements in 
the industry are not just a violation of the fundamental rights of workers, but a clear violation 
of the Nigerian labour laws. 
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6.13.  Trade Unions Responses against Agency Labour 
Table 48:  PENGASSAN and NUPENG Responses 
 
When asked why the trade union is resisting the use of agency labour.  PENGASSAN 
declared that the battle against agency labour has been on since 2000. The advent of 
globalisation and by extension privatization brought about job insecurity, membership 
decline, threat to standard of living, increased unemployment, perpetual exploitation, 
repression and above all the sudden dwindling of the traditional form of employment relations 
in the industry to fragmented labour relations, as well as, the increasing usage of agency 
workers in the core production areas, in the name of human capital shortage in the required 
skills and expertise.  He said: 
“The trade unions traditional base is declining; its bargaining power has been 
diminishing due to contemporary work arrangements, since it is all about technology, 
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let the management train their existing employees, they have the capacity of doing 
that. Employees are being reassigned from the organised to the unorganised segment 
where trade unions presence is restricted thereby trying to weaken the strength of the 
union”.   
Giving an account of the aborted plan of the Nigerian government to privatise the Nigerian 
National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) in 2004, he mentioned that this was the first time in 
the history of Nigeria privatization, that the government was compelled to renege their 
decisions as a result of the trade unions agitation, by this act, the government and the whole 
nation gave prominence to the strength of both unions (PENGASSAN and NUPENG). 
In recollection, he reveals that practically every staff of the oil industry was either a member 
of PENGASSAN or NUPENG before privatization in the 1990s, and declared PENGASSAN 
had membership strength then of about 59,000, but experience a sharp decline to 31,296 after 
privatization. Several employees were made redundant in 2004 due to privatization, new 
people were hired directly, but on temporary basis, and these workers were fought for and 
unionised which saw membership to increase to about 36,451. However, in 2005, there was 
an amendment in the labour law, which put a cap on union automatic membership; this further 
stunted the growth of membership. This marked the beginning of steady decline in 
memberships. With this singular act, the union perceived that government, the management of 
the oil MNCs and the employment agencies are not being transparent in their dealings with 
the workers, and noted that excessive powers have been accorded to the management, he 
stated: 
“The corruption and exploitation in the industry is unquantifiable and if the trade 
union does not fight for this, the wealth of the nation will only be in the hands of but 
few, which is already happening”. 
With reference to Gerald’s earlier argument on a signed communique agreement between 
ExxonMobil, trade union, and employment agencies in 2012 to organise agency workers, 
PENGASSAN declared that the trade unions indeed were able to mobilise some of these 
workers, which further increases their membership in 2013. However, as time progresses and 
employers noticed that the conditions of these workers were improving, they came up with 
another strategy of reducing the contract terms. He noted: 
“The management strategy is to deprive new workers from unionization by refusing 
the renewal of contract of the existing workers, thereby hiring new workers on a short-
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term basis. The new workers are compelled to sign an undertaken not to join the 
union. This strategy is a huge smash on the trade unions, more particularly, NUPENG 
the junior workers. We (PENGASSAN) are professional and skilled workers, the 
company will always take these groups of people on board.  However, our present 
grievance is that, these oil MNCs are using their foreign suppliers to hire expatriates 
and few other indigenous workers in the core production areas and more of the agency 
workers”.  
Both NUPENG and PENGASSAN lamented about the deployment of agency workers into 
the core production areas and declared that this is more worrisome.  They mentioned that in 
the past trade unions had accepted the use of temporary workers for some specialised 
activities, but not the influx of these workforce, and expatriates who now occupies senior and 
permanent positions. NUPENG perceived this is directed at degrading labour standard and 
conditions of work.  Although the resistance is not against the use of temporary workers on 
some specialised activities, but, however declared that irrespective of these special skills and 
competence, there is need for training and knowledge transfer.  
 PENGASSAN flaws the assumption of the management on the increasing utilization of 
agency workers as a necessity due to global competition and market dynamics, he resented the 
fact that the use of these workers is not only for competitive advantage but has been 
discovered to be a profit making strategy of the management. 
He alleged that it is a strategy of the management to suppress the trade unions and exploit the 
workforce. The absence of a collective voice to regulate the terms and conditions of agency 
workers implies that employers can fashion their relationship without any restraints. He 
therefore declared that these workers are however powerless to exert control over the type of 
labour they rendered. This indicates the concern for appropriate legislation and institutional 
protection for agency workers.  He stated: 
“The Nigerian Labour Act did not specify the rights of agency workers and most of 
the employers are catching on this clause to externalised their workforce and exploit 
them, they are cheap to use”. 
In summary and from the investigations, it was discovered that the union were not totally 
against the use of agency labour, rather, it is the dimension it has taken and the salient 
involvement of the Federal Government that is causing the agitations. The union observed 
that some of the oil Multinational Companies were awarding labour contracts in ways and 
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manners ostensibly to de-unionise workers and create disaffection and jurisdiction crisis 
among the workforces. PENGASSAN and NUPENG accuses the management of importing 
their foreign brothers to take up temporary-permanent employment contracts who are 
immensely well paid, but find it more beneficial to place indigenous workers on contract 
terms to deny them the benefits attached to their jobs. The union lamented not only for the 
fact that this is impacting on their membership, it has increased the rate of capital flight in the 
country, and renders the workers, who are supposed to be the major beneficiaries, 
impoverished and completely hopeless. 
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6.14.  Trade Unions Responses to the Likely Implication of a Two-Tier Workforce. 
The result from the Matrix Coding Table 49 below shows all the interviewees indicated social 
inequality as the most likely implications of a two-tier workforce. 
Table 49: PENGASSAN and NUPENG Views of the Implications of a Two-tier Workforce 
 
PENGASSAN responding to the question of the likely implications of a two-tier workforce 
reveals the issue of social inequality between indigenous permanent employees and 
expatriates. He noted that there are distinctive margins in the terms and conditions between 
these two workers. Using Shell Nigeria as an example, he revealed that from inception an 
indigenous permanent staff often commenced from a disadvantaged position. He pointed out 
that: 
“An indigenous permanent employee joining the company is hired on job group 7, 
while an expatriate who joins the same company on same day and on same 
qualifications is hired on job group 5 (this is a senior position).  On ratification of 
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appointment after six months, the expatriate is promoted to group 4, while there is no 
promotion for the Nigerian colleague.  The impact of this promotion and injustice is 
very evident and most often this expatriate becomes the manager of the indigenous 
colleague”. 
He alleged that in 2011 there was a memorandum of understanding (MOU) between the 
employers of the oil MNCs, the trade unions and the ministry of labour and employment on 
the issue of employment contracting and suggests implementable solutions to unethical labour 
arrangements in the industry. He alleged that, some employers have refused to implement 
these agreements, notwithstanding that this was an outcome of the negotiation by the tripartite 
body. Unfortunately, many of these employers are strategizing new ways to circumvent this 
agreement. He availed the researcher a copy of the guidelines and stated that: 
“The most worrisome is that, the mechanism set-up by the Ministry of Labour and 
Employment for monitoring and evaluating these guidelines is very weak due to their 
corrupt tendencies”. 
PENGASSAN observed that, when it comes to the management restructuring, it is the 
indigenous employees that are most affected. For instance, in Shell Nigeria, the mass 
redundancy and imposed early retirement that happens towards end of 2014 and early 2015 
caused some unions’ members their jobs and affected more than 2000 employees who are 
mainly permanent workers. He admitted that this act was not devoid of internal politics by 
disclosing that: 
“The management’ deliberately aimed at the most senior employees and trade union 
activists to undermine the union’s strength. This is the various means in which 
management reduced the indigenous permanent workers and fill such positions with 
few expatriates and more of agency workers. Likewise, employees who fail to accept 
their package for early retirement saw their workload increased to unmanageable 
levels to force acceptance or get poor performance appraisal which will be tantamount 
to dismissal or retrenchment”. 
NUPENG also criticised the management of engaging expatriates to work in Nigeria when 
there are more qualified indigenous employees who could do same job.  However, this 
accusation was denied by Debiri (Shell Management) who argued that the allegation was 
wrong, that for Shell Nigeria, they operate radical national policy on expatriates. He declared 
that Shell Nigeria has 4,300 permanent staffs out of which, only 243 are expatriates. The 
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employment system and operations in Shell is very Nigerian with indigenous employees in 
management and supervisory levels. 
In disputing Debiri’s argument, PENGASSAN maintained that the managements of oil MNCs 
lack transparency and marginalised indigenous workers, as well as, the indigenous 
employment agencies. He argued that their mode of operations violates the International 
Labour Organisations standards which states that MNCs should cultivate a non-discriminatory 
employment policies and promote equal job opportunities. He pointed out that:  
“Since 2007, that Shell Nigeria launched “Securing Our Future” (SOFU); the 
management has consistently been operating anti-indigenous managerial strategy.  It is 
the Nigerian workers’ that faces early retirement, redundancy, dismissal and demotion 
from permanent position to contract status, thus impacting negatively on their income 
and consequently affecting standard of living”. 
He noted that in early 2013, PENGASSAN challenged the management of the industry on the 
influx of expatriates; they (management) came up with the claim of the expatriates having the 
required technical capacity for their business development. He claimed that the oil MNCs 
keep hiding under human capacity gaps to bring in their nationals under various guises into 
the Nigerian oil industry. He further expresses his displeasure over management relegating the 
trade unions, and not been involved on issues that concerns recruitments. He said: 
“The trade unions are not carried along when decisions critical as hiring, particularly 
that of the expatriates is taken.  As far as the union is concerned, it is always a 
unilateral decision, and this disposition does not just augur well for management and 
labour relationship, rather, it is creating the rule of division among the rank and file of 
the labour force. Union representatives should be consulted as social partners on 
critical issues as recruitment to make their input”. 
In summary, trade union indicated social inequality among the employees with particular 
reference to the expatriate workers. From union responses, it can be perceived to be rather a 
hegemonic struggle between super-ordinated and subordinated groups. Indicatively this is the 
way and manner management appropriates positions and resources in the Nigerian oil 
industry.  Their argument stems from the power and benefits accorded to the expatriates due 
to their technical expertise as argued by the management and the indigenous workers who 
benefits little and bears the social and environmental cost of slavery. However, in an attempt 
to whittle down the abuse of power and position allegation, the management had earlier 
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argued that the use of capital innovative machinery demands high wage employment only for 
few workers with the technological skills and little employment for others. 
6.15.  Trade Unions Responses to Labour-Management Relationship 
Table 50: PENGASSAN and NUPENG Responses 
 
From the Matrix Table 50 above it indicates lack of trust and conflictual interests as the 
underpinning factors of labour – management relationships according to the trade union. 
PENGASSAN affirms that in any work organisation, labour-management relationship is 
characterised by conflict of interests. He emphasized that in this industry conflict is 
unavoidable; however, there must always be ways to enact peace for work activities, growth 
and development purposes. 
He maintained that management had already gained upper hand in the running operations of 
the industry by virtue of their capital, which is why they always want to suppress labour as the 
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representative voice of the workers not to be heard. Most of their decisions are unilateral, 
thereby not recognising trade union as a social partner. He stated for example: 
“Market viability on the part of the management creates constant pressure to minimise 
cost and this leads to the pressure to either retrenched workers or cuts on benefits.  In 
either way it is to the workers’ disadvantage. Unions are not always consulted at the 
decision level on issues of downsizing and restructuring. What labour demands in a 
process such as this, is a mutual consensus and compromise from both parties, but in 
the absence of this, then the managements are calling for war”. 
He opined that consensus agreements enable social partners to transcend and work through 
their conflictual interests towards successful accomplishments of the company’s goals and 
objectives.  
PENGASSAN noted that trade unions are oftentimes neglected in the issues that concerns 
employees. He emphasized the concern for a joint- consultation in workplace on matters of 
common interest which is not items for negotiation. The lack of involvement tends to portray 
the limited power associated for being a representative and a social partner.  He declared, 
when the unions resolved to challenge some of management decisions, it always ends as 
unpleasant situation just because the policies of the companies are rarely open to negotiation. 
He emphasised that: 
“A true partnership wherein no particular group or a class is greater than the other and 
where distribution of mutual interests exists from a base of equality is the way the 
management of a robust employment relationship should be between the management 
and trade unions/employees”. 
However, he declared this is not the case here going by what we experience in the industry. 
This is why we are fighting for the enactment of the Petroleum Industry Bill (PIB). He handed 
the researcher a prototype of the PIB. 
Moses asserts that labour/management relationship in this industry is characterised with 
distrust and dislike which often leads to antagonistic behaviour. He alleged that the most 
important aspect of labour and management relationship is the existence of trust between the 
partners and these relationships can better be understood in the context of collective 
bargaining and negotiation of collective agreement. He emphasized, that several collective 
agreements have not resulted in productive outcome either because the process is defaulted or 
agreements reached are not implemented. In a situation as this where one of the partners 
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reneged in fulfilling its part of agreements, or seek other means to circumvent such 
agreements then such partner is asking for unrest. He said: 
“Trust is very significant in any relationship and if this is lacking in labour and 
management relationship then it will be very difficult to have a harmonious working 
environment”. 
 In affirmation, PENGASSAN maintained that the oil MNCs are perceived to have been 
indulging in the approach of keeping the trade unions in the dark.   He said: 
“If workers are to be hired, the unions need to be consulted of who is going to be 
hired, why, what are their requirements and their positions within the company. But 
the inclusion of the trade union on issues of engagement is not acknowledged, and 
neither the constitution nor the labour law deem it necessary for trade unions to be 
involved in employment decisions”.  
Further declaring his resentment on the hiring of expatriates as one of the major concern in 
the realm of employment relations, he argues that this poses genuine questions concerning the 
ethical obligations of the oil MNCs, since before and after Nigeria independence. The nation 
has witnessed expatriates occupying sensitive positions, and this raises the issue of 
legitimacy. He noted for years, training and technical education have been seen as a key to 
provision of skills for the workforce in order to improve the technical and technological skills 
required in the industry but this has never been the case. He said: 
“The management of the oil MNCs are making so much profit from Nigeria, rather 
than use part of the profits for more technical innovative skills acquisitions for more 
sustainable employment opportunities for the workforce, they rather embark on human 
capital flight by bringing in expatriates”.   
PENGASSAN accuses the management of deliberately hiding under human capital gaps to 
undermine the law, by hiring expatriates and denying the indigenous employees of their 
rights.  Stressing further, he noted that the oil MNCs reneges on the agreement of partnering 
with the Nigerian Universities to promote collaboration in research and technology transfer to 
the Nigerians; rather, they extend financial support and research grant to their home 
universities.  Regrettably he said:  
“Some of these practices they are doing in Nigeria will not happen in their home 
country.  They are only taking advantage of the sluggish nature of the Nation’s 
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economy, the weak legislation and the high rate of unemployment to deny Nigerians 
of their rights”.   
 From the on-going there seems to be love lost between labour and management in the 
Nigerian oil industry. Majority of the interviewees declared conflictual interests and distrust 
as the bane of the erstwhile harmonious workplace. 
 
6.16.  Trade Union Responses to Causes of Exacerbating Conflicts 
The Matrix Table 51 below indicates anti-labour practices as the most outstanding factor 
amongst others as the causes of exacerbating conflicts in the industry. 
Table 51: PENGASSAN and NUPENG Responses 
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All the interviewees attested to anti-labour practices as the major cause of conflicts in the 
Nigerian oil industry, which often leads to strike actions. NUPENG noted that there are 
extensive anti-labour practices going on in the industry, particularly on the issue of 
casualization. He said: 
“The struggle to put an end to casualization started in 2002, and this has since been the 
employment practices by this industry. In October 21, 2014 the union gave ultimatum 
to the government to get the oil MNCs (ExxonMobil, Chevron, Addax and Petrobras) 
to correct the anomaly of the growing trend of agency labour, and their continued 
victimization of union leaders, who were sacked unjustly simply for fighting against 
casualization. The government however failed to implement these within the stipulated 
period, then PENGASSAN and NUPENG embark on 7 days long strike action and 
this hit a gas supply to Nigeria’s power plants and its neighboring country Ghana, 
which gets its gas through the West African Pipeline”.  
In a similar affirmation PENGASSAN declared that in August 2014 PENGASSAN and 
NUPENG petitioned the Federal Government of Nigeria over alleged anti-labour practices by 
AGIP Oil and Plantgeria Company trying to frustrate their members and undermine Nigeria’s 
local content act. They alleged that problem started when AGIP Oil subcontracted parts of its 
operations to Plantgeria company, by transferring a project previously handled by another 
company ARCO Petrolchemical whose current workers where supposedly to be rolled over to 
Plantgeria Company as a result of their skills, but Plantgeria declared that if they are to accept 
these workers they would have to sign an undertaking with them not to join any union and 
60% of the workers will be disposed by AGIP’s directive. He lamented that: 
“We have lost members to sack, victimisation and humiliation contrary to labour best 
practices. With this antecedent of Plantgeria Company and AGIP, it indicates how 
desperate the oil MNCs and their employment agencies are committed in enslaving 
Nigerians by constantly denying them the right to association, this, the trade union 
was prepared to resist at all cost”. 
PENGASSAN asserts that there are several unresolved issues of concern going on in the 
industry that frequently leads to conflicts, for example, in 2012, during the general strike 
action, agency workers were utilised, and this is against labour ethics. He expressed that in the 
last few years, many union members have lost their jobs while many job functions have been 
migrated from permanent to more fragmented employments.   
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He stated: 
“NUPENG gave 14 days’ ultimatum to the Government either resolves the issue of 
anti-labour practices affecting Chevron agency workers, or the trade union would 
embark on a nation-wide strike. PENGASSAN is solidly supporting NUPENG on this. 
He stated that there is an on-going retrenchment of NUPENG’s members in Chevron. 
Chevron and its labour intermediaries in a bid to deplete the numerical strength of 
NUPENG, embarked on massive retirements of its members without following due 
process, this the union would resist at all cost”. 
He likewise lamented, that presently the major issue confronting the trade union is 
divestment. Oil MNCs are selling off their onshore and shallow water assets and this is 
greatly impacting on jobs of our members, as many of our members are being released to the 
labour market. This is why job security is the most significant to union now. Besides the issue 
of divestment, another more worrisome is the outsourcing of some key departments by oil 
MNCs out of Nigeria on the ground of insecurity. He said for example: 
“Shell has outsourced key departments such as IT to Hague, ExxonMobil to Fairfax 
and Austin, Texas-United Sates, and Chevron to Houston also in Texas, while others, 
Total to Paris, and AGIP to Milan. This resulted in job migration to those places and 
job loss for Nigerians. Likewise, Shell, Chevron, Agip, Total and Addax are divesting 
offshore blocks off to stakeholders in Nigeria”. 
He bemoaned that union greatest concern is the loss of jobs and the increasing utilization of 
agency workers from the divestment process. He emphasized on the instability and 
uncertainty strongly affecting the industry and declared that PENGASSAN has lost 40% of its 
members to various divestment purposes since 2012 and lamented that the figure may be on 
the increase with the new intention by Chevron to release 55% of its workforce to the labour 
market.  
PENGASSAN lamented that the government’s inadequacies to provide appropriate guidelines 
for divestment activities, gave room for massive retrenchment and flexible work arrangements 
without opportunity for protective conditions of employment for her citizens and the trade 
unions. 
All the interviewees have similar responses; NUPENG who likewise attributed the causes of 
the exacerbating conflicts to anti-labour practices lamented that the worst unfair labour 
practices by oil MNCs in Nigeria, specifically referring to Shell, Chevron and Agip, accusing 
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them of inflicting inhuman treatment on indigenous employees. He particularly mentioned 
Agip Nigeria of retrenching 93 agency workers that had worked between 25 and 35 years, 
without benefits. He further accuses Chevron of not only converting workers from permanent 
employment contracts to agency labour but also denying them the right to collective 
bargaining agreements and right to unionization. He declared, as this interview is going on 
now, Agip agency workers in Port Harcourt are on strike, and threatened if the situation is not 
resolved as soon as possible, it would degenerate into a nationwide strike. He bemoaned: 
“The unions can no longer fold their arms and watch their fellow Nigerians to be 
enslaved in their own nation. In 2013 Chevron Nigeria restructured its operations, 
retired and rolled-over some of the direct temporary staff who had put-in more than 20 
years of service to employment agencies, thereby denying them their constitutional 
rights. This implies that their jobs are no longer protected, and can be sacked at any 
given time without notice”. 
He maintained that, union grievance is basically the anti-labour activities perpetuated by these 
oil MNCs, imagined “Chevron paying a month basic salary as severance benefit to the retired 
workers”. 
In summary, PENGASSAN and NUPENG reported that several anti-labour practices are 
going on in the Nigerian oil industry. They fault the Ministry of Labour and the Federal 
Government in collaborating with the oil MNCs to disrespect the constitutional rights of the 
workers to join union and bargain collectively. Another key trend highlighted was the 
degeneration of permanent employment contracts and the increasing use of agency labour. 
The respondents argued that the shift away from permanent employment is an attempt to 
replace unionised employees with non-unionised workers, who are rarely protected under any 
legislative law or coverage.  
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6.17.  Conclusion on Trade Unions Findings 
Generally, PENGASSAN and NUPENG were discovered not to be against the use of agency 
labour, rather, is the deployment of this workforce into the core areas- supposedly the 
permanent employees’ positions. The growth of agency workers in the industry is sure 
boosting profits for management; hence, their growth in the industry threatens the existence of 
the permanent employees. 
In addition, the shrinking nature of unions’ membership is perceived to necessitate the 
agitations.  Particularly, their quest to recruit the fragmented workforce and the challenge 
encountered in the process. However, it was also noted, that the decline in membership has 
not in any way affected their militancy position in the fight against enslavement of the 
workforce, as both unions still considers strike actions as a weapon of last resort. 
Notwithstanding the trade unions individual identities, it was discovered that they stand a 
common ground on issues, such as expatriates taking over the jobs of qualified Nigerians, 
early retirement, arbitrary dismissal, increasingly usage of agency workers, the use of agency 
workers as buffer and government corroborative stance with the management.  It is noted 
whenever the issue of mutual welfare arises both unions removes their artificial barriers built 
by the separatist piece of constitution to fight a common cause. Their commitment is to 
protect and defend job security of the permanent workforce which is paramount and cannot be 
sacrificed. 
Despite the different forces that the trade unions have to fight, one undisputable fact is that, 
they have however survived the onslaught and remain standing. 
Lastly, not only do the findings in Chapter 5 and 6 help to broaden the understanding of 
management rationale for the increasing utilization of agency labour and trade unions 
challenges, but also gave insight into the relationships that exist among the social actors and 
the existing structures that underpins their operations. 
 
This study reinforces the argument, underlying the importance of investigating the problem of 
agency labour and the interplay between workplace actors.  In advancing this argument, the 
next section presents findings from agency workers, and two of the employment agencies. 
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6.18.  AGENCY WORKERS RESPONSES 
6.18.1. Findings  
In order to unravel the underpinning arguments between the management and the trade unions 
on the issue of agency workers’ rights to unionizations, two basic questions were asked to 
decipher the contradictory responses. The first question was whether agency workers have the 
right to unionization, and the second question was related to wage and benefits. 
Table 52: Profile of Non-Standard Workers 
No. Designation Shell ExxonMobil Chevron Total 
1 HR Official  
(Support Staff) 
1 1 1 3 
2 Welcome Team 
(Contract Staff) 
1 1 1 3 
3 Logistics Units 
(Contract Staff) 
1 1 - 2 
4 Engineer 
 (Service Staff) 
1 1 1 3 
5 Account officer 
(Contract Staff) 
1 1 - 2 
 TOTAL 5 5 3 13 
 
Out of the 13 respondents, 9 of them claimed to have been working for the oil industry for 
over 7 years, while the rest 4 alleged to have been in employment as agency workers for 
between 5 and 2 years respectively. 
They were asked the right to unionization? Particularly those working for ExxonMobil were 
asked if they were aware of the communique signed by management, trade unions and their 
employers on the right to unionization. 
6.18.2.  ExxonMobil 
As shocking as it sounds, the respondents queries the need to join the trade unions, they 
generally believed identifying with the trade union will threaten their livelihood, which is 
their jobs.  One of the agency workers from Mobil declared: 
“Forget that communique, a good number of us, will not participate in trade unionism, reason 
being that management will not openly declare don’t join union, but if you are wise and still 
need your job, better face your work and forget about union”. 
A member of the welcome team from Shell declared, I should join trade union and expose 
myself to employer’s attack. I am only, but a contract staff, and there is no assurance that 
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trade union can permanent my contract, rather my association with union would only put me 
in trouble”. 
The fear of losing one’s job and the assumption of not getting any benefits for being a union 
member is a major concern for many agency workers, and this has contributed as to why a 
considerable number of them lose hope in the capability of the trade union. An engineer from 
Mobil said, 
“I am not interested in being a member because majority of us do not get our contracts 
renewed, so there is nothing they can do for me, because the contract terms are very clear. So, 
the fact that I am lucky to have my contract renewed is not to the glory of any trade union but 
God”. 
An Account officer from Mobil, declared: “trade unions have no case; they are more concern 
about their dues – everyone was ready to embark on strike action when there was a breach on 
the renewal of collective agreement, only for the union to agree on certain terms with the 
management”.   
6.18.3. Shell 
An engineer from Shell maintains that, “I don’t attend union’s meeting, because they are not 
interested in what concerns me, nobody listens to me – they only want to use us. I will gain 
nothing, because they belong to a different class, why I belong to another class. If the 
company is retrenching today, I and my colleagues would be the first group to go, while the 
unions (permanent workers) will be rejoicing, they just want to use us – not because they have 
our interest at heart that they want us to join union” 
Another respondent from Shell declared, “there is no benefit joining the trade union, we are 
dispensable at will, sometimes we are fired and later re-hired through same agency or another. 
There are few favoured workers whose contracts get renewed intermittently, while many are 
less fortunate”. 
6.18.4. Chevron 
Another worker from Chevron Human Resource department viewed it exclusively from the 
monetary perspective, she declared: “what is the excess of joining the union as an agency 
worker, as a union member, I would be required to pay due on monthly basis, and my contract 
is only for five years and I have been told it could end before the five years, so you see, it can 
end anytime, and there is no guarantee of renewal. Let’s even assumed the contract will end in 
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five years, and renewed again, it is as good as starting all over again, because I will be made 
to sign a new contract, as some of my colleagues have experienced. Which means all the dues 
I had paid would be a thing of the past. Please, tell me, where is my gain? Yet my employer is 
very hostile towards trade unionism, so, why would I want to put myself in his black list”. 
A member of the welcome team from Chevron who happens to be an engineer by profession, 
and found himself in the welcome team due to lack of job has this to say, 
“I am an engineer, a graduate of second class, but here I found myself as welcome officer in 
Chevron. What other options do I have, having sought for employment in my profession 
without success? Then when I got this, although not a permanent job, I immediately accepted 
it. To a great extent the wage is relatively better compared to what my colleagues in the public 
sector earn, and you want me to go and join union for what”? 
Findings revealed that some of the agency workers considered their wages to be good in 
relative to what is prevalent in the public and other sectors, hence, do not see the need to join 
the union. However, there are some workers who disagreed with their wages by comparing 
their output with that of the employees on permanent employment contracts who earns higher 
pay and benefits, as claimed by one of the account officers from Shell, who stated that: 
“I am not pleased with what I earn, compared to my colleagues on permanent employment 
contracts; some of them do not have the educational and professional qualifications that I 
possess, yet are highly paid than myself. Of course, I agreed that when you compared my 
wage as an agency worker in the industry with what is paid in other industries in Nigeria, I 
should be grateful, but you know how mentally agonising it is when you are deprived of your 
worth”. 
The account officer is not alone on this agonizing state, as it appears the oil multinational 
companies use agency workers for costs advantage. Another support worker from the logistics 
department of Shell declared, “How can I be happy with my earning, when I compared my 
take-home to that of my colleagues on full-time employment, we are in the same office, doing 
the same job, and ended up going home with different pay, I am talking of a wide margin. We 
don’t earn pension allowance; lacks free medical services; not privilege for car loan, or 
housing benefit and many more benefits just like the permanent employees. If I make a simple 
comparison between my colleagues on permanent employment contracts and those of us on 
triangular employment contracts, the disparity is substantial, agency workers’ earnings only 
about 55% of the average monthly salary of regular workers. What can be more agonizing and 
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depressing”? This discrepancy is in affirmation with Eun, (2012:86-87); and Forde and Slater 
(2005) arguments in addressing employment agencies wages, it was observed to be on 
average of 68% to that of the employees on standard employment contracts. 
 
He further lamented that “the management of these oil multinational companies cannot claim 
the inability to pay us agency workers what they pay the full-time employees or accord us 
full-time positions. After all we know how much money they are making, and we see how the 
expatriates and executives among the indigenous employees live large and travel with their 
families. Some of them we know their homes, where they live, it shows the affluence they 
possess. They are taking advantage of the fact that agency workers are voiceless and the 
labour regulation that is supposed to protect us condemned us the more. The trade unions 
cannot do much for us because it is beyond them”. With a legal framework that has 
determined to restrain the power of trade unions against the backdrop of high unemployment 
rate, the unions had not particularly been powerful forces in bargaining wages, for agency 
workers. 
 
 Although the claim of lack of benefit was denied by one of the employment agency, who 
claimed for example, that overtime pay is embedded in agency workers’ wages. Also, 
ExxonMobil made it compulsory for employment agency to offer medical services and 
pension scheme for agency workers. To do the contrary is putting their contracts with the oil 
MNCs at risk, because the workers discuss and work directly with the oil company. Of 
course, the benefit may not be compared with the permanent employees, I believed that is 
understandable. 
With this conflicting statement in view, the researcher confronted the HR officer of 
ExxonMobil whether or not they are entitled to benefits, the officer stated, “Yes we are told of 
medical services, but I think it is a way of cutting our wages. For example, my employer 
deducts #15,000 ($94) monthly for medicals, neither I nor any members of my family have 
been sick. As a matter of fact, few colleagues of mine who have visited the medical centre 
claimed poor services as they were given just pain killers, that you can just buy over the 
counter. I would rather prefer no deduction from my wages and take care of myself and 
family when ill. 
It is apparent there is a medical facility provided by ExxonMobil employment agency for their 
workers, which differs from the medical facility offered for ExxonMobil permanent 
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employees; however, evidence suggests that the workers are not satisfied with the services 
provided. 
6.19. Summary of Agency Workers Findings 
The agency workers interviewed from Shell, ExxonMobil, and Chevron, shows lack of 
interest in joining the trade unions on the ground of keeping their jobs, which is their means 
of sustenance. They likewise indicated the inability of trade unions to help them, since the law 
of the land did not recognise them. Also, for the fact that they cannot gain immediate dividend 
for being union members due to their unstable jobs, indicates their lack of interest in 
unionization. 
 Workers generally join the trade unions for the benefits that may accrue to them; these 
benefits include economic, social, educational and political benefits. However, in Shell, and 
Chevron Nigeria, agency workers are overtly deprived from being members of PENGASSAN 
and NUPENG. Although, agency workers from ExxonMobil are not overtly restrained from 
joining the trade unions, but covertly shows they are not permitted to join union. 
Findings also revealed a considerable proportion of income disparity between agency workers 
and the permanent workforce, taken into account, the benefits accrued to permanent 
employees, which suggest a wide margin in their take-home pay at the end of every year. 
There is no doubt, that the remarkable differences in earnings between the permanent 
employees and agency workers, would certainly aggravates negative feelings or interests 
towards trade unionism.  
Beside the issues of trade unionism, low wages, and benefits; job insecurity and lack of legal 
framework appeared to be the major concerns of agency workers. Although, ExxonMobil 
shows concern for the wellbeing of agency workers. For the fact that ExxonMobil shows little 
concern for the workers wellbeing, needs to be applauded irrespective of the monthly 
deduction from workers’ salaries. While on the other hand, nothing of this nature from Shell 
and Chevron Nigeria. On this note, this thesis looks at the roles and operations of some of the 
employments agencies. 
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6.20.  Discussions with the Employment Agencies 
When the needed cooperation from the employment firms was not forthcoming, the researcher 
got access to two employments agencies (Accenture and Kimberly Ryan) through a 
recommendation from ExxonMobil and Shell senior HR personnel. The only disadvantage of 
opting for this strategy is that, the employment agencies were recommended by personnel 
from the oil industry and there is this logical tendency to recommend companies with good 
relationship and this might reflect trade unions bias within the companies.  
More so, there is this inclination that the oil personnel likely picked companies that are 
considered to be well organized and compliant with the conditions of the oil MNCs with 
respect to the communique signed by the tripartite parties in relation to the unionization of 
agency workers. Likewise, having hand-picked companies may contradict the aspects of 
having random responses from a list of participants. Nevertheless, below are the findings from 
the little time granted the researcher? 
6.20.1  Findings 
Employment agencies are very crucial in the labour market of the Nigerian oil industry; this is 
because the three cases under investigation are increasingly utilizing them to their advantage. 
The relationships between the oil companies and the employment agencies are purely 
contractual to supply temporary workers.  The contract of work is a formal arrangement 
whereby the employment agencies undertake the responsibility of the oil companies. The 
work contract enables the agencies to provide its workers with employment contracts so that 
they can enter the oil companies’ premises and perform tasks assigned. Thus, the oil 
companies attempt to avoid an employer’s responsibilities or employment relationship with 
the temporary workers.  
When asked the managers of the two employment firms (Accenture and Kimberly Ryan) what 
are their relationships with the oil MNCs, and how their agencies obtained contract awards to 
supply workers? 
Accenture manager responded: the company has a formal contractual business working 
relationships with most of the oil MNCs. However, I will only deal with you on the basis of 
the oil company who directed you here. He indicates that, it is a total misconception for 
anybody to deduce that oil multinational companies find it easy using temporary workers to 
execute their jobs. The process of engaging an employment agency with any of the oil 
companies is not so direct, and usually costly. The oil companies are required by law to 
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advertise for labour intermediaries and screen them before the contracts could be awarded. 
This is no way economical, and when you look at what is contracted out, it ranges from the 
supply of workers for the very technical field of core activities to the peripheral activities”. 
Although the manager attested that a number of contracts have been awarded to some ethnic 
elites with the prevalence of nepotism, without necessarily going through the formal 
procedures. The two managers with the two firms alleged that the process of bidding for 
contract in these companies is highly subjective competition. The manager from Kimberly 
Ryan argues that, biddings can be won or lost before the management even places such jobs in 
the market for a bidding exercise; a lot depends on how highly influential your contact is. If 
the shareholders of the agency are influential, the chances of getting the contract would be 
high. The bidding exercise sometimes is nothing but an attempt to fulfil all procedures. The 
management would have already decided on the employment firm to award such contracts. 
So, your company supplies technical workers. Are they recruited nationally or internationally? 
The manager from Accenture, declares in affirmative, the circumstances determine whether to 
source for the technical personnel locally or internationally. However, in a process whereby 
the agency is unable to find a qualified person locally, they go international, and it also 
depends on the urgency of the need. When you have good working relationships with these oil 
MNCs, they trust the employment agencies to supply them suitable hands, and this we strive 
to accomplish in order to secure our contract. Understand there are lots of competitions out 
there, there are certain traditions and standard we have to adhered, a little compromise here 
and there to secure our contracts. In this era of economy of scale, there are predators that take 
advantage of workers in order to secure contracts and denied workers of their legal rights. 
This indicatively suggests that the employment agencies are compelled to compete with other 
competitors who are willing to oblige to every dictate of the oil multinational companies. This 
implies for an employment agency to be assured of contract renewal, such an agency must 
play by the rules and satisfy the management. This shows the trend towards intensified 
competition in the temporary employment industry, and how the oil MNCs takes the 
advantage to shop around for the best deal of commodifying labour power. Interestingly, 
employments agencies also find themselves in similar situations just like their workers 
whereby they are discarded if they refused to play the rule and dictates of the oil MNCs. 
The response on this issue from Kimberly Ryan was dispirited; the manager was reluctant to 
express his dissatisfaction with the tight control over their business by the management of oil 
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MNCs, and the limited opportunities for increasing their income. Nevertheless, interviews 
with the two employment agencies reveal some frustration, he said, “in the past, we had 
autonomy, but presently, there is no autonomy any more, operations of the agency are dictated 
and decided by the oil MNCs. Because of this, we cannot help but have issues in our 
relationships with the workers”. 
6.20.2.   Playing the Agenda of the Oil MNCs 
In playing the agenda of the oil MNCs, the employment agencies assert some measures of 
control in hiring workers, according to the oil MNCs dictates. For example, when it is 
necessary to hire new workers, employment agencies utilise a shrewder selection process, and 
screen for the tendency of potential worker to trade unionism, and their personal loyalty to 
both the oil companies and their employers. This recruitment approach is perceived as 
management/employers strategy to prevent the young workers from participating in trade 
union activity. 
This suggests a considerable hostility towards trade unionism. It also implies that, the 
measures taken by management to forestall agency workers from unionization– includes 
pressurising the employment agencies to play to their terms, hence, the negative response or 
lack of interest exhibited by agency workers towards unionism. 
 
The experience with Kimberly Ryan was not in any way different from the Accenture Group. 
When confronted with the issue of the firm threats to fire workers, should they join trade 
union or participate in union activities, an official of the firm stated unequivocally: 
 
“It is not right to say the firm threatens any worker with dismissal or contract renewal 
if they join or participate in unionism. Every contract of employment, regardless of its 
terms, permanent or temporary, have explicit employment contract terms specifying 
expectations, and so it is, with every other employment contracts. But in honesty, why 
should a temporary worker such as the ones in our employ join the trade unions? Their 
employment is temporary and the trade union will only collect their dues without the 
workers getting anything in return. Remember trade union is not a cooperative society 
where they can get their money back”. 
 
Indicatively, and from the foregoing, the utilization of agency workers by the management of 
oil MNCs in Nigeria has cause and effect on PENGASSAN and NUPENG. However, for the 
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sake of an effective and holistic account, the next chapter begins by triangulating the key 
findings of this study, summarising and drawing together data from all the stratified domains. 
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Chapter 7:    Discussion 
 
7. Introduction 
 
This chapter presents an integrated discussion of the quantitative and qualitative findings in 
light of the literature. The research reported in this study was undertaken with the aim of 
investigating management rationale for the growth of agency labour in the Nigerian oil 
industry and trade unions challenges. In order to achieve the aim of the study a mixed-
methods research study was adopted, which involved a combination of quantitative and 
qualitative research methods. The quantitative survey and qualitative research were conducted 
simultaneously. Data was collected from management, trade unions, agency workers, and 
employment agency. Also a supplementary data was collected from ministry of labour and 
employment, as well as, the community leaders from the oil producing communities.  
This study was guided by a number of research objectives, and the findings from the 
quantitative and qualitative research were presented separately. The quantitative study was 
conducted so as to unravel the generative mechanism that gave rise to the growth and 
increasing utilization of agency workers in the oil industry, and the subsequent deployment of 
this group of workers into the core production areas.  
The qualitative study explored the rationale for the increasingly utilization of agency workers 
and unions challenges from management perspective of the case study companies, and 
stakeholders, such as, trade unions, agency workers, employment firms and other 
supplementary interviews from ministry of labour and employment, and community leaders. 
It highlighted the ways in which the employment practices of the companies were perceived 
to have affected employment relationships and labour movement. It also identified specific 
actions trade unions embarked in passing their grievances across to the management in order 
to influence management policies and practices. Finally, it identified employment agency 
involvement in promoting two-tier workforce, and the imposition of the case study 
companies’ autonomy over the firm’s operations, thereby breeding disgruntled labour force 
who do not see themselves as workers. 
In keeping with the broad aim of presenting a holistic account from the point of view of 
management and stakeholders, this discussion is divided into subsections with focus on 
different aspects of the phenomenon under investigation. As mentioned earlier in chapter 1, 
previous studies have tended to focus on different aspects of flexible work arrangements and 
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the problems workers face (Williams, 2017); casualization and the constitutional rights of 
workers (Danesi, 2010), and have focused relatively on low wages, terms and conditions of 
work (Fajana, 2005; Kalejaiye, 2009). This study has attempted to tie these different aspects 
of the growth of agency labour together to provide a more holistic and richer narrative, as the 
utilization of agency workers has well grown beyond the peripheral into the core activities of 
the case study companies. The main findings are hereby recapitulated. 
This section presents the major findings from data analysis carried out in Chapter 5 and 6. 
Results suggests that Shell, Exxon Mobil and Chevron Nigeria operate a two-tier workforce. 
The internal labours of these companies are segmented into the core and peripheral categories 
which are similar to Atkinson Flexible Model (Atkinson, 1984). However, some peripheral 
workers were discovered to also work in the core production process and not strictly legal 
employees of these three oil MNCs. These categories of workers are of various employment 
contracts terms such as, service, contract, and support staff. They are generically used here 
and refer as agency workers, since they have more or less the same conditions of work which 
depicts a job subject to austere employment conditions.  
 
The deployment of diverse workforce and integrated work process involving permanent 
employees and agency workers have impacted organisational structure and labour relations in 
various forms. It is important to note that the new work arrangements and reconfigured work 
organisation have emerged in the course of promoting organisational flexibility. Agency 
workers are located within the work teams of standard employees as a matter of course, and as 
the former are hired to carry out similar duties to those of the latter, the demarcation of tasks 
has largely disappeared in recent years. These changes have led to close working relationships 
between standard employees and agency workers. 
 
 In this regard, this research found that the functions of agency workers have changed 
dramatically as these workers have been progressively utilized in core activities of the oil 
MNCs. Such changes are frequently resisted by the trade unions, who believed this strategy 
negatively impact on their membership; as a result, trade unions are seen to act in ways that 
are ostensibly against the interests of the management, thereby segregating them from the 
labour process. Based on this perception, conflict in the Nigerian oil industry is not just as a 
result of the antagonistic actions of the trade unions or unseemly management policies and 
practices. Nor is it simply the product of competing interests in the workplace, rather, it is the 
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outcome of the very nature of employers’ exploitative motives and the unequal distributions 
of proceeds from joint production (Abbot, 2006: 195). 
 
7.2. Key Findings:  
 
7.2.1. Rationale for the Growth of Agency Labour 
 
The three oil MNCs indicated, that the utilization of agency labour is an attempt to implement 
flexible work processes to compete more efficiently in the competitive market, both to remain 
afloat and improve their positions. The implementation of these processes necessitated a 
restructuring in the nature of work production and technological changes that affect 
management ability to control the work process and the work itself.  
 
By restructuring management can oversee, manage, and inspect work performance. These 
mechanisms, though costly, but allow higher hierarchy of managerial control and manage the 
entire organization. The availability of this organizational tool for the efficient acquisition of 
labour power presents management with an important choice: either to integrate workers 
within the organization or to keep them at a distance outside the organisation. But more 
importantly, is the cutting of organisational costs in order to meet the unpredictable 
challenges and maintain a competitive advantage. In this regard, the oil industry operates like 
an organism that goes through some metamorphosis, and in the phase of adverse market 
challenges, management embarks on HR policies that are beneficial to the organisations. Key 
amongst such policies is the organisational restructuring to cope with the market environment. 
On this note, this chapter discusses the restructuring processes, and other HR policies 
adopted.  
 
7.2.2.   Restructuring 
Restructuring is the key word in the phase of business challenges (Forde and Slater, 2010). 
This implies the dissecting of production processes into various segments, to determine the 
areas that are critical (core) to the business, and by this act, some workers whose functions 
where considered non critical were relinquished of their jobs.  Hence, the use of agency 
workers with the required company’s specific skills, and others for areas considered non-
critical (periphery). Agency workers are not direct hires of the oil companies, this strategy 
contributes immensely in reducing uncertainties for management, and helps to swiftly reacts 
to the fluctuations in demands, thus reducing labour costs. Houseman et al. (2003:107) 
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observed that the economic benefits can be greatly high when product markets fluctuate 
because management are relieved from the tensions of raising wages to pay permanent 
employees. 
Empirical findings revealed that the use of agency labour has way gone beyond the peripheral 
into the core production units of these companies. The three oil MNCs have kept a good 
number of these workers in the core production areas on same status for years, without any 
advancement, and outside the purview of collective bargaining. To Smith, (2016), this is 
super-exploitation. Agency workers were found to work alongside with standard employees, 
in most cases, they are engaged to carry out same tasks as those on standard employment 
contracts. Thus, the distinction of tasks has largely disappeared in this dispensation of 
industrialist mode of production. 
Barron et al. (1991) with other labour market segmentation scholars argued that these 
categories of workers should be acknowledged as employees of the principal companies, 
particularly when they have put-in quite a number of years. This study argued, that mobility 
from the secondary to primary segment in the Nigerian oil industry internal labour market is 
often limited. This brings to agreements with (EuroCiett, 2012; Barron et al. 1991) who 
argued that workers in triangular employment contracts are bedevilled by the fact that 
movement across the frontiers of these segments are confined. This study therefore, rejects the 
functional flexible model, since there are basically no differences in terms of job functions 
perform by standard employees and agency workers in the core production areas of the case 
study companies. 
Likewise, it is evident agency workers are made immediately redundant when the workload 
reduces during economic crisis or once the projects they are hired expires. Since the oil 
MNCs do not have any contractual relationship with these workers, they can be flexibly sent 
back to their employers when their services are no longer needed. Discontinuing with their 
services does not depend on legally binding transformation periods and do not produce costs 
like severance payments. This cost effective redundancy provides an incentive for the 
management of the oil MNCs to engage these workers. This study argues that flexible firm 
model is aimed at finding ways to improve production output of business from management 
perspective, without due regards for workers.  
Agency workers are confronted with poor working conditions, financial and job insecurities, 
as well as, the absence of institutional protection. This condition signified two key effects. 
Firstly, this dispensation of flexible work arrangements has positioned the management of the 
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oil MNCs in a strong bargaining position and minimalised the degree of economic uncertainty 
they are confronted. This has a reversed correlation with the degree of uncertainty and 
bargaining position of the labour force. Secondly, the use of agency labour has altered the 
way and manner jobs are performed through innovative technology by concentrating the 
knowledge of work in the hands employers. These technical evolutions are inherent to the 
logic of contemporary forms of industrialist mode of production, which are believed to be the 
result of the ever-present necessity for employers to find new ways to employ labour more 
efficiently and economically. Hence, flexible work arrangements.  
 
7.2.3. Work Flexibility 
Work flexibility appears to be another significant factor that influences the decision of 
management of the oil MNCs in the use of agency labour. Lawton and Michaels (2001, p. 91) 
anticipated that the world market would advance to the level at which only companies with 
the most flexible frameworks would remain afloat in the heat of the competition.  It was also 
suggested by Corbett, (2008: 5494) and Atkinson, (1984) that strategic flexibility should be 
the very approach to an unstable market environment. Thus, findings show that workforce 
flexibility improves the opportunity for the three oil MNCs to achieve competitive advantage 
of providing solutions to the business instabilities, pressures of changing market demands and 
technology (Rubery, et al. 2010: 9; Weil, 2009; Hall, 2006: 163; Remery et al. 2002: 480).  
However, flexibility theorists who were quick to generalise the need for companies to adopt 
flexible firm model through restructuring, fails to address the limitations that would originates 
as a result of the adoption and implementations. The implications originating from 
restructuring are very rarely considered in the flexibility debate; consequently, the 
implementation of flexible labour relations has both direct and indirect effects on the 
mechanism through which workers are managed.  
 
Firstly, finding a balance between employment, wage and work process flexibility necessitate 
changes in labour regulation which may require the imposition of beneficial constraints on 
economic actors, particularly the workers, thus giving rise to a different type of regulation. 
For example, the Nigerian Labour Law 1974, before the reform in 2005, deduction and 
contributions were made from workers upon registration, which made them automatic 
members upon recruitment and compulsory recognition of trade unions by employers and 
members.  
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However, the 2005 reform saw to the abolishment of that automatic trade union membership 
and employer’s recognition, this grossly contributes to the rise of work flexibility in the 
Nigerian oil industry. This Amendment gave government and employers legal powers to 
destroy all the manifestation of democratic expression of the working class to struggle to 
protect their economic and political interests in the face of relentless assaults on these 
interests by the owners of the means of production who dominates the Nigerian society.  
 
This is what Hyman termed “regulated deregulation” involving the replacement of direct and 
uniform substantive legal regulation by alternative regulatory regimes under procedures that 
still rest ultimately on legal sanction (Hyman, 1994:18). That is, the real world of the Nigerian 
legislation, one which is overwhelmingly dominated by partial and piecemeal flexibilization 
(Esping-Anderson and Regini, 2000:2). Thus movement towards increased reliance on labour 
flexibility reflect the reconfiguration of the bureaucratic organisation of production. 
 
Furthermore, the growth of numerical flexibility in the form of incorporation of agency 
workers can be attributed to three factors: firstly, agency labour is cheap to hire with the help 
of numerous and aggressive employment agencies, with great networks sprawling all over the 
globe. The complexities of this contractual work relationships between the oil MNCs and the 
employment agencies reflects the commodification of labour, in which labour force are 
simply no more objects of the process of production, but rather commodities controlled by the 
employers. These workers are usually not entitled to any benefits that are accrued to 
permanent employees. Hence, this study argues that management are able to respond to 
unpredictable fluctuations in production without having to bear the costs of engaging large, 
permanent workforce, and in an attempt to avoid non-wage benefits, management easily 
escape bearing the costs of severance pay, pension and provident fund, as well as, medical aid 
schemes. 
 
Secondly, agency workers are found to exert themselves in performing their tasks. This is 
because they are at risks of being dismissed at any time, they perform any job assigned. This 
is not the case with the permanent employees – they can refuse to perform certain tasks for 
health and safety purposes. This is because standard employees have rights that are granted 
and protected by labour legislation, and are more likely to be unionised, therefore, cannot 
easily be disposed as compared to agency workers. This study suggests that the essential 
driving force behind work flexibility is profit maximization at the expense of the labour force.  
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Thirdly, agency workers are easily obtainable as buffer during strike actions. Management do 
not want any restrictions on their ability to plan for, and manage business continuity during 
strike action. However, this step is much criticised by trade unions, thereby, legally 
challenging the management of the Nigerian oil industry and their employment agencies. In 
few cases, management of Shell Nigeria has used periods of long-drawn out strikes as 
opportunities to reward “perceived” deserving loyal agency workers by moving them across 
the boundary of peripheral to core segment. Although this seldom happens, just rare 
opportunities for vertical mobility, which made agency employment a dead end, job (Booth et 
al. 2002). This study suggests that the changing nature of employment necessitates reform in 
the codes of regulation, which is presently not aligning with reality. The demand for the 
legislature is to bring national policy in line with today’s workplace reality. Although, this 
might not be total remedy for all identifies excesses and extremities of the use of agency 
labour, but a reform may helpfully address some concerns. 
Finally, as the move towards flexible labour force becomes more established with pronounced 
labour fragmentation and job insecurity, the oil multinational companies have inadvertently 
increased resentment among workers and host communities. This purposive management 
flexible or segmentation strategy incentivised by economic motives provides a scope for 
internal work conflicts, which often spill over to the host communities. These communities 
are also agitating for permanent positions for their wards. The dissatisfaction of trade unions, 
and workers, as well as, the oil communities with flexible work arrangements has led to 
increased tension in the work environment. 
 
The management interest lies in accumulating profit derived from exploiting labour, and 
minimising costs of engagements. The management dominant positions serve them in both 
ventures (Smith, 2016). This study argues that the more economic pressing need of the 
workers, the unequal balance of power between capital and labour can lead to social 
unfairness (Smith, 2016: 32-34). Particularly with regard to agency workers, this can be 
exacerbated by the fact that these workers to a large extent remains outside the purview of the 
regulatory framework governing labour in Nigeria and this consequently paved way for 
labour fragmentation (Fajana, 2005; Burgess, et al. 2004; Davidov, 2004). 
 
7.2.4. Labour Fragmentation 
The management of the oil MNCs objected to labour fragmentation as a means of exploiting 
the unprotected workers, nor to maximise profit, rather, they argued that the nature of project 
at any given period determines the employment contract terms. Although these workers are 
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fractionalized into what is known as contract, service and support staff (see table 1) with 
short-term contracts that does not have explicit or implicit contract terms, hence the dilemmas 
of the trade unions to mobilise and effectively represent this vulnerable group of workers.  
 
The employment system in the oil industry is complex and complicated (see Figure 1); the 
employment agencies are contracted by the oil MNCs to supply workers when the need arises, 
however, in the process where an employments agency cannot easily find a suitable qualified 
worker according to the oil company skills specification, they liaise with any of their affiliated 
networks to supply such, it could be indigenous or expatriates. While on the other hand, the 
oil MNCs outsource some services to sub-contractors directly, who brings in their workers 
and supervises them. Figure 2 below gives a visual understanding of the fragmented workers 
in the Nigerian oil industry. 
Figure 2: Triangular and Fragmented Employment Relationships 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Given the various forms of employment status of agency workers, the conditions under which 
such workers engaged in their work are so diverse, for instance, the grey position on Figure 2 
above, and some of the fixed-term workers reflects workers hired by servicing companies 
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who have been on long-term employment contracts by virtue of their intermittent contract 
renewal. Their functions extend into the core productions areas of Shell, ExxonMobil and 
Chevron; this practice confirms Huws, (2012) and Sanchez, et al. (2007) arguments of what 
began as a measures of improving profitability and equity market by reducing labour and 
organizational costs has now escalated to professional’s positions (Forde and Slater, 2005). 
This shift in the work arrangements sure threatens the existence of the permanent workforce, 
and trade unions in general. 
 
These fragmented agency workers are expunged from the oil MNCs collective agreements 
and imposed on private employment agencies where trade union organisation is highly 
prohibited. Consequently, the traditional base of the trade union is rapidly shrinking, and its 
strength of unity is abating as a result of the relocation of workers from the organised 
category to unorganised zone where unionism is fiercely denied. Hence the direct core 
employees and the third party hires came to be managed by different institutional realities. 
 
 Besides the precarious work effects on trade unionism, there are no explicit guidelines within 
the Nigerian labour law to define who the worker and employer are in the context of 
triangular employment relationships. This consequently leaves agency workers vulnerable in 
terms of statutory rights, as neither the oil MNCs nor employers are willing to undertake 
employers’ responsibilities. For instance, findings discovered that in the case of any industrial 
accident, expenses incurred are deducted from the worker’s wages. In most cases, these 
underprivileged workers find that their right to take either the oil MNCs or the employer to 
court is in fact illusive, because the court often finds triangular employment relationships as a 
difficult task to manage. This study therefore argues that it is not practicable for this exploited 
waged workers to be involved in legal battles, besides the lack of financial means and time, to 
have justice with such employers in the Nigerian context is a mere wasting of precious time. 
 
This study therefore argues that the existing labour law in Nigeria may not be adequate to 
prohibit the ongoing exploitation of the labour force. Therefore, suggest that the deficits in the 
labour law can be mitigated through the identification of gaps, and provides a framework just 
as some other emerging economies did such as China and Indonesian (He, B and Xie, Y. 
2012: 426) to prevent both the management and the employment agencies using these flaws to 
their own advantages. Given the low-salary levels, high rate of inflation and the lack of 
national unemployment insurance scheme, legal backings becomes all the more necessary for 
the welfare of the exploited and already vulnerable workers. 
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Therefore, a practicable legal right for these groups of workers to collective representation is 
needed, regardless of the legal status of the employment contracts. Thus, the emphatic 
disposition of Atkinson labour rigidities in this context is rather questioned (Atkinson, 1984), 
because majority of workers in these three oil MNCs are not protected under the labour law. 
Rather the findings align with dual labour market segmentation theories, which anticipates 
that workers’ progression within the market will be hindered due to rigidities surrounding the 
process of contracts of employment rather than the rigidities in labour regulations (Doeringer 
and Piore, 1971; Edwards, 1979; Piore and Sabel, 1984).  
 
The reality is that, the Nigerian labour market is, to a great extent not regulated. The labour 
law applies only to less than 30 per cent of the workforce. With regards to these 30 per cent, 
there is need to overhaul the regulatory framework in a way that it is not lopsided, but in a 
manner that is friendly towards both industry and labour. The power elites of Nigeria most 
importantly, the law makers, should be concern about provision of minimum decent working 
conditions and social security to the great numbers of workers not covered by the present 
labour law. 
 
Finally, labour fragmentation is already working to the advantage of the oil industrial 
capitalists. Fragmented workforce implies less chances of unionisation, thereby creating 
opportunities for management and employers to exploit the workers with minimal resistance. 
The trade unions reflect an awareness of this divisive strategy, as management ploy to divide 
the workers and have bureaucratic control in the workplace. This study argues that if trade 
union, as the custodian of worker’s rights do not actively engage with such process of 
opposition, they are likely to experience a sharp decline in membership, as agency workers 
seems to be more favoured in terms of employment over permanent employments contracts, 
but not in terms of working conditions.  
Empirical findings revealed that most of the agency workers engaged in extra and sometimes 
conflicting interests outside of normal work environment. This is simply because these 
categories of workers find it difficult to survive in the precarious situation they found 
themselves. Some of them have to augment their wages with side business, while some goes 
as far as involving in criminality. In retrospective, the management of Exxon-Mobil argues 
that workers earn according to their qualifications and skills, basically on monthly basis with 
the exception of few with other payments arrangements. The following section elaborates 
more on wages, and the differential terms and conditions of work among the two-tier 
workforce in relation to the three cases under investigations. 
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7.3. Differential Terms and Conditions of a Two-tier Workforce  
The fragmentation of the workforce into various, separate and sometimes even competing or 
at least non-cooperating groups, is essentially boosting management power and the rule of the 
capital. This is because the Nigerian oil industry operates a two-tier workforce, the standard 
workers, though few in number are direct hires of the oil MNCs. They enjoy good pay, better 
working conditions, work stability and career advancement. They are members of 
PENGANSAN and NUPENG. 
 Under these umbrellas, they enjoy higher bargaining power and their work conditions are 
institutionalised through the machinery of collective bargaining. In unity they have found 
strength to effectively challenge unfavourable employment conditions. While on the other 
hand, the fragmented agency workers are hired through employment agencies under less 
favourable employment conditions.  They are not obliged the rights of freedom to association 
like their colleague on standard employment contracts, thus lacks that bargaining power to 
bargain collectively. The management and the employment agencies bargains and reached 
agreements on their terms and conditions of work, which is explicitly or implicitly 
communicated to them. Although a great number of these workers are verbally informed 
about the conditions under which they are hired without any written statement which is an 
infringement of Section 7 of the Labour Act of 1974, which stipulates the following: 
7.3.1. Contracts of Employment  
 
Section 7 (1) stated that not later than three months after the beginning of a worker's period of 
employment with an employer, the employer shall give to the worker a written statement 
specifying- 
  
(i) The name of the employer or group of employers, and where appropriate, of the 
undertaking by which the worker is employed; 
  
(ii) The name and address of the worker and the place and date of his engagement; 
  
(iii) The nature of the employment; 
  
(iv) If the contract is for a fixed term, the date when the contract expires; 
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(v) the appropriate period of notice to be given by the party wishing to terminate the contract, 
due regard being had to section 11 of this Act; 
  
(vi). the rates of wages and method of calculation thereof and the manner and periodicity of 
payment of wages. 
 
The above stipulations indicate that workers no matter their status, whether standard or non-
standard have the right to explicit written contracts of employment. An employer is therefore, 
obligated by this act to automatically give a written contract of employment to workers which 
covers each of the particulars mentioned in the above sub-sections. But this has not been the 
case with the employers, majority of the workers see their contracts terminated by the end of 
three months and rehired, or new workers are brought on-board. This deliberate avoidance 
and none compliance, employers do with impunity since it is anticipated that the government 
will not act, after all, the government equally abuses workers’ rights in the public sector. For 
example, all the Doctors in the public service of Lagos State Government that embarked on 
strike actions in March, 2012 were dismissed 5 days into the strike, after all avenue of law 
were sought including warning strike and no response from the government. However, this is 
outside the jurisdiction of this research. 
The variation in the form of employment contracts and remuneration rates has traditionally 
been one of the most important means of allocating the workers into different categories, 
thereby creating monetary and status hierarchies. The traditional distinction of the salaried 
from the waged worker, is that the former is paid on a monthly and the latter on a weekly 
basis, although, this is still presently operational, but has lost most of its descriptive 
significance in the discussion of labour force segmentation. Presently, the traditional waged 
yet low paid jobs, such as, cleaners, are not the exceptions any more, today’s capitalist mode 
of production has created some weekly paid occupations involving relatively rare skills and 
are quite highly remunerated – such as, technical and specialised skills. 
 
The difference in remuneration rates produces and reproduces hierarchies not only between, 
but also, within occupations. Skilled workers today are not merely a small specialised social 
segment enjoying a privileged status within salaried/waged labour. But there are also many 
others, who are more or less treated as a commodity in the same production process, 
employed in the best case scenario on a grey position (they are neither permanent nor non-
permanent) with low monthly salaries.  
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 As far as the case companies are concerned, profit accumulation is the basic essentiality that 
underpins their mode of production. Therefore, profit maximization hinges on a social 
relation, which necessitates the legal separation of the producers from the commodities that 
they produce through their contracts of employment. In this regard, the production of 
commodities for profitable exchange, automatically involves the reproduction of the legal, 
moral and social framework which ensures that labour power exist as a commodity (Marx, 
1975). This implies that markets cannot survive distinctively of the social context within 
which they are embedded. This study argues that there is always an inherent connection 
between economic and extra-economic institutions, therefore cannot reasonably look at the 
production sphere (economic) without possibly discussing the sociological realm - mentioning 
the networks of extra-economic relations which underpins capital accumulation. 
 
The precarious work system in the three oil MNCs is a situation in which the wages of agency 
workers are entirely determination by market forces.  While the salaries of permanent 
employees are decided at, although, by purely social institutions outside of the market such 
as, through collective bargaining agreement or by legislation, therefore, study consider the 
wage in this context as being determined by extra-economic factors. A common financial 
value determined unilaterally by market forces. 
The denial to collective bargaining, the erosion of constitutional rights, and the invasion on 
terms and conditions of employment, all of these characterised the infringement of the 
economic, and the logic of commodification that goes with it into the extra-economic realm. 
This study argues that increase in the precarious work arrangement is an attempt to 
increasingly commodify labour power. Importantly, this implies that management can treat 
labour as an object of production process, disposable, replaceable and driven not by social 
rather by market institutions. Therefore, agency labour is not simply an economic problem as 
neo-liberal advocates makes the world to believed, rather, it is basically an issue of social 
forces, which imperatively involves in practice, an imbalance of power in the capitalist 
society (Jessop, 2001). 
 
Conceptualizing this argument, this study presents a comparative wage analysis between the 
different workforces in three oil MNCs see Chapter 5, Tables 11A-11D (see pages 140-143), 
for the differences in wages. The over-saturated labour market, and the evolving employment 
practices in the industry, has left the fragmented agency workers with no bargaining power 
over the issues of wages and benefits. This set their salary scale at the bottom with little or no 
chance of incremental progression as a result of employments interruption. While on the other 
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hand, their employers are able to maintain wages at low rate due to the high demand for 
employment.  
 
The income earned by agency workers represents only a fraction of the value they collectively 
generate. The surplus is accumulated by the management as profit, and rent to government, 
this is in affirmation to Marx’s democratic critique of the owners of the means of production, 
who unilaterally dispossessed the surplus value created by the extra labour of the workers, as 
enunciated in chapter 2.  
As lamented by one of the agency worker from the human resource department of Chevron: 
“The oil MNCs cannot claim any inability to pay us contract staff what they pay permanent 
staff or even hire us on a permanent basis. After all, we know how much money they are 
making, and we see how the expatriates and executives among the indigenous ones live large 
and travel frequently with their family. They are capitalising on the fact that we are voiceless 
and the employment law here is weak”. To augment this point, Solidarity Centre (2010:19) 
reveals that Shell petroleum in its production alone pays $3.5 billion in fees and taxes to the 
Nigerian government, by this revelation, it is undeniable to say that the oil MNCs cannot not 
afford to hire workers on permanent employment contracts, rather, the drive for surplus 
accumulation brought into effect nothing but labour repression and super-exploitative 
tendencies (Smith, 2016).  
 
 Despite these differences, the standard employees are also placed at a disadvantaged position. 
For example, the increasingly use of agency workers is likely to increase their 
supervisory/training responsibilities without increase in their salaries (Broschak and Davis-
Blake, 2006: 37; Davis-Blake, 2003: 476). Although, the researcher was not privileged to gain 
access to expatriates’ earnings, this was considered as classified information, however, was 
privileged to understand that most of them have relatively rare skills (specialised technical 
functions), and are highly remunerated. 
 
The costs benefit of maintaining a great number of agency workers on the lowest wage scale 
was spelt out by Hindi, (2005), who maintained that labour contracting saved enormously for 
organisations. For example, assuming there are 65 per cent of agency workers, or more, 
working in a company, that means 65 per cent or more of these workers earn low wages. Then 
assumes these workers were on permanent employment contract their wages would evolve. So 
there you have 65 per cent who remains on the lowest wage without moving, despite the long 
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working hours and overtime in generating surplus value for the owners of the means of 
production. This Smith (2016) termed super-exploitation. 
 
7.3.2. Working Hours 
There are no standardized working hours for the standard employees who work for 9hrs daily. 
Their resumption time varies, some resumes 8am-5pm; 7am-4pm; 9am-6pm; besides those on 
the rig who are on shift basis. However, agency workers work for not less than 12 hours on 
daily basis. This is because in most cases a whole shift of overtime work is imposed on them 
without a commeasurable pay. The HR senior management interviewed, claims that the 
organisations bargains overtime rates with the employment agencies and pay them 
accordingly. The labour intermediaries interviewed maintained that overtime pay is embedded 
in the workers’ wages. Although, trade unions refuted this, and alleged that majority of these 
workers’ wages are not detailed to know how they are paid. 
7.3.3.   Annual Holiday  
 
Except for permanent staff who has their terms and conditions of work explicitly documented 
and know when due for holidays, this cannot be said of the agency workers. The oil MNCs 
arranges with the employment agencies for workers that have put-in 12 calendar months to be 
granted seven days’ holiday. Although these workers preferred to remain on duty than 
accepting the holiday, explanation for such decision is that, they are not paid for the period of 
holiday nor receives any holiday pay. A crucial fear is that, once agreed to proceed on 
holiday, the tendency of them being replaced is petrifying, thus, agency workers are not keen 
on going on holidays for the fear of replacement and loss of subsistence. 
 
7.3.4. Dismissal 
 
In the issue of dismissal or redundancy, agency workers are made redundant without any 
compensation nor benefits. Notice of termination is an issue between the oil MNCs and their 
employers. The employers are privileged to know when and why such exercise would take 
place by the oil MNCs. The workers are accordingly informed. Likewise, where the intention 
is initiated by either the employers, the oil MNCs are accordingly informed. But most often, 
agency workers are fired by their employers without notice or when they suspect militancy 
activities. 
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7.3.5. Industrial Accident 
 
In the case of industrial accident or sudden health issue at the workplace the oil companies 
take care of the wounded agency worker. Thereafter, whatever costs incurred, the expense is 
deducted from the employers confers, who subsequently deducts the amount from the wages 
of the wounded worker. In effect, neither the oil companies nor the employers are liable for 
the medical care arising from the workplace accident. 
 
Findings discovered that a great number of agency workers have fallen victims to severe 
industrial accidents without any form of help from their employers. According to trade union 
representative, employment agencies who supplies more than twelve workers are under 
obligation to insure their workers under the Health Insurance Scheme. The reason for the 
Scheme is to protect workers in the event of industrial accidents, should in case of any 
disability attracting workman compensation; the insurance company will be responsible for 
the payment. However, it was revealed that most Insurance Policies in the possession of the 
employment agencies were not genuine. Even in circumstances when industrial accident 
attracts disability compensation, before the injury healed for an assessment to be made, the 
worker is fired and ultimately suffered the disability unaided by both the oil MNC and the 
employer. 
 
7.3.6.   Work Insecurity 
 
Work insecurity is an overarching characteristic of agency work, and this has consequential 
impacts on how agency workers experience life on the line. Within the three oil MNCs, 
empirical findings reveal that the intermittent ending of agency workers is very well obvious 
due to turnover rate. Although the unions resounded of a massive redundancy in 2012, that 
affected both the standard employees and agency workers through a process of restructuring 
production process. They emphasized on the instability and uncertainty strongly affecting the 
oil industry and declared that PENGASSAN has lost about 40% of its members to various 
divestment and restructuring purposes since 2012 and lamented that the figure may be on the 
increase with the new intention by Chevron to release 55% of its workforce to the labour 
market due to crude oil crisis. 
 
PENGASSAN and NUPENG maintained that the most worrisome is the outsourcing of some 
key departments by oil MNCs out of Nigeria on the premise of insecurity. He said for 
example: “Shell has outsourced key departments such as IT to Hague, ExxonMobil to Fairfax 
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and Austin- Texas-United Sates, and Chevron to Houston also in Texas, while others, Total to 
Paris, and AGIP to Milan. This resulted in job migration to those places and job loss for 
Nigerians. Likewise, Shell, Chevron, Agip, Total and Addax are divesting offshore blocks off 
to stakeholders in Nigeria”. 
 
The representatives lamented that unions’ greatest concern is the loss of jobs and the increase 
in flexible work arrangements from the divestment process. The insecurity of employment 
experienced by permanent work force creates a de facto hierarchy between standard 
employees and agency workers, based not only on the concern of job loss, but also on the 
externalization of the internal labour market in the management drive for profit maximization. 
Whilst management argued that permanent employees should feel more secure where agency 
workers are present, because as long as there are agency workers, their employment is 
secured. But where there are none, there is no buffer, if there are issues, such as what the oil 
industry is experiencing right now; it will definitely be the permanent employees who are hit. 
Therefore, the existence of two-tiered workforce can create a collusion of perceived interests 
among the social forces of production.  Standard employees may, inadvertently or not, find 
themselves in a state of confusion in relations to agency workers, which can either work for, 
or against them. While the relegation and the exploitation of agency workers was a significant 
factor in defining the experience of work, one which is rooted in their insecure status. It is 
generally acknowledged that agency labour has been used in circumstances that not only 
stretch the interpretation of the legal framework, but also in instances that are clearly beyond 
the legal framework. The following section presents legal framework as it applies to agency 
workers in the Nigerian oil industry. 
7.4. Regulatory Framework 
This study investigated the regulatory framework in connection to agency labour, and in 
relation to trade union responses. Findings revealed that there is lack of explicit regulations 
on the terms and conditions of a worker on triangular employment relationships. The 
Nigerian labour law does not define what agency labour is and does not provide a legal 
framework for the regulation of conditions of these new work arrangements (Danesi, 2012). 
Section 7 (1) only specifies that workers should not be hired for more than three months 
without regularisation of such employment contracts. This implies, after three months all 
workers, including those on non-standard employment must be regularised by the employers 
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by giving an explicitly written terms and conditions of employment. However, this seldom 
happens to agency workers. 
The deficiency in the Labour Law concerning legal categorization of workers is one of the 
propelling factors for the growth of agency labour in the Nigerian oil industry. Only one class 
of worker is defined in the Labour Law, and that is a worker is: “Any person who has entered 
into or works under a contract with an employer, whether the contract is for manual labour or 
clerical work or is expressed or implied or oral or written, and whether it is a contract of 
service or a contract personally to execute any work or labour” (Labour Act, 1974, 
Oshintokunbo, 2015: 414). 
This description does not recognised workers in triangular employment relationships. This 
can be interpreted to the fact that the present labour law was enacted in 1974 when flexible 
work arrangement was unknown to the industrial relations environment. Unfortunately, this 
labour law has since not been reviewed to address the present actualities in the workplace, 
which further encourages management to increasingly utilised agency workers (Antonio and 
Jahn, 2009; De Cuyper, et al.  2008); the consequences of this however, is that agency 
workers are outside the purview of the protection and rights accorded to permanent 
employees under the labour law. This form of work arrangement is therefore characterised by 
lack of right to organise and collective bargaining. Findings found that this legal context also 
influences trade unions conservative decisions in organising agency workers as would later 
been seen as the discussion progresses. 
Besides the Nigerian Labour Act, the operations of these three oil MNCs, with regard to 
employment relationships are regulated and mediated by other structures and institutions 
which are located within the framework of labour management system. The Federal Ministry 
of Labour and Employment particularly the department of Trade Union Services and 
Industrial Relations Department, including the Industrial Arbitration Panel and Inspectorate 
are institutional framework for ensuring compliance with laws and standards, as well as, 
protecting workers' rights. It is the essential duty of these institutions to enforce labour 
legislation and to offer solutions to the various and complex problems that arises in the 
workplace. 
The inspectorate department is the central department of the Ministry, which is saddled with 
the task of ensuring compliance with both national and international labour regulations 
concerning terms and conditions of employment, amongst others. However, this monitoring 
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mechanism has failed in its duties, due to lack of resources to execute its functions. For 
example, empirical findings revealed, that there is a shortage of staff to carry out functions 
nationwide. This development has, in turn weaken the ability of the structure to deliver even 
when there is the desire. By the department estimation, about 275 inspectors are needed for 
effective inspection, but they only have 102 inspectors as the time of this interview. A 
representative of PENGASSAN claimed that there are only seven industry inspectors in the 
whole of South-South region, which is far inadequate to monitor the operations of the oil 
companies alone.  
In addition, the Ministry complains of paltry budgetary allocations which likewise contribute 
to the lack of efficiency on their part, for instance, utility vehicles to expedite inspection 
visits to the workplaces are not readily available.  The respondent likewise stated, at the time 
of this interview, that there was not a single utility vehicle for inspectorate department, yet 85 
utility vehicles are required to expedite inspection visits to workplaces.   
Undoubtedly this deposition by the Nigerian government should not be surprising, since the 
implementation of neoliberal agenda, it is of the obvious the government is more involved in 
safeguarding the interest of capital. Hence the paltry budgetary allocation to the ministry to 
ineffectively monitored the scheming activities of oil MNCs and their labour suppliers.   This 
tendency has been evidently exhibited by the way and manner the government easily 
concedes to the coercive strategies of foreign investors who practically insisted on lowering 
labour standards as one of the prerequisites for investing locally. The oil MNCs are well-
known for this. In the true sense, they dare not try the employment practices they implement 
in Nigeria in their countries of origin.  
This is unlike what is obtainable in other nations, for example, in the United Kingdom (UK), 
agency workers are protected under the Transfer of Undertakings Protection of Employment 
(TUPE), irrespective of TUPE criticism on the basis of limited coverage and narrow effects; 
at least TUPE forms the basis for these workers’ terms of employment and collective rights.  
With TUPE as a regulatory body in the UK, trade unions were more likely to adopt inclusive 
strategies towards agency workers without much confrontation from employers, and with less 
effort to forge common interests between workers on different employment contracts. In this 
regard, this study suggests that the higher the level of legal protection for terms and 
conditions of employment contracts, and collective rights of agency workers, the more 
actively PENGASSAN and NUPENG would have to mobilised and represent them. 
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Although it could be argued that legal regulations, such as TUPE, may weaken PENGASSAN 
and NUPENG efforts to mobilize agency workers since it could be possible that such 
mechanism may discouraged agency workers from joining the union. This is because the 
workers may hold-on to the fact that they are protected by these legal provisions without 
being a union member (Baccaro et al. 2003). In reality, this is not the truth, trade unions in the 
UK have utilised these legal provisions as privilege to draw agency workers by monitoring 
compliance with the law, which has led to more inclusive union strategies.  
This study argued that the inefficiencies from the Ministry of labour and employment, due to 
lack of resources, and the lack of explicit legal mechanisms in the Nigerian labour law 
regulating labour relations, hinders agency workers from being given legal protection in terms 
of both individual and collective rights. This is why Marx’s theory conceptualises State 
regulations as beneficial constraints, this means, an institution which supposedly function as a 
facilitator turn out acting as a constraint in achieving certain goals (Iyayi, 2009).  
The fact is that government does not have any intention of protecting workers from the 
overindulgence of oil MNCs. It would appear that at best government is insensitive to 
workers plight and this explains why it finds it difficult to deal with infringement of statutory 
provisions. For example, the refusal of management to honour collective agreements, rather 
for government/ministry of labour to compel management to honour the terms of agreement, 
they would rather persuade the trade unions to consider renegotiations, violations are treated 
with levity.  
These motives of the government are essentially meant to justify the ideological position of 
management for unilateralism in managing employment relations. The management of oil 
MNCs are taking due advantage of the weak institutional and regulatory frameworks at the 
expense of the workers. As long as this circumstance continues, workers’ rights would 
continuously be curtailed. The point is that, management do not want to share the control of 
employment relations with neither the trade unions nor workers. That is why they are 
financially frustrating every possible means for workers’ respite, thus bringing in new 
managerial ideologies to justify their positions, which discourages the mobilization and 
representation of workers. This act encourages individualism instead of collectivism; of 
course, this contemporary trend in employment relations is nothing other than the situation 
that has been promoted by the dominance of neo-liberalism as the framework of economic 
policies universally. 
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This is the core of human resource management (HRM) approach of employment relations. 
As a labour strategy, the preference for individualism underpins HR approach, rather than 
collectivism.  This philosophical hostility towards collectivism and trade union movement has 
engendered HR to be regarded as anti-union, a Trojan horse for trade union avoidance 
(Bratton and Gold, 2015:498). As stated by union representatives in the course of the 
fieldwork, at the very point of recruitment, agency workers are made to sign a dismissal letter 
(known as “yellow-dog”) once caught to be involved in militancy, and made to believe that 
trade unionism is inconsequential to their employment renewal, with total commitment to 
their employers, they are reassured of contract renewals. This is against the backdrop that, 
without the trade union or any collective platform to address common interests, workers 
become more vulnerable, while management takes total control of the workforce and 
employment relationship. 
The State power to enforce labour law effectively has decline and the continued ideological 
hegemony of neoliberalism has greatly weakened the capacity of the government to enforce 
labour law rights as it concerns agency labour (volscho, 2012; Edwards, 2002). The next 
section sheds more light on the role of the Nigeria State in promoting agency labour as argued 
by the trade unions. 
7.5. The State  
In retrospect to chapter 2 and 3 non-standard work became an item in the Nigerian labour 
market in the late 1980s when the government implemented the neoliberal policy 
recommended by World Bank, and International Monetary Fund (IMF). A major outcome of 
this strategy led to privatization and redundancy in the public sector which resulted to high 
unemployment rate. The private sector that was to be empowered by the government 
neoliberal policies to engage these laid-off employees could not, consequently, a great 
number of the employees were subjected to the status of non-standard employment contracts 
which means they lacks the privilege to bargain and had to succumb to terms and conditions 
of contract, and subjected to arbitrary disengagement, since there is no legal framework that 
regulates their terms and conditions of labour. 
 Although PENGASSAN and NUPENG fiercely opposed this move, but was never a success, 
it met with stringent counter-attack which saw some of the unions leaders imprisoned and 
fired.  Hence, unions’ perception of the Nigerian government, who initiated and encouraged 
the use of agency labour, which they perceived as means for higher rent, capital accumulation 
and de-unionization of the labour force. This counter-attack also contributed to some unions 
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branches to adopt conservative approach with focus on existing members’ interests rather than 
extending their representational coverage. 
 It is obvious that the implementation of neoliberal policies in the Nigerian oil industry results 
in deplorable socio-economic situations that have created antagonistic behaviour among the 
actors in the employment relations. Unfortunately, these policies, such as deregulation has 
seen a great number of workers outside the purview of collective bargaining which has 
contributed to high level of workers’ exploitation. This study argues that the growing trend of 
agency labour is not only about cost reduction, but can also be perceived as a factor in the 
wider neoliberal process of disintegrating the working class and the retreat of collectivist and 
solidaristic values which are labour movement identities (Paleologos, 2006; Howell, 2005; 
Hyman, 1999).  This act has forced trade unions to take a defensive position, by trying to 
protect as much as possible the core of the workforce who are still their members, rather than 
trying to extend organisation to fragmented labour force. The next section elaborates more on 
trade unions opposition and responses to the organisation of agency workers.  
 
7.6. Trade Union Opposition to Agency Labour 
The growth of agency workers and by extension into the core production units has come with 
considerable changes in employment relationships in the three oil MNCs. The previous 
sections demonstrated some of the changes that occurred in work organisations. Along with 
the aspects of restructuring and flexible work arrangements, workers’ representation also 
constituted an important part of the changes that have occurred in the context of the changing 
market environment. This section is thus devoted to examining unions’ oppositions and how 
the increasing usage of agency labour has affected workers’ representation. 
 
Trade union plays a significant role in regulating the labour market and employment 
relationships. Given the hierarchical structure of organisations and their asymmetrical 
management – labour relations, union representation and collective bargaining have been used 
to effectively narrow the power gap in the workplace.  Workers who are affiliated to trade 
unions are in a better position to negotiate pay and working conditions compared to those who 
attempt to bargain with employers on individual basis.  
 
Findings revealed that the organisational role of the trade unions and their capacity to 
represent the workforce has been weakened in the case study companies, due to the subjection 
of internal labour market to secondary market, increasing utilization of agency workers, 
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workers’ fragmentation, forced retirement of the permanent employees, and lack of regulatory 
framework. The impacts of these phenomena are reflected in the declining nature of union 
membership, decline in the popularity of collective bargaining, lack of recognition of trade 
unions by management and employers, and the abating trade union influence in 
socioeconomic policy formulation.  
 
Although the trade unions have been largely unsuccessful in their attempts to check the 
growth of agency workers, especially as it has grown beyond the peripheral into the core 
areas, and not able to function efficiently in their representation of these workers, has been a 
major concern for the unions. One of the major reasons for these shortcomings lies in the form 
that trade unions have taken. 
 
The most interesting finding was that, besides management and employers’ hostility towards 
the representation of agency workers, there was indifference in mobilization resolution 
between unions’ leaders and the represented on recruiting agency workers, and the agency 
workers themselves. Such a representation gap reflects the resultant tension between the 
coexisting internalised and externalised employment relations.  
Although, some branches of PENGASSAN had made proactive conscious efforts to include 
agency workers into their fold, while others remain passive. Before now, NUPENG was never 
really disposed to include these workers nor accepts them as colleagues, rather, NUPENG 
utterly opposed the use of agency labour. Accordingly, this study uncovers the importance of 
an integrated approach between institutional and non-institutional factors (see Figure 11 
below). These factors are very significant to help explains why the typical responses of 
PENGASSAN and NUPENG. It is therefore important to elaborate more on some of the 
identified institutional factors that have contributed to the challenges that unions have to deal 
with in the face of increased work flexibility and labour fragmentation in the workplace. 
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Figure 11: Institutional and Non-institutional Factors 
Source: Itegboje, (2018) 
Empirical evidence suggests that different institutional arrangements in the Nigerian oil 
industry played a significant role in shaping employment relationships. The implementation 
of neoliberal policies and  the reform of the Nigerian Labour Law were interpreted by the 
trade unions to have caused massive unemployment, and promote precarious work 
arrangements, thereby undermining trade unionism. These institutional factors were argued to 
have given excessive powers to the management of oil MNCs, hence, both the management 
and the employment agencies were criticised for not been transparent in their dealings with 
the workers. However, the compelling findings of this study indicates that institutional factors  
alone, were not sufficient enough to explain unions responses and the decline in membership. 
This study derived some factors other than institutions from the fieldwork such as the role of 
union leadership, indifference of the represented to accept agency workers and the 
unwillingness of agency workers to join the unions. All these factors have played important 
role in the declining nature of trade union memberships. For example, PENGASSAN has 
approximately 20,000 paid up members - a decline of approximately 50 per cent members 
Institutional Factors 
-Neoliberal Policies 
- Nigerian Labour Law 
- Collective Bargaining 
- Employment Agency 
Policies 
Non-Institutional 
Factors 
- Union Leadership 
- Indefference of the 
represented  
 - Trade unions structures 
- The unwillingness of 
agency workers  
Negative impact on 
union membership 
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since 2005. Same applies to NUPENG. The unions have experienced many fluctuations in 
membership. These fluctuations are attributed to the fact that on a daily basis, the oil MNCs 
are constantly restructuring to make their companies as flexible as possible, in order to cut 
costs and to effectively responds to production and market demands. 
 The table below shows the changes of unions’ memberships in the Nigerian oil industry, as at 
the time of the fieldwork in 2015. These figures are subject to changes presently as the 
industry has experienced massive retrenchment due to the oil crisis (recession) globally. 
 
Table 2: Trends in Trade Unions Memberships 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
PENGASSAN            
MALE 33,283 31,281 31,008 29,097 28,328 28,143 28,359 27,234 27,904 24,256 19,207 
FEMALE   3,324   3,100   3,012   2,279   1,908   1,900  1,881   1,907   1,580   1,033      793 
TOTAL 36,607 34,381 34,020 31,376 30,236 30,554 30,240 30,141 29,484 25,289 20,000 
            
NUPENG            
MALE 32,760 32,450 31,875 30,219 29,671 29,352 29,008 28,877 26,798 23,981 18,240 
FEMALE   4,247  4,132   4,143   3,769 3,498   3,199   3,109   3,102   2,363   1,210      917 
TOTAL 37,007 36,580 36,018 33,988 33,169 32,551 32,117 31,979 29,161 25,191 19,157 
Source: PENGASSAN and NUPENG 2015 
 
The unions expressed frustration in membership fluctuation. A particular emphasis was laid 
on Shell Nigeria that embarks on numerous projects. The project-based nature of the work 
performed often necessitates a great use of agency labour and a few numbers of permanent 
staff. The argument is that, even when this group of workers are permitted to unionise, the 
fact remains that membership rate will constantly fluctuate as at, and when, the projects starts 
and end. The unions lament that this has the potential to bear negative consequences for the 
unions in terms of taking part in collective bargaining processes. This is a challenge for the 
unions because the replacement of the internal labour for external labour market does little to 
increase union membership.  
The rate of workers turnover notwithstanding, the perceived view held by some agency 
workers, about unions’ primary aim on the protection and representation of permanent 
workers, hinders their interest of becoming a member. The logic is that, if these helpless 
workers are less likely to join union, and if the union is unable to recruit them and increase 
their membership in order to be recognised by management, taking part in collective 
bargaining processes in the workplace may prove to be a herculean task. Hence, there is need 
to strengthened relationship with allies and within the agency labour community, this is 
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similar to the logic of Heery’s inclusion strategy. In view of this, the next section analysed 
trade union’s challenges in mobilizing agency workers in the Nigerian Oil Industry 
 
7.7. Challenges of Union Mobilization of Agency Workers 
 
The trade union constitute more importantly, the organisational form in which employees’ 
collective interests are represented and protected. However, not all workers see trade union 
positively as their representatives, or the protectors of their interests. Particularly, agency 
workers have negative opinion of the trade unions. Many view them as compromising with 
the management, or indifferent to their interests.  
 
Based on the above discussion, this study examines more closely trade unions challenges in 
mobilizing agency workers, through empirical evidence. Results suggest that many young 
workers both unionise and non-unionise expressed their displeasure with the trade unions, 
particularly, NUPENG. One of the interviewees declared that “trade unions have no case; they 
are more concern about their dues – everyone was ready to embark on strike action when 
there was a breach on the renewal of collective agreement, only for the union to agree on 
certain terms with the management”.  This study suggests that the impression about the trade 
unions was indeed a significant factor that arises from the empirical work. A great number of 
these youthful workers’ view trade unions as incompetent machineries of struggle and in 
representing them. Their impression is that trade unions should be fighting on a daily basis for 
their rights but they do not. This aspersion is believed to have taken a total depreciation on 
trade unionism in the industry.  
 
Furthermore, the possibility of bias by the trade unions in favour of the welfare of their 
members is probably noticed by the agency workers and constitutes a factor that maintains the 
distance between them and the unions. An agency worker maintains that, “I don’t attend 
union’s meeting, because they are not interested in what concerns me, nobody listens to me – 
they only want to use us. I will gain nothing, because they belong to a different class, why I 
belong to another class. If the company is retrenching today, I and my colleagues would be 
the first group to go, while the unions (permanent workers) will be rejoicing, they just want to 
use us – not because they have our interest at heart that they want us to join union”. This 
possibly affects the consciousness of the labour force in that they do not necessarily see 
themselves as workers; rather they do not view their struggle against capital as the same, 
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which consequently may affect workplace solidarity, and the emancipation Marx anticipated 
(Marx, 1978; Hyman 1999). 
 
Consequently, the inabilities of the trade unions to mobilize agency workers, or the challenges 
of doing so for several reasons, besides the institutional factors, are: standard employees’ self-
centred resistance and the agency workers indifference. This reinforces the division of the 
labour force, hence the distance between the standard employees and agency workers. The 
division between the employment relation with the employment agencies and the work 
relation with the oil MNCs creates a contractual and physical separation between the various 
elements of labour relations which is management divide and rule strategy to have total 
control over the workforces and create resentment among labour force. 
 
This study anticipated that for trade unions to gain the confidence of agency workers in the oil 
industry there is need for the unions to map out strategies on both educational and political 
programs not only for their members, but to the general labour force that would bring about 
trust and solidarity. 
This is because the drive for high road business strategy to remain competitive by the 
management of the oil MNCs is insatiable. They have succeeded in creating false-
consciousness among the workforce, by pitting the workers against themselves, so they can 
have total control over them and manipulate their labour power in a commodity form, for 
profit maximization. 
 
Therefore, examining unions’ representation in relation to agency labour is essential because 
it enables the researcher to understand whether existing trade union representation structures 
and functions are able to incorporate the interests of the emerging class, particularly focusing 
on the unions’ branches as the unit of analysis.  
 
7.7.1. Dilemmas of Trade Union Structure 
Firstly, given that a trade union branch, as the key element of union organisation, is primarily 
based on the oil companies’ premises and agency workers, by view of belonging to another 
employer provides union branches with the question of whether to accept workers with 
different employers. Although, PENGASSAN and NUPENG gave their branches scope to 
include some of these workers by allowing branches to form their structure beyond the 
permanent employees.  The branches visited struggled with the fragmentations of workers in 
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that it necessitates them going the extra mile to reconcile potential different interests among 
workers with different contractual employment terms, they however lamented, it is quite 
challenging, and most of them are not willing to join the union, due to their employers’ threat.  
Secondly, other branches are confronted with the challenge of how to deal with the issue of 
agency workers on short-term contracts, whether to accept them as union members. Their 
dilemma stems from the fact that some branch leaders and the represented perceived this as 
conforming to this form of work arrangements. Even if this agitation is basically associated 
with trade unions ideological positions, it is evident that their perceptions of agency workers 
had an influence on their responses in either positive or negative ways. Despite trade unions 
having dual-purpose strategy, evidence in Chapter 5 and 6 shows that Exxon Mobil 
(PENGASSAN Lagos Branch) made effort to improve conditions of employment for agency 
workers through collective bargaining with the oil company and their employment agencies.  
 
Although, results reveals contradicting outcomes on the negotiations between the 
management of Exxon Mobil and trade union (PENGASSAN), but there is a duly signed 
tripartite agreement between the management, PENGASSAN and the employment agencies 
of the right to organise these workers. However, PENGASSAN argues that the agreement is 
operational in theory and not in practice, due to labour fragmentation and its complexities. On 
this note, it can be interpreted that PENGASSAN made a compromise between their 
ideological positions and practical issues in the light of their insufficient power resources to 
include agency workers into their fold. 
 
 However, it was not unanticipated that there were other branches that have hardly done 
anything in relation to accepting these workers, as played out by PENGASSAN. This position 
can likewise be interpreted, that the ways in which these branches reacted are predicated upon 
their principles intended at the rejection of agency labour in the industry. This may be closer 
to reality to say that their action was due to organisational indifference, or more specifically, 
lack of ability to deal with the challenges relating to agency workers, such as the complexities 
associated with triangular employment relations. 
 
Thirdly, if granted or resolved to represents these workers, PENGASSAN and NUPENG 
branches may need to form an appropriate representational structure. Although it may be 
alleged that handling the issue of agency workers is not a new challenge confronting trade 
unions, representing them requires fresh forms of representation that break from the 
dominant, workplace pattern (Heery, et al. 2004b: 20). This research discovered that some 
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organisations that represent agency workers formed a structure beyond the workplace or work 
closely together with the workers.  
This study suggests the need for both PENGASSAN and NUPENG to create union structure 
at a level above the workplace constituency to articulate solidarity which has likewise been 
recommended by some scholars who studied trade union representation of agency workers 
(Kretsos, 2011; Darlington, 2009; Heery, 2009; Wills and Simms, 2004; Heery et al. 2004b; 
Hyman, 1999). This study does not anticipate to claim that this is the best strategy for 
PENGASSAN and NUPENG to adopt in representing agency workers, but it adds the 
evidence of previous literature with a focus on the representation structure beyond the union 
constituencies.  
Confronted with the changes in the employment relations, trade unions have to resolve 
whether or not to represent these categories of workers by including them into their structures 
(Heery, 2004; Cervino, 2000).  Unlike the standard employees who are direct hires of the oil 
MNCs, the issue of agency workers necessitates the expansion of representation beyond the 
workplace level (Heery et al. 2004b: 31), because failure to include these groups of workers 
can lead to further growth in their usage and complete extinction of the internal labour 
market. Although some branches of PENGASSAN have gone to a considerable length than 
others and there remains a considerable scope for the trade unions to develop their work in 
this area of inclusion. This study suggests Heery’s (2009: 432) recommendation of a shift in 
trade union’s traditional policy on non-standard workers from exclusion and subordination to 
inclusion and engagement. 
This is because Heery (2004: 435) systematic classification clearly works with the features of 
triangular employment relations operating in the Nigerian oil industry.  As earlier stated in 
Chapter 2, and also revealed by empirical findings, agency workers are of various 
characteristics in terms of contracts of employment as compared to permanent workers. 
However, the fragmented workers share a common feature, i.e. the triangular employment 
relations involving at least two to three parties. Thus, Heery’s typology is very useful in 
classifying trade unions responses to agency workers and shows its applicability in the 
context of the Nigerian oil industry.  
Although, some studies with a focus on classification of trade union attitude have problem in 
developing an understanding of why union’s respond in a specific way. As Klerck (2000: 
110) reveals, existing studies in industrial relations have paid more attention either to explain 
union rejection of agency workers or to classify various types, structure or identities of 
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unions. Nevertheless, there are other studies with a focus on trade unions strategic choices in 
collective negotiations over labour contracting (Doellgast, 2008; Hayakawa and Simard, 
2001), but not adequate attention has been exerted on how trade unions have responded to 
agency workers. Thus, this study contributed to existing industrial relations literature by going 
beyond formulating and classification, and by uncovering factors shaping a particular form of 
responses. 
 From the ongoing discussion it is explicitly recognised that PENGASSAN and NUPENG did 
not create the atmosphere to unionise this class of workers. They were initially perceived as 
intruders who have come to collect their jobs and weaken their collective bargaining, and the 
more union fight management over agency labour, the more aggressive the management 
becomes in hiring them. Moreover, there is no law in Nigeria that prohibits them from 
engaging such nefarious act. This may likely contribute to the unwillingness of the agency 
workers to join the trade unions, since they felt unwelcomed by the represented, and not duly 
protected under the labour law. 
Interestingly, the unions are not totally against the use of agency labour, but opposed to the 
growing trend and deployment into the permanent positions without right to unionization. 
Trade union considered the permanent circle as a central unit of strength in terms of 
membership and collective bargaining, and therefore perceived the increasing usage of agency 
labour and labour fragmentation as attack on their existence. One of the trade union 
representative asked a question – “going by the growth of agency workers, what would the 
industry collective agreement mean, if there are no more permanent employees, but only 
outsiders who are under the employment contract of external employers”? In this regard, the 
next section discusses trade unions’ responses to collective bargaining as a tool with which 
social regulation of the employment relationship is achieved. 
7.7.2.   Implications for Collective Bargaining 
Among the distinctive nature of trade union approaches, collective bargaining is perceived as 
the strategic part of industrial relations since it regulates the terms and conditions of 
employment (Marchington et al. 2011; Clegg, 1976).  Although, these scholars argued that 
variations in collective bargaining can explain differences in trade unions attitudes and 
approaches. But the empirical findings do not wholly support this argument. Some other 
scholars also criticise this assertion based on causality and deterministic view (Heery, 2009; 
Frege and Kelly, 2003).  For instance, the Nigerian oil industry trade unions operates on 
enterprise level and the case of PENGASSAN (Exxon Mobil Lagos Branch) shows that the 
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reform of union structure to accommodate some of agency workers led to a reform of 
collective bargaining structures (the Communique), although it is impulsive to say that the 
reformed bargaining structure has been well secured and standardized. But to a great extent 
PENGASSAN fought and won the battle of mobilizing these workers in their collective 
bargaining units and negotiated terms and conditions on their behalf. 
 Findings indicates the underlying differences in the terms of employment status have led to 
unions different responses in organising these workers and not variations in collective 
bargaining. This study suggests that the more formalised and stabilised the employment 
system, the more favourable atmosphere for PENGASSAN and NUPENG to mobilise and 
represent agency workers. However, the steady decline of the traditional employment 
relations, has the potential to generate tension and resentment between labour and 
management relationship. This is because contemporary employment relationship is not a 
voluntary exchange; rather it is antagonistic exchange of socially based mechanism of 
dominance/control and super-exploitation (Smith, 2016; Hyman, 1975: 12). On this note, this 
study discusses the effects of this contemporary work arrangements on labour – management 
relationship. 
 
7.8. Labour – Management Relationships 
Contemporary work arrangements in the Nigerian oil industry has had a negative impact on 
the representation and rights of agency workers, as well as, on the organisational strength of 
the trade union in terms of resources, both human and capital. This study argues that the 
interests of the workplace actors are bounded together in complex ways, particularly with the 
increasingly utilization of agency workers, by extension in the core production areas. Such a 
conclusion sheds light on conflicts of interest between labour and management. 
 
Firstly, empirical findings reveal social hegemony of unitary perspective as most evident in 
the three oil MNCs, although, this hegemony is neither thorough nor robust enough. Its 
fragility was made obvious through the participants from the three oil MNCs. As the 
interview entered into the realm of rights and interests, workers and even line-managers that 
generally adhered to liberal conception of employment relations admitted that there is conflict 
of interests in operations between labour and management. Some line-managers who spoke 
about the good character and the generosity of their management at other points in the 
interview referred to the trade unions as the protector of their interests and rights from actual 
and potential violations by their management.  
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The management style is said to have become aggressive and autocratic in comparison with 
the traditional employment relations. The two-way formal mediating institution between 
management and employees seems to be dysfunctional; unions are perceived to be side-lined 
at most of the consultative decisions. It has degraded to a unilateral top-to-bottom 
management style. There is no more open door policy, the curtains seem to be drawn against 
the trade unions. The management has been very antagonist and not well disposed to trade 
unionism. Labour – Management relationship has become tensed and this has made the 
unions to become hysterical and restive.  
Secondly, labour plays a minimal role in processes that take place in the workplace, processes 
such as, restructuring as it affects workers, the recruitment and placement of new workers, as 
well as the problems that confronts the industry. The perspective that such processes are 
largely within the managerial prerogative and not unions, hence, unions are not accorded the 
privileged to participate. This may be attributed to the challenges confronting unions in terms 
of declining membership due to increased usage of agency workers and labour fragmentation. 
Thus management undermines union strength. 
 
The fact that trade unions are undermined in processes such as recruitment is attributed to the 
limited awareness that unions tend to have, particularly, with regards to employment 
decisions. Most of the key strategic decisions and policy making are mainly carried out at the 
oil MNCs home corporate headquarters. In this regard, it is easy for the management to say 
they are following the company policy.  This argument is similar to Michels (1999) claims of 
“the iron law of oligarchy”, which states that, at a point in company’s size, it will become 
virtually impracticable for all members to equally take part in the decision-making process. 
Thus, this study suggests for trade unions to meaningfully engage in such processes, it may be 
fruitful for union to negotiate for involvement at the workplace policy-making level, 
particularly, policy that concerns employment procedures. 
 
Taking part in the workplace policy-making where trade union organise effectively means 
that the unions will be taking part in determining the direction and vision of the company, as 
partners in the workplace. However, this desire is not always met favourably by the 
management. Results found that PENGASSAN and NUPENG are generally kept in the dark 
about the key direction and strategies of the companies. It is always a struggle, as they insist 
to be involved in consultations and determining the direction of the organization, including 
where the profits must go because before this present recession, productivity has been very 
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high in the Nigerian oil industry, but the derivative of the productivity never comes the way 
of the workers. 
 
Thirdly, results suggest that contracting of employment and the emergence of agency workers 
in the core production units are major issues also affecting labour – management relationship. 
One distinctive feature impacting their relationship is workers’ representation, which has 
earlier been discussed in this chapter. In the multitude of these groups of workers, the ability 
of the trade unions to mobilise them due to their fragmentation and short-term contracts, has 
proven to be a dilemma. 
 
Lastly, the circumstances surrounding agency labour are very complex and the unions’ 
representation of these categories of workers is very limited. Hence the representational gap 
between standard employees and agency workers. This study argues that there is a great drive 
towards making the Nigerian Oil Industry a secondary labour market and this is speedily 
impacting on union’s membership. This reflects the resultant conflicts between labour and 
management which constantly leads to series of protest and strike actions. Conflicts are 
nothing but another means of competition at different level of development and conflictual 
economic interests, giving rise to the exacerbating conflicts in the oil industry. Next section 
discusses causes, extent and nature of exacerbating conflicts in the Nigerian oil industry. 
 
7.9. Causes of the Exacerbated Conflicts in the Nigerian Oil Industry 
Marxists acknowledged that conflict is an endemic characteristic in the work place, and 
conflict is located within the various interests of capital and labour (Darlington, 2012; Lukacs, 
2000; Howard, 1994; Hyman, 1975). These authors argued that the advance interest of one 
party must be at the expense of the other. Accordingly, the owners of the means of production 
remain the most powerful in the employment relationships. Contemporary employment 
relations in the Nigerian oil industry has seen power and control in the hands of management, 
and their unending drive to accumulate, to expand and shape more people lives activity into 
the commodity form, underpins the unceasing power struggle in the industry (Hyman, 1975: 
26).  
 
The conflicts between labour and management in the Nigerian oil industry are not only 
significant because labour is being exploited for the enrichment of just a few, but also because 
this exploitation relation is a major mechanism in the dynamic growth of capitalist social 
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formations in general. Therefore, this contention is not only an organisational event of 
contrasting demands and tensions at the workplace; rather, it is a product of an inequitable 
distribution of power and wealth in wider society (Darlington, 2009).  The conflict that takes 
place at the organisational level between labour-management is considered by Marxists as a 
constant feature of capitalism and one that is produced by the concentration of social, 
economic and political authority in the hands of the property-owners (Omoyibo, 2012). 
 
Consequently, the dialectical relation between labour - management conflict and the 
consistent restructuring generates a continuous shifting “conflictual terrain” on which both 
present and future struggle will continue to unfold. Therefore, conflict of interest and thus 
conflict between labour – management is not simply a function of where one stands, but 
significantly, what one stands for (Howard, 1994, as cited in Larry, et al. 2008: 11).   
According to Darlington (2012: 519) it is the legitimate demand that encourages labour to 
revolt at management action. Although, labour – management conflict is not a new 
development; it is the form it has assumed in contemporary employment relations that is 
causing exacerbating conflicts in the Nigerian oil industry (Jawadu and Adenugba, 2014). 
7.9.1. Causes and Nature of Industrial Actions over the Years Stemming from all Forms of 
Unethical Labour Practices such as: 
i. The increase utilization of agency workers, particularly in the core production areas 
and failure to ensure standardised terms and conditions of work 
 
ii. The subjection of direct hires to a triangular employment relation 
 
iii. Denial of rights to unionization 
 
iv.  Non-implementation of collective bargaining, such as compensation for early 
retirement 
 
v.  Expatriate quota abuse. Trade unions requested for the engagements of more 
indigenous citizens in managerial positions. 
 
vi. Unions demands to be involved in the industry’s decision-making process; especially 
when such policy concerns the workforce 
 
vii. Redundancy in the cause of restructuring. 
 
On the one hand, the Nigerian oil industry trade unions are generally concerned with the 
welfare of their members/workers, while on the other, the management of oil MNCs and 
government are after profit maximization and rents. Given the vicious nature of government 
policies (labour law) and the economic power of the oil MNCs, the inclination is for labour to 
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lean more towards overt modes of revolts. According to Bukharin (2003: 12), a capitalist 
system is unimaginable without uncertainties, it is inconceivable without battles. Therefore, a 
system that thrives on the imposition of the interests of the powerless in the workplace can 
only arouse social chaos, agitations and conflicts. Hence the Nigerian oil industry has 
experienced series of revolts in different forms, and the most common, is strike actions. This 
is generally attested by the unions as the only language the management and government 
understood; Table (53) below, highlights cause and series of strike actions in the industry 
from year 2000 – 2017. 
 
Table: 53- Causes and Series of Strike Action in the Nigerian Oil Industry: 2000-2017 
 
 
COMPANY                   ISSUES PERIOD 
1 TOTAL Call to disengage the Managing Director, for the intention to 
remove indigenous employees from senior management post 
02/02/2000 
2 Halliburton Management failure to honour the tripartite agreement of 
standardizing  contract workers 
        28/04/2000 
 
3 Major oil 
producing 
companies 
Unethical labour practices. Management charged with 
biased treatment on Nigerian workers over the expatriates, 
and issues of casualization. 
 
27/11/2000-07/12/2000 
4. Texaco  Deadlock on Collective Bargaining 09/05/2001-13/05/2001 
5 Major oil 
producing 
companies 
NUPENG 
Casualization, termination and victimization 28/06/2001 
 
6 
NAOC  Unfair treatment of indigenous workers. Managers’ arbitrary 
application to company rules. 
18/03/2002-02/04/2002 
7 Transocean The refusal of management to allow workers to put forward 
their grievances to the visiting officials of the parent 
company from France. 
07/03/2003-18/03/2003 
8 NNPC  Restructuring 03/08/2003 
9 ExxonMobil Unions demand more employment for indigenous citizens 
rather to expatriates 
 
2004 
10 Major oil 
producing 
companies 
Increasing number of expatriate workers in the industry 
Externalising the internal labour market 
11/04/2005-14/04/2005 
10 Chevron  Management refusal for an attempt for contract employees 
to join labour 
15/06/2006-22/06/2006 
11 Major oil 
producing 
companies 
Indiscriminate sales of the Nations Refineries 21/5/2007 – 24/05/2007 
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11 
 
 
12 
Chevron 
 
 
Shell 
PENGASSAN strike action over job appointments and 
safety standards. 
 
Sudden firing of 21 contract staff who have put in 15-25 
years’ service after attempting to join union   
23/06/2008-28/06/2008 
 
 
10/10/2008 
 
13 Major oil 
producing 
companies 
Trade unions strike over concerns for workers security in the 
industry 
09/09/2009-12/09/2009 
14 ExxonMobil PENGASSAN indefinite strike action over the sacking of 84 
workers  and expatriate quota violation, as well as the issue 
of contract labour 
30/11/2010 
15 Major oil 
producing 
companies 
Three days warning strike over sporadic kidnapping or oil 
workers 
10/10/2011-13/10/2011 
16 
 
17 
Shell 
 
Major oil 
producing 
companies 
NUPENG industrial disputes with management on 
casualization. Warning strike over unjustifiable mass 
disengagement and migration of workers to contract staff 
and casuals in the downstream, unfair labour practices and 
anti-union activities-failures to engage PENGASSAN on 
issues in the petroleum industry bill. 
28/01/2012-30/01/2012 
16/04/2012-19/04/2012 
18 Major oil 
producing 
companies 
Over the sack of 2,500 tanker drivers and the poor states of 
the country refineries. 
26/07/2012-29/07/2012 
19 
 
 
20 
Major oil 
producing 
companies 
Shell, Chevron 
and Agip 
 
Refusing oil workers union rights 
stop casualization 
 
NUPENG three days warning strike over inhuman treatment 
by these three multinational companies; inability to 
implement signed collective bargaining agreement with 
petroleum tanker drivers and non-adherence to guidelines on 
contract staffing/casualization and the abuse of expatriate 
quotas. 
13/02/2013-16/02/2013 
 
01/07/2013-03/07/2013 
21 Major oil 
producing 
companies 
PENGASSAN and NUPENG strike action over 
casualization of work, and the use of contract staff in the 
core production areas. 
Insensitivity to the health and safety of workers in 
operational areas, career progression as well as undue delay 
of the on-going collective bargaining agreement.  
30/07/2014-31/07/2014 
22 Major oil 
producing 
companies 
Non-payment of oil subsidy grounded 11/05/2015-25/05/2015 
23 Major oil 
producing 
companies 
PENGASSAN went on six days strike for failure of 
government and partners to honour collective agreement and 
planned restructuring without carrying the union along 
07/07/2016-13/07/2016 
24 Major oil 
producing 
companies 
PENGASSAN and NUPENG 3 days’ strike action over 
indiscriminate sack of workers without benefits. 
Casualization of the workforce 
11/01/2017- 
13/01/2017 
Source: Fajana (2005:20), Oluokun, 2015; Dodondawa, 2017 
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Besides the general strike actions in which all the trade unions participated, there are also 
patterns of organisation in which branches of the unions mobilize on the basis of any 
particular neo-liberal invasions on the rights of individual regional branches, or on the basis of 
addressing specific unethical labour issues as retrenchment without severance pay. For 
example, the recent case of union revolts against Shell Nigeria whereby NUPENG requested 
management to address the issues of unethical labour practices, such as, the sacking of over 
4,000 workers without severance pay, balkanization of the ongoing disinvestment system, the 
subjection of majority of employees to the status of contract workers, and the non-
implementation of collective agreements or face an indefinite strike action.    This threat drew 
the attention of the Minister of labour and employment, and the Minister of state for 
Petroleum who called for a meeting between the Lagos branch of NUPENG and the 
management of Shell Nigeria, however, the meeting ended in deadlock, which saw NUPENG 
issuing a 3-day ultimatum warning strike, which took effect from January, 11
th
 – 13th, 2017 
(Dodondawa, 2017). 
 
NUPENG President (Achese Igwe) lamented on how the oil MNCs have refused to respect 
the existing labour laws. He stated in displeasure how a good number of employees have lost 
their jobs and sent away without severance pay and has been unable to meet family 
obligations. He bemoans how huge sum of money running into trillions was being held down 
in the industry in the name of debt and buy back by the Asset Management Company of 
Nigeria (AMCON). Igwe recalled how AMCON took over a company, Sea Drill Nigeria 
Limited, in the pretence of debt buy back and discharged all the employees without their due 
benefits in 2013 and hired agency workers. 
 
The fact that the Nigerian government has not completely divested its interest in the oil 
industry, contributes immensely to the active involvement of trade unions in series of threats 
of action, particularly, strike actions. For example, in 2007, towards the end of President 
Obasanjo’s regime, PENGASSAN and NUPENG were not disposed to the sales of two out of 
the four Nigerian refineries, which were quickly sold at ridiculous prices, and called for 
Nation-wide strike, this compelled the successor, President Yar’ dua to rescind on the sales. 
Trade unions agitation was based on the lack of transparency and fairness, and maintained 
that Nigeria as an oil producing nation should own and manage these national refineries 
(NLC, 2007:9).  
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For PENGASSAN and NUPENG, the weapon of strike remains central to trade unionism, it 
sets the context both of the past and the future.  The unions have no other option but to talk 
about strike both as past struggle and as future possibility, drawing the lines as it both concern 
protecting their jobs and putting a stop to exploitation in the industry. Strike was indicated as 
a weapon that always shakes both government and management, and there is no middle 
ground for neutrality.  
 
A strike, when things are eventually led towards that direction, is effectively a workplace war. 
It is often a psychologically disturbing situation as social relations become antagonistic while 
two opposing groups are formed. As it is in the industry of workers’ polarization, one is 
compelled to choose and join a camp, and is subjected to social and political pressure both 
from the unions’ representatives, as well as, companies’ management.  As the open class 
struggle unfolds the stakes are set high, some may lose their jobs or risks being subjected to 
social ridicule either way. 
 
Furthermore, the pressure of work and the feeling of exploitations may at certain times 
proceed beyond confrontational channels of strike actions, to a greater extent of sabotage as 
revenge to both oil MNCs and government. Sabotage of the process of production and 
distribution of petroleum products is primarily carried out by jobless youth of host-
communities in collaboration with some of the precarious oil workers. This is seen in the light 
of both expropriation and re-appropriation of the part of the valued produced 
7.9.2. Extent of Conflicts 
 
Sabotage is probably the most intense form of labour struggle and can only be based on a 
deep consciousness of the antagonism of interests between labour and capital, and within the 
exploited itself. In this regard, findings revealed contradictory tendencies of convergence and 
divergence between the struggle of trade unions and the oil hosts communities. A union 
respondent stated that in a petition to the Nigerian National Assembly, demanding that the 
anticipated Integrated Joint Venture Companies (IJVs) included in the Petroleum Industry Bill 
(PIB) should include oil hosts communities in the landowner structures.  
 
This was channelled towards the trade unions intent to identify with the interest of the 
communities, while at the same time condemning the attack on the workers and petroleum 
pipelines by the community youths. As earlier discussed, the 2007 national strike actions by 
PENGASSAN, and NUPENG, witnessed the participation of other trade unions such as NLC 
and the TUC, except one of the oil hosts community (Warri National Congress WNC) in 
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Niger Delta Region, that refused to participate, on the ground that it was of no benefit to the 
people of the Niger Delta- and threaten to lead a protest against the strike.  
 
Though it was historic because no general strike in Nigeria has ever made plight of the oil 
hosts communities an important issue in the custom of demands. The oil hosts communities 
are, however, swift in responding to workers’ actions, once they are certain that they stand to 
benefit from the workers struggle. Besides the tension between labour and management, the 
above discussion reflects the tensions in relationships between labour and host communities, 
rather than their cooperation.  
 
This mirrored capitalist’s contradictory nature – the tendency to unite the workforce and its 
allies through mutual or shared experiences of expropriation and separation and at the same 
time, the tendency to divide and rule. This study suggests for the collective interest of both 
workers and communities to thoughtfully build an alliance. This approach often referred to 
social movement unionism or community unionism, and viewed as emerging from Marxian 
kind of struggles. For instance, the 1994 trade unions strike action supported by some NGOs 
mainly from Niger Delta Region, such as, The Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni 
People (MOSOP) greatly affected productions, not only in Ogoni land, but throughout the 
nation. This is the tradition to consciously and officially build-upon, it is a pathway to that 
self-consciousness class that Marx agitates and the solidaristic nature Hyman anticipated that 
would bring about emancipation and freedom. 
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7.10.  Summary 
This study has found evidence in support of the body of literature that attest to cost-reduction 
as the primary aim of the road to bottom phenomenon. The management of the three oil 
MNCs openly appreciated the utilization of agency workers because they are cheaper than 
employees on standard employment contracts and can easily be dismissed without redundancy 
costs. This is because, agency workers’ terms and conditions of employment are exploitative 
by nature and favour the economic progress of the management, rather than the well-being 
and job security of the workers.  
 
The oil MNCs make use of these workers to limit and further reduces costs of running their 
companies. Moreover, because they do not wish to bind themselves to offering long term 
work for employees, oil MNCs companies whose work tends to be project-based, such as 
Shell Nigeria. In others words, the use of agency labour is seen as an instrument for avoiding 
employment protection legislation for standard employees and trade unions collective 
agreements. However, because social regulation tends to depend on power plays, the trade 
unions can be argued not to wield the power to overcome the adverse relationship that tends 
to exist in industrialist production system. Empirical findings explicitly acknowledged an 
imbalance of power, in which the owners of the means of production uses their superior 
power to influence events. 
 
While some studies argued that agency workers constitute a volatile segment of the labour 
force, which occupies unskilled positions, this study found among the key rationales for using 
agency labour and the associating transformation of employment relationships, was the 
promotion of organisational flexibility. Shell, Exxon Mobil and Chevron Nigeria hires agency 
workers in the core production units and attested that this has increased companies’ 
capabilities to tailor labour force capacity according to production plans and to facilitate 
efficiency.  
A great level of flexibility has been achieved by the greater integration of this labour force 
into the production process, thus working alongside with standard employees. Experienced 
and skilled agency workers are supplied by employment agencies, who, in this way, do not 
need training and can productively work in the core production areas, this is due to the fact 
that, they already had that production and industry experience, hence, the demarcation of 
tasks has largely disappeared in recent years. This study clearly argues that although core and 
peripheral labour markets may indeed interact by working side-by-side, however, permanent 
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employees may be exposed to pressure of insecurity by the pool of agency workers in the 
workplace. 
The increasingly utilization of this labour force in the main production units has altered the 
organisational structure of the trade union and its representation of workers, which developed 
on the principle of a bilateral management-labour relation in the past.  The promotion of 
organisational flexibility through the use of employment agencies promotes the fragmentation 
of work (Marchington et al. Eds. 2005). Given the fragmented labour force, not only are legal 
and structural constraints imposed on agency workers in terms of union participation and 
interest representation in the workplace, but labour fragmentation also poses a challenge to 
the organisational ability of the trade unions. 
The impact of agency labour on the collective nature of the employment relationships is 
clearly demonstrated by examining the representation gap between employees on standard 
employment contracts and agency workers and the associated problems. Such analysis 
highlighted a substantial disparity between these two categories of workers in terms of 
representations, which also revealed their diverse interests. On this premise, triangular 
employment relationship has a negative effect on the representation and rights of agency 
workers, as well as, on the organisational strength of the trade unions. 
Although, in the case of Exxon Mobil (PENGASSAN Lagos Branch), a closer working 
relationship among agency workers and the permanent employees excites the interest of 
representations and the outcome of such was the emergence of inclusion of agency workers in 
2012. However, the attempt by Exxon Mobil (PENGASSAN) to extend membership to 
agency workers indicated the potential for innovation in the organisational structure of the 
trade union. There is thus little doubt that the representation and rights of these workers in 
Exxon Mobil Nigeria will continue to evolve, while some other union branches are still at 
dilemma, due to the issue of interests and traditional position. 
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CHAPTER 8:   Conclusion 
 
8.  Introduction 
Based on the case companies (Shell, ExxonMobil and Chevron Nigeria), this study set out to 
explore the growth of agency labour in the Nigerian oil industry and the trade unions 
challenges.  Flexible work arrangements in these three oil MNCs has a greater significance, 
than simply an increase in the usage of agency labour. It indicates a shift away from the 
traditional processes of companies’ activities, which involves the restructuring of 
organisation, and employment practices, leading to a restructuring in work arrangements, 
functions and relationships between workplace actors, these consequently leads to conflicts of 
interests arising as a result of this new work arrangements among the social actors.  
 
Undeniably, this new form of work arrangements posed a challenge to the traditional 
knowledge of the use of agency labour. In recognising empirical and conceptual gaps in the 
literature, this research explored how the growth and utilization of agency labour affects 
employment relationships. Data was drawn from an investigation of stratified domain into the 
various facets of employment relationships, involving, management, trade union, the 
workforce, ministry of labour and employment, employment agencies, and community 
leaders’ perspectives. The findings of the research addressed issues associated with the 
growth and utilization of agency workers in the core production areas of the three oil MNCs 
and its implications on trade unions’ representation and strength.  
 
The findings of this study were centred on two arguments. First, the dynamic interplay 
between workplace actors and how they intertwined in the context of employment 
relationships. It shed light on the manner in which the interaction of workplace actors impacts 
employment relationships. This gave an in-depth understanding of the complexity arising 
from the growth and utilization of agency workers and the reactions of the trade unions to 
changes in their work environments. Secondly, this research also put forward the argument 
that the classification of organisational changes driven by increased work flexibility achieved 
through the use of agency labour is filled with tension, the essence of which lies, in the 
pursuit of workplace flexibility and representational rights.  
 
This study explored the ways and manner in which the case companies have pursued 
organisational flexibility and the issue of the rights to association that has emerged as a 
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consequence. This exploration uncovered contradictions associated with the utilization of 
agency workers with little or no benefits in the core production areas. It was found that such 
anxieties and contradictions were complicated by both cooperation and conflict between and 
within workplace actors. 
 
This discovery reinforces the first argument, underlying the significance of investigating the 
issue of employment relationships and the interaction between the actors in order to advance 
the conceptual tool for analysing the growth and usage of agency workers. Such analysis 
helped this thesis investigate the way in which inherent tensions play out in shaping 
employment relationships. 
 
In this concluding chapter, the major findings of the research are summarised by drawing 
together material from previous sections of the study. It considered three relevant issues, (i) 
the changing nature of employment relationships in the context of organisational flexibility 
and the increasing utilization of agency labour; (ii) the contradictory nature of the use of these 
workers, and (iii) the denial of their representational rights. Followed by the implications of 
the findings of the case companies (Shell, ExxonMobil and Chevron Nigeria). Research 
contributions and consideration is also given to areas for future research that could further add 
to the knowledge of the use of agency labour in the core production areas and employment 
relationships in general. 
 
8.1. Management Restructuring towards Work Flexibility and the Employment 
Dynamics 
The empirical findings indicate significant changes in the employment relationships, whereby 
the customary employment system of direct relationship with one employer has given way to 
multiple and complex employment structure in the case companies (Shell, ExxonMobil and 
Chevron Nigeria). Indeed, the employment relationships that occur in the context of flexible 
work arrangements are more complex, such as the growing trend in the use of agency workers 
and the subsequent deployment of these workers to the core production areas. It was found 
that the functions of agency workers and permanent employees have become blurred as a 
result of the integration of the core and peripheral workers in similar tasks.  
 
The three oil MNCs demonstrated that the deployment of agency workers to the core 
production areas has increased the ability of the companies to implement numerical flexibility 
according to consumers’ demands. Significantly, a high degree of flexibility has been attained 
291 
 
by greater integration of these workers into the production process and by utilising them side-
by-side with permanent employees. 
 
The integration of both labour forces has affected employment practices and the 
organisational structure of the trade unions. It is worth noting that the contemporary work 
arrangements and restructured work organisations have arisen in the course of the promotion 
of organisational flexibility. In retrospective to Atkinson (1984) flexible firm model and 
segmentation theory in Chapter 2, agency workers are concentrated in low-skilled, peripheral 
job functions, which lie beyond the traditional representation scope. While on the other hand, 
standard employees occupy positions characterised as core necessitating highly skilled, and 
benefits from workplace representations (Osterman, 1987).  
 
While previous studies suggested that flexible workers constitute a volatile labour force 
segment which occupies semi-skilled or unskilled positions, this study found that Shell, 
ExxonMobil, and Chevron Nigeria hired highly skilled agency workers from employment 
agencies, who in this way, do not need training and can productively work in the core 
production areas. This is because they already have industry experience with the 
organisational practices and machineries, hence their deployment to the core production areas 
to performed similar functions to those of the permanent employees. Indicatively, the division 
of functions has largely disappeared in the contemporary industrialist mode of production. 
These transformations have led to close working relationships between employees of standard 
employment contracts and agency workers. In light of this, this research found that the 
traditional function of agency labour has dramatically changed from the peripheral activities 
into the core functions these oil multinational companies. 
 
This is the most compelling insight gained out of this exploration of reality. The increased 
utilization of agency workers in the core production areas of the three oil MNCs implies that 
the traditional conceptual analysis of the core-periphery theory is unable to fully explain 
recent workplace changes and the corresponding shifting in employment relationships. The 
flexible firm model and segmentation theory are useful for analysing the peripheral services 
of temporary employment industry, and the segmentation of labour in the labour market.  
However, these theories are narrowed in their scope of interpretation of the complexity of the 
employment relationships that arises from the increasing usage of agency labour in the core 
production areas, and the roles of the workplace actors’ in the changing nature of labour. 
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Thus, this study examined the dynamic interaction between workplace actors. Such an 
examination helped to better understand the changes in work arrangements and the impact 
that this had on employment relationships in the Nigerian oil industry. The increasing 
utilization of agency workers in the core production areas has great potentials in undermining 
workers’ rights and trade unions organisations. 
Given the aggressive growth of these workers in the workplace, several authors, particularly 
in the US and UK, had already began to argue since the 1990s that this phenomenon threatens 
the existence of the standard employment relationship and represent the end of the distinction 
between core and peripheral labour market segments (Ward et al. 2001; Osterman, 1996).  
This is because agency labour is more economical and seems to be the pathway for 
organisations to generate value (Williams, 2017; Elmuti, 2003: 33). With a contracting 
strategy, an organisation can benefit from cost reduction (Dekker and Koster, 2016: 3; Forde 
and Slater, 2005: 252). For example, the wage of agency workers was observed to be on 
average of 68% to that of the full-time employees (Eun, 2012: 86-87; Forde and Slater 2005). 
Reasons have been that agency workers lack fringe benefits, cost of health insurance and 
employer funded pension plans, and can easily be disposed without redundancy pay. In 
essence, the use of agency workers is seen as an instrument for avoiding employment 
protection legislation for permanent employees and collective agreements. 
 
Although, most literature on the growth of agency labour in some developed nations, such as 
Netherlands, Sweden and Germany, have maintained a core-periphery structure. This is 
because they have more regulated labour markets and stronger industrial relations than most 
developing nations, and the production framework traditionally relies on standard 
employment and labour-management coordination (Hall and Soskice, 2001). 
 
Thus, this study has looked at what, why and how agency labour has been growing in the 
Nigerian oil industry to such an extent to become a relevant labour force segment for trade 
unions to mobilize. This study first evaluates the explanatory power of management interest 
in coordinated labour market outcomes as opposed to the role of labour power resources, 
concluding that previous literature has overestimated management interests in maintaining 
coordinated and flexible labour market segments in dual equilibrium. In contrast, management 
use of agency labour puts core workers under pressure and even triggers competition between 
the two labour market segments. This core-periphery dynamic questions the stability of 
labour-management arrangements which supposedly rely on the protection of core workers at 
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the expense of the peripheral labour force; instead, this dynamic is argued to explain why 
unions have started including agency workers in their representation domain.  
The growth and the shift of agency workers into the core production areas brings with it 
greater involvement of the trade unions, it was found that the move towards greater flexibility 
based on the utilization of these workers, involves cooperation and conflict between and 
within workplace actors. The organisational drive for agency labour has prompted the trade 
unions to extend membership to this emerging group of workers. This indicates the potential 
for innovation in the representational structure of the trade unions as adopted in the case of 
ExxonMobil in chapter 6.  
The deployment of this segment of workers in the core functions of the companies has 
practically changed the organisational structure of the trade unions and their representation of 
employees, which developed on the principle of a bilateral employer-employee relation in the 
past. Thus promotion of organisational flexibility and implementation of flexible work 
arrangements through employment agencies involves the fragmentation of organisations and 
work (Marchington et al. 2005).  
However, given the fragmented labour process, legal and structural constraints are imposed 
on agency workers in terms of trade union participation and interest representation. The 
differences in interests between agency workers and the permanent employees proves as a 
dilemma for their organisation and representation, which negatively impacted on union 
memberships. 
 
At the heart of these organisational flexibility and new work arrangements is the assertion of 
greater control over the operations of the companies and the entire workforce. The heavy 
intervention of management over the affairs of the employment agencies has greatly 
influenced the employment practices of the employers, and the working conditions of their 
workers, resulting to the loss of employers’ business autonomy and the subsequent erosion of 
workers’ rights to unionization. In view of this, this study argued that increased managerial 
autonomy and control over the affairs of the employment agencies and workers, led to 
employers’ hostility towards trade unionism and the lack of interests exhibited by agency 
workers towards unionization. 
 
Although, empirical findings revealed that in the case of ExxonMobil, closer working 
relationships between the permanent employees and agency workers stimulated the interest of 
the workers in union representation, and of course, with the cooperation of the represented. 
294 
 
The outcome of such effort was the organisation of agency workers in 2012, although, 
PENGASSAN criticised this outcome as being operational in theory and not in practice due to 
short-term contracts terms now awarded to workers. Certainly, the organisation of agency 
workers is constrained by structural barriers that are rooted in their terms and conditions of 
work. However, the attempted move by PENGASSAN to extend their membership of 
inclusion, indicates the possibility for innovation in the organisational structure of the trade 
unions. There is no doubt that the representation and rights of agency workers at ExxonMobil 
will continue to be subject of evolving modification that will likely extend to other branches 
of PENGASSAN and NUPENG. 
 
The Nigerian oil industry trade unions (PENGASSAN and NUPENG) have been under attack 
by the powerful owners of the means of production. The erosion of labour rights associated to 
the race-to-bottom employment practices in the industry is particularly a matter of concern in 
the drive for low road labour practices. The insensitivity of the management and repressive 
measures that the powerful industrial employers possess, supported by the state machinery, 
have been in operations over the past two decades. Although, there is nothing new about this, 
Marx has always seen the state as promoting the affairs of the bourgeoisie against labour, and 
the history of trade unions anywhere is nothing but a repetitive attack after attack on the 
dignity and rights of workers, particularly, in this modern industrialist mode of operations, 
promoted by neoliberal agenda. Neoliberal economic policy promoted exploitative economic 
growth in Nigeria, thereby widening the gap of social inequality in the workplace.  
 
8.2. Neoliberalism a Precursor to the Increasing Utilization of Agency Labour in the 
Nigerian Oil Industry 
 
This thesis also found that labour market deregulation and eroding industrial relations 
institutions promoted the growth of agency labour in the Nigerian oil industry. The major 
relevant institutional changes were the deregulation of the labour market and the Nigerian 
labour law reform in 2005, whereby automatic trade union membership clause, and the right 
to strike were abolished (Fajana, 2005). Significantly, these institutional changes have 
previously been interpreted as the catalysts to flexible work arrangements. 
 
With flexible work arrangements, workers have become the unfavourable categories in the 
process of economic globalization. Neoliberalism has driven the global world into 
competition in different forms, which mainly reflects in business and employment 
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relationships.  This agenda advocated for the removal of state control, regulations and 
protection of any business sector, promoted the free market policy that has the capability to 
regulate the labour market and wages. Deregulations and liberalisation opens up loopholes 
employers can exploit by circumventing legal and collectively agreed standards (Doellgast, 
Batt et al. 2009; Jaehrling and Méhaut 2012).  
Although, the International Labour Organisation (ILO) was never disposed to deregulation 
and liberalization because of the monopolistic control by MNCs and by few industrialised 
countries. This arrangement is perceived to be unfavourable to the developing nations, 
particularly Nigeria, who was believed to be coerced to adopt the neo-liberal ideology through 
the implementations of various anti-social and anti-people policies (Omoyibo, 2012; 
Fapohounda, 2012). The active role of government in deregulating the labour market have 
been taken into account as factors promoting the growth of agency workers and the shifting 
balance of power in favour of employers. 
One of the effects of these anti-social policies is the externalization of the internal labour 
market in the Nigerian oil industry, which is steadily eroding the size of the traditional 
permanent workforce that represents the core of the trade unions.  A deliberate attempt by the 
unions to represents the external labour force met with great challenges due to employers’ 
hostility, workers’ fragmentation, short-term contracts of employment, and the lack of interest 
exhibited by the represented and the agency workers. The conflictual interests between the 
two-tier workforce is definitely promoting the game of the employer, divide and rule strategy 
to have absolute control over the labour force who do not see themselves as workers. These 
phenomena present new challenges for the organised labour, which naturally represents 
workers in permanent employment contracts (Gumbrell-McCormick, 2010). 
 
This study revealed that agency workers’ attitudes towards trade unions participation are 
influenced by the strategies of their employers’ policies, their employment status and 
conditions. By examining the propensity of agency to union participation, this study 
demonstrated different interests among the various group of workers. It was also revealed that 
the representational problem is compounded by the conflicting interests and compromise 
between workplace actors.  
 
The conflicts between labour and management in dealing with agency workers representation 
are reflected in the contradictory approach of the management of oil MNCs in the context of 
employment relations.  Here the key factor relates to the strategic options unions have for 
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aligning their interests with either the agency workers or management, which proves critical 
in explaining these strategic choices. These strategic options are, in turn, shaped by changes in 
the institutional setting, which reconfigure constraints and opportunities for actors. 
 
In addition, the proliferation of neoliberal policies shifted power and authority to employers 
and marginalized the trade unions. At the heart of these policies is the assertion of flexible 
work arrangements, and greater control over operations of employment relations through the 
employment agencies. In this circumstance, the fundamental argument of this study which is 
more than fully supported by evidence indicates that equitable labour practices cannot emerge 
in management driven work flexibility organisations on a generalized basis and be sustained 
in labour surplus markets in the open economy context of neoliberal globalization.  
 
The inequitable employment relations contributed to the marginalisation of the agency 
workers from trade union representational scope. As the institutional limitations on the usage 
of agency labour weakened by neoliberal reforms, employers were found not only greatly 
involved in the use of agency labour, but far way beyond the peripheral activities into core 
production areas of their organisations, which thus questions the flexible firm model of 
Atkinson (1984), and the dual labour market segmentation theory of Doeringer and Piore 
(1971) and the issue of trust between labour and management. 
 
A critical problem that has arisen from the move towards greater organisational flexibility is 
the fact that it has not been accompanied by any innovation in working practices or 
improvement of industrial relations. For example, it was found that standard employees’ 
terms of employment had become more rigid following the pool of agency workers in the 
workplace. Neither has the employment security guarantee agreement for existing permanent 
employees between management and the trade unions been directly reflected in the promotion 
of mutual trust between labour and management.  
 
Not surprisingly, through observing the dismissal of a great number of their colleagues, and 
the subsequent large-scale recruitment of agency workers, trade unions have become 
increasingly sceptical about explicit employment guarantees. This is another great insight 
gained out of this research, which is the fear of losing job in the presence of the growing and 
expanding agency workers. More worrisome it becomes seeing positions once occupied by 
permanent employees now filled up with agency workers, who are not keen in participating in 
trade unionism. 
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8.3.  The Contradictory Nature of Employment Relations 
The key findings of this study is the contradictory nature of the use of agency workers as it 
extends its scope from peripheral functions to the core production activities; as well as the 
contradictory data on trade unions mobilization of these workers in ExxonMobil Nigeria. This 
study highlighted series of contradictions inherent in the use of agency labour in the Nigerian 
oil industry. One of the significant factor of these contradictions is the deployment of agency 
workers with fewer employment rights into the core production activities. The attainments of 
greater flexibility through the use of employment agencies indicate the substitution of 
bilateral employment relations while maintaining a distance contractual responsibility. 
Nevertheless, organisational stability and efficiency remains important to management’s 
pursuit for flexible work arrangements, despite attempt to circumvent employers’ obligations 
to their workers. 
The dawning awareness and adverse effects of agency workers in the core production areas, 
which includes the potential threat to job security and weakened of trade unions strength, 
caused the perception and attitude of the trade unions to move against further growth, by 
adopting the inclusive strategy towards the externalised labour force. This move was only 
acknowledged by ExxonMobil management on its approval for PENGASSAN to represent 
workers on triangular employment relationships. Despite its approval, PENGASSAN had the 
challenge of mobilization due to the fragmentation and short-term nature of their contracts 
terms. Hence the union argues that the right to mobilize is only documented, but not 
practicable. The inability by the union, posed a greater challenge, which has tentatively leads 
to series of conflicts between labour and management, which consequently culminated into 
strike actions (see Table 48 of chapter 7). 
These conflicts of interests exist not only in relations between labour and management, but 
also between standard employees and agency workers, as well as among the represented and 
union officials. For example, despite the industry trade unions implementation of a more 
inclusive policy for agency workers in recent times, some of the union branches are still 
indisposed to pursue the change of inclusive strategy. Study reveals that such an ambivalent 
position of the trade unions and the represented is connected to the growth and use of agency 
workers in the core production areas. While on the other hand, this study found that agency 
workers’ attitudes to union participation were influenced by both the oil MNCs and their 
employers’ policies, coupled with their unrecognised status by the Nigerian legal framework. 
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Despite all these impediments to the mobilization of agency workers, the issue of membership 
inclusion, still remains a key reform agenda for the Nigerian oil industry trade unions.  
In summary, the shifts in the attitudes/perceptions towards agency workers’ representations, 
calls for more educative forum for both the represented and non-represented to deal with the 
issue of conflicting interests, this would possibly reshape the practices of the use of agency 
labour, as well as workplace representation. It is feasible that the changes in the representation 
of agency workers and the challenges faced will be altered as agency labour evolves in the 
Nigerian oil industry. 
 
8.4. Contributions  
 
This research study has contributed to the existing literature by demonstrating the dynamics 
between core and peripheral labour market segments. It has challenged Atkinson flexible firm 
model and labour market segmentation theory on the argument that both the core and 
peripheral belongs to two distinctive markets. It has shown tension between labour and 
management based on these two segments, and the outcome which depends on the power 
balance between the actors and the strategies implemented. This study argued that 
institutional changes undermined workers’ homogeneity, and increases managerial control 
over employment relations, thus, paving the way for management to increasingly utilized 
agency workers, thereby, steadily eroding the size of the traditional core workforce and 
undermining the trade unions. 
 
Thus, this study has argued that the concept of core and peripheral substitution relies on the 
misinterpretation of the dynamics between core and peripheral as distinct labour market 
segments. On the contrary, this study revealed that the growth of agency workers, by 
extension into the core production process can threaten the permanent workforce, compelling 
trade unions to expand their representational constituencies to the externalised workers. 
Although, Heery and Adler, (2004) study on the revitalisation of union strategies has already 
argued that trade union is likely to include these workers when its membership and resources 
have been declining. Other literature also indicates that strong institutionalised trade unions 
can adopt revitalising strategies departing from the traditional way (Turner, 2009; Greer, 
2008).  
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However, existing studies have mainly focused on exceptional union campaigns for 
organising agency workers, preventing an analysis of the conditions under which unions 
abandon insider-focused strategies to adopt inclusive strategies and then to institutionalise 
them in the long term. This study has shown that the triangular employment relationships and 
fragmentation, as well as, the short-term contracts of agency workers constitute unions’ 
exclusive positions on these groups of workers. While on the other hand, the substitution 
dynamics between core and peripheral workers provokes unions’ inclusive strategies towards 
agency workers.  
 
In addition, this study has shown that the opposition against agency labour, particularly, as it 
concerns the increasing usage of agency workers in core production areas, has to be pursued 
outside the industrial workplace and escalated to other sectoral and institutional levels as 
workplace representation could not prevent the growth of this labour force. By setting sectoral 
standards and including agency workers in their representation constituencies, labour 
movement thus strengthens its power at each bargaining level. By this act, it extends the 
possibility of adopting Heery (2004) typology to the study of trade unions responses to 
agency workers. This study likewise suggests that labour movement solidarity is necessary in 
an increasingly fragmented labour market for delivery positive outcomes for the workforce 
(Marx, 1977; Simms and Dean, 2014).  
 
Furthermore, drawn on industrial relations studies regarding trade unions’ strategic choices, 
which help understand why differences in trade unions responses, within a given industrial 
context and same institutional settings, this study arrived at a conclusion that was drawn from 
empirical findings, the need for a unified and solidaristic approach between institutions, 
unions leadership and workers’ roles against the powerful industrial predators in the Nigerian 
oil industry. Several studies are in support of the integrated approach (Darlington, 2009; Lee, 
2009; Frege and Kelly, 2003), however, these studies have basically focused on attempting to 
present the possibility of an integrated approach as explanatory power with detailed empirical 
evidence drawing on different cases. In this regard, this study contributes to scholarly efforts 
in a multidimensional and detailed form notably with reference to the challenge of broadening 
trade unions’ strategic choices beyond their standard constituencies to agency workers. In the 
process, it reveals the necessity to integrate both institutional and non-institutional factors into 
a single analytical framework. 
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 It further contributes to the current discussion on workers’ exploitation and the ‘decent work 
concept’ of the International Labour Organisation (ILO, 2009), and its associated policy 
agenda, as advocated by the trade unions. It is hoped that it provides the possibility to 
appreciate the impacts of the growth and expansion of agency labour not only on the trade 
unions and workers, but the society in general. 
 
8.5. Practical Policy Implication 
 
The use of agency labour is fast becoming less seasonal and more built into business model 
like never before. Economically, the utilization of this labour force seems logical; it increases 
the ease, and reduces the cost of responding to changes in business fluctuations, making the 
business market more versatile. The obligation to pay high wages and to retain employees led 
to employers organisational restructuring to accommodate flexible work arrangements and 
undermine trade union. The neoliberal economic-political institutions do not support workers’ 
representation, high wages and employment security, rather agency labour by nature 
developed out of the pursuit of employers need for organisational flexibility and profit 
accumulation. 
The flexible work arrangements close off this route by establishing the ease with which 
employers can offer and withdraw work, as well as the deprivation of the means of control. 
Marginalising agency workers from collective representation reinforces the power of the 
employers, and weakens that of the union. This raises the issue of legal implications. The law 
is such that agency workers have few, if any, employment rights.  
 
This study appeals to policy-makers to carefully consider the implementation of regulatory 
body similar to Transfer of Undertakings Protection of Employment (TUPE) in the UK, with 
such regulatory body in place, trade unions are more likely to adopt inclusive strategies 
towards agency workers without much confrontation from employers, and with less effort to 
forge common interests between workers on different employment contracts, or just like the 
Chinese government’s enactment of a new Labour Contract Law in 2008 to accommodate 
these emerging workers (He, B and Xie, Y. 2012:426) .  
Academics and policy makers have promoted these reforms as an equitable mechanism for 
bridging the inequitable segmentation between internal and external labour force (Bentolila et 
al. 2012). As argued in chapter 2 and 3, the increase of precarious work has implications not 
only for workers’ representation and industrial democracy but also for the welfare of the 
society in general (Standing, 2011; Dorre, 2013). 
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Furthermore, some crucial policy issues were raised in this study. The evidence suggests that 
even the employment agencies supplying these labour force, appeared as unregulated labour 
suppliers (when inadequacies or gaps exist in the legislation, including the interpretation of 
legal provisions and their implementation. One area that lacks this legal clarity is agency 
labour) and have serve as a catalyst for the externalization of labour thriving within the oil 
industry. In addition, the growth of this workforce seems deliberate, systematic, and 
calculative act not only to relinquish management obligations, but also to undermine the trade 
unions that are the voice of the powerless. The externalization of employment relations, 
through the use of employment agencies do not only affects trade unions negatively, in terms 
of membership strength and collectiveness, but also for the general wellbeing of the wider 
society (Standing, 2011). 
In documenting the way in which the use of agency labour had worked to the advantage of 
management and disadvantage of workers and their trade unions, this study raises important 
implications for Nigerian policy makers and workplace industrial relations actors. It, 
therefore, becomes a matter of policy concern in relation to the economic wellbeing of the 
powerless and vulnerable workers, because the increasing utilization of agency workers in the 
Nigerian oil industry suggests that it is unregulated. 
The importance of the policy implications with regards to agency workers in triangular 
employment relationships is not new. In the 1980s, (Atkinson, 1984) posited that changes in 
consumers’ demand creates pressure for greater flexibility and demands for low-costs and 
easier labour, and therefore will result in higher availability of this labour force.  
Pollert (1988) argues that one of the many flaws of Atkinson’s Flexible Model was the 
disregard for policy implications. Particularly, policies on different non-standard work 
arrangements, that would allow choices for workers and would also avoid the legitimacy of 
employers’ assertions that flexible work arrangements need to be considered given the market 
circumstances. In addition, labour deregulation, which may be connected to lack of 
employment protection, reflects the need for negotiation between management, employers, 
and trade unions. These concerns remain open and urgently necessitate the attention of 
government and policy makers. Besides, today’s triangular employment relationships, 
necessitates the need for new policies that will promote equality in the workplace and put an 
end to workers’ subjugation. 
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8.6. Future Research 
This study has provided a detailed empirical analysis of the rationale for the growth and 
increasing utilization of agency workers in the Nigerian oil industry and unions’ challenges. 
However, there are some crucial issues that emerged that call for further investigation. A very 
significant concern that should further be explored is the State Regulation (Gaps in labour 
legislation). It is well acknowledged that the prevalence use of agency labour has been 
recognised to be varied across nations, and that a regulatory approach of this form of work 
depends on a specific socio-economic context of the individual state. On this note, an 
investigation of how and to what extent state policies and regulations influences the usage of 
agency labour in different national and industrial setting is essential. Such comparative 
analysis would however, be beneficial in understanding the changes in employment relations, 
the polarization of the workforces and employment practices in different contexts. It would 
also aid to draw policy implications for the development of more effective labour protection 
measures for agency workers. 
Furthermore, there is need to investigate and address the issue of human capital shortage 
which underpins one of the rationale for the increase utilization of expatriates and the lack of 
skills transfer in the industry. Such an investigative research can uncover themes, which 
possibly would lead to skills enhancement and development and subsequently put an end or 
minimised the use of expatriates and agency labour. 
 
8.7. Implications, Recommendations and Implementations 
This study highlighted series of contradictions inherent in the use of agency labour in the 
Nigerian oil industry, for example, the growth and the increasing utilization of agency 
workers in the core activities. The use of agency labour is fast becoming less seasonal and 
more built into business model like never before. Their status has become temporary-
permanent without an end-date to their contract of employment, due to the intermittent 
renewal of contracts, thereby undermining the core areas of employment conditions and 
strength of trade unionism. 
One interesting findings was that both institutional and non-institutional factors played a 
pivotal role in the declining nature of union membership. On the one hand, trade union 
desired to organise agency workers, but are apprehensive of undermining the conditions of the 
represented. However, since the increasing usage of agency workers is negatively impacting 
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on their membership the strategy of inclusion has been adopted by PENGASSAN, although 
this strategy proves more challenging because of the heterogeneous status of the workers. 
While on the other hand, agency workers desired strongly to be represented and have some 
collective defence, however, they are concerned that the trade unions are not really the best or 
reliable vehicle for them due to the views held (union is more concerned about the 
represented) and the “yellow dog contract” forced to sign by their employers, coupled with 
their unrecognised status by the Nigerian labour law. 
Nigeria as a nation has made major strides in attaining international labour standard sets out 
by ILO, such as the enactment of Pension Reform Act 2004, and Employee’s Compensation 
Act 2010. However, the reform of the Trade Unions Act 2005 tends to demonstrate one step 
forward, and two steps backward in the process. The reform did not take into considerations 
the interest of employees, particularly, the non-standard workers, and has been widely 
criticized by both national and international bodies.  The reform is perceived not to be in 
harmony with international labour standards (ILO) and the practice of industrial relations.  In 
view of this seemingly negative impact of the reform on workers, and from the finding, this 
study recommends the following: 
 
1. The Nigerian oil industry trade unions are in need of three-pillar policy, (i) to protect 
the rights of all workers and (ii) to combat the growing alienation between unions and 
the agency workers, (iii) between union leadership, and the represented in having a 
common goal. The present individualised leadership, fragmentation on political lines 
and motive to gain monetary benefits for their members alone do not provide the ideal 
platform for the mobilization of agency workers. Therefore there is need to evolve 
internal democracy within trade unions. To accomplish this, it is necessary that the 
union leadership, the represented and branches should be united with a common voice 
and goal. If they need to survive, then they have to go in this direction. 
 
2. They must rise up to the challenge of providing quality services, dynamic leadership 
style, transparent democratic principle towards the protections of not only their 
members, but also to the non-unionized agency workers. 
 
3. Trade union leadership needs to be more proactive,  pay more attention to the 
changing market environment, in terms of innovative technology, economic and social 
transformation, as well as the new management style. In view of this, the union must 
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redefine their role in the new environment and adopt an appropriate strategy to tackle 
the problems posed by the new order, in terms of training. Without such changes, it 
will be difficult for them to mobilised and unionised agency workers. 
 
4. Trade unions must intensify and determined in their aggressiveness to mobilize 
agency workers and remain resolute toward labour unity. They must all fight non-
standard labour with one voice. There should try and resolve all their differences in 
this struggle of fighting workers exploitation.  
 
5. The unions must unite; form solidarity to counter the power of capital in this age of 
neoliberalism that has eroded labour standard. They should see themselves as labour 
against capital, and let go off the divide and rule strategy of the employers in causing 
confusion and disunity in their midst. 
 
6. Trade unions need to concentrate on organising the temporary agency workers by 
forming one general union in the unorganised sector. Enterprise unions cannot do 
much going by the new management strategy; such an area based general union can 
take care of agency workers of individual employment agency in the matter of 
negotiation with management. This area based general union also need to have link 
with the oil industry and national level united trade union centre. If unions move in 
this direction, there may still be a good future ahead. But if not, the present situation is 
not promising for them. 
 
7. For the employers, it has been observed that globalization, technology, increased 
competition and more are forces behind the growth of agency labour.  Economically, 
the utilization of this labour force seems logical; it increases the ease, and reduces the 
cost of responding to changes in business fluctuations, making the business market 
more versatile.  In view of this, it is recommended that more attention should be given 
to capacity development for efficiency and effectiveness,  because high rate of job 
turnover associated with agency labour has some measure of negative impact  not only 
in achieving organizational goals and objectives, but also on the living standard, self-
esteem and the general well-being of the workers. 
 
8. The government on its part should not only  enact laws that will reflect the realities of 
contemporary employment relationship, but also address all forms of unfair labour 
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practices and implements same to serve as deterrent to organisations that are found of 
exploiting workers. Employment relationship should be structured in such a way that 
there is no gap in employment benefits between permanent employees and agency 
workers, especially when carrying out same job functions. 
 
9. Also, making agency work an option for the intending worker would create an 
atmosphere and the enabling environment for the worker to engage based on personal 
preference for the nature of employment arrangement.  This is because agency work 
could be designed in such a way that it creates opportunity for the worker to be 
involved in other activities of interest, as well as enjoying work-life-balance. 
 
10. Finally, there is need to adopt and implement some (if not all) of the conventions and 
declarations by the ILO, which promote the decent work agenda. The government also 
has to look at the re-regulation of the labour market and taking back the power to hire 
and fire workers from the employers, and set-up effective independent body to look at 
any queries before firing worker as it is done in Netherland and UK (TUPE). The 
important thing is that any labour legislation passed by the government, should 
conform to international labour standards and best practice. 
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Appendix 1 
  
  
  
           College of Arts & Social Sciences  
                        Room 633 Maxwell Building  
                         The Crescent  
                      Salford, M5 4WT  
                 Tel: 0161 295 5876  
  
  
11 May 2015  
  
Joan Itegboje  
University of Salford  
  
Dear Joan  
  
  
Re:  Ethical Approval Application – 140025  
  
I am pleased to inform you that based on the information provided, the Research Ethics Panel have no 
objections on ethical grounds to your project.  
  
  
Yours sincerely  
  
  
  
Deborah Woodman  
On Behalf of CASS Research Ethics Panel  
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Appendix 2 
Joan Itegboje 
Salford Business School 
Maxwell Building, 
5
th
 Floor Salford 
M5 4WT 
Tel: +44 (0) 7879726081 
E-mail: j.o.itegboje1@edu.salford.ac.uk 
 
08/03/2015 
 
INFORMATION LETTERS TO INTERVIEWEES 
 
Dear Sir/Madam, 
 
My name is Joan Omone Itegboje, a PhD student, at the College of Business and Law, Salford 
Business School, The University of Salford, United Kingdom. I am conducting a research on:  
 
‘The Growth of Agency Labour in the Nigerian Oil Industry and its Challenges for Trade Union 
Organisation’. 
 
 
The main aim of carrying out this research is to assess the way the shift from standard employment to 
contract jobs in a crucial Nigerian arena of employment has been a source of on-going dispute 
between employers and trade unions in the Nigerian oil and gas industry. The study intends to 
understand the factors influencing managerial decisions on outsourcing/contracting of labour and why 
workers take up employment of contract status.   
 
 
As part of getting the research objectives, the views of some management personnel, line-managers, 
HR professionals, trade unions representatives, employment agencies, community leaders and the 
ministry of labour will be accessed through structured and unstructured interview. Similarly, 
questionnaires will be administered to the employees of the industry. 
 
- The interview will take relatively 45minutes to an hour 
- Participation is completely voluntary 
- Participants are free to recede their consent at any time 
- Data and information gathered will be analysed by the researcher only for the purpose of this 
research, and will not affect any participants by any means 
- The researcher intends to record each interview, with the consent of the interviewee.  The 
researcher will take down notes in the cause of the interviews and use the recording version to 
cross-check the accuracy of the transcribed notes 
- At the end of the data analysis, both the recorded and transcribed notes will be discarded 
accordingly to avoid misuse 
- The final written thesis will ensure anonymity by not using real names or identifying features 
of any interviewee except otherwise specified. 
This letter seeks your indulgence to be part of this research.  Please signify this in the section at the 
end of this letter. 
 
Kind Regards 
 
 
Joan Itegboje. 
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Note: If you have any concern of the conduct of this research, please contact: 
 
Professor Ralph Darlington 
Director of School of Business 
The University of Salford 
Salford 
Greater Manchester 
M5 4WT 
Tel. ++44 (0)161-295-5456 
Email: r.r.darlington@salford.ac.uk 
 
Thank you in anticipation for all participants 
 
 
 
Please signify approval for your participation in the research by deleting as applicable.  I wish/I do 
not wish to participate in the research titled: Assessing Outsourcing and Contracting of Labour in the 
Nigerian oil and gas industry. 
 
---------------------------------------------- 
Signature 
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Appendix 3 
 
08/03/2015 
 
Department of Petroleum Resources 
7 Kofo Abayomi Street 
Victoria Island 
Lagos State 
Nigeria. 
 
Dear Sir/Ma, 
 
The bearer, Ms Joan Omone Itegboje, is a full-time postgraduate research student at Salford 
Business School, University of Salford, UK. She is studying for a Doctorate Degree in  
Contemporary Employment Relations: Critical view on The Growth of Agency Labour in 
the Nigerian Oil Industry and its Challenges for Trade Union Organisation’ and she is 
my supervisee. 
 
Ms Itegboje is researching on the factors influencing managerial decisions on agency labour 
in the Nigerian oil industry and the trade unions challenges: A case study of the Nigerian Oil 
Industry and would need your department assistance in gathering the necessary data for her 
study. She would be collecting primary data via interviews and questionnaires. 
 
Whatever information your department provides her would be treated with utmost 
confidentiality. 
 
Your kind cooperation would be most appreciated. 
 
Kind Regards, 
 
 
Prof. Ralph Darlington 
Professor of Employment Relations and Director of Post-Graduate Research 
Salford Business School, College of Business and Law 
University of Salford, 
Salford, Manchester, M5 4WT, UK 
Tel. ++44 (0)161-295-5456 
email: r.r.darlington@salford.ac.uk 
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Appendix 4 
 
08/03/2015 
 
Operations Controller 
Department of Petroleum Resources 
7 Kofo Abayomi Street 
Victoria Island 
Lagos State 
Nigeria. 
 
Dear Sir, 
 
Request for Permission to Access Oil Companies for Research Purposes 
 
I am a postgraduate research student at the Salford Business School, University of Salford, 
UK.  I am studying for a Doctorate Degree. The research is a professional doctorate degree 
that is fashioned to address contemporary employment relations issues of concern with the 
aim of providing relevant and practicable recommendations to business organizations. 
 
I wish to request for permission to access selected oil companies in the oil and gas industry 
for the purpose of data collection. My research project is titled: “Assessing Contemporary 
Employment Relations: Critical View on The Growth of Agency Labour in the Nigerian 
Oil Industry and its Challenges for Trade Union Organisation’. I choose the Nigerian oil 
and gas industry as the context in which to study this subject, because of the exacerbating 
disputes among the social partners and of its significance to the Nigerian economy. 
  
In particular, I have chosen to study this process drawing cases from specific multinational oil 
companies in the industry. I wish to collect primary data through interviews and 
questionnaires from the following companies in the industry: 
 
1. Shell Petroleum Development Company 
2. ExxonMobil Corporation 
3. Chevron Nigeria Ltd 
 
Data collected from the above companies would be treated with utmost confidentiality. 
 
Thank you for your kind consideration. 
 
Yours sincerely, 
 
 
Joan Itegboje 
Email: j.o.itegboje1@edu.salford.ac.uk 
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Appendix 5 
 
08/03/2015 
 
ExxonMobil Corporation  
Mobil House 
1 Lekki Expressway 
Victoria Island 
Lagos State 
Nigeria. 
 
Dear Sir/Ma, 
 
The bearer, Ms Joan Omone Itegboje, is a full-time postgraduate research student at Salford 
Business School, University of Salford, UK.  She is studying for a Doctorate Degree in 
Contemporary Employment Relations: Critical view on The Growth of Agency Labour in 
the Nigerian Oil Industry and its Challenges for Trade Union Organisation’ and she is 
my supervisee. 
 
Ms Itegboje is researching on the factors influencing managerial decisions on 
outsourcing/contracting of labour in the Nigerian oil and gas industry and the trade unions 
oppositions. She would need your company’s assistance in gathering the necessary data (via 
questionnaires and interviews) for her study.  
 
Whatever information your corporation provides her would be treated with utmost 
confidentiality. 
 
Your kind cooperation would be most appreciated. 
 
Kind Regards, 
 
 
Prof. Ralph Darlington 
Professor of Employment Relations and Director of Post-Graduate Research 
Salford Business School, College of Business and Law 
University of Salford, 
Salford, Manchester, M5 4WT, UK 
Tel. ++44 (0)161-295-5456 
email: r.r.darlington@salford.ac.uk 
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Appendix 6 
MANAGEMENT INTERVIEW  
 
Section A:  
 
Name of Company: 
Sex: 
Age: 
Length of time in job: 
Company: 
Status: 
Work location: 
Union membership: 
 
 
Section B: The primary question posed by the research has been framed as thus:  
 
1. What are the management rationales for the increasing usage of agency labour? 
2. Are contract workers on pathways being permanent employees or they are used to 
cover up? 
3. Besides the upsurge of agency workers, there is a new twist of subjecting permanent 
workers to contract staff, what is your view on this? 
4. Are contract workers more economical than permanent workers? 
5. What nature of job are they (contract employees) mainly used for? (Core or 
Peripheral)? 
 
Section C:  
1. Why are the trade unions opposing the use of agency labour in the industry? 
2. These workers, do they have the right to unionisation? 
 
3. In some quarters, it is believed that management are unduly shifting employees’ 
responsibility to a third party, especially in a process where they perceived the trade 
unions representing the workforce as militants and also to cut-cost: how factual is this 
statement? 
 
4. Do the trade unions have a role in the decision that concerns employees’ engagement? 
 
5. Recently there have been agitations by the trade unions against the management of the 
oil and gas industry, what are the causes of this unrest. Can you elaborate on the 
nature and extent of the exacerbating conflicts? 
 
Section D: 
6. It is believed in a triangular form of employment system there are differential terms 
and conditions of employment among a two-tier workforce (core and peripheral) what 
are the implications/consequences (if any) on employees under this new employment 
system as well as the company 
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Section E: 
7. With this triangular form of employment relations, how would you describe the 
relationship between management and the trade unions/employees? 
 
8. If flexible form of labour is however admitted and necessary in a competitive market, 
the question now is, how protected is the workforce under the new labour system. 
 
9. What preventive measures do the company have in place for occupational health 
hazards? 
10. What are the relevance challenges or issues in this area? 
11. To what extent does bad working conditions has been seen as a reflection of 
precarious employment condition and to what point is it viewed as a result of 
segregated work, lack of training, unfair treatment; and lack of integration? 
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Appendix 7 
 
TRADE UNIONS INTERVIEW 
 
Section A: Background Data: 
 
1. Age:  …………….years 
2. Sex: Male  (  )     Female  (  ) 
3. Name of Company: 
4. Educational Qualification (Highest): 
5. Name of trade union  
6. How long have you been with the trade union? 
7. Status: 
8. No. of employees covered 
9. Typical Membership (in terms of permanent and contract employees; gender, 
hours of work and age) 
 
Section B: Knowledge of the Subject Matter 
10. There has been an upsurge in the use of agency workers what is the trade union 
stand on this issue of concern? 
11. What are management rational for the increasing usage of agency workers, and 
why the oppositions from the trade unions? 
12. How many of your members are contract employees? 
13. What nature of job are they mainly used for? (Core or Peripheral)? 
14. Agency workers, have rights to unionisation? 
15. How do you mobilise agency workers? 
16. Can trade union actually represent agency workers? 
17. Does the trade union experience challenges in representing agency workers? 
18. In what areas are you able to represent agency workers and to whom (employment 
agency or professional indemnity) 
19. Has the union ever handled any issue raised by agency worker (s)? What kind of 
issues, can you give me some instances? 
20. Do trade unions have any relationship with the employment agencies? What kind 
of relationship? 
21. Do you engage in collective bargaining with the employment agencies? 
 
Section C:  
 
22. To what extent do the differential terms and conditions of a two-tier workforce 
have negative consequences on employees as well as the company under 
contemporary employment system? 
23. Do they have same responsibilities and benefits as the permanent staff? 
24.  Do they have same rights as the permanent employees? 
25. Are they equally treated as directly employed staff by management and 
colleagues? 
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26. Would you say that the balance of power within the workplace is in favour of the 
employers going by the triangular terms of employment contract and the arbitrary 
fixing of wages without collective bargaining? 
 
Section D:  
27. What has been the relationship between management and trade union as a result of 
this new work arrangement? 
Section E:  
28. In recent times there have been agitations by the trade unions against the 
management of the oil industry, what are the causes of these unrest. Can you 
elaborate on the nature and extent of the exacerbating conflicts? 
29. What is your view about expatriate quotas- are the MNCs respecting this quota? 
30. What is the bill of local content all about? 
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Appendix 8 
Table 8A: Permanent Workers (Respondents’ Employment Status, Qualifications, Experience 
and Annual Income 
Employment 
Status 
Qualifications 
Years Of Experience 
In The Oil And Gas 
Industry 
Income 
Less Than 
N10 Million 
N10 - 20 
Million 
N20 -30 
Million 
N30 - 40 
Million 
N40 - 50 
Million 
Over 
N50Million 
Permanent 
Staff 
Never Attended School 
Less Than 1 Year - - - - - - 
1-5 Years - - - - - - 
6-10 Years - - - - - - 
11-15 Years - - - - - - 
16-20 Years - - - - - - 
Over 20 Years - - - - - - 
Primary School 
Less Than 1 Year - - - - - - 
1-5 Years - - - - - - 
6-10 Years - - - - - - 
11-15 Years - - - - - - 
16-20 Years - - - - - - 
Over 20 Years - - - - - - 
Junior Secondary 
School(JSS) 
Less Than 1 Year - - - - - - 
1-5 Years - - - - - - 
6-10 Years - - - - - - 
11-15 Years - - - - - - 
16-20 Years - - - - - - 
Over 20 Years - - - - - - 
Senior Secondary 
School(SSS) 
Less Than 1 Year - - - - - - 
1-5 Years - - - - - - 
6-10 Years - - - - - - 
11-15 Years - - - - - - 
16-20 Y 
ears - 1 - - - - 
Over 20 Years - 1 - - - - 
National 
Diploma(ND)/National 
Certificate Of 
Education(NCE) 
Less Than 1 Year - - - - - - 
1-5 Years - - - - - - 
6-10 Years - - - - - - 
11-15 Years - - - - - - 
16-20 Years - - - - - - 
Over 20 Years - - - - - - 
Bachelor  Degree(BSC; 
BA/Higher National 
Diploma(HND) 
Less Than 1 Year - - - - - - 
1-5 Years - - - - - - 
6-10 Years - - 2 - - - 
11-15 Years - - 1 2 1 1 
16-20 Years - - 1 - - 1 
Over 20 Years - - - - - 1 
Higher University 
Degree (E.G. PGD; 
MSC; MBA And PhD) 
Less Than 1 Year - - - - - - 
1-5 Years - - - 1 - - 
6-10 Years - - - 2 2 - 
11-15 Years - - - 1 4 5 
16-20 Years - - - 1 1 20 
Over 20 Years - - - - - 11 
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Table 8B: Contract Workers 
Employment 
Status 
Qualifications 
Years Of Experience In 
The Oil And Gas Industry 
Income 
Less Than 
N10 Million 
N10 - 20 
Million 
N20 -30 
Million 
N30 - 40 
Million 
N40-50 
Million 
Over N50 
Million 
Contract Staff 
Never Attended 
School 
Less Than 1 Year - - - - - - 
1-5 Years - - - - - - 
6-10 Years - - - - - - 
11-15 Years - - - - - - 
16-20 Years - - - - - - 
Over 20 Years - - - - - - 
Primary School 
Less Than 1 Year - - - - - - 
1-5 Years - - - - - - 
6-10 Years - - - - - - 
11-15 Years - - - - - - 
16-20 Years - - - - - - 
Over 20 Years - - - - - - 
Junior Secondary 
School(JSS) 
Less Than 1 Year - - - - - - 
1-5 Years - - - - - - 
6-10 Years - - - - - - 
11-15 Years 1 - - - - - 
16-20 Years - - - - - - 
Over 20 Years - - - - - - 
Senior Secondary 
School(SSS) 
Less Than 1 Year - - - - - - 
1-5 Years 1 - - - - - 
6-10 Years - 1 - - - - 
11-15 Years - 1 - - - - 
16-20 Years - 1 - - - - 
Over 20 Years - 1 - - - - 
National 
Diploma(ND)/Nat
ional Certificate 
Of 
Education(NCE) 
Less Than 1 Year - - - - - - 
1-5 Years 1 - - - - - 
6-10 Years - 1 1 - - - 
11-15 Years 1 2 2 - - - 
16-20 Years - 1 - - - - 
Over 20 Years - - - - - - 
Bachelor 
Degree(BSC; 
BA/Higher 
National 
Diploma(HND) 
Less Than 1 Year - - - - - - 
1-5 Years - 3 1 - 1 - 
6-10 Years - 6 5 - - - 
11-15 Years - 3 2 - - - 
16-20 Years - 1 - - - - 
Over 20 Years - - - - 1 - 
Higher University 
Degree (E.G. 
PGD; MSC; MBA 
And PhD) 
Less Than 1 Year - - - - - - 
1-5 Years - - 1 - - - 
6-10 Years - 6 2 - - - 
11-15 Years - - 2 2 1 1 
16-20 Years - - - 5 - - 
Over 20 Years - - - - - - 
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Table 8C: Service Staff 
Employment 
Status 
Qualifications 
Years Of Experience In 
The Oil And Gas Industry 
Income 
Less Than N10 
Million 
N10 - 20 
Million 
N20 -30 
Million 
N30 - 40 
Million 
N40 - 50 
Million 
Over 
N50 
Million 
Service Staff 
Never Attended School 
Less Than 1 Year - - - - - - 
1-5 Years - - - - - - 
6-10 Years - - - - - - 
11-15 Years - - - - - - 
16-20 Years - - - - - - 
Over 20 Years - - - - - - 
Primary School 
Less Than 1 Year - - - - - - 
1-5 Years - - - - - - 
6-10 Years - - - - - - 
11-15 Years - - - - - - 
16-20 Years - - - - - - 
Over 20 Years - - - - - - 
Junior Secondary 
School(JSS) 
Less Than 1 Year - - - - - - 
1-5 Years - - - - - - 
6-10 Years - - - - - - 
11-15 Years - - - - - - 
16-20 Years - - - - - - 
Over 20 Years - - - - - - 
Senior Secondary 
School(SSS) 
Less Than 1 Year - - - - - - 
1-5 Years - - - - - - 
6-10 Years - - - - - - 
11-15 Years - - - - - - 
16-20 Years - - - - - - 
Over 20 Years - - - - - - 
National 
Diploma(ND)/National 
Certificate Of 
Education(NCE) 
Less Than 1 Year - - - - - - 
1-5 Years - - - - - - 
6-10 Years - 1 - - - - 
11-15 Years - 1 - - - - 
16-20 Years - - - - - - 
Over 20 Years - - - - - - 
Bachelor  Degree(BSC; 
BA/Higher National 
Diploma(HND) 
Less Than 1 Year - - - - - - 
1-5 Years - 2 - - - - 
6-10 Years - 3 9 - - - 
11-15 Years - 1 4 - - - 
16-20 Years - - - - - - 
Over 20 Years - - - - - - 
Higher University 
Degree (E.G. PGD; 
MSC; MBA And PhD) 
Less Than 1 Year - - - - - - 
1-5 Years - 2 1 - - - 
6-10 Years - - 3 - - - 
11-15 Years - - - - 1 - 
16-20 Years - - - - - - 
Over 20 Years - - - - - - 
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Table 8D: Support Staff 
Employment 
Status 
Qualifications 
Years Of Experience 
In The Oil And Gas 
Industry 
Income 
Less Than 
N10 Million 
N10 - 20 
Million 
N20 -30 
Million 
N30 - 40 
Million 
N40 - 50 
Million 
Over N50 
Million 
Manpower Staff 
Never Attended School 
Less Than 1 Year - - - - - - 
1-5 Years - - - - - - 
6-10 Years - - - - - - 
11-15 Years - - - - - - 
16-20 Years - - - - - - 
Over 20 Years - - - - - - 
Primary School 
Less Than 1 Year - - - - - - 
1-5 Years - - - - - - 
6-10 Years - - - - - - 
11-15 Years - - - - - - 
16-20 Years - - - - - - 
Over 20 Years - - - - - - 
Junior Secondary School(Jss) 
Less Than 1 Year - - - - - - 
1-5 Years - - - - - - 
6-10 Years - - - - - - 
11-15 Years - - - - - - 
16-20 Years - - - - - - 
Over 20 Years - - - - - - 
Senior Secondary 
School(SSS) 
Less Than 1 Year - - - - - - 
1-5 Years 1 - - - - - 
6-10 Years - - - - - - 
11-15 Years 1 - - - - - 
16-20 Years - - - - - - 
Over 20 Years - - - - - - 
National 
Diploma(ND)/National 
Certificate Of 
Education(NCE) 
Less Than 1 Year - - - - - - 
1-5 Years - - - - - - 
6-10 Years 1 - - - - - 
11-15 Years 1 - - - - - 
16-20 Years - - - - - - 
Over 20 Years - - - - - - 
Bachelor’s Degree(BSC; 
Ba/Higher National 
Diploma(HND) 
Less Than 1 Year - - - - - - 
1-5 Years - 1 - - - - 
6-10 Years - 15 1 - - - 
11-15 Years - - - - - - 
16-20 Years - - 1 - - - 
Over 20 Years - - - - - - 
Higher University Degree 
(E.G. PGD; MSC; MBA And 
PhD) 
Less Than 1 Year - - - - - - 
1-5 Years - - - - - - 
6-10 Years - 2 - - - - 
11-15 Years - 1 3 - 1 - 
16-20 Years - - - - - - 
Over 20 Years - - - - - - 
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Appendix 9 
Respondent Response 
  
Company 
Shell ExxonMobil Chevron Total 
Mea
n 
SD Description 
Mea
n 
SD Description Mean SD Description Mean SD Description 
Technological 
Innovation 
4.67 0.85 
Highly 
Preferred 
4.54 1.09 
Highly  
Preferred 
4.57 1.07 
Highly 
Preferred 
4.60 0.99 
Highly 
Preferred 
Cutting-Cost 
(Wages, Training, 
Benefits And 
Others) 
4.56 0.65 
Highly 
Preferred 
4.57 0.59 
Highly  
Preferred 
4.49 0.77 
Highly 
Preferred 
4.55 0.65 
Highly 
Preferred 
Focusing On 
Competence 
3.16 1.26 Preferred 3.31 1.21 Preferred 3.35 1.23 Preferred 3.26 1.23 Preferred 
Union Militancy 4.26 0.97 
Highly 
Preferred 
4.26 0.94 
Highly  
Preferred 
4.57 0.77 
Highly 
Preferred 
4.33 0.92 
Highly 
Preferred 
Lack Of Human 
Capital 
1.84 0.96 
Subtly 
Preferred 
2.12 1.04 
Subtly  
Preferred 
2.19 1.08 
Subtly 
Preferred 
2.02 1.02 
Subtly 
Preferred 
Fluctuation In The 
Demand Of 
Product Market 
3.53 0.93 
Very 
Preferred 
3.34 1.11 Preferred 3.22 1.13 Preferred 3.39 1.04 Preferred 
Global 
Competition 
3.32 1.03 Preferred 3.06 1.12 Preferred 3.30 1.15 Preferred 3.22 1.09 Preferred 
Restructuring And 
Reorganization 
2.07 0.93 
Subtly 
Preferred 
2.32 1.12 
Subtly  
Preferred 
2.35 1.09 
Subtly 
Preferred 
2.22 1.04 
Subtly 
Preferred 
Aiding The 
Community 
1.77 1.01 
Not 
Preferred 
2.06 1.20 
Subtly  
Preferred 
1.89 1.15 
Subtly 
Preferred 
1.90 1.11 
Subtly 
Preferred 
To Have Total 
Control Of The 
Workforce 
3.84 0.94 
Very 
Preferred 
3.88 0.96 
Very  
Preferred 
4.16 0.90 
Very 
Preferred 
3.92 0.94 
Very 
Preferred 
Focusing On The 
Critical Functions 
2.60 1.08 Preferred 2.92 1.25 Preferred 3.19 1.22 Preferred 2.85 1.19 Preferred 
Efficiency And 
Expertise 
3.88 1.30 
Very 
Preferred 
3.82 1.36 
Very  
Preferred 
4.35 0.98 
Highly 
Preferred 
3.95 1.27 
Very 
Preferred 
Shifting 
Responsibilities 
(Health, Safety 
And Legal) 
4.56 0.96 
Highly 
Preferred 
4.46 1.06 
Highly  
Preferred 
4.68 0.75 
Highly 
Preferred 
4.55 0.96 
Highly 
Preferred 
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Appendix 10 
Assessment of respondents’ response to trade union resistance:  
  
Company 
Shell ExxonMobil Chevron Total 
Mean SD Description Mean SD Description Mean SD Description Mean SD Description 
Profit 
Maximization 
4.77 .51 
Highly 
Preferred 
4.77 .61 
Highly 
Preferred 
4.76 .72 
Highly 
Preferred 
4.77 .59 Highly Preferred 
Hiring Of 
Expatriates 
3.30 1.08 Preferred 3.40 1.17 
Very 
Preferred 
3.89 .94 
Very 
Preferred 
3.46 1.10 Very Preferred 
To Have 
Control Over 
The 
Workforce 
3.78 1.10 
Very 
Preferred 
3.71 1.17 
Very 
Preferred 
4.30 .94 
Highly 
Preferred 
3.86 1.11 Very Preferred 
Denial Of 
The Non-
Permanent 
Staff Right 
To Unionize 
4.40 1.09 
Highly 
Preferred 
4.43 1.12 
Highly 
Preferred 
4.54 1.04 
Highly 
Preferred 
4.44 1.09 Highly Preferred 
Affects 
Union 
Membership 
4.86 .48 
Highly 
Preferred 
4.88 .45 
Highly 
Preferred 
4.95 .23 
Highly 
Preferred 
4.89 .43 Highly Preferred 
Cutting-Cost 4.60 .57 
Highly 
Preferred 
4.62 .58 
Highly 
Preferred 
4.70 .46 
Highly 
Preferred 
4.63 .55 Highly Preferred 
Division 
Among The 
Workforce 
3.23 1.03 Preferred 3.23 1.03 Preferred 3.68 .85 
Very 
Preferred 
3.33 1.01 Preferred 
Weakens 
Trade Union 
Strength 
3.23 1.06 Preferred 3.25 1.13 Preferred 3.24 1.28 Preferred 3.24 1.13 Preferred 
Irrational 
Wages 
3.74 .87 
Very 
Preferred 
3.63 .99 
Very 
Preferred 
3.59 1.04 
Very 
Preferred 
3.67 .95 Very Preferred 
Weak 
Legislature 
4.08 .88 
Very 
Preferred 
4.00 .97 
Very 
Preferred 
4.14 .98 
Very 
Preferred 
4.06 .93 Very Preferred 
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Appendix 11 
How does agency labour affect management and employees’ relationship in the Nigerian oil 
and gas industry? 
F1 – F15 DEGREE OF EMPLOYEES AGREEMENT OR DISAGREEMENT 
  
Company 
Shell Exxonmobil Chevron Total 
Mean SD Description Mean SD Description Mean SD Description Mean SD Description 
Unnecessary 
Agitations From 
The Union 
Against The Use 
Of Non-
Permanent Staff 
4.89 0.46 
Strongly 
Agree 
4.91 0.29 
Strongly 
Agree 
4.84 0.60 
Strongly 
Agree 
4.89 0.44 
Strongly 
Agree 
Union Find 
More 
Challenging To 
Organize Non-
Permanent Staff 
4.67 0.62 
Strongly 
Agree 
4.74 0.44 
Strongly 
Agree 
4.62 0.79 
Strongly 
Agree 
4.69 0.61 
Strongly 
Agree 
There Are No 
Threats, 
Harassment And 
Victimization 
For Joining The 
Union 
2.04 1.11 Disagree 1.86 0.79 Disagree 1.89 0.88 Disagree 1.94 0.95 Disagree 
The Govt. And 
Employers Are 
Of The View 
That 
Unionization 
Disrupt 
Production 
hence The 
Restriction On 
The Right To 
Unionize 
4.52 0.75 
Strongly 
Agree 
4.45 0.73 
Strongly 
Agree 
4.51 0.56 
Strongly 
Agree 
4.49 0.70 
Strongly 
Agree 
Non-Permanent 
Staff Are Made 
To Sign A 
Yellow-Dog 
Contract Of Not 
Associating 
With Any Trade 
Union 
2.23 1.21 Disagree 2.11 0.99 Disagree 2.24 1.16 Disagree 2.19 1.12 Disagree 
With Regards To 
The Nigerian 
Constitution 
Workers Has 
Right To 
Associate 
4.49 0.71 
Strongly 
Agree 
4.46 0.90 
Strongly 
Agree 
4.54 1.04 
Strongly 
Agree 
4.49 0.86 
Strongly 
Agree 
The Labour Law 
Should Be 
Reform To 
Accommodate 
Contemporary 
Labour System 
4.93 0.25 
Strongly 
Agree 
4.85 0.36 
Strongly 
Agree 
4.70 0.74 
Strongly 
Agree 
4.85 0.44 
Strongly 
Agree 
Trade Union In 
Your Workplace 
Has Been 
Helpful With 
Regards To 
Workers Right 
4.41 0.96 
Strongly 
Agree 
4.42 0.93 
Strongly 
Agree 
4.49 0.99 
Strongly 
Agree 
4.43 0.95 
Strongly 
Agree 
The Role Of 
Trade Unions In 
The Counter-
Movement Of 
The 
Employment 
Transformation 
Is Highly 
Applauded 
4.47 1.19 
Strongly 
Agree 
4.39 1.09 
Strongly 
Agree 
4.51 0.99 
Strongly 
Agree 
4.45 1.11 
Strongly 
Agree 
Non-Permanent 
Workers Are 
Protected Under 
The Nigerian 
2.63 1.48 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
2.48 1.57 Disagree 2.68 1.58 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
2.58 1.53 Disagree 
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Labour Law 
Workers Take-
Up Contract 
Work Because 
That Is What 
They Want 
1.73 0.84 
Strongly 
Disagree 
1.83 0.89 Disagree 1.92 0.68 Disagree 1.81 0.83 Disagree 
The Employers 
Involves Unions 
When Taking 
Decision On 
Issues Affecting 
The Workforce 
And The 
Company In 
General 
2.26 1.36 Disagree 2.58 1.38 Disagree 2.62 1.36 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
2.46 1.37 Disagree 
There Are 
Effective 
Mechanism In 
Place Promoting 
Good Working 
Relationship 
Between Labour 
And 
Management 
2.18 0.99 Disagree 2.35 1.22 Disagree 2.49 1.33 Disagree 2.31 1.15 Disagree 
Do You Support 
Workers 
Organization In 
Your Company 
4.00 1.18 Agree 4.17 1.18 Agree 4.22 1.23 
Strongly 
Agree 
4.11 1.19 Agree 
 
Table above shows that the respondents strongly agree for the statements “Unnecessary 
Agitations from the Union against the Use of Non-Permanent Staff”; Union Find More 
Challenging to Organize Non-Permanent Staff; The Govt. And Employers Are of the View 
That Unionization Disrupts Production Hence the Restriction On the Right to Unionize; With 
Regards to The Nigerian Constitution Workers Has Right to Associate; The Labour Law 
Should Be Reform to Accommodate Contemporary Labour System; Trade Union in Your 
Workplace Has Been Helpful with Regards to Workers Right; and The Role of Trade Unions 
in The Counter-Movement of The Employment Transformation Is Highly Applauded. 
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Sum of 
Squares 
df 
Mean 
Square 
F p-value Description 
Unneccesary Agitations From The 
Union Against The Use Of Non-
Permanent Staff 
Between Groups .12 2 .059 
0.30 0.74 Not Significant Within Groups 33.60 172 .195 
Total 33.71 174 
 
Union Find More Challenging To 
Organise Non-Permanent Staff 
Between Groups .35 2 .174 
0.47 0.62 Not Significant Within Groups 63.37 172 .368 
Total 63.71 174 
 
There Are No Threats, Harrasement 
And Victimization For Joining The 
Union 
Between Groups 1.23 2 .615 
0.68 0.51 Not Significant Within Groups 156.20 172 .908 
Total 157.43 174 
 
The Govt. And Employers Are Of 
The View That Unionization 
Distrupt Productionhence The 
Restriction On The Right To 
Unionise 
Between Groups .21 2 .107 
0.21 0.81 Not Significant 
Within Groups 85.52 172 .497 
Total 85.74 174 
 
Non-Permanent Staff Are Made To 
Sign A Yellow-Dog Contract Of 
Not Associating With Any Trade 
Union 
Between Groups .68 2 .340 
0.27 0.76 Not Significant 
Within Groups 216.10 172 1.256 
Total 216.78 174 
 
With Regards To The Nigerian 
Constitution Workers Has Right To 
Associate 
Between Groups .15 2 .074 
0.10 0.91 Not Significant Within Groups 127.59 172 .742 
Total 127.74 174 
 
The Labour Law Should Be Reform 
To Accommodate Contemporary 
Labour System 
Between Groups 1.29 2 .644 
0.27 0.76 Not Significant Within Groups 32.85 172 .191 
Total 34.14 174 
 
Trade Union In Your Workplace 
Has Been Helpful With Regards To 
Workers Right 
Between Groups .16 2 .079 
0.09 0.92 Not Significant Within Groups 156.70 172 .911 
Total 156.86 174 
 
The Role Of Trade Unions In The 
Counter-Movement Of The 
Employment Transformation Is 
Hoghly Applauded 
Between Groups .39 2 .196 
0.16 0.85 Not Significant 
Within Groups 212.64 171 1.244 
Total 213.03 173 
 
Non-Permanent Workers Are 
Protected Under The Nigerian 
Labour Law 
Between Groups 1.18 2 .588 
0.25 0.78 Not Significant Within Groups 403.20 171 2.358 
Total 404.37 173 
 
Workers Take-Up Contract Work 
Because That Is What They Want 
Between Groups .98 2 .489 
0.71 0.49 Not Significant Within Groups 118.42 172 .688 
Total 119.39 174 
 
The Employers Involves Unions 
When Taking Decision On Issues 
Affecting The Workfoce And The 
Company In General 
Between Groups 4.89 2 2.443 
1.30 0.27 Not Significant 
Within Groups 322.54 172 1.875 
Total 327.43 174 
 
On balance, Do You Support 
Workers Organisation In Your 
Company 
Between Groups 2.55 2 1.274 
0.96 0.39 Not Significant Within Groups 228.79 172 1.330 
Total 231.34 174 
 
There Are Effective Mechanism In 
Place Promoting Good Working 
Relationship Between Labour And 
Management 
Between Groups 1.53 2 .764 
0.54 0.58 Not Significant 
Within Groups 243.41 172 1.415 
Total 244.94 174 
 
 
The ANOVA table above shows that there is not significant difference in the agreement of for 
the statements. 
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Appendix 12 
 
F16-F22 ON WORKERS ORGANISATION AND MANAGEMENT STAND 
 
  Frequency Percent 
As A Non-Permanent Staff, Do You Adequately Represented By The Union 
 Yes 64 35.4 
 No 109 60.2 
  (no response) 8 4.4 
In The Last 10 Years, I Believe That The Management Has Positively Change In The Following Areas 
 From Aggression To Understanding/Dialogue 24 13.3 
 From Dialogue To Aggressive Stand 151 83.4 
  (no response) 6 3.3 
Over The Last 10 Years, What Change Has There Been In The Activities Of Worker Organisation To Your Company 
 No Change 16 8.8 
 From Militant Actions To Negotiation/Court Cases 11 6.1 
 From Court Cases To Negotiations To Militant Actions 147 81.2 
  (no response) 7 3.9 
In What Capacity And How Often Do You Participate In Workplace Organisation Activities In Your Unit 
 As A Union Member 75 41.4 
 Potential Member 2 1.1 
 Freedom Fighter 2 1.1 
 Dont Participate 96 53.0 
  (no response) 6 3.3 
I Did Not Participate In Order 
 To Avoid Been Victimized 14 7.7 
 Because I Still Need My Job 49 27.1 
 For My Contract To Be Renewed 26 14.4 
 Because The Struggle Favours Only The Permanent Staff 6 3.3 
  (no response) 86 47.5 
How Would You Describe The Relationship Between Management And Workers In Your Workplace 
 Very Co-Operative 7 3.9 
 Somewhat Co-Operative 61 33.7 
 Not Co-Operative 107 59.1 
 (no response) 6 3.3 
What Do You Think Is The Major Issue With Workers Organisation 
 Workers Have Divided Interest And Priorities 147 81.2 
 Non-Permanent Workers Believed That The Union Want To Use Them As A 
Shield 
25 13.8 
  (no response) 9 5.0 
Total 181 100.0 
 
The table above shows that 60.2% of non-permanent staff feels that they are not adequately 
represented by the union.  83.4% believe that in the last 10 years the management has 
changed from dialogue to aggressive stand.  53% don’t participate in workplace organization 
activities in their unit.  The reason for this is that most of them still need their jobs.  59.1% 
describe the relationship between management and the workers as not Co-operative.  81.2% 
think that the major issue with workers’ organization is that they have divided interest and 
priorities. 
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Appendix 13 
2. Trade union has been identified as crucial social partners and is perceived as having a great 
impact on the level of adoption of flexible work arrangements. Why is the trade union in the 
Nigerian oil and gas industry opposing to the use of contract labour? 
 
DSEC1 TRADE UNION’S RATIONALE FOR OPPOSING 
Permitted to join 
union 
Company   
Chi-Square df p-value Description 
Shell Exxonmobil Chevron Total 
f % f % f % f %   
   
Contract 
Staff 
Yes 27 37.50 32 50.79 12 32.43 71 41.28 
3.31 2 0.19 Not Significant 
No 45 62.50 33 52.38 25 67.57 103 59.88 
Service 
Staff 
Yes 22 30.56 25 39.68 11 29.73 58 33.72 
1.32 2 0.52 Not Significant 
No 51 70.83 40 63.49 26 70.27 117 68.02 
Manpower 
Staff 
Yes 4 5.56 3 4.76 0 0.00 7 4.07 
1.68 1 0.2 Not Significant 
No 68 94.44 61 96.83 37 100.00 166 96.51 
All the Non-
Permanent 
Staff 
Yes 4 5.56 3 4.76 0 0.00 7 4.07 
1.66 1 0.2 Not Significant 
No 68 94.44 60 95.24 37 100.00 165 95.93 
Total 72 100 63 100 37 100 172 100         
 
 
The table above shows those staff who were or were not permitted to join union.  Results 
show that almost 50% of the Contract Staff for ExxonMobil were permitted to join union 
compared to other companies wherein around 32% to 28% were permitted to join. Manpower 
and all non-Permanent Staff were mostly not permitted to join union specifically for Shell and 
Chevron (0%).  Chi-Square results show no significant association between the companies 
and the type of staff that were permitted to join union. 
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Appendix 14 
 
DSEC2 
  
Company 
Shell ExxonMobil Chevron Total 
Mea
n 
SD 
Descriptio
n 
Mea
n 
SD 
Descriptio
n 
Mea
n 
SD 
Descriptio
n 
Mea
n 
SD 
Descriptio
n 
Profit 
Maximizati
on 
4.77 .51 
Highly 
Preferred 
4.77 .61 
Highly 
Preferred 
4.76 .72 
Highly 
Preferred 
4.77 .59 
Highly 
Preferred 
Hiring Of 
Expatriates 
3.30 
1.0
8 
Preferred 3.40 
1.1
7 
Very 
Preferred 
3.89 .94 
Very 
Preferred 
3.46 
1.1
0 
Very 
Preferred 
To Have 
Control 
Over The 
Workforce 
3.78 
1.1
0 
Very 
Preferred 
3.71 
1.1
7 
Very 
Preferred 
4.30 .94 
Highly 
Preferred 
3.86 
1.1
1 
Very 
Preferred 
Denial Of 
The Non-
Permanent 
Staff Right 
To Unionise 
4.40 
1.0
9 
Highly 
Preferred 
4.43 
1.1
2 
Highly 
Preferred 
4.54 
1.0
4 
Highly 
Preferred 
4.44 
1.0
9 
Highly 
Preferred 
Affects 
Union 
Membership 
4.86 .48 
Highly 
Preferred 
4.88 .45 
Highly 
Preferred 
4.95 .23 
Highly 
Preferred 
4.89 .43 
Highly 
Preferred 
Cutting-
Cost 
4.60 .57 
Highly 
Preferred 
4.62 .58 
Highly 
Preferred 
4.70 .46 
Highly 
Preferred 
4.63 .55 
Highly 
Preferred 
Division 
Among The 
Workforce 
3.23 
1.0
3 
Preferred 3.23 
1.0
3 
Preferred 3.68 .85 
Very 
Preferred 
3.33 
1.0
1 
Preferred 
Weakens 
Trade 
Union 
Strength 
3.23 
1.0
6 
Preferred 3.25 
1.1
3 
Preferred 3.24 
1.2
8 
Preferred 3.24 
1.1
3 
Preferred 
Irrational 
Wages 
3.74 .87 
Very 
Preferred 
3.63 .99 
Very 
Preferred 
3.59 
1.0
4 
Very 
Preferred 
3.67 .95 
Very 
Preferred 
Weak 
Legislature 
4.08 .88 
Very 
Preferred 
4.00 .97 
Very 
Preferred 
4.14 .98 
Very 
Preferred 
4.06 .93 
Very 
Preferred 
 
The table above shows the trade union reasons for opposing the management on outsourcing 
and contracting of labour.  Results show that for all companies, Profit Maximization, Denial 
of the Non-Permanent Staff Right to Unionize, Affects Union Membership, and Cutting Costs 
were highly preferred.  Chevron added that they highly prefer to have control over the 
workforce. 
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The ANOVA table above shows significant differences in the preferences for each company 
for hiring of expatriates and to have control over the workforce wherein Chevron gave a 
higher preference to these compared to other companies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
Sum of Squares df Mean Square F p-value Description 
Profit Maximization 
Between Groups .00 2 .002 
0.01 0.99 Not Significant Within Groups 61.39 172 .357 
Total 61.39 174   
Hiring Of Expatriates 
Between Groups 8.97 2 4.486 
3.81 0.02 Significant Within Groups 202.54 172 1.178 
Total 211.51 174   
To Have Control Over 
The Workforce 
Between Groups 9.04 2 4.520 
3.78 0.02 Significant Within Groups 205.67 172 1.196 
Total 214.71 174   
Denial Of The Non-
Permanent Staff Right 
To Unionise 
Between Groups .51 2 .256 
0.22 0.81 Not Significant Within Groups 204.61 172 1.190 
Total 205.12 174   
Affects Union 
Membership 
Between Groups .18 2 .088 
0.48 0.62 Not Significant Within Groups 31.54 172 .183 
Total 31.71 174   
Cutting-Cost 
Between Groups .26 2 .132 
0.43 0.65 Not Significant Within Groups 52.59 172 .306 
Total 52.86 174   
Division Among The 
Workforce 
Between Groups 5.75 2 2.873 
2.90 0.06 Not Significant Within Groups 170.69 172 .992 
Total 176.43 174   
Weakens Trade Union 
Strength 
Between Groups .01 2 .003 
0.00 1.00 Not Significant Within Groups 221.91 172 1.290 
Total 221.92 174   
Irrational Wages 
Between Groups .66 2 .332 
0.37 0.69 Not Significant Within Groups 156.11 172 .908 
Total 156.78 174   
Weak Legislature 
Between Groups .48 2 .239 
0.27 0.76 Not Significant Within Groups 149.83 172 .871 
Total 150.31 174   
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3. To what extent do the differential terms and conditions of a two-tier workforce have 
negative implications/consequences on employees under this new employment system? 
Table 19: Benefit Related Problems  
E1 WAGE RELATED PROBLEM  
  
Company 
Shell Exxonmobil Chevron Total 
Mean SD Description Mean SD Description Mean SD Description Mean SD Description 
No Problem 2.19 1.53 
Slightly 
Negative 
Implication 
2.29 1.54 
Slightly 
Negative 
Implication 
1.73 1.33 
No 
Implication 
2.13 1.50 
Slightly 
Negative 
Implication 
Low Wages 3.89 1.21 
Very 
Negative 
Implication 
3.98 1.18 
Very 
Negative 
Implication 
4.24 1.01 
Highly 
Negative 
Implication 
4.00 1.16 
Very 
Negative 
Implication 
Wage Not Paid On 
Time 
2.38 .95 
Slightly 
Negative 
Implication 
2.03 .79 
Slightly 
Negative 
Implication 
2.24 1.01 
Slightly 
Negative 
Implication 
2.22 .92 
Slightly 
Negative 
Implication 
Cut In Wages 2.19 .79 
Slightly 
Negative 
Implication 
1.95 .78 
Slightly 
Negative 
Implication 
2.27 1.07 
Slightly 
Negative 
Implication 
2.12 .86 
Slightly 
Negative 
Implication 
No Overtime Payment 4.40 1.08 
Highly 
Negative 
Implication 
4.43 1.09 
Highly 
Negative 
Implication 
5.73 7.88 
Highly 
Negative 
Implication 
4.69 3.75 
Highly 
Negative 
Implication 
No Bonus 3.58 1.34 
Very 
Negative 
Implication 
3.31 1.38 
Negative 
Implication 
2.78 1.34 
Negative 
Implication 
3.31 1.38 
Negative 
Implication 
No Allowance Given 3.53 1.32 
Very 
Negative 
Implication 
3.17 1.35 
Negative 
Implication 
2.92 1.42 
Negative 
Implication 
3.27 1.37 
Negative 
Implication 
No Increment 3.32 1.33 
Negative 
Implication 
3.03 1.35 
Negative 
Implication 
2.84 1.40 
Negative 
Implication 
3.11 1.36 
Negative 
Implication 
Inadequate Bonus 4.29 1.06 
Highly 
Negative 
Implication 
4.15 1.25 
Very 
Negative 
Implication 
4.24 1.26 
Highly 
Negative 
Implication 
4.23 1.17 
Highly 
Negative 
Implication 
Laying Of Wage Not 
Paid 
3.42 1.25 
Very 
Negative 
Implication 
3.06 1.29 
Negative 
Implication 
2.73 1.24 
Negative 
Implication 
3.14 1.28 
Negative 
Implication 
 
Table above shows that for all companies the result of outsourcing labour gave a highly 
negative implication of not having overtime payment and inadequate bonus.  In Chevron’s 
case, another negative implication is that it resulted to low wages. 
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E1 WAGE RELATED PROBLEM BETWEEN AND WITHIN COMPANIES 
    
Sum of 
Squares 
df Mean Square F p-value Description 
No Problem 
Between Groups 7.92 2 3.959 
1.77 0.17 Not Significant Within Groups 384.06 172 2.233 
Total 391.98 174   
Low Wages 
Between Groups 3.08 2 1.541 
1.15 0.32 Not Significant Within Groups 230.92 172 1.343 
Total 234.00 174   
Wage Not Paid 
On Time 
Between Groups 4.30 2 2.150 
2.60 0.08 Not Significant Within Groups 142.01 172 .826 
Total 146.31 174   
Cut In Wages 
Between Groups 3.01 2 1.503 
2.06 0.13 Not Significant Within Groups 125.47 172 .729 
Total 128.48 174   
No Overtime 
Payment 
Between Groups 50.62 2 25.311 
1.82 0.17 Not Significant Within Groups 2394.72 172 13.923 
Total 2445.34 174   
No Bonus 
Between Groups 15.39 2 7.693 
4.19 0.02 Significant Within Groups 315.95 172 1.837 
Total 331.34 174   
No Allowance 
Given 
Between Groups 10.32 2 5.159 
2.81 0.06 Not Significant Within Groups 316.06 172 1.838 
Total 326.38 174   
No Increment 
Between Groups 6.22 2 3.109 
1.70 0.19 Not Significant Within Groups 314.72 172 1.830 
Total 320.94 174   
Inadequate 
Bonus 
Between Groups .63 2 .313 
0.23 0.80 Not Significant Within Groups 238.23 172 1.385 
Total 238.86 174   
Laying Of 
Wage Not Paid 
Between Groups 12.54 2 6.271 
3.95 0.02 Significant Within Groups 272.89 172 1.587 
Total 285.43 174   
 
The ANOVA table above shows significant differences in the implications of agency labour 
for no bonuses and laying of wage not paid for Shell employees. 
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SE4 EMPLOYEES LEVEL OF SATISFACTION 
  
Company 
Shell Exxonmobil Chevron Total 
Mean SD Description Mean SD Description Mean SD Description Mean SD Description 
Sick Pay 2.32 1.55 
Slightly 
Satisfied 
2.34 1.50 
Slightly 
Satisfied 
2.68 1.55 Satisfied 2.40 1.53 
Slightly 
Satisfied 
Holiday Pay 2.27 1.46 
Slightly 
Satisfied 
2.23 1.33 
Slightly 
Satisfied 
2.73 1.48 Satisfied 2.35 1.43 
Slightly 
Satisfied 
Pension Provision 2.23 1.49 
Slightly 
Satisfied 
2.23 1.40 
Slightly 
Satisfied 
2.57 1.50 
Slightly 
Satisfied 
2.30 1.46 
Slightly 
Satisfied 
Job Security 1.32 0.85 Not Satisfied 1.32 0.83 Not Satisfied 1.35 0.79 Not Satisfied 1.33 0.83 Not Satisfied 
Low Basic Salary 3.12 1.55 Satisfied 4.78 11.96 
Highly 
Satisfied 
3.24 1.69 Satisfied 3.77 7.41 
Very 
Satisfied 
Hazardous Work 
Environment 
1.92 1.06 
Slightly 
Satisfied 
1.69 1.06 Not Satisfied 1.73 1.07 Not Satisfied 1.79 1.06 Not Satisfied 
Lack Of 
Responsibility At 
Work 
3.49 1.32 
Very 
Satisfied 
5.00 11.92 
Highly 
Satisfied 
4.08 1.28 
Very 
Satisfied 
4.18 7.33 
Very 
Satisfied 
Lack Of Promotion 2.56 1.29 
Slightly 
Satisfied 
2.42 1.27 
Slightly 
Satisfied 
2.81 1.47 Satisfied 2.56 1.32 
Slightly 
Satisfied 
Unpredictability Of 
Work 
1.78 0.75 Not Satisfied 1.77 0.63 Not Satisfied 1.95 0.74 
Slightly 
Satisfied 
1.81 0.71 
Slightly 
Satisfied 
Time Spent 
Waiting Between 
Assignment 
2.53 0.85 
Slightly 
Satisfied 
2.37 0.88 
Slightly 
Satisfied 
2.57 0.77 
Slightly 
Satisfied 
2.48 0.84 
Slightly 
Satisfied 
 
The table above shows that employees of all companies were not satisfied with having job 
security and unpredictability of work. 
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SE4 EMPLOYEES LEVEL OF SATISFACTION BETWEEN COMPANIES AND WITHIN 
    Sum of Squares df Mean Square F p-value Description 
Sick Pay 
Between Groups 3.58 2 1.792 
0.76 0.47 Not Significant Within Groups 404.42 172 2.351 
Total 408.00 174   
Holiday Pay 
Between Groups 6.68 2 3.339 
1.65 0.19 Not Significant Within Groups 347.36 172 2.020 
Total 354.03 174   
Pension Provision 
Between Groups 3.29 2 1.644 
0.77 0.46 Not Significant Within Groups 365.66 172 2.126 
Total 368.95 174   
Job Security 
Between Groups .03 2 .017 
0.02 0.98 Not Significant Within Groups 118.40 172 .688 
Total 118.43 174   
Low Basic Salary 
Between Groups 107.71 2 53.854 
0.98 0.38 Not Significant Within Groups 9435.69 172 54.859 
Total 9543.39 174   
Hazardous Work Environment 
Between Groups 1.94 2 .972 
0.86 0.43 Not Significant Within Groups 194.65 172 1.132 
Total 196.59 174   
Lack Of Responsibility At Work 
Between Groups 78.51 2 39.253 
0.73 0.48 Not Significant Within Groups 9283.00 172 53.971 
Total 9361.51 174   
Lack Of Promotion 
Between Groups 3.69 2 1.844 
1.05 0.35 Not Significant Within Groups 301.43 172 1.753 
Total 305.12 174   
Unpredictability Of Work 
Between Groups .85 2 .427 
0.85 0.43 Not Significant Within Groups 85.92 172 .500 
Total 86.78 174   
Time Spent Waiting Between 
Assignment 
Between Groups 1.30 2 .648 
0.91 0.40 Not Significant Within Groups 122.38 172 .712 
Total 123.68 174   
 
The table above shows no significant differences in the satisfaction of the employees when 
compared as to the company they are employed.  This means that all of them have the same 
satisfaction level regardless of the company they are in. 
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Appendix 17 
 
SE5 FACTORS THAT WOULD MAKE EMPLOYEE MOVE TO ANOTHER WORK 
 
The table above shows the factors that would make them consider moving to a different work.  
Results show that for all companies, the employees would move highly probably if there are 
better benefits, better prospects, greater security, and change in circumstances (demotion), for 
Chevron employees, additionally to move to a better career. 
 
    
Sum of 
Squares 
df Mean Square F p-value Description 
Better Pay 
Between Groups .81 2 .406 
0.18 0.84 Not Significant Within Groups 391.16 172 2.274 
Total 391.98 174   
Better Benefits 
Between Groups 1.59 2 .797 
0.52 0.59 Not Significant Within Groups 262.41 172 1.526 
Total 264.00 174   
Better Prospects 
Between Groups 3.49 2 1.746 
0.98 0.38 Not Significant Within Groups 304.94 172 1.773 
Total 308.43 174   
Greater Security 
Between Groups .15 2 .076 
0.12 0.89 Not Significant Within Groups 108.44 172 .630 
Total 108.59 174   
Change In Circumstances 
(Demotion) 
Between Groups .43 2 .217 
0.30 0.74 Not Significant Within Groups 125.28 172 .728 
Total 125.71 174   
Job Satisfaction 
Between Groups 2.78 2 1.389 
0.49 0.61 Not Significant Within Groups 487.77 172 2.836 
Total 490.55 174   
Good Career Move 
Between Groups 1.53 2 .766 
0.43 0.65 Not Significant Within Groups 309.41 172 1.799 
Total 310.94 174   
 
The table above shows no significant differences in the factors that would make them 
consider moving to a different work when compared as to the company they are employed.  
This means that all of them have the same factors that will make them consider moving to a 
different work. 
  
Company 
Shell ExxonMobil Chevron Total 
Mean SD Description Mean SD Description Mean SD Description Mean SD Description 
Better Pay 4.07 1.48 
Very 
Probable 
3.92 1.51 
Very 
Probable 
3.95 1.56 
Very 
Probable 
3.99 1.50 
Very 
Probable 
Better Benefits 4.51 1.08 
Highly 
Probable 
4.35 1.32 
Highly 
Probable 
4.27 1.37 
Highly 
Probable 
4.40 1.23 
Highly 
Probable 
Better Prospects 4.32 1.25 
Highly 
Probable 
4.32 1.28 
Highly 
Probable 
3.97 1.57 
Very 
Probable 
4.25 1.33 
Highly 
Probable 
Greater Security 4.78 0.79 
Highly 
Probable 
4.83 0.72 
Highly 
Probable 
4.76 0.93 
Highly 
Probable 
4.79 0.79 
Highly 
Probable 
Change In 
Circumstances 
(Demotion) 
4.75 0.78 
Highly 
Probable 
4.72 0.82 
Highly 
Probable 
4.62 1.04 
Highly 
Probable 
4.71 0.85 
Highly 
Probable 
Job Satisfaction 3.73 1.63 
Very 
Probable 
3.45 1.75 
Very 
Probable 
3.54 1.68 
Very 
Probable 
3.58 1.68 
Very 
Probable 
Good Career Move 4.11 1.33 
Very 
Probable 
4.02 1.37 
Very 
Probable 
4.27 1.30 
Highly 
Probable 
4.11 1.34 
Very 
Probable 
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Appendix 18 
IMPLICATIONS/CONSEQUECIES OF OUTSOURCING ON BOTH THE PERMANENT AND NON-
PERMANENT STAFF 
G1, G2 AND H1 
  
Company 
Total 
Chi-
Square 
df 
p-
value 
Description 
Shell ExxonMobil Chevron 
f % f % f % f %     
Which of the following do you 
think is the most likely 
implication/consequence of 
outsourcing on non-permanent 
staff 
There are no 
implications/consequences 
3 4.11 2 3.08 1 2.70 6 3.43 
0.76 1 0.38 
Not 
Significant 
Kills Their Morale 11 15.07 8 12.31 3 8.11 22 12.57 
Lack Of Commitment And 
Productivity 
5 6.85 2 3.08 3 8.11 10 5.71 
Sabotage 5 6.85 6 9.23 4 10.81 15 8.57 
Bunkering 8 10.96 3 4.62 4 10.81 15 8.57 
Crime (Kidnapping,Robbery 
And Bombing) 
41 56.16 44 67.69 22 59.46 107 61.14 
Which Of The Following Do 
You Think Is The Most Likely 
Implications/Consequecvies 
Permanent Staff As A Result 
Of Outsourcing Of Labour 
There are no 
implications/consequences 
5 6.85 6 9.23 2 5.41 13 7.43 
6.21 1 0.01 Significant 
False Retirement 24 32.88 19 29.23 6 16.22 49 28.00 
Increase Workload 14 19.18 7 10.77 3 8.11 24 13.71 
Remaining In One Position 
For Long 
15 20.55 14 21.54 10 27.03 39 22.29 
Lack Of Confidence And 
Trust On Their Employer 
9 12.33 14 21.54 10 27.03 33 18.86 
Lack Of Commitment And 
Productivity 
6 8.22 5 7.69 6 16.22 17 9.71 
Did your company face any 
kind of workers’/union protest 
during the last 10 years  such 
as strike, boycotting, walk-out 
and protest 
Yes 73 100.00 64 98.46 37 100.00 174 99.43 
0.07 1 0.79 
Not 
Significant 
No 0 0.00 1 1.54 0 0.00 1 0.57 
Total 73 100.00 65 100.00 37 100.00 175 100.00         
 
The table above shows that the implication/consequence of permanent staff for all the 
companies is that a majority of them mentioned Crime (Kidnapping, Robbery and Bombing).  
For Non-Permanent Staff of Shell and ExxonMobil, most of them said False Retirement. A 
majority of the companies have faced union protests during the last 10 years. 
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Table 21: Causes of Exacerbating Conflicts  
 
 
  
Company 
Shell ExxonMobil  Chevron Total 
Mean SD Description Mean SD Description Mean SD Description Mean SD Description 
The Shift From 
Permanent Work To 
Contract Work 
4.99 0.12 
Highly 
Probable 
4.98 0.12 
Highly 
Probable 
4.97 0.16 
Highly 
Probable 
4.98 0.13 
Highly 
Probable 
Denial Of The Non-
Permanent Staff 
Right To Join Union 
4.42 1.05 
Highly 
Probable 
4.45 1.06 
Highly 
Probable 
4.68 0.94 
Highly 
Probable 
4.49 1.03 
Highly 
Probable 
Refusal To Honour 
Collective Agreement 
3.85 1.01 Very Probable 3.80 1.06 Very Probable 4.14 0.98 Very Probable 3.89 1.03 Very Probable 
Union Recognition 3.34 1.15 Probable 3.52 1.21 Very Probable 3.62 1.21 Very Probable 3.47 1.18 Very Probable 
Retrenchment 2.27 0.90 
Slightly 
Probable 
2.22 0.91 
Slightly 
Probable 
2.70 1.13 Probable 2.34 0.97 
Slightly 
Probable 
Increase In Wage 
Demand 
2.23 0.77 
Slightly 
Probable 
2.14 0.90 
Slightly 
Probable 
2.43 1.04 
Slightly 
Probable 
2.24 0.88 
Slightly 
Probable 
Increase Usage Of 
Expatriates 
2.93 1.18 Probable 2.78 1.11 Probable 3.11 1.07 Probable 2.91 1.13 Probable 
Unlawful 
Termination And 
Victimization Of 
Union Members 
4.68 0.64 
Highly 
Probable 
4.62 0.78 
Highly 
Probable 
4.81 0.57 
Highly 
Probable 
4.69 0.69 
Highly 
Probable 
Unlawful 
Termination Of 
Contract Staff For 
Joining The Union 
3.84 1.31 Very Probable 3.83 1.21 Very Probable 4.00 1.18 Very Probable 3.87 1.24 Very Probable 
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